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Feminist activists and international lawyers have been working to draw attention to the 
problem of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) since the early 1990s. They advocated for 
rape and other forms of sexual violence to be prosecuted in international tribunals - with 
notable success. CRSV has been prominent on the agenda of the United Nations Security 
Council since 2008 and the British Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict of 2014 
attracted significant media and public attention.  
Although CRSV is not a new problem, it is only in the last fifteen years that the United 
Nations, regional organisations and governments have called on and committed militaries 
to prevent and respond to it. It has been proposed that militaries mount patrols designed 
to prevent CRSV, intervene to stop CRSV, and help to collect evidence and arrest 
perpetrators, for example. This presents a dilemma for feminists who wish to see an end to 
CRSV but are sceptical of militaries as a force for good for women, and indeed often identify 
militarism as an underlying cause of CRSV. 
This thesis explores this dilemma through two perspectives. First, it examines the legacy of 
legal activism around CRSV from the perspective of how it has influenced militaries. It asks 
whether militaries now understand CRSV as a violation of international law implying 
positive legal obligations. Second, it examines militaries’ ideas about gender, women and 
the nature of sexual violence. It explores how these ideas influence militaries’ approach to 
CRSV in operations. 
This thesis looks at these questions in two cases: NATO, an important military alliance, and 
the British Armed Forces, an influential military. Using interviews, observation of training, 
and documentary review, it traces these institutions’ commitments and action around CSRV 
since 2005, identifying key progress and constraints. It finds that both NATO and the British 
Armed Forces have made progress in incorporating CRSV into their policies and that the 
topic of CRSV has challenged them to think about women affected by armed conflict in new 
ways. However, neither NATO nor the British Armed Forces see themselves as being under 
any legal obligation to prevent or respond to CRSV. Moreover, dealing with CRSV often 





difficult to envision militaries that effectively prevent and respond to CRSV unless they 
holistically transform to become more focused on human security and less focused on 
combat. 
This project brings new understanding to how international law, military culture, and ideas 
about gender interact, and how these dynamics influence how militaries behave. This 
allows for the identification of new avenues for influencing militaries and military 








This thesis explores militaries’ efforts to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual 
violence (CRSV). As militaries around the world declare their commitment to gender 
mainstreaming and implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, CRSV tests 
the limits of what militaries can and should do. CRSV presents complex legal questions in 
view of the convergence between international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law in military operations. For critics of militaries, CRSV also raises dilemmas over 
whether to resist militarism or urge militaries to change. In examining both these aspects, 
this thesis opens a new dialogue between feminist approaches to international law and 
scholarship on gender and militaries. 
This study examines international law obligations applying to military action to prevent and 
respond to CRSV committed by third parties, proposing the relevance of a range of human 
rights standards. It uses NATO and the British Armed Forces as case studies to explore how 
militaries understand and integrate these obligations. Using interviews, observation of 
training, and review of policy, doctrine, directives and training materials, this research 
traces NATO and the British Armed Forces’ commitments and action concerning CSRV since 
2005, identifying key progress, shortcomings and constraints. The analysis is guided by 
feminist methodologies of identifying structural bias within the law. 
This thesis proposes that, in certain circumstances, armed forces have an obligation of due 
diligence to prevent CRSV by third parties and to support the investigation of CRSV. What 
this requires in practice has been inadequately considered. It finds that NATO and the 
British Armed Forces have made progress incorporating CRSV into policy, doctrine and 
training, in particular since 2012. NATO has established institutional structures to support 
gender mainstreaming and issued a series of operational directives. The British Armed 
Forces have delivered CRSV training to foreign forces and introduced policy on human 
security. In both contexts, however, conceptual and cultural obstacles to effectively 
preventing or responding to CRSV remain. CRSV is framed with reference to the Women, 
Peace and Security Agenda: in political rather than legal terms. Exploring how militaries 





combat in militaries’ strategic culture limits what they consider reasonable, and how this 
shapes and is shaped by understandings of legal obligation.  
In demonstrating the difficulties of and resistance to responding to CRSV, this study offers a 
sobering counterpoint to progressive visions for the transformation of militaries. It 
questions expectations that adopting a human rights framework for armed intervention will 
be enough to orient militaries to human security. In exploring the place of international law 
in military understandings of CRSV and what militaries see their role in countering CRSV to 
be, this thesis contributes new insights to scholarship concerning law in armed conflict as 
well as to critical scholarship on gender, militaries, and security. It urges critical 
engagement with militaries and military organisations to deepen militaries’ commitment to 
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PART I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMING 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
To end sexual violence in conflict is a great endeavour and at its heart 
stands the soldier and the choice that he will make, when all is at its 
most elemental – a simple, terrible choice – to be a protector or a 
perpetrator. 
Lieutenant General David Morrison, Chief of Australian Army, Address to the 
closing plenary session at the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
13 June 2014 
 
1.1 Origins and context of this thesis 
This thesis was born in an office in a Ministry of Defence headquarters, in 2014, when a 
senior military official told me that militaries could not protect civilians in conflict because 
there was never the political will to put “boots on the ground”. Political leaders who said 
militaries could stop sexual violence were asking too much, he said. Militaries were 
designed for killing people and blowing stuff up and did not have the training for protecting 
civilians, nor handling victims of sexual violence. The conversation made me question 
whether the efforts of feminist organisations and practitioners, like myself, to urge 
militaries to orient themselves to sexual violence prevention and response were a waste of 
time. I wondered whether we were unwittingly legitimising merely rhetorical performances 
on the part of militaries. I was annoyed that a military costing the public tens of billions of 
pounds each year seemed so unuseful. But I wondered whether militaries might change. 
First, whether they could be made to act differently through the assertion of legal 
responsibilities in relation to sexual violence. Second, whether militaries might come to see 
their role as providing protection rather than combat, whether their sense of their own role 
might shift. These two themes, the role of international law and the nature of militaries, 
shape this research. 





Are international legal strategies effective against sexual violence in conflict? 
In many of the world’s contemporary armed conflicts violence is primarily directed toward 
civilians, and sexual violence used as a tactic to control or destroy communities. Analysis of 
conflicts in seventy-six countries between 1989 and 2009 identifies seventeen countries 
where sexual violence was “systematic,” “massive,” or “innumerable”.1 The number of 
rebel groups reported as perpetrating sexual violence more than tripled from 1989 to 
2015.2 
Conflict-related sexual violence (widely abbreviated as “CRSV”) has been a totemic issue for 
global feminist activism, and international law has been a key mechanism through which to 
challenge it.3 Since the war in Bosnia Herzegovina in the early 1990s, feminist scholars and 
activists invested great effort in ensuring that courts recognise the many forms of sexual 
violence committed during armed conflict and punish it with due severity. Feminists set out 
to dismantle the pervasive culture of impunity for sexual violence during conflict, and to 
make it a less appealing “weapon” for potential perpetrators.4 Their success is often 
invoked to illustrate how advocacy around international law can be used to promote 
women’s human rights.  
In the political arena, CRSV has been a prominent theme within the Women Peace and 
Security (WPS) Agenda since 2008. Established by the adoption in 2000 of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and (at the time of writing) substantiated 
 
1 D. K. Cohen and R. Nordås, ‘Sexual violence in armed conflict Introducing the SVAC dataset, 1989–
2009’ (2014) 51 Journal of Peace Research 418–28. 
2 R. Nordås and R. Nagel, Continued Failure to End Wartime Sexual Violence (2018) p. 2. 
3 K. Engle, ‘A Genealogy of the Centrality of Sexual Violence to Gender and Conflict’ in F. Ní Aoláin, N. 
Cahn, D. F. Haynes, N. Valji (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict, (2018). 
4 E.g.: H. Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93 The American Journal of 
International Law 379; P. V. Sellers, ‘Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of 
Rape’ (2002) 34 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 287–304; K. D. Askin, 
‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’ (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 288–
349. 





through a further nine resolutions,5 the WPS Agenda has established a new normative 
framework concerning the protection of women’s and girls’ human rights in armed conflict 
and post-conflict settings, the full and equal participation of women in peace and security, 
and gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Although its 
implementation remains incomplete, the WPS Agenda plays a significant role in national 
contexts and regional organisations, implemented through action plans and strategies.6 The 
first UNSCR on WPS dedicated to sexual violence in conflict was adopted in 2008, and a 
further four have been adopted since.7 From 2013 CRSV received a further boost in political 
prominence through the British-led Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI).  
Despite the successes of the 1990s in developing individual criminal responsibility and the 
subsequent political focus on CRSV, it continues seemingly unabated. The horrific sexual 
violence by ISIS and the seeming inability or unwillingness of the international community 
to prevent it or rescue its victims brings into question what all the legal development and 
summits have achieved.8 At the same time, concern has grown about possible unintended 
conceptual, political and practical consequences of CRSV advocacy. Does emphasising CRSV 
close down space to recognise other forms of harm that women suffer in war? This is one 
dimension of what Catherine O’Rourke describes as “a strongly critical, reflective thrust 
about the costs of engaging international law and the quality of ostensible gains” within 
contemporary feminist work.9 The potential costs of feminist engagement with the WPS 
Agenda are perceived to include co-option of women’s movements and de-radicalisation of 
 
5 Resolution 1325 (2000); Resolution 1820 (2008); Resolution 1888 (2009); Resolution 1889 (2009); 
Resolution 1960 (2010); Resolution 2106 (2013); Resolution 2122 (2013); Resolution 2242 (2015); 
Resolution 2467 (2019); Resolution 2493 (2019). 
6 There is a mature body of scholarship on the WPS Agenda, captured in recent series of handbooks: 
C. E. Gentry, L. J. Shepherd, and L. Sjoberg, The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security 
(Routledge, 2018); F. Ní Aoláin, N. R. Cahn, D. F. Haynes, and N. Valji (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Gender and Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2018); S. E. Davies and J. True (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
7 Resolution 1820; Resolution 1888; Resolution 1960; Resolution 2106; Resolution 2467. 
8 N. Al-Ali, ‘Sexual violence in Iraq: Challenges for transnational feminist politics’ (2018) 25 European 
Journal of Women’s Studies 10–27. For data, see: Nordås and Nagel, Continued Failure to End 
Wartime Sexual Violence.  
9 C. O’Rourke, ‘Feminist Strategy in International Law: Understanding Its Legal, Normative and 
Political Dimensions’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1019–45 at 1020. 





the feminist peace agenda and fragmentation of gender equality norms.10 These debates 
place a question mark over the legacy and future of feminist legal strategy around CRSV. 
Could militaries prevent and respond to CRSV? 
One of the achievements of feminist advocacy on CRSV is that addressing sexual violence is 
now regularly included in the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, where a 
civil conflict has a high prevalence of sexual violence, it is almost three times as likely that 
the UN and regional organisations will deploy a peacekeeping operation.11 
Since 2005, there has been new political commitment to militaries playing a role in 
preventing and responding to CRSV.12 Some 155 countries have committed their armed 
forces to review doctrine and training to ensure that it enables more effective prevention 
and response to sexual violence in conflict.13 Several militaries have done so, hand-in-hand 
with broader work on WPS and gender mainstreaming. For example, in 2014, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s peacekeeping training centre produced a curriculum on the prevention of 
CRSV, and the United States military published CRSV scenario-based training.14 The 
Norwegian Defence University College is developing a handbook on military capabilities to 
address CRSV.15 Images of actor Angelina Jolie visiting a NATO command and a British 
military base illustrate the new types of conversations happening in those spaces.16  
 
10 Ibid., 1022, 1028; D. Otto, ‘The exile of inclusion: reflections on gender issues in international law 
over the last decade’ (2009) 10(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 11–26. 
11 J. Kreutz and M. Cardenas, ‘Women, peace and intervention: how the international community 
responds to sexual violence in civil conflict’ (2017) 23 Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 260–76 at 271. 
Their dataset spans 1989 to 2009. 
12 Militaries can potentially also play roles in preventing and responding to sexual violence in non-
conflict contexts, e.g. in disaster relief operations, where deployed in peacetime settings, and most 
obviously, among their own forces. Because it is framed in relation to legal and political activism 
focused upon armed conflict, this project does not focus upon these dimensions.  
13 A Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (2013). 
14 Peace Support Operations Training Centre, ‘Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Generic 
Reference Curriculum for Training in Security Sector’ (2014); U.S. Army War College (ed.), ‘Preparing 
to Prevent: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Mitigation Scenario-Based Training’ (2014). 
15 S. Holen and L. Vermeij, ‘Combating Conflict-Related Sexual Violence’ (October 2017). 
16 ‘Angelina Jolie visits British military team in Kenya’ (June 2017); NATO, ‘UN Special Envoy Angelina 
Jolie visits NATO Headquarters’ (2018). 





Could we make militaries work for women?  
While some feminist activists and scholars urge the military to step up its role in protecting 
women, others greet military engagement with international efforts around CRSV with 
scepticism.17 Feminists have long drawn attention to the negative impacts of military 
operations on women and girls, and the connections between war, military masculinities, 
and violence against women.18 As such, some question whether armed forces are capable 
of being “forces for good” for women, and strive toward a vision of demilitarisation, rather 
than “better” militaries. As such, they might argue that militaries are not an appropriate 
focus for constructive feminist engagement. 
In other quarters, feminist critique of militaries is tempered by a vision of “regendered” 
militaries, based upon new forms of military masculinity observed in peacekeeping and 
counterinsurgency. A regendered military would work collaboratively with local 
communities through relationships founded upon respect and empathy, disrupting the 
masculine/feminine hierarchies constitutive of militarism.19 This idea has commonalities 
with theorisation within mainstream security scholarship of “cosmopolitan” militaries and 
 
17 E.g. M. Henry, ‘Why is handling and responding to sexual violence a military responsibility?’ Sexual 
Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations, (Lillehammer: Norwegian Armed Forces 
Defence Command and Staff College, 2011), pp. 81–83; C. Cockburn, ‘Snagged on the Contradiction: 
NATO, Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses’ (2012) Women in Action 48–57; H. Wright, ‘Ending 
Sexual Violence and the War System – Or Militarizing Feminism?’ (2015) 17 International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 503–507.  
18 C. Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives , 1 ed. (University of 
California Press, 2000); A. Orford, ‘Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law’ 
(2002) 71 Nordic Journal of International Law 275–96; K. Engle, ‘“Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy 
Relationship among Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2007) Human 
Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention; S. Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A 
Gendered Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); A. Mama and M. Okazawa-rey, ‘Militarism, 
conflict and women’s activism in the global era: challenges and prospects for women in three West 
African contexts’ (2012) Feminist Review 97–123. 
19 C. Cockburn and M. Hubic, ‘Gender and the peacekeeping military: a view from Bosnian women’s 
organisations’ The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping: 
Bosnia and the Netherlands, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2002), pp. 103–21; C. Duncanson and R. 
Woodward, ‘Regendering the military: Theorizing women’s military participation’ (2016) 47 Security 
Dialogue 3–21. 





proposals for “law enforcement” or “human security” forces.20 These models envision 
militaries (or hybrid civilian/military forces) oriented towards protection and policing-type 
tasks, and cooperating more actively with local communities: tasks which are coded 
“feminine” in contrast to the “masculine” nature of combat.21  
Scholarship on cosmopolitan militaries and human security-oriented forces emphasises the 
importance of international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law 
(IHL) guiding military action.22 Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor’s bold strategy of “second-
generation human security” argues for committing to IHRL as the predominant legal regime 
in any military intervention.23 Whether IHRL is framed as the predominant legal regime or a 
regime operating in tandem with IHL, there is as yet scant scholarship examining how 
militaries interpret legal standards pertaining to CRSV. This leaves complex questions of 
whether militaries could be fit for CRSV tasks, both in terms of their institutional culture 
and the strategic and legal frameworks within which they operate. 
This project explores these questions about law, militaries, and feminist strategy through 
examining how the call for militaries to prevent and respond to CRSV has been understood 
and acted upon in NATO and the British Armed Forces since 2005. More specifically, it seeks 
to answer the following questions. 
 When and how does international law recognise and demand military response 
to CRSV? 
 
20 L. M. Elliott and G. Cheeseman, Forces for Defense Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-
first Century (Manchester University Press, 2004); M. Glasius and M. Kaldor, A Human Security 
Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities (Routledge, 2006); S. D. Beebe and M. H. Kaldor, 
The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace 
(PublicAffairs Books, 2010). 
21 A. Kronsell, Gender, Sex, and the Postnational Defense: Militarism and Peacekeeping (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) p. 145. 
22 Other fields of international law such as refugee law or disaster response law can additionally be 
relevant to military operations (see n 12).  
23 C. M. Chinkin and M. Kaldor, International Law and New Wars (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
pp. 230, 282. 





 How is NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV shaped by 
understandings of international law, and what does this tell us about the 
workings of international law? 
 What initiatives have NATO and the British Armed Forces developed to prevent 
and respond to CRSV?  
 How is NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV shaped by 
gender, and how is engagement with sexual violence challenging these gender 
dynamics? 
 How does NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV inform 
debates within feminist scholarship and activism around the potential risks and 
rewards of engaging with militaries? 
The remainder of this chapter situates these questions within international law scholarship 
and feminist security studies, explains the concepts used, discusses the scope and 
limitations of this study, and maps out this thesis’ structure. 
1.2 Gaps in knowledge and understanding 
Law 
The first question this project asks is: “When and how does international law recognise and 
demand military response to CRSV?” Despite the rich developments in jurisprudence 
concerning CRSV, the nature of a state’s responsibilities to prevent and respond to CRSV 
(and other violations) by third parties is unclear. The operational demands being placed 
upon armed forces in relation to CRSV fall into grey areas in terms of positive obligations 
under IHL, IHRL and any mandate to protect civilians.24 This speaks to the importance of the 
 
24 M. Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 341–
85; S. Wills, ‘International Responsibility for Ensuring the Protection of Civilians (Chapter 10)’ in H. 
Willmot, R. Mamiya, S. Sheeran, M. Weller (eds.), Protection of Civilians, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 





questions raised by feminist critique of IHL, as to whether the legal frameworks governing 
military operations are fit for purpose when it comes to CRSV.25  
If the above is a gap in the comprehensive and consistent understanding of the content of 
international law concerning CRSV, there are likewise gaps in understanding how that law is 
understood and applied within military operations. While there is a great deal of literature 
on the complex applicability of IHRL during armed conflict, how state armed forces actually 
understand their IHL and IHRL obligations as regards the protection of civilians has received 
little empirical attention. As such, this project asks: “How is NATO and the British Armed 
Forces’ engagement with CRSV shaped by understandings of international law, and what 
does this tell us about the workings of international law?” Then, fresh attention to the 
gendered nature of the implementation of law within the context of military operations is 
overdue. Feminists have not yet given the day-to-day interpretation by militaries of 
IHL/IHRL norms the attention it requires. For example, there has been scant gender analysis 
of military doctrine. As Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis observe, it is state militaries that 
primarily determine the scope and content of IHL rules and their direct implementation, 
through their training and education, manuals and legal advice.26  
Militaries 
If one takes militaries, rather than the law, as this project’s starting point, there are likewise 
gaps in understanding. Within feminist security studies and critical (and not so critical) 
military studies, there is a vigorous body of work concerning gender and militaries.27 Much 
of this scholarship either focuses on the integration of women or conceptual 
 
25 E.g.: L. Philipose, ‘The Laws of War and Women’s Human Rights’ (1996) 11 Hypatia 46–62; H. 
Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (Manchester University Press, 
2000); J. Gardam and M. J. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2001). 
26 Gardam and Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law, pp. 114, 130–31. 
27 A comprehensive overview is: R. Woodward and C. Duncanson (eds.), The Palgrave International 
Handbook of Gender and the Military (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). It describes the contributing 
disciplines as feminist, women’s and gender studies; sociology; criminology; political science; 
management studies; international relations; war studies; peace studies; anthropology; psychology 
and human geography; and terrorism studies (p. 7). 





understandings of gender and WPS. To explore what is being done in relation to CRSV at 
strategic and operational levels, this project asks: “What initiatives have NATO and the 
British Armed Forces developed to prevent and respond to CRSV?” 
As highlighted above, scholarship takes widely divergent positions on the potential for 
gendered transformation within militaries. Gendered institutional dynamics likewise 
constrain progress towards truly cosmopolitan forces; towards militaries that have turned 
from a focus on combat toward protection and collaboration. To explore what CRSV can 
show about the potential for gendered and cosmopolitan change, this project’s fourth 
question, is: “How is NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV shaped by 
gender, and how is engagement with sexual violence challenging these gender dynamics?” 
The potential for meaningful regendering of militaries speaks to debates as to the potential 
risks and rewards, from a feminist standpoint, of engaging with militaries. 
Connecting all of these questions is attention to the relationships between gender and 
international law. The new engagement by militaries with CRSV, a deeply gendered 
challenge, is an important opportunity to explore the processes underlying militaries’ 
implementation of IHL and IHRL, and to understand how gendered dynamics shape them.  
1.3 Political and conceptual approach 
Before outlining the scope and structure of this thesis, it seems necessary to say a little 
more about my own feminist politics and ethics in researching militaries, as well as to set 
out the project’s conceptual approach to CRSV and gender. 
Pragmatically engaged feminism 
For many feminist international lawyers, the motivating project, to use the phrase coined 
by Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, is to redraw the boundaries of international 





law, challenging its categories and dichotomies.28 Feminists question and disrupt the 
foundational categories according to which international law is applied, including 
public/private, international/non-international armed conflict, armed conflict/internal 
disturbances, and conflict-related/non-conflict related. Within feminist IR this 
poststructuralist critique is even more vigorous, with some problematising uncritically using 
even concepts such as “the state,” as reinforcing current geopolitical power relations.29  
Whilst feminist poststructuralist work makes critical contributions to theoretical 
development, it can be difficult, in my own experience, to invoke it in engagement outside 
of feminist communities. We risk that as feminist scholars we are, in Charlesworth’s words, 
“talking to ourselves”.30 Of feminist engagement with IHL, for example: Karima Bennoune 
observes that scholarship on women and IHL is little cited in the mainstream IHL references 
used by militaries;31 a former military Legal Advisor in Afghanistan, describes the feminist 
critique of IHL as not significantly influencing “either the theory or conduct of military 
operations”.32 Concurrently with this research, I work with an intergovernmental 
organisation focused on security sector governance. This affords me an unusual degree of 
access to policy and military spaces. Through completing this research, I hope to engage 
 
28 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law. See also: K. Knop, ‘Re/Statements: 
Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law Symposium: Feminist Inquiries into 
International Law’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 293–344; D. Buss and A. S. 
Manji (eds.), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Hart, 2005); G. Heathcote, The Law on 
the Use of Force: A Feminist Analysis (Routledge, 2012); S. Kouvo and Z. Pearson, Feminist 
Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and Compliance? (Hart 
Publishing, 2014). 
29 C. Bacchi and M. Rönnblom, ‘Feminist Discursive Institutionalism—A Poststructural Alternative’ 
(2014) 22 NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research 170–86 at 179. 
30 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law’, in Feminist 
Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and Compliance? Oñati 
International Series in Law and Society (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 17–19. Likewise: J. Gardam, 
‘Feminist Interventions into International Law: A Generation On’ (2019) 40 Adelaide Law Review 
219–26 at 221. 
31 K. Bennoune, ‘Do We Need New International Law to Protect Women in Armed Conflict 
International Justice and Shifting Paradigms’ (2006) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law 363–92 at 391. Making a similar point: J. Gardam, ‘The Silences in the Rules That Regulate 
Women during Times of Armed Conflict’ (2018) The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict. 
32 J. M. Prescott, ‘NATO Gender Mainstreaming and the Feminist Critique of the Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (2013) 14 Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 83 at 103. 





mainstream international law communities in dialogue around sexual violence, protection 
of civilians, IHRL and IHL, as well as contributing to feminist scholarship. I thus chose to use 
analytical categories and methodologies not too unfamiliar to main(male)stream 
international law and policy, whilst cognisant that these dichotomies of war/non-war and 
sexual violence un/related to conflict are themselves gendered constructs. At the same 
time, I am mindful of David Kennedy’s warning against “being drawn into the collaborative 
exercise of violence” in working on the laws of war.33 This project tries to keep these 
approaches in (somewhat uneasy) balance, analysing the law “as law” whilst also reflecting 
upon and challenging the gendered militarism of IHL and armed forces’ application of it.  
For many feminists working on peace and security, a motivating project is to dismantle the 
structures that promote military solutions to conflict and sustain the global arms trade. 
Indeed, some might consider the very subject of this thesis “dangerous” in the manner 
suggested by Carol Bacchi and Malin Rönnblom; that asking whether militaries could work 
for women in itself reinforces dangerous “realities” about what militaries are and do.34 For 
three reasons, I disagree with any proposition that feminists should refrain from 
researching or critically engaging with militaries. First, pragmatically, because our 
governments and societies are far from willing to dissolve our militaries transforming 
militaries must play a role in achieving feminist goals of demilitarisation. Second, 
normatively, because as citizens we should hold militaries to account when they act in our 
names, paid from the public purse, and this requires that we scrutinise their practices and 
demand the change we want to see. As Woodward and Duncanson say, “… for citizens in 
democracies then, militaries are what we make of them … For feminists, activists and 
scholars concerned about peace, it seems important not to concede the point that 
militaries are capable of reform”.35 Third, I believe that until the utopia of global peace is 
achieved, there are, unfortunately, circumstances where military action is right, in an 
ethical sense. I concur with Kaldor’s analysis that militaries have a role to play in securing 
 
33 D. Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2016) p. 272.  
34 Bacchi and Rönnblom, ‘Feminist Discursive Institutionalism—A Poststructural Alternative’, 181. 
35 Woodward and Duncanson, Palgrave Handbook, p. 6. 





space to allow urgent humanitarian assistance and to enable a political process to occur.36 
To this, I would add securing sites to enable police to collect evidence and apprehend 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes, including CRSV. For civilians under threat, 
militaries should be willing and able to provide direct protection in circumstances where 
the security environment is beyond what police can handle. Nadje Al-Ali recently wrote a 
thoughtful and academically courageous piece on sexual violence in Iraq, saying: 
My previous political positions were clear in terms of rejecting 
imperialist and neocolonial military interventions and the need to find 
non-violent political solutions. However, purist pacifist notions and the 
call for non-violent resistance are absurd in the face of the threats and 
atrocities linked to ISIS. My position does not translate into a sudden 
embrace of military intervention as a way to liberate women, but 
recognizes that in certain situations targeted military intervention might 
help those who are putting their lives at risk while resisting fascist and 
genocidal organizations and ideas.37 
This captures the discomfort and dilemmas of maintaining a critical feminist and 
antimilitarist approach in the face of massive CRSV, killing and genocide. These are 
dilemmas that I believe feminists should more substantively engage with: to move beyond 
sometimes narrow and binary understandings of military action, to articulate paths to 
change, and to speak more specifically to defence policy and military strategy. To do so, we 
need to understand militaries and military organisations, and how they are responding to 
issues such as CRSV. 
Chapter 4 discusses research ethics and reflexivity in more detail. 
Gender and gender analysis 
Innumerable organisational-cultural factors could impact upon how a military unit or 
individual soldier reacts to a victim or potential victim of sexual violence. One might 
usefully, for example, analyse military responses to CRSV through the lens of race or 
colonialism; civil-military relations; ethics; or focus on leadership, intelligence or 
 
36 M. Kaldor, New and old wars: organized violence in a global era, 3 ed. (Polity Press, 2012) p. 133. 
37 Al-Ali, ‘Sexual violence in Iraq’, 23. 





coordination with other agencies. Choosing to engage with feminist scholarship makes 
particular sense, however, as gender identities are deeply implicated in how sexual violence 
is understood, and it is feminist scholarship that engages most richly with CRSV.  
This project looks through a gender lens to, in the words of Jill Steans: “Focus on gender as 
a particular kind of power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to 
understanding international processes.”38 Applied to law, a gender analysis reveals how 
ideas about men, women, the masculine and feminine shape understandings and 
application of the law, and how law itself contributes to the construction, maintenance and 
alteration of gender norms. In analysing military responses to CRSV, gender analysis of the 
law looks, for example, for how assumptions about gender mediate what is understood as 
obligated, and how the law shapes recognition of victims and perpetrators.  
Feminist understandings of gender identify the hierarchical gendered binary as a symbolic 
structure that permeates all language, thought, social and political life. Poststructuralist 
feminist scholarship explores “how activities, prima facie unconnected to relations between 
women and men, are actually frequently marked with masculine or feminine labels, that is, 
how they are ‘gendered’”.39 When a military is described as “gendered” or a “gendered 
organisation”, therefore, this is not only a description of the numerical domination by men 
but also a description of militaries’ structural patterns of legitimised gendered inequality, in 
terms of gender divisions in occupations, opportunities and power, as well as a description 
of military organisational culture and ideology, its idealised practices and symbols being 
“gendered male and masculine”.40  
Increasingly, gender scholarship strives to transcend binary understandings of gender 
referent only to male/female, men/women. This being a project that centres violence 
inflicted upon bodies, it is appropriate to retain a conceptual focus on the gendered body. 
Accordingly, this study uses a more everyday understanding of “gender” as its conceptual 
 
38 Steans, J. (1998) cited in J. L. Peet and L. Sjoberg, Gender and Civilian Victimization in War 
(Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2020) p. 5. 
39 R. Cavaghan, Making Gender Equality Happen: Knowledge, Change and Resistance in EU Gender 
Mainstreaming. (Routledge, 2017) p. 20. 
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frame; specifically, that which has been developed within the UN and widely applied in 
international and national-level institutional frameworks: 
Gender refers to the roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a 
given society at a given time considers appropriate for men and women. 
In addition to the social attributes and opportunities associated with 
being male and female and the relationships between women and men 
and girls and boys, gender also refers to the relations between women 
and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and 
relationships are socially constructed and are learned through 
socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable. 
Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or 
a man in a given context.41 
What the above institutional definition of gender fails to adequately acknowledge is the 
feminist insight that gender is hierarchical:  
… a constellation of significations, where masculinities and femininities 
are mutually constituted (along with race, class, sexuality etc.) in 
specific, hierarchical relation to one another – where (often) 
masculinities are prized and powerful, while femininities are seen as 
undesirable and therefore subordinated.42 
Sexual violence against women and girls, as well as men and boys who do not conform to 
hegemonically masculine roles, is one way that that this gendered subordination is 
maintained. The UN definition of gender applied in a manner sensitive to gendered 
hierarchy provides this project’s conceptual framework for analysing how NATO and the 
British Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV is shaped by gender. 
 
41 UN Women, ‘UN Women Training Centre Gender Equality Glossary: Gender’ (June 2020). For 
discussion of gender terminology within the UN and broader international community see: V. 
Oosterveld, ‘The definition of “gender” in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court: a 
step forward or back for international criminal justice?’ (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 55–
84.  
42 Peet and Sjoberg, Gender and Civilian Victimization, p. 5. 





Defining conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) 
This project uses the term ‘conflict-related sexual violence,’ abbreviated to CRSV. Several 
alternatives exist in scholarship and policy. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), for example, refers to “rape and other forms of sexual violence during armed 
conflicts”.43 A number of feminist scholars have offered alternative language to better 
capture women’s lived experiences of injury, abuse and harassment (discussed in Chapter 
2). Because I am interested, in particular, in acts that invoke positive obligations for 
militaries under international law, I employ - with one difference - the understanding of 
CRSV articulated by UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action),44 which is 
drawn from the statutes and case law of international tribunals. UN Action employs the 
following definition of ‘CRSV’.  
Conflict-related sexual violence refers to incidents or … patterns of 
sexual violence … Such incidents or patterns occur in conflict or post-
conflict settings or other situations of concern (e.g., political strife). They 
also have a direct or indirect nexus with the conflict or political strife 
itself, i.e. a temporal, geographical and/or causal link. In addition to the 
international character of the suspected crimes (that can, depending on 
the circumstances, constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, acts 
of torture or genocide), the link with conflict may be evident in the 
profile and motivations of the perpetrator(s), the profile of the victim(s), 
the climate of impunity/weakened State capacity, cross-border 
dimensions and/or the fact that it violates the terms of a ceasefire 
agreement.45 
UN Action outlines acts included within “sexual violence” as rape, sexual slavery, forced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence 
of comparable gravity, against women, men, girls or boys. Examples given of sexual 
violence “of comparable gravity” are indecent assault, trafficking, inappropriate medical 
 
43 ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, ‘Prevention and criminal repression of 
rape and other forms of sexual violence during armed conflicts’ (2015). 
44 UN Action is an initiative established in 2006 to unite work across the UN to end sexual violence in 
conflict. The network is composed of fifteen UN entities and its Chair is the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. 
45 UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, Analytical & Conceptual Framing of Conflict-Related 
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examinations and strip searches.46 This UN analytical framing excludes sexual exploitation 
and abuse (SEA), on the basis that it is “addressed elsewhere in the UN system”.47 In my 
research, I retain a focus on SEA by foreign military personnel as a form of CRSV. 
By including acts of sexual violence with only an “indirect nexus with the conflict or political 
strife” the UN Action definition of CRSV expands from the framework developed in 
international criminal law of a direct, or at least sufficient, link or nexus to an armed 
conflict. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia described this as: 
“the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in 
the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was 
committed or the purpose for which it was committed”.48 This criterion of nexus with an 
armed conflict serves to distinguish sexual violence as an international crime from other 
acts of sexual violence that might be occurring, such as sexual violence within the family or 
in schools. Although not discussed in terms of “nexus”, this issue of the “boundaries” of 
CRSV will be explored throughout this thesis.  
1.4 Project scope and limitations 
This research applies a socio-legal qualitative approach, combining doctrinal analysis of the 
law with two case studies, of NATO and the British Armed Forces. Case studies offer the 
opportunity to study a single bounded entity in detail, with a variety of methods, over an 
extended period; to look at the real-life context of a phenomenon.49 Focusing on just two 
cases permits this study to engage broadly and deeply, synthesising extensive documentary 
analysis with interviews and observations conducted over a span of three-and-a-half years. 
Yet, this methodology, as any, implies limitations.  
 
46 Ibid., p. 1. 
47 Ibid., p. 3. 
48 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Judgement) (2002) para. 58. 
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No claim is made that the findings made as regards NATO and the British Armed Forces are 
generalisable to all multinational organisations nor all armed forces. However, others 
studying the implementation of WPS and/or gender mainstreaming may recognise 
congruence between these case studies and their own research contexts, and accordingly, 
conclude some transferability of findings. This project cannot assess whether NATO forces 
nor the British Armed Forces are perpetrators of CRSV.50 It does not attempt analysis of the 
impact of NATO or British operations on particular communities and does not engage 
directly with communities living in conflict to seek their views. Ultimately, this thesis 
presumes to offer no solution to the horror of CRSV, nor a “magic bullet” to transform 
militaries. Nonetheless, it does offer a range of new insights: not least because in my 
interviews and observations, I was often shocked by how frequently what I was hearing 
contradicted institutional policies and problematized the celebratory tone that has 
accompanied much NATO and British Armed Forces engagement with WPS. 
This research has wider relevance to understandings of law and war. CRSV can be seen as 
just one issue in relation to which modern militaries are asked to perform an ever-greater 
range of tasks, moving beyond traditional combat activities and contexts, into law 
enforcement, stabilisation, and support to statebuilding. As Kennedy has argued, this 
contributes to the increasing uncertainty and unpredictability of the legal frameworks 
applicable to military operations.51 Although there is a body of work on “IHL compliance,”52 
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the concept of compliance is, in isolation, too blunt and too nascent for the legal 
complexity of contemporary military operations. Rather, improving prevention of and 
response to CRSV, and understanding the potential roles for and risks of military 
involvement, demands nuanced explanations of the mechanisms by which armed forces’ 
actions are shaped by international law, and how they are mediated by institutional culture 
and practices, including gender norms. This project offers this nuance, through a deep and 
close examination of NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV, taking 
into account law and institutional culture and their interactions. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is in three parts. Part I, being this Chapter 1 and Chapters 2 to 4, frames this 
research in terms of scholarship and debates concerning CRSV, international law and 
militaries, and presents the project’s methodology. Part II, Chapters 5 to 9, analyses the 
applicable legal standards concerning CRSV and presents the two case studies. Part III, 
Chapters 10 to 12, explores the implications of this project’s findings for gendered 
understandings of international law, transformation of militaries, and feminist strategy. The 
following presents this structure in greater detail.  
Chapter 2 traces the apparent success of international feminist advocacy around CRSV from 
the early 1990s and explains why its legacy has come to be contested. It outlines the 
(connected) feminist critique of IHL that argues inter alia that IHL’s recognition of sexual 
violence remains partial and that military operations reproduce gendered hierarchies of 
protection. These threads of feminist scholarship and activism remain in tension: on the 
one hand, progressive understandings of sexual violence have been enshrined in 
international, national and institutional policies; on the other, there would seem to remain 
gendered structural flaws in the legal frameworks surrounding military operations and 
armed conflict. It explores emerging approaches to law in war that foreground IHRL norms.  
Chapter 3 traces how since 2005 the tasking of militaries to prevent and respond to sexual 
violence has expanded. It highlights how militaries have been simultaneously framed in 
policy as protectors and perpetrators. Civil society WPS advocates have called for militaries 





to play a role in preventing CRSV. At the same time, there is a longstanding feminist critique 
of militaries and militarism that understands militaries as particularly implicated in gender-
based violence. As such, aspects of feminist scholarship and activism are again in tension: 
can one anticipate “regendered” militaries which are competent and ready to address 
CRSV, or are militaries irredeemably part of the problem? This chapter explores the hopes 
embedded in the theorisation of “regendered” militaries and proposals for militaries more 
orientated towards human security tasks. 
Chapter 4 introduces this project’s mixed-method socio-legal qualitative approach and 
feminist methodology. It explains how structural bias feminism is used as a perspective to 
uncover exclusions and silences. The chapter discusses why NATO and the British Armed 
Forces were selected as cases and provides a detailed outline of what data was selected 
and generated, how data was collected, and the approaches applied to analysis. It discusses 
the ethical and data safeguards used and reflects upon my insider/outsider positionality 
and biases as a researcher. 
Chapter 5 presents an original doctrinal analysis of armed forces’ legal obligations in 
relation to CRSV, both as concerns CSRV committed by a third party, and CRSV by one’s 
own personnel. It opens by drawing out the legal complexity of contemporary armed 
conflict in light of the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL standards, and the lack of 
clarity as to what IHRL standards require in practice. Applied to obligations committed by 
third parties, the analysis establishes that militaries have a due diligence obligation to act to 
prevent CRSV and to support investigation and prosecution. Although the parameters of 
this obligation are unclear, this study breaks new ground in drawing upon a range of IHL 
and IHRL sources to sketch out what actions these due diligence obligations imply as 
regards CRSV. 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, on NATO and the British Armed Forces, respectively, present 
analysis of each institution’s key milestones and turning points in developing responses to 
CRSV from 2006 to the beginning of 2020. These chapters draw together analysis of policy, 
institutional structures, operational directives, training and education, as well as rich 
material from interviews, observation of training sessions and public events. Each identifies 





a range of interconnected challenges to the institution being effective on CRSV, which 
centre around conceptual understandings and coherence of approaches. In both NATO and 
the British Armed Forces, one finds a blend of progress and resistance, innovation and 
inability to change as regards CRSV.  
Chapter 8 then explores more closely the understandings of legal obligation manifested by 
NATO and the British Armed forces’ approaches to CRSV: how they engage with IHL and 
IHRL in their CRSV discourse, both in formal texts and as articulated in training and 
interviews. This demonstrates that IHL remains the dominant perspective, with CRSV not 
approached through the lens of law. There is moreover inconsistency between rhetoric on 
CRSV and approaches to SEA. 
Chapter 9 considers, in light of the foregoing, how NATO and the British Armed Forces’ 
engagement with CRSV might contribute to processes of regendering, through disrupting 
gendered binaries and challenging their internal gender cultures. It relates this to 
discourses within NATO and the British Armed Forces around the appropriate purpose and 
roles of militaries, which come to the fore in discussing possibilities for action on CSRV. 
In the third part of the thesis, Chapters 10 and 11 consider how these findings enrich 
understandings of international law and of militaries and in relation to both, the risks and 
possible rewards of feminist engagement. Chapter 10 reflects upon how indeterminacy of 
legal obligations and notions of reasonableness manifest gendered power structures in the 
making of international law and the logics of war. Chapter 11 likewise examines the logics 
of war but through the lens of military strategic culture. These analyses challenge several 
aspects of recent feminist scholarship and advocacy concerning CRSV and suggest a number 
of sites for renewed feminist activism.  
Chapter 12 concludes by reviewing the debates and dilemmas that frame this research, 
drawing together its findings, and reflecting upon this study’s contributions to 
understanding how gendered dynamics shape international law. It sets out a renewed 





CRSV, feminist legal activism and new visions of international law 
More women need to participate in the process of prescribing and 
adjudicating the laws of armed conflict. Substantial progress has been 
made in recent years, but formidable obstacles remain before crimes 
that are directed exclusively or disproportionately against women and 
girls will be given the same attention as other crimes of violence in 
these contexts. 
K. D. Askin, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the 
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status’ (1999) 93 The 
American Journal of International Law 97–123 at 123. 
 
This chapter explores feminist engagements with international law as regards CRSV and war 
and armed intervention more generally. It traces how international law has been advocated 
and theorised to address CRSV, and new directions this advocacy is taking in terms of 
centring a human rights perspective on international interventions. Section 2.1 describes 
how feminists have deployed international law as part of campaigning against CRSV but 
have come to problematise terminology associated with CRSV and question the political 
implications of organising around it. Section 2.2 contextualises this feminist focus on CRSV 
as part of a broader feminist critique of IHL: how it constructs women, and how its 
hierarchies of protection are gendered. Section 2.3 extends the discussion to other critical 
perspectives on IHL and arguments for an expanded role for IHRL as the framework for any 
intervention on humanitarian grounds.  
This chapter establishes a framework for one of the three themes of this project: the roles 
played by international legal strategies to counter CRSV. While this chapter explores CRSV 
as the subject of feminist legal activism, Chapter 5 will examine in detail specific state 
obligations to prevent and respond to CRSV, reviewing a range of doctrinal sources. 
Chapter 2 




2.1 Feminist legal advocacy around CRSV 
Expanding international law’s recognition of rape during armed conflict  
Rape in war has for centuries been recognised as a war crime, although historically rarely 
prosecuted.53 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 (GCs) and their Additional Protocols of 
1977, the modern codification of the laws of war, explicitly prohibit rape and enforced 
prostitution, using language wide enough to encompass other forms of CRSV. GC IV, Article 
27(2), prohibits sexual violence against women in international armed conflict in the terms 
that: “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular 
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.” In non-international 
armed conflict, a more limited IHL framework is established by common Article 3 to the GCs 
and Additional Protocol II. Common Article 3 demands that persons not (or no longer) 
taking an active part in hostilities be treated humanely and prohibiting “‘violence to life and 
person” including cruel treatment and torture, and “outrages upon personal dignity, 
especially humiliating and degrading treatment.”54 Additional Protocol II additionally 
contains a “fundamental guarantee” of humane treatment for all persons who are not 
taking part in hostilities, including a prohibition of “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, forced prostitution and any other 
form of indecent assault.”55 This is the first IHL provision prohibiting rape without 
distinction between women and men. (Elements of these provisions will be examined more 
closely in Chapter 5.) 
Feminist legal activism around CRSV has its origins in the demand of Asian feminists for 
recognition of the abuse of "comfort women" by Japanese soldiers during the Second 
World War. In 1992, groups in the Philippines, Okinawa, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan came 
together as the “Asia Solidarity Network on the Forced Military Comfort Women Problem” 
 
53 Discussing European customs and prosecutions, including after World War II: Askin, ‘Prosecuting 
Wartime Rape’; N. N. R. Quénivet, Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law 
(Transnational Publishers, 2005). 
54 E.g. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (1949) Art. 3. 
55 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977) Art. 4(2)(e). 
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with an explicit aim to involve global human rights organisations in their campaigning.56 
Against this background, feminist advocates at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights drew attention to the sexual violence against women taking place in Bosnia. 
Framing CRSV as a violation of international law was a key advocacy strategy. They and 
feminist legal scholars through the 1990s galvanised around the problematic framing within 
the GCs of rape as a crime against women’s “honour”, which they argued “reinforce[ed] the 
notion of women as men's property”.57 They criticised rape’s omission from the acts listed 
as grave breaches of the GCs, and as such rape’s seemingly lesser status within the 
hierarchy of war crimes, which left prosecution permissive rather than obligatory.  
Scholars allied with feminist activists outside the academy and worked first to influence the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), then 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and the Maputo Protocol. Karen Engle describes how “the focus on rape in 
armed conflict both tapped into and gave feminists power in the simultaneous 
development of international criminal law and institutions”.58 Their achievements included 
ensuring the explicit recognition of sexual violence as having the status of an international 
crime. Indeed, the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes 
articulate an expansive understanding of the types of violence recognised as sexual 
violence: not only rape but “sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”.59 Sexual 
violence is recognised not only as a war crime but potentially as a crime against humanity 
and/or constitutive of an act of genocide. Then, feminists worked to influence rules, 
procedures and structures within the international tribunals to make it more likely that 
crimes of sexual violence would be indicted and successfully prosecuted, and that victims 
 
56 M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Cornell University Press, 1998) pp. 175–76, 180. 
57 Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’, 386.  
58 Engle, ‘A Genealogy of the Centrality of Sexual Violence to Gender and Conflict’, p. 138.  
59 E.g. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Art. 7(1)(g). 
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and witnesses would be supported.60 They scrutinised and lobbied for focus on sexual 
violence in transitional justice processes.61 Subsequent scholarship and advocacy have 
highlighted male victims and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) 
victims of sexual violence.62 Cementing this normative progress, the UN Security Council 
and states have repeatedly in recent years acknowledged rape and other forms of serious 
sexual violence in armed conflict as war crimes constituting grave breaches of the GCs.63 
The ICRC study on customary IHL affirms that rape and other forms of sexual violence are 
 
60 For key commentary on these developments see Chapter 1 n 4, as well as: F. Ní Aoláin, ‘Radical 
rules: the effects of evidential and procedural rules on the regulation of sexual violence in war’ 
(1997) 60 Albany Law Review 905; Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, 
chap. 10; Gardam and Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law, chap. 6; Oosterveld, 
‘The definition of ‘gender’ in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court’; R. Gawaya and R. 
Mukasa, ‘The African women’s protocol: A new dimension for women’s rights in Africa’ (2005) 13 
Gender & Development 42–50; J. Halley, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization 
of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law’ (2008) 30 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1–124; P. V. Sellers, ‘Gender Strategy is Not Luxury for International Courts 
Symposium: Prosecuting Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes Before International/ized Criminal Courts’ 
(2009) 17 Social Policy 24; C. A. MacKinnon, ‘Creating International Law: Gender and Leading Edge’ 
(2013) 36 Harv. JL & Gender 105; P. V. Sellers and I. Rosenthal, ‘Rape and Other Sexual Violence’’ in 
A. Clapham, P. Gaeta, M. Sassòli, I. van der Heijden, Académie de droit international humanitaire et 
de droits humains à Genève (eds.), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015); C. O’Rourke, ‘Feminist scholarship in transitional justice: a 
de-politicising impulse?’ (2015) 51 Women’s Studies International Forum 118–27.  
61 C. Bell and C. O’Rourke, ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory 
Essay’ (2007) 1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 23–44; F. Ní Aoláin, ‘Advancing Feminist 
Positioning in the Field of Transitional Justice’ (2012) 6 International Journal of Transitional Justice 
205–28; V. Nesiah, ‘Engendering transitional justice’ in S. Kouvo, Z. Pearson (eds.), Feminist 
Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and Compliance?, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2014); A. Swaine, Conflict-Related Violence Against Women: Transforming Transition 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
62 Building on groundbreaking work by, amongst others, R. C. Carpenter, ‘Recognizing Gender-Based 
Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations’ (2006) 37 Security Dialogue 83–103; S. 
Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict’ (2007) 18 European Journal of 
International Law 253–76. For more recent work on male victims: C. Dolan, L. E. Fletcher, and S. 
Oola, ‘Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Against Men: A Comparative 
Legal Analysis of International and Domestic Laws Relating to IDP and Refugee Men in Uganda’ 
(2013); and on LGBTIQ persons: L. Davis, ‘Reimagining Justice for Gender-Based Crimes at the 
Margins: New Legal Strategies for Prosecuting ISIS Crimes Against Women and LGBTIQ persons’ 
(2018) 24 William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 558. 
63 Resolution 1820; Resolution 1888; Resolution 1960; Resolution 2106; A Declaration of Commitment 
to End Sexual Violence in Conflict; G8, ‘G8 Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict’ 
(2013). 
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prohibited under customary IHL during both international and non-international armed 
conflict, not only against women and girls but men and boys.64  
Some argue that gaps in the criminalisation of CRSV remain; for example, that protections 
against CRSV remain ambiguous; that boys and girls should be the focus of additional 
protection, and that protection should be extended to children born of conflict-related 
rape. Patricia Viseur Sellers and Indira Rosenthal argue for a new legal instrument which 
includes all forms of sexual violence as grave breaches of the GCs, and expressly prohibits 
sexual violations against all people regardless of gender, sex, gender identity, sexual 
orientation or any other status.65 Advocacy continues to influence institutional practice; for 
example, in 2017, a feminist coalition petitioned the ICC to advance the protection of the 
rights of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer people.66 As 
long ago as 2005, Engle noted that “many feminists now have a sense of achievement with 
regard to the development of international law in this area”.67 Nonetheless, as will be 
outlined below, the legacy of this apparent progress has come to be questioned.68 
Problematising the concept of “CRSV” 
“Rape as a weapon of war” is a powerful narrative, and has been used strategically by 
activists to garner political attention. Analysis of the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender 
Violence campaign testifies to the strong relevance of CRSV for women’s advocacy groups 
in Europe, North America, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.69 CRSV was 
emphasised by activists from DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 
 
64 ICRC, ‘Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd edition’ (2016) para. 700. 
65 Sellers and Rosenthal, ‘Rape and Other Sexual Violence’’, paras 77–80. 
66 Davis, ‘Reimagining Justice for Gender-Based Crimes at the Margins: New Legal Strategies for 
Prosecuting ISIS Crimes Against Women and LGBTIQ persons’. 
67 K. Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
(2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 778–816 at 779.  
68 O’Rourke, ‘Feminist Strategy in International Law’, 1020. 
69 For example, in 2011 and 2012, 20% and 27% respectively of some four hundred 16 Days 
initiatives focused on CRSV: Center for Women’s Global Leadership (CWGL), 16 Days of Activism 
Against Gender Violence: Analytical Summary, November 25 - December 10, 2011 (2012) pp. 3–4; 
CWGL, ‘2012 Analytical Summary’ (2013). See also: Engle, ‘A Genealogy of the Centrality of Sexual 
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the 2013 Kinshasa Call to Action.70 Women’s civil society participated in force in the 2014 
Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict.  
However, the representation of women in relation to CRSV has become a divisive issue in 
scholarship and activism, across work in law, feminist security studies, and other disciplines. 
As Paul Kirby has summarised, “The first generation of scholarship had lamented 
indifference to sexual violence and successfully agitated to place it on policy agendas; the 
second came to be more critical of how this new attention from the international 
community operated”.71 Feminist disquiet around CRSV advocacy has several threads - 
although they should be understood as critiques in dialogue with each other. Most relevant 
to this research are the arguments, simply put, that the “weapon of war” narrative is a 
blinkered representation of women’s experiences of conflict, and that elevating CRSV 
invokes stereotypes of women as victims that ultimately are at odds with gender equality 
and peace itself.  
Over the last decade, in particular, scholarly and policy understanding of the nature and use 
of CRSV has broadened and deepened. Early narratives tended to frame sexual violence as 
a form of violence committed against (potentially all) women in conflict, perpetrated by 
men. Understandings have become more nuanced, recognising that women’s victimisation 
is often based also on their ethnic, national or religious identity; that men and boys too are 
victims of sexual violence, in different forms to women and girls; that women at times have 
participated in acts of violence against other women and against men.72 More conceptually, 
early research around sexual violence often painted rape as a “weapon of war,” 
emphasising its ordered, organised use for racialised political ends associated with the 
conflict (with Bosnia often taken as illustrative). Research on the dynamics of sexual 
violence in specific contexts has questioned these overarching explanatory models, 
illustrating that rape in conflict is often not ordered, but opportunistic; and that sexual 
 
70 GNWP, ‘Kinshasa Call to Action’ (2013). 
71 P. Kirby, ‘Wartime sexual violence’ in C. E. Gentry, L. J. Shepherd, L. Sjoberg (eds.), The Routledge 
Handbook of Gender and Security, (London; New York: Routledge, 2018) p. 218. 
72 M. Loken, ‘Rethinking Rape: The Role of Women in Wartime Violence’ (2017) 26 Security Studies 
60–92. 
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violence in public spaces exists on a continuum with sexual violence in homes and 
communities.73 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin warns of:  
... the splintering of impunity discourses on sexual violence – lodging 
conflict rape in the “extra-ordinary” violence of wartime atrocity – 
divorcing conflict rape conceptually from the lived experience of routine 
sexual violence and facilitating the easy dislocation of one kind of harm 
from the other.74 
Emphasising a strong nexus between the use of sexual violence and the political or military 
aims of the perpetrator’s group can serve to render invisible victims of sexual violence 
committed for other - or no particular - ends, and victims of sexual violence committed by 
unarmed actors. Recognising the continuum of violence is to see violence against women in 
myriad forms across the spectrum of peace, conflict, and post-conflict as well as in contexts 
of humanitarian disaster, and how structural relations of power and domination underlie 
CRSV, as all forms of violence. Aisling Swaine has explored this deeply, explaining, 
Considering one set of assault as ordinary and normal and the other as 
aberrant negates consideration of how pre-conflict and the conflict-
responsive changes in masculinities and femininities enable the assault, 
disciplining, and regulation of women through violent sexual relations.75 
The temporality of the notion of “sexual violence in conflict” is revealed as problematic. 
Feminists question the distinctions imposed between forms of violence recognised as “in 
conflict” or “conflict-related” and violence in domestic spaces and at community levels. In 
 
73 Enloe, Maneuvers; M. Baaz and M. Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, 
Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond (Zed Books in association with the Nordic Africa 
Institute, 2013); C. O’Rourke, Gender Politics in Transitional Justice (Routledge, 2014); C. Cockburn, 
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‘Transforming Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Principles and Practice’ (2015) 28 
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Gender, State & Society 496–520. 
74 F. Ní Aoláin, ‘Gendered Harms and their Interface with International Criminal Law: Norms, 
Challenges and Domestication’ (2014) 16 International Feminist Journal of Politics 622–46 at 626. 
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many settings, even during periods of armed conflict, sexual violence is much more often 
perpetrated by intimate partners than by armed fighters.76 Private sphere domestic 
violence may be a precondition for more visible violence against women in the public 
sphere and can fuel and exacerbate armed conflicts.77 Moreover, Charlesworth and Nesiah 
explore how the almost exclusive focus on sexual violence in legal protection of the human 
rights of women in armed conflict obscures protection of the economic, cultural and social 
rights of women; issues such as shortage of food and medicine, the impact of economic 
sanctions; internal displacement and forced removals.78 O’Rourke proposes instead 
theorising a “web of harms against women” during periods of political violence.79 
The limited forms of CRSV prosecutable under international criminal law and the 
requirement to demonstrate a nexus to conflict80 mean that international law does not 
recognise the relationships between CRSV and violence within the home, on the street, 
within society at large, also occurring pre-conflict and post-conflict, and how subordination 
of women produces this violence. We should recall that in the negotiations toward the 
Rome Statute, feminists argued, without success, for the recognition of “gender violence” – 
which could include “non-sexual attacks on women or on men based on their gender-
defined roles,” such as attacks on women’s livelihoods.81  
Whilst these debates are important in identifying those victims who remain invisible in the 
categories of international law and policy, the horrific nature of sexual atrocity during war 
remains more than a policy or legal construct. Key empirical authorities, Elizabeth Wood 
and Dara Kay Cohen, argue that studies of wartime rape have found that 75% or more of 
 
76 E. J. Wood and D. K. Cohen, ‘Is sexual violence during war exceptional —or a continuation of 
everyday violence?’ (July 2016). 
77 J. True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women (Oxford University Press, 2012); C. E. 
Gentry, L. J. Shepherd, and L. Sjoberg (eds.), ‘Violence against women/violence in the world: toward 
a feminist conceptualization of global violence’ Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, 
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78 Nesiah, ‘Engendering transitional justice’, p. 149; Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International 
Law’, 388. 
79 O’Rourke, Gender Politics in Transitional Justice, chap. 2. 
80 See text at n 48. 
81 Halley, ‘Rape at Rome’, 83–84. 
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reported cases are of gang rape; rape is more often by strangers; it is often public, and 
often accompanied by other forms of torture and mutilation. At least as concerns sexual 
violence by armed combatants during war, the vast majority “is dramatically different from 
peacetime sexual violence … is truly extraordinary, contrasting sharply with ‘everyday 
violence’.”82 It is not necessarily the case that a high prevalence of sexual violence means it 
is being used strategically, however, or inversely that infrequent sexual violence is not 
strategic.83 CRSV remains a problem that local women’s organisations want policymakers to 
address. For example, in civil society consultations in advance of the “Global Study on the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325”, 317 civil society organisations in 
seventy-one countries, identified prevention and protection of women from SGBV in 
conflict as a top advocacy priority.84 (Civil society advocacy around CRSV is discussed further 
in Chapter 3.) For these reasons, in my view, it remains important that scholars continue to 
ask questions about how women, men, boys and girls can better be protected from CRSV, 
but in a manner that recognises that sexual violence is entwined with other types of 
gendered harms and that CRSV has deep roots in the structural inequalities that span 
peace, conflict and post-conflict times and spaces. 
Problematising women’s victimhood 
Some feminist scholars have resisted the focus on sexual violence for a different set of 
reasons: arguing that putting women’s victimisation in conflict at centre stage detracts 
from the goal of seeing women as agents of change during peace-making. That is, feminists 
have problematised the subjectivities or stereotypes of women invoked in discourse around 
 
82 Wood and Cohen, ‘Is sexual violence during war exceptional —or a continuation of everyday 
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CRSV,85 which (generally unconsciously) frame women as “the metaphor for 
vulnerable/victim in war”.86 Dianne Otto identifies three recurring female subjectivities of 
women in international legal discourse: first, the figure of wife and mother, who needs 
“protection” during times of both war and peace; second, the woman who is “formally 
equal” with men in public life; and third, the “victim,” “who is produced by colonial 
narratives of gender, as well as by the notions of women’s sexual vulnerability”.87 Otto 
argues that each of these three female personas is dependent upon racialized binary male 
representations.88 
The notion of the male protector is what Jean Elshtain described as the “Just Warrior”; 
according to Laura Sjoberg “a masculinized soldier who fights bravely … but out of a desire 
to protect the innocent… his masculinity is affirmed by providing protection … and he is 
emasculated when he is unwilling or unable to provide that protection”.89 Importantly, 
these feminine/masculine binaries are not neutral: in them, sex/gender is organised 
hierarchically, with the masculine assuming the position of authority. The persistence of 
female subjectivities that are injured and marginalised, in contradistinction to “protecting” 
and “civilising” masculinities, Otto argues, serves to reproduce masculine, racial and other 
forms of privilege.90 Queer perspectives on law and WPS show us that there is also a 
 
85 E.g. K. Engle, ‘The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council Resolutions on Human 
Security’ in G. Heathcote, D. Otto (eds.), Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective 
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88 D. Otto, ‘Lost in translation: re-scripting the sexed subjects of international human rights law’ in A. 
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privileging of the heteronormative, excluding the experiences of LGBTIQ people.91 
Accordingly, some scholars (and activists) worry that the strong political and advocacy focus 
on CRSV reasserts stereotypes of women’s passive victimisation, which (although might 
lead to improvements in some individual women’s lives) ultimately further entrench the 
gender hierarchies under which all women are marginalised, and which are responsible for 
producing the gendered violations in the first place. Not only this, but feminist just war 
theorising would implicate CRSV advocacy in the war system itself: building upon Elshtain, 
Sjoberg argues that protection of women “becomes a key motivation for fighting and 
therefore a key cause for making and continuing wars, either explicitly (as a rallying cry) or 
implicitly (as an internalized metric of masculine sacrifice).”92 
These are debates around what acts are punishable as crimes under international law, and 
the implications of CRSV advocacy for progress more broadly on women’s rights and 
equality. This research will be attentive to the extent to which militaries recognise the 
complex dynamics of CRSV: that CRSV is not always ordered or used for strategic ends; that 
it has a relationship with structural relations of power and domination, including but not 
limited to gender; that men and boys can be victims. It will be attentive to whether the 
manner of military engagement with CRSV tends to represent women merely as victims 
rather than active in their lives and communities. Understanding how militaries understand 
CRSV can inform feminist thinking around the potential for transformation, for 
“regendering” of militaries. 
2.2 Feminist advocacy on the laws of war 
The foregoing sections of this chapter have traced the origins, success and then 
contestation (particularly from feminist security studies) of advocacy concerning CRSV. This 
work has both drawn from and influenced a robust body of feminist scholarship focused 
upon how IHL understands and addresses the distinct needs of women in armed conflict 
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and the “anomalies and inconsistencies” that result from the narrow focus of IHL on issues 
of concern to the male-dominated “warrior caste”.93 The more recent development of 
gendered analysis of IHL plus consideration of the application of IHRL in armed conflict has 
brought to attention more diverse range of issues, including the gendered social and 
economic impacts of war and occupation,94 healthcare and humanitarian assistance in 
armed conflict, and legal review of weapons.95 This section looks at two threads in feminist 
IHL scholarship of particular relevance to this project: how IHL represents women; and how 
IHL balances protection of civilians against the protection of military bodies and objectives.  
Limited constructions of “women” in IHL 
The GCs afford a range of special protections to women, predominantly when pregnant, as 
mothers or as potential rape victims, leading Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis to claim 
that “women are valued in IHL in terms of the sexual and reproductive aspects of their 
lives”.96 Helen Kinsella’s work looks deeper into the constructions of sex and sex difference 
throughout the development of IHL, to find that gender difference is invoked in and 
productive of the essential distinctions that IHL draws between combatant and civilian. The 
protection of women as civilians has, however, historically been predicated upon women’s 
sexual modesty and decorum and remaining outside of public life and politics.97 Kinsella 
goes on to argue that the “passivity” which premises civilian immunity “… may be both 
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impossible and dangerous to maintain in times of war. To be innocent is also to be without 
the freedom or agency to act in one’s own defense and for one’s own life”.98  
If we accept Kinsella’s analysis, we expect it to be difficult to link protection of women from 
sexual violence under IHL with their public and political empowerment, the latter being 
antithetical to the rationale for women’s protection. It has been argued that IHL’s 
association of women so thoroughly with children constructs women as infantilized, seen 
only as vulnerable; their capacities for resilience, leadership and indeed combat, their 
individual and collective agency overlooked.99 In this way, the special provisions for women 
in IHL reinforce limited representations of women’s characteristics and the underlying 
systematic discrimination that permeates IHL, as a system designed for men. As such, one 
area of attention in this research is the constructions of women as victims of sexual 
violence in military doctrine, education and training – are these theorised subjectivities and 
stereotypes reproduced? 
Gendered hierarchies of protection 
These gendered notions of civilian/victim translate into hierarchies of protection where – 
both in international law and in humanitarian action - women, children and sometimes 
elderly men are offered protection over and above male youths and men.100 Scholarship 
over the last fifteen years has highlighted the invisibility of sexual violence against men and 
boys, civilian or combatant.101 This can be linked back to IHL’s notions of masculinity, 
wherein “Masculine privilege and notions of warrior honour and duty obscure, even 
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preclude the possibility of males being subjected to conflict-related sexual and gender-
based violence”.102  
At the same time, within IHL there are profound hierarchies between military and civilian 
lives, which are in tension with protection norms. IHL does not directly address how to 
make judgements, either individually or institutionally, concerning acceptable levels of risk 
to one’s own forces vs. other people.103 But Gardam’s early feminist critique of IHL claims 
an unspoken assumption that male combatants’ lives are to be prioritised over civilian lives: 
“The military resist strongly the notion that combatants should assume risks to protect the 
civilian population”.104 The concept of “military necessity” central to IHL is not neutral, but 
incorporates a hierarchy of gendered values: military judgements of the proportionality of 
civilian injury and damage to anticipated military advantage are (gendered) assessments 
about the relative value of lives. Louise Arimatsu demonstrates this in relation to IHL’s 
acceptance of reprisals against a civilian population, measures that involve violence that 
disproportionately targets women.105 Gardam and Jarvis explicitly link lack of respect for 
civilian lives with military attitudes toward women, suggesting that the demeaning images 
of women used to train soldiers influence how the protection of civilians in IHL develops.106 
As such, areas of attention in this research include how victims and perpetrators of CRSV 
are gendered in military doctrine, education and training, and more broadly, the balance 
struck between protecting civilian and military lives in sexual violence response. 
 
102 Sellers and Rosenthal, ‘Rape and Other Sexual Violence’’, para. 76. 
103 D. Luban, ‘Human Rights Thinking and the Laws of War’ in J. D. Ohlin (ed.), Theoretical Boundaries 
of Armed Conflict and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 45–77 pp. 
74–75. 
104 J. Gardam, ‘Women and the law of armed conflict: why the silence?’ (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 55 at 72. On this point, see also Chinkin and Kaldor, International Law 
and New Wars, p. 255. 
105 L. Arimatsu, ‘Understanding defences in international criminal law’ Ph.D., London School of 
Economics 2007. 
106 Gardam and Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law, p. 131. 
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2.3 Feminists reframe IHL and IHRL 
Disrupting sanctioned violence and moral disengagement 
The gendered constructions of victimhood and hierarchies of protection in IHL, discussed 
above, speak not only to what violence is prohibited, but to what violence is “sanctioned 
and legitimized and made possible by the laws of war.”107 Indeed, feminist scholarship in 
IHL is alert to more generalised critiques of IHL as more military than humanitarian in 
character. As Jochnick and Normand argued, “Despite the humanitarian rhetoric, military 
concerns have dictated the substantive content of the laws of war.”108 Critical scholars paint 
IHL as lending legitimacy to customary military practice, rather than restraining it, 
demonstrated most vividly in its acceptance of proportionate civilian casualties and the 
legality of frightful weapons.109 David Kennedy and Dale Stephens (himself a former military 
lawyer) discuss IHL as displacing moral and ethical decision-making.110 In Kennedy’s words, 
“Law and war have become oddly reciprocal, communicating and killing along the 
boundaries of the world system … evading both ethical and political responsibility”.111  
These perspectives on IHL offer important insights into the possibilities and challenges of 
constructive military engagement with CRSV. If one accepts that (problematic, gendered) 
IHL norms are strongly internalised within militaries,112 how might the limits of what IHL 
requires of armed forces – to be discussed in Chapter 5 - mediate military engagement with 
CRSV? Does the “morally agnostic” disinterest of IHL in civilian victims of war (beyond try 
not to kill/rape/injure them yourself) restrain response to CRSV? Militaries themselves 
explicitly frame CRSV response in terms of individual moral judgement, as illustrated by the 
 
107 Philipose, ‘The Laws of War and Women’s Human Rights’, 57.  
108 C. Jochnick and R. Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War’ 
(1994) 35 Harvard International Law Journal 49–96 at 56.  
109 S. Sewall, Limits of Law: Promoting Humanity in Armed Conflict (Stanford University Press); G. J. 
Andreopoulos, ‘Challenges and Opportunities in Advancing Human Protection: Rethinking the 
Global-Local Nexus’ (2010) 29 Criminal Justice Ethics; New York 142–56. 
110 Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and warfare’; D. Stephens, ‘Behaviour in war: The place of law, moral inquiry 
and self-identity’ (2014) 96 International Review of the Red Cross 751–773. 
111 Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and warfare’, pp. 181–82. 
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quote from the Chief of the Australian Army that opened Chapter 1. Lt. Gen. Morrison went 
on to emphasise that the choices made by individual soldiers reflect the values inculcated 
by the military, including as regards women and men’s value, and diversity.113 This leads 
one to ask, how does militaries’ gendered institutional culture – to be discussed in the 
following chapter – mediate response to CRSV?  
Envisioning a more prominent place for IHRL in military operations 
Feminist critique of the divorcing of CRSV from other pervasive forms of gender-based 
violence (GBV) challenges the demarcation between IHL as applicable in conflict and IHRL as 
applicable in peace.  
In this future vision of the role of human rights in armed conflict, the 
existing demarcation between international and non-international 
armed conflicts will disappear … there will be a fundamental re-ordering 
of priorities as the influence of the military diminishes and the 
legitimate claims of humanity are acknowledged.114  
Feminists advocated for accountability for violations of IHRL in conflict as a means of 
redressing the gaps in IHL from a gender perspective, pushing toward convergence of IHL, 
IHRL and international criminal law.115 Jarvis and Gardam, for example, advocated for IHL to 
be “contained, controlled and fashioned by [IHRL] at every point possible.”116 This is 
arguably coming to pass in the contemporary convergence of IHL and IHRL: to be discussed 
in Chapter 5. Still, the implications of convergence as concerns violence against women and 
CRSV have not yet been judicially tested.  
Against, a canvas of uncertainty and debate as to the relationship between IHL and IHRL, 
Chinkin and Kaldor’s International law and new wars proposes the international community 
 
113 D. Morrison, ‘Chief of Army addresses the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict’ 
(2014). 
114 Gardam and Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law, p. 254. 
115 V. Nesiah, ‘Gender and Forms of Conflict’ in F. Ní Aoláin, N. R. Cahn, D. F. Haynes, N. Valji (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
116 Citing Gerald Draper (1971), Gardam and Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law, 
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rethink its understandings of “war” and acceptance of IHL norms. They problematise the 
sometimes huge losses of civilian life caused by armed interventions based upon claims of 
self-defence or humanitarian intervention, and how IHL sanctions and seemingly legitimises 
this. Rather, they argue, IHRL should govern any use of force framed as humanitarian 
intervention:  
Surely, if the language of humanity is being used, the rules of 
engagement should be based on human rights rather than IHL and 
should be more like the rules of engagement in domestic policing. The 
aim is not to defeat the adversary in a conflict but to protect people and 
arrest criminals responsible for violations of human rights.117  
As will be explored in the following chapter, their vision of what militaries should do chimes 
with the commitments made for militaries to be more engaged in prevention and response 
to CRSV. Chinkin and Kaldor argue that self-defence should be reconceptualised as 
defending a collective individual right to life, and that in this too states should conform with 
IHRL as well as IHL.118 They argue that IHL, whilst no longer concordant with global values, is 
not to be discarded; its specific protections should be clarified and retained whilst it is 
complemented by IHRL.119 Emphasising IHL’s protections rather than its permissions, 
Chinkin and Kaldor’s vision goes beyond current understandings of the co-applicability of 
IHRL and IHL. They present a structural, transformational argument for a more central role 
for IHRL in international intervention and a claim that IHRL provides a credible and 
legitimate set of standards by which to construct a new world order.120 
This, then, is one of the framing theoretical debates for this research. What difference 
might human rights-led approaches make to military action to prevent and respond to 
CRSV, and what can be learnt about how militaries apply IHL and IHRL standards concerning 
CRSV? 
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The purpose of this chapter was, first, to show why we should expect international law to 
matter in strengthening the prevention and response to CRSV. Feminist scholars and 
activists have invested great energy in trying to develop how international law treats sexual 
violence, with notable successes. The feminist critiques of CRSV discourse and of IHL 
presented here suggest several important questions as regards military responses to CRSV. 
Will militaries continue to (re)produce subjectivities of female victimhood and militarised 
male protection? Will they overlook linkages between CRSV and other forms of direct and 
structural violence? In operations tasked to protect civilians from CRSV, will militaries be 
reluctant to assume risks to their own personnel to do so? This is part of a questioning of 
the international legal and political order that, some argue, uses law to legitimate existing 
forms of warfare and is ill-suited to realise human security and human rights. Some see 
progressive legal development as requiring greater convergence of IHL and IHRL, or an even 
more ambitious paradigm that places human rights at the centre of any international 
intervention. What these developments would imply will be examined in Chapter 5, which 
examines in greater detail armed forces’ obligations in IHL, IHRL and on the basis of 
peremptory norms in relation to prohibition, prevention and response to CRSV. 
Could militaries play a positive role in such a new legal world order? Chapter 3, following, 
will outline the increasing political commitment since 2005 to military engagement in the 
prevention of and response to CRSV. A feminist critique of militaries and militarism 
problematises framing military action as a solution to CRSV, although prospects for change 
may lie in militaries’ “regendering” and in visions for militaries articulated with reference to 
cosmopolitan values and human security. The case studies that follow will then explore 
these dilemmas, analysing military policy, doctrine, training and institutional structures in 
NATO and the British military, and using interviews and observations to surface how the 
gendered structural biases embedded in IHL are expressed, challenged or even overcome in 




CRSV and new visions of militaries 
Security forces are often the first responders to sexual violence. They 
have access to information about events on the ground that is otherwise 
unavailable to civilians. They may be the only protection that vulnerable 
sections of society have against sexual violence. In a limited number of 
cases they may also be the perpetrators. 
Chair's Summary, End Sexual Violence in Conflict Global Summit London 
2014, para. 34. 
 
This chapter describes how there has been increasing political commitment to military 
involvement in sexual violence response, and how this has been questioned by some 
feminist scholars. Indeed, there is a broad community of critical scholarship that is 
ambivalent, if not hostile, toward militaries. The potential for deep change in the gender 
regimes of militaries is contested. This speaks to debates at the heart of this project: can 
feminists, should we, look to militaries to protect women, girls, men and boys from CRSV? 
Can we imagine different, positive, forms of military intervention, with personnel attuned 
to protection and human rights? 
Section 3.1 describes how militaries have, since 2005, been framed in policy both as 
potential perpetrators of and potential protectors against CRSV. Section 3.2 relates this to 
feminist advocacy that has called for militaries to engage with the problem of CRSV, and 
feminist critique of militarism and militaries that tends to reject militaries as part of the 
solution to CRSV. Section 3.3 explores theorisations of “regendering” of militaries, and how 
these speak to the theorisation of cosmopolitan militaries and new forms of human-
security orientated intervention. This chapter establishes a framework for the second 
theme of this project: considering the potential for militaries transform to “regender,” so to 
be effective in combating CRSV. 
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3.1 Calling in the troops: Committing the military to prevent 
and respond to CRSV  
Since 2005 a new set of training, doctrinal and operational expectations for militaries as 
regards the prevention of and response to CRSV has been articulated, predominately 
through the WPS Agenda and the PSVI. It should not be assumed that armed forces had no 
experience with or guidance concerning CRSV in advance of this. The GCs and other earlier 
IHL instruments, such as the 1863 Lieber Code, did address CRSV (although often, as was 
discussed in Chapter 2, obliquely). The UN Security Council acknowledged CRSV in several 
contexts through the 1990s.121 The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action had a 
strong focus on women and armed conflict.122 In 1999, UNSCR 1265 emphasised that 
peacekeeping mandates must pay particular attention to the protection and assistance 
needs of women and that peacekeepers need to be trained, by the UN and their own 
states, in the gender-related provisions of international humanitarian and human rights 
law.123 The adoption of UNSCR 1325 on WPS in 2000 was a watershed in focusing 
international attention on both the needs and contributions of women in conflict and post-
conflict contexts. It is from 2006, however, and in particular the adoption of UNSCR 1820 in 
2008, that the focus on how armed forces can respond to CRSV sharpens in international 
discourse.124  
Figure 1 (on page 41) highlights key points of normative development in and around the UN 
system concerning military response to sexual violence from 1999. As the following 
discussion will explore, within this normative framework, militaries are presented both as  
 
121 E.g. in 1992 highlighting rape of women in the Former Yugoslavia in UNSCR 798. In 1995, serious 
injury arising from sexual assault during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was included as a basis for 
compensation by the UN Compensation Commission: UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 
Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response (1998).  
122 United Nations, and World Conference on Women, The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for 
Action: Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 4-15 September 1995 (1996). 
123 Resolution 1265 (1999). 
124 A number of regional human rights instruments, including the Maputo Protocol and the Istanbul 
Convention refer to protecting women and girls from sexual violence including during armed conflict. 
They are not described in detail here, although Chapter 5 will illustrate their potential application. 
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Figure 1: Key points of normative development concerning military response to CRSV, 1999 - 2019 
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potential protectors of women and children from CRSV, and themselves as potential 
perpetrators of CRSV, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA, defined below). 
Framing the military as protectors 
In 2000, UNSCR 1325 called for parties involved in armed conflict to “abide by international 
laws that protect the rights of civilian women and girls and to take special measures to 
protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of 
sexual abuse”.125 This wording is broad enough to include not only warring militaries but 
military peacekeepers and other intervening militaries. From around 2005 military 
peacekeepers were taking actions specifically directed at CRSV prevention or response. 
African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Darfur conducted ‘firewood patrols’ to protect women 
from rape, abduction and murder. The European Union (EU) mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) collaborated with local women's organisations to ensure they 
were able to refer cases of sexual violence to arrange for support for the victims.126 In April 
2006, UNSCR 1674 on the protection of civilians in conflict undertook to “ensure that all 
peace support operations employ all feasible measures to prevent [all sexual and other 
forms of violence committed against civilians in armed conflict, in particular women and 
children] and to address its impact where it takes place”.127 This marks a significant 
development: seeing peacekeeping operations as having a role in preventing and 
responding to CRSV. It is for this reason that 2006 is taken as my starting point to examine 
changes in military policy and practice throughout this project. 
In May 2008, an influential international discussion amongst diplomats, government 
officials, prominent leaders of women’s organisations, and UN military commanders took 
place, titled “Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military 
Peacekeepers?” Participants agreed that militaries should develop tactical responses to 
intercept and deter attacks on women and children. A subsequent “analytical inventory” of 
 
125 Resolution 1325, para. 10. 
126 M. Bastick, K. Grimm, and R. Kunz, Sexual violence in armed conflict: global overview and 
implications for the security sector (DCAF, 2007) pp. 169–70. 
127 Resolution 1674 (2006) para. 19. 
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military strategies included: preventative patrols and escorts; establishing safe havens for 
civilians; evacuating vulnerable groups; freeing women held as sex slaves; providing medical 
care to survivors; collaborating with local women’s organisations and humanitarian 
agencies to establish victim referral protocols; collecting information about sexual violence 
whilst patrolling; identifying, securing and preserving evidence to support prosecution; 
assisting in the apprehension and hand over of suspected perpetrators, and civil-military 
cooperation activities such as providing fuel or stoves, and construction of shelters for 
sexual violence survivors.128 The meeting identified the need for a ‘paradigm shift’ for 
militaries to predict, prevent and respond effectively to sexual attacks. Key challenges were 
identified as: variation in interpretation of mission mandates and rules of engagement as 
regards sexual violence attacks, in the sense of commanders failing to see CRSV as a 
priority; divergent attitudes between forces from different nations to violence against 
women; training gaps; resourcing gaps; and ambiguities between the roles of police and 
military personnel. It was noted, “It is a mistake to assume that gender analysis/women’s 
protection will come ‘instinctively’ to soldiers trained in war-fighting”.129  
The following month the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution dedicated to 
sexual violence in conflict, sponsored by the United States.130 Anne Marie Goetz explains 
that discussions around innovative tactics being used by military peacekeepers to prevent 
CRSV such as “… intelligence-collection from women on impending threats, patrolling in the 
areas (and at the times) that sexual violence was known to occur” apparently in part drove 
how UNSCR 1820 “reframed” sexual violence in conflict “as a threat to international peace 
and security and a tactic of warfare that required a security response”.131 UNSCR 1820 
frames militaries as potential perpetrators of CRSV in emphasising inter alia military 
disciplinary measures, training of soldiers on the prohibition of sexual violence and vetting 
 
128 L. Anderson, Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping 
Practice (2012) pp. 18–34. 
129 A. M. Goetz and L. Anderson, ‘Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What role for 
military peacekeepers?’ Conference Summary, Wilton Park Conference, (2008) p. 4. 
130 Resolution 1820.  
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armed forces.132 However, it simultaneously called for UN peacekeepers to be trained to 
prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence, and on troop and police-contributing 
countries to “… consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the 
responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect 
civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and 
girls in conflict and post-conflict situations …”133 In the years that followed, the UN 
Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) added scenario-based training for 
peacekeepers on sexual violence response into their protection of civilians modules.  
Four further UNSCRs dedicated to CRSV have since been adopted: 1888 (2009); 1960 
(2010), 2106 (2013) and 2467 (2019). Their key provisions concerning militaries are set out 
in Annex 1, with the following summarising commitments made as regards military action 
in relation to CRSV.  The UNSCRs on WPS include the demand that ‘all parties to armed 
conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and 
girls, from all forms of sexual violence’ which might include, inter alia, evacuating women 
and children to safety.134 Troops involved in armed conflict should be trained not only on 
the prohibition of sexual violence but to ‘debunk[…] myths that fuel sexual violence’.135 As 
concerns militaries participating in UN peace operations, the UNSCRs direct peace 
operations to employ ‘all feasible measures’ to prevent sexual violence against civilians and 
to address its impact.136 Training of peacekeepers must include how to prevent, recognize, 
assess and respond to sexual violence; respond to trafficking in persons in the context of 
armed conflict; in “gender expertise”; and in the importance of involving women in all 
peacekeeping and peace-building measures.137 Moreover, peacekeepers’ training on sexual 
violence, human trafficking and SEA should be integrated into the performance and 
 
132 Resolution 1820, para. 3.  
133 Ibid., paras 6, 8. 
134 Resolution 1820, para. 3; Resolution 1888, para. 3. See also: Resolution 1325, para. 10. calls upon 
‘all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based 
violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse’. 
135 Resolution 1820, para. 3. 
136 E.g. Resolution 1674, para. 19.. 
137 Resolution 1265, para. 14; Resolution 1325, para. 6; Resolution 1820, para. 6,8; Resolution 1960, 
para. 11,15; Resolution 2106, para. 14; Resolution 2122, para. 9; Resolution 2331 (2016) para. 19. 
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operational readiness standards against which troops are assessed.138 Linking female bodies 
to these capabilities, the Security Council has in several resolutions encouraged deployment 
of greater numbers of female military personnel.139 In parallel to these processes within the 
UN Security Council, in 2013 CEDAW published General Recommendation No. 30 on 
women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations.140 As will be outlined in 
Chapter 5, this contains several references to military roles.  
Political attention to military roles concerning CRSV was significantly stepped up through 
the British Government’s PSVI, launched in 2012. Founded by then British Foreign 
Secretary, William Hague, alongside celebrity humanitarian, Angelina Jolie, the PSVI 
mobilised diplomatic resources to make CRSV an issue for foreign and security policy, not 
just one for humanitarian assistance.141 It facilitated the Group of Eight’s (G8) Declaration 
on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict and endorsement by 155 countries (including all 
NATO members) of a Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. The 
Declaration of Commitment commits that armed forces will review their doctrine and 
training and ensure that it: “… is in accordance with international law so as to enable a 
more effective prevention and response to sexual violence in conflict”.142 In June 2014, 
Britain hosted the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (“Global Summit”), 
which attracted seventy-nine ministers from 123 nations, hundreds of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), thousands of members of the public, and a flood of mainstream 
media attention.143 The Chair’s Summary framed militaries as “a critical partner for both 
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prevention and protection” of CRSV and proposed senior military leadership should be 
“personally accountable for proactive delivery on tackling sexual violence”.144 However, it 
acknowledged that militaries are “not always properly equipped to deal with this sensitive 
and difficult problem,” and indeed “they may also be the perpetrators.”145  
Framing the military as perpetrators 
In April 2006, when the UN Security Council adopted the resolution on protection of 
civilians that for the first time committed peace support operations to prevent sexual 
violence, highlighted above, it also made its first condemnation of SEA and trafficking of 
women and children by peacekeepers.146 SEA within UN peacekeeping had in 2003 been 
defined: 
… “sexual exploitation” means any actual or attempted abuse of a 
position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual 
purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or 
politically from the sexual exploitation of another … “sexual abuse” 
means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, 
whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.147 
It was specifically prohibited for UN staff to (amongst other things) have sexual activity with 
persons under the age of eighteen, regardless of the age of majority or consent locally, or 
to exchange money for sex.148 Thus, in advance of the emergence of CRSV as a distinct 
advocacy and policy agenda, the Security Council was grappling with the tension of calling 
upon peacekeepers to protect women and children, whilst acknowledging peacekeepers as 
at times the perpetrators of CRSV against women and children.  
The Security Council has asserted states’ responsibilities to prevent abuses and ensure 
accountability for their own forces as regards sexual violence by ensuring that all reports of 
sexual violence committed by military personnel/one’s own forces are thoroughly 
 
144 FCO, Global Summit Report, p. 44. 
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147 United Nations Secretary General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and 
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investigated and alleged perpetrators brought to justice. Measures set out include: 
enforcing military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command 
responsibility;149 making and implementing commitments to combat sexual violence, 
including issuing clear orders through chains of command; and prohibition of sexual 
violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent.150 Military commanders 
are specifically called upon to use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence.151 
For countries contributing troops to peacekeeping, UNSCRs require they use training and 
other measures to prevent SEA and ensure full accountability, including through swift and 
thorough investigations and, if appropriate, prosecutions, and repatriation of units.152 The 
need to prohibit SEA has been recognised also in AU, EU and NATO missions and by private 
security providers,153 meaning that SEA is no longer conceptually limited to peacekeeping or 
even only to conflict-affected contexts. Unfortunately, as will be considered in Chapter 5, 
SEA remains prevalent, underreported and its handling beset by jurisdictional and practical 
challenges.154  
Within UN discourse and practice, SEA and CRSV are often treated as separate threads – 
rather than SEA being a “type” or “subset” of CRSV. There are separate peacekeeper pre-
deployment training modules for sexual violence in conflict and SEA.155 As noted in Chapter 
1, SEA is excluded from the definition of “conflict-related sexual violence” adopted by the 
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interagency UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and in 2016 a UNSCR dedicated 
to SEA did not mention “sexual violence”.156 There was an early sense among UN staff that 
“the media spotlight” on SEA was in tension with getting peacekeepers to prevent sexual 
violence: 
 … distancing [peacekeeping] personnel from the host population, 
thereby limiting situational awareness of women’s needs and risks. … 
Fear of SEA allegations may deter uniformed personnel from operating 
in proximity to women or undertaking, for example, much-needed night 
foot patrols. It may also compound efforts to engage local women as 
language assistants and community liaisons. This could diminish 
innovation and de-motivate the mission from taking proactive steps to 
protect.157 
As was highlighted in Chapter 2’s discussion of how CRSV has been problematised as an 
agenda, feminist advocates and scholars tend to be critical of lines drawn between SEA and 
sexual violence in conflict. They rightly emphasise the extent to which sexual abuse at the 
hands of peacekeepers and the hands of armed and unarmed men (usually) in their 
communities is linked in theory and lives.158 One of the criticisms made of the Global 
Summit was that it ignored that sexual violence committed by international peacekeeping 
troops, NATO allies and “armed forces supported, funded and/or protected by the US and 
the UK”.159  
3.2 Resisting and advocating military responses to CRSV  
Feminist activists and scholars have shaped the WPS Agenda in many respects and are 
deeply implicated in its focus on CRSV.160  Nonetheless, many are troubled by the sexual 
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vulnerability of civilians in war being used to justify or legitimate military action. The 
accepted truth around feminist dinner tables would seem to be, as Otto put it, “we know 
that armed interventions … inevitably make the lives of the majority of women significantly 
worse”.161 Indeed, and worryingly, some analyses suggest that external armed military 
intervention increases the risk that sexual violence and other forms of civilian victimization 
will be used by non-supported factions.162 At the same time, women living amidst conflict 
do at times call for military protection from CRSV. The following gives an overview of these 
longstanding debates.  
Feminist opposition to militarism 
Gina Heathcote observes “an uneasy silence in feminist debates about when, if ever, the 
use of force to save women would be feminist”.163 Whilst some feminists in the 1990s 
advocated military humanitarian intervention to protect women during war, this ran 
counter to revered alliances between feminism and pacifism. Feminist peace activism 
remains strong, embodied in transnational feminist organisations and movements such as 
the WILPF and Women in Black, and women’s organising within campaigns such as 
“NoToNATO”. Indeed, there is a long-standing feminist suspicion of militaries, which 
understands “militarism” as essentially inimical to feminism. By “militarism” in this context 
is meant an ideology which frames military force as a necessary resolver of conflict; 
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“militarisation” being a social process by which military approaches to social problems gain 
elite and popular acceptance.164 Even where described as pacifying, liberating or 
humanitarian, military interventions will, in Zillah Eisenstein’s words, demand “opposition, 
differentiation and the othering of peoples”.165 As well as perpetrating direct physical 
violence, militaries are implicated in the structural violence of military-industrial complexes, 
which absorb vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on achieving human 
security.166 As such, feminists have critiqued how claims to be promoting women’s rights or 
protecting women from CRSV have been used to legitimise military interventions, including 
in Bosnia, Darfur, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.167 When CRSV was in 2015 framed by the UN 
as “a global, moral crisis,”168 feminists again warned that employing the language of crisis 
securitises violence against women in a manner that prioritises military responses over 
more transformative social and political change.169  
Feminist critique of militaries  
Enmeshed with resistance to militarism on a more symbolic level, many feminists see 
militaries as fundamentally different from other institutions, fundamentally problematic, 
focusing on their historical foundation as the institution of state-legitimised violence to 
claim that they are “inherently and irredeemably masculinist and violent”.170 In militaries, 
hegemonic forms of masculinity - variously described as privileging practices of violence 
and misogyny, combined with myths of heroic protection of vulnerable civilians; focused 
upon the domination of women (and subordinate males) and the denigration of the 
feminine; associated with combat and rape - are produced and reproduced. Military culture 
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is moreover dominated by the “potent myth” of combat, that “to be a soldier means 
possibly to experience ‘combat,’ and only in combat lies the ultimate test of a man’s 
masculinity”.171 As Claire Duncanson explains, the dominance of this “combat-orientated 
masculinity” valorises “tough,” aggressive responses to conflict, and feminises non-violent 
responses.172 It is theorised that militarized masculinities not only make militaries 
problematic actors but have effects rippling through society in terms of how all 
masculinities are constructed.173 It is not that every aspect of military masculinity is violent: 
it can also be protective; but, the gendered hierarchy wherein men and “the masculine” are 
strong and correspondingly, women and “the feminine” are weak and dependent is 
continually reproduced.  
This understanding of military culture sees it as not only complicit in but productive of 
sexual violence in peacetime, conflict, and post-conflict settings. That is, “soldiers rape 
because the institutional culture of militaries, and the norms of masculinity which they 
promote, are conducive to rape; and moreover, rape itself is a site at which perpetrators 
performatively construct themselves as soldierly subjects.”174 Scandals around sexual 
harassment and/or sexual violence within the United States, Australian, British, Canadian, 
French, Spanish and New Zealand militaries, among others, evidence deep-rooted gender 
problems in the institutional culture of many Western militaries. Globally, state militaries 
are more likely to be reported as perpetrators of sexual violence than either rebel groups or 
militias.175  
Marsha Henry asks more specific questions as to whether the use of militaries is 
appropriate to address CRSV. She points to the emphasis on combat and acts of violence in 
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military training, and questions whether peacekeepers, in particular, are adequately 
prepared for humanitarian roles.176 She highlights the risk that problematic subcultures 
within militaries lead them to commit violence against local communities; questions 
whether local communities who have been victimised by militarized groups will distinguish 
the military peacekeepers aiming to assist them; and suggests the reputational impact of 
SEA by peacekeepers may have compromised their ability to offer support and services. She 
suggests the generally short rotations of peacekeepers make it difficult for them to develop 
the trusting relationships with local communities, and the risk that military engagement 
with CRSV response militarizes others’ humanitarian work. Nonetheless, Henry goes on to 
conclude that the reality that peacekeepers might encounter victims of sexual violence 
seeking their help compels contemporary militaries to try to prepare themselves.  
Feminist calls for military engagement with CRSV 
It is important to acknowledge, nonetheless, that feminist activists, from the local to the 
international, have actively called for militaries to protect people from CRSV. On the 
adoption of UNSCR 1820, WILPF argued that there needed to be more discussion about 
ending militarism, but also that it was "necessary to act to provide physical protection to 
prevent and respond to sexual violence as it is happening”.177 From around 2011, in 
feminist spaces and advocacy, one begins to find military participants and new attention to 
the possibility of training and directing militaries to actively protect civilians from CRSV. The 
influential Nobel Women’s Initiative issued a “Call to Action” that implicitly argued for more 
active military protection: 
… much more is needed to see an end to crimes of sexual violence. … A 
more coordinated effort involving civil society, government, the military 
and other people working on the ground … 
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… It is unacceptable that such an incident [mass rape] could take place 
within 30 kilometres of a UN peacekeepers’ base where a company of 
80 blue helmet troops was stationed.178 
The Call to Action urged the Canadian Government to implement “training of all Canadian 
military personnel on gender-based violence and protection strategies”.179 Before the 2014 
Global Summit, Britain’s umbrella WPS organisation, GAPS UK, called for stepping up of 
military engagement in CRSV response, advocating for “dialogue between militaries and 
experts about the skills, training, standards and accountability measures needed to prevent 
and respond to [CRSV]".180 In the Summit’s aftermath, the Secretary-General of WILPF 
problematised the strong emphasis on the military as protectors yet commented, “… better 
to have the Australian Lieutenant General … talking of the transformation of the military 
than to pretend the military doesn’t exist … yes of course [UNSCR 1325] must apply to the 
military.”181 This pragmatism is shared by women’s civil society organisations and networks 
around the world that engage with armed forces and with NATO to influence them inter 
alia to better engage with and protect people affected by conflict, and to steer them 
toward gendered transformation.182 
3.3 Envisioning “gendered change” within militaries 
Much of the feminist scholarship discussed above paints a gloomy picture of the potential 
for militaries to protect women and girls from CRSV, and the risk that even if they do, this 
serves to prop up systems of gender subordination that themselves perpetuate CRSV. Other 
feminist scholars, however, are less pessimistic about the prospects for militaries to evolve 
in their internal gender culture and for strategic refocus away from combat, finding 
common ground with cosmopolitan visions of militaries.  
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It was committed anti-militarist the late Cynthia Cockburn, working with Meliha Hubic to 
understand Bosnian women’s perceptions of international peacekeepers, who first asked if 
militaries could be “regendered”.183 Cockburn and Hubic relayed Bosnian women as 
wanting the NATO-led mission to be friendlier, more respectful of the local population, 
better at communicating and more cooperative, but simultaneously to “pursue, even more 
energetically, its military work of pacification, demilitarisation, weapons collection, 
landmine clearance and protection … arrest of war criminals.”184 It was on this basis that 
Cockburn and Hubic articulated “a new kind of soldier, a new kind of military”.185 They 
asked whether military culture could be transformed to allow for the exploration of values 
and choices, to not require the suppression of feelings of weakness and fear, and to “allow 
for bonding between men that is not based on the rejection, diminishing and abuse of 
women and femininity … the despising of less militarized forms of masculinity?”186  
Scholars working within critical military studies have documented shifts in militaries’ ideal 
soldier qualities associated with the recent emphasis on peacekeeping, counterinsurgency 
and stabilisation: soldiers as not only tough and combat-ready, but empathetic and 
culturally aware.187 From her work on British peacekeepers, Duncanson argues there is now 
“an alternative British military masculinity to the combat model; a masculinity that is 
associated as much with conflict resolution as conflict, with the skills and practices of 
communication, negotiation, humanitarianism, sensitivity, compassion and empathy”.188 
Relating these changes to shifting military masculinities, Duncanson and Woodward 
develop the implications of Cockburn and Hubic’s notion of a regendered military as 
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soldiering “constructed through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect, and 
recognition of similarities and shared experiences”, implying a disruption and 
deconstruction of gendered masculine/feminine hierarchies.189 They emphasise the 
importance of militaries building relationships with local populations.  
In theorising paths of change in military masculinities, Duncanson and Woodward reject 
deterministic assumptions that militaries are irredeemably masculinist, arguing that the 
shifts in how women have been accommodated evidence a capacity for militaries to 
change. They highlight that institutional transformations have at times been founded upon 
small, incremental changes; that incremental change can be “radical” and galvanise deep 
shifts.190 They, with others, see the expansion of women’s presence in militaries as 
presenting “opportunities for disruption, subversion and even transformation”.191 Indeed, 
there is diverse evidence, if scattered and anecdotal, that a military contingent that 
includes women can better make contact with local women and marginalized groups; and 
can more easily support conflict-affected women; that having women in operations, within 
a policy, planning and organisational framework to facilitate gender mainstreaming, can 
make operations more gender-sensitive.192 
These are the narratives that militaries are invoking as they commit to prevent and respond 
to CRSV, as highlighted in Chapter 1, and to pursue gender mainstreaming and/or 
implementation of the WPS Agenda. Several armed forces, along with the UN, NATO and 
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the OSCE, and have issued guidance materials on gender in military operations.193 Some 
militaries, to varying degrees, are confronting their internal dynamics of male hegemony. 
Much of the analysis of recent initiatives around gender mainstreaming within militaries is 
broadly optimistic, differing sharply from the tenor of antimilitarist feminist work, and 
illustrating meaningful variance in the gender dynamics within different state militaries.194 
Implicit in the dissonance between these bodies of work is their different underlying belief 
as to whether militaries are likely to change and whether feminists should invest time in 
looking for such change.195 
Cosmopolitan militaries 
Duncanson and Woodward point to some militaries’ shift toward a focus on human security 
as a potential opportunity for regendering in militaries.196 In so doing, they connect feminist 
critical military scholarship with broader debates around how militaries should change to 
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meet the contemporary security context. Key ideas within these are of cosmopolitan 
militaries and the potential for “human security response forces”. 
Theorising around a vision of cosmopolitan democracy provides a framework within which 
new tasks would be asked of military personnel, including the protection of civilians. This 
gave rise to notions of cosmopolitan militaries197, cosmopolitan peacekeeping198 and 
cosmopolitan law-enforcement199 as models through which protection of civilians could be 
given its due emphasis, and the concept of human security operationalised. The militaries 
of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have been offered as examples that 
foreground contributing to international peace and protecting people beyond their own 
nationals.200 These attest that a cosmopolitan military is not necessarily a larger military, 
but one that invests more in peacekeeping and support to humanitarian assistance as 
compared to combat capabilities.  The cosmopolitan military ideal is of a transition to new 
values and roles rather than merely adding new capabilities. Chinkin and Kaldor’s strategy 
of second generation human security, outlined in the previous chapter, envisions: 
Human security personnel would have the task of dampening down 
violence, defending people and property, and, where possible, arresting 
rather than killing those responsible for criminal acts. Such personnel 
must be trained in various skills, including those currently associated 
with military, police, humanitarian aid, healthcare, or development 
expertise.201 
Kaldor, with Shannon Beebe, has elsewhere developed in more detail this ideal: 
The human-security officer is a new type of hero with a mandate to help 
humanity. Groups of human-security personnel could be called 
engagement brigades. Each brigade might contain a mix of capabilities 
ranging from the use of force … [to] capacity to deal with breakdowns in 
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law and order … There is a role for the military, but it is an atypical role - 
in human-security operations, military personnel act more like police, 
protecting people ….202 
To be a cosmopolitan military in this sense requires both “organisational and ‘ideational’ 
transformation”;203 a “profound cognitive shift concerning what it means to be a soldier”.204 
But, in work around cosmopolitan militaries/human security forces, how this radical change 
in military culture and mindset might occur remains largely untheorized. Similarly, the 
questions that these alternate models of militaries raise vis a vis the divisions between 
policing and military roles are little discussed within the literature on cosmopolitan 
militaries. 
Feminist scholars have explored the gender dimensions of this cosmopolitan military ideal. 
Annica Kronsell observes that the tasks of the cosmopolitan military, “civilian-like tasks, 
such as policing, cooperating with locals … have been coded as feminine through military 
practices in the past. Hence, it may be considered a demasculinization.”205 Kronsell and 
Annika Bergman Rosamond see cosmopolitan military practices as potentially transforming 
female as well as male soldiers, and in positive ways. When female NATO soldiers were 
deployed to engage with local women in Afghanistan, doing so simultaneously altered the 
usual protected/protector hierarchies between foreign military and locals and prompted 
the female soldiers to revaluate their gendered identities as a soldier.206 Nonetheless, 
Kronsell traces tensions between militaries’ desire to develop new cosmopolitan skills (so to 
allow them to build relationships with locals, for example) whilst wishing to retain their 
capacity for combat - recognising that it is the latter that militaries regard as their unique 
contribution. She emphasises the potentially radical nature of these shifts, that 
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“cosmopolitan values hold the potential to demilitarize the military.”207 Given that a 
“demilitarisation” of the military is exactly what the main body of feminist anti-militarists 
seek, I argue that there are important linkages to be developed between anti-militarist and 
cosmopolitan work. 
As well as being a vision for UN peacekeeping better able to deliver protection of civilians, 
cosmopolitan ideals have been reflected in proposals for regional forces. Within the 
framework of the EU, a concept was put forward for a "human security response force” 
that combined the capacity for “robust military force” with integrated civilian/military 
action.208 Indeed, the limitations of UN peacekeeping forces being able to deliver protection 
of civilians209 underscore the potential importance of a shift toward cosmopolitan practice 
by major military powers and by regional alliances such as the EU and NATO. NATO has 
been judged unlikely to be a cosmopolitan military organisation,210 but recent 
developments in its approach to the protection of civilians, to be discussed in Chapter 6, 
call for fresh consideration. That the British Armed Forces are now, as will be explained in 
Chapter 7, training “Human Security Advisors” as part of developing human security as a 
“capability” demonstrates that some militaries are taking these ideas seriously. Examining 
the approach of NATO and the British Armed Forces’ to CRSV has the potential to make 
important contributions to understanding the potential for meaningful cosmopolitan 
transformation of militaries. Moreover, my project’s focus on understanding and invocation 
of IHL and IHRL standards offers scope to add new dimensions to cosmopolitan theorising 
in terms of how international law mediates these shifts. 
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This chapter has opened the theoretical framework for this project from the laws of war to 
the warriors. While political discourse (and in some circles, feminist advocacy) has framed 
state militaries as potential perpetrators of CRSV, it also frames militaries as having 
important roles to play in preventing and responding to CRSV. Some militaries – including, 
as will be demonstrated through the case studies to follow, NATO and the British Armed 
Forces - have expressed enthusiasm for these tasks, within broader commitments to gender 
mainstreaming and implementation of the WPS Agenda. For feminist activists and scholars, 
this raises dilemmas. Hostility toward the military is prominent in the feminist 
dissatisfaction with the achievements of the WPS Agenda.211 Cockburn went so far as to 
suggest that the UNSCRs on WPS have been “co-opt[ed] by militarist states and military 
institutions for military purposes.212 Yet, theorising regendered or cosmopolitan militaries 
imagines militaries that better align with feminist and human security agendas. Should 
feminists focus on resisting militaries and militarism, or engage with processes that have 
the potential, some argue, to demilitarise the military? 
The alternate positions regarding the possibilities for gendered change within militaries, 
discussed in this chapter, suggest different sets of expectations for this research. A sceptical 
anti-militarist perspective would expect militaries to engage in CRSV response in a manner 
that reproduces their existing gendered hierarchies. A more hopeful posture toward change 
might expect militaries to engage in CRSV response in a manner that reflects or even 
catalyses a disruption and deconstruction of the gendered masculine/feminine hierarchies 
that are argued to be constitutive of the military. Understanding which of these alternative 
scenarios is unfolding is important at many levels. Most importantly, because if successful 
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ways to protect people from CRSV are being developed within military contexts, fostering, 
sharing and promoting these good practices might help avert or mitigate life-changing harm 
to real women, girls, men and boys caught up in conflict. Speaking to feminist anti-militarist 
scholarship, if one accepts the analysis that hegemonic military masculinities reinforce and 
are reinforced by militarism, changes in models of military masculinity “are not just about 
changes in individual identity, they are about challenging the entire structure of militarism 
and war”.213 Therefore, this research examines the potential for processes within militaries 
related to CRSV prevention and response to disrupt structures of militarism and war.  
This project weaves together two themes that have remained largely dissociated in 
scholarship: feminist critiques of the laws of war (outlined in Chapter 2) and feminist 
understandings of militaries (outlined in this chapter). To these, Chapter 5 will add new 
analysis of legal obligations in relation to CRSV, incorporating previously overlooked human 
rights jurisprudence concerning violence against women. The interactions between these 
three themes - feminist activism, militaries and international law – will then be interrogated 
through the case studies and analysis of NATO and the British Armed Forces. The following 
chapter outlines the methodological approach applied. This study seeks a deeper 
understanding of possibilities to reorient militaries to protect and promote human rights 
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This chapter outlines the methodology through which this project explores its questions 
concerning legal obligations and how they are understood, CRSV prevention and response, 
and gender dynamics. It opens by introducing the feminist legal method employed, then 
explains how the case studies were selected; what sources were selected, why and how; 
and how data analysis was conducted. It concludes with a discussion of ethical 
considerations, data protection and reflexivity. 
4.1 Feminist method 
This research applies a mixed-method socio-legal qualitative approach. It is mixed-method 
in combining doctrinal analysis of traditional legal sources (international treaties, 
jurisprudence and soft law sources, in Chapter 5), with analysis of primary source material 
at the institutional level (governmental and institutional policy, military doctrine and 
training materials), interviews and observational research (in Chapters 6 – 9). I describe it as 
“socio-legal” in the sense that it explores how the law is understood in the context of 
military institutions. In departing from dominant doctrinal approaches to researching IHL, it 
responds to calls from scholars working at the intersections of international law and 
international relations for empirical examinations to understand the effects of international 
law.214 It is inspired by others who have brought the application of IHL to life through 
interviews and observation.215  
My analytical approach blends feminist legal methodologies with theorisations of gender 
and methodologies from feminist security studies. In analysing understandings of the law 
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and the work law is doing, I adopt a method developed by Charlesworth and Chinkin in The 
Boundaries of International Law,216 which Karin Engle terms “structural bias feminism”.217 
Structural bias feminism on one level examines how “apparently ‘neutral’ principles and 
rules of international law can be seen to operate differently with respect to women and 
men.”218 At a deeper level, it “reveals the gendered and sexed nature of the basic concepts 
of international law, for example, ‘states’, ‘security’, ‘order’ and ‘conflict’”.219 It reveals 
gendered biases in the making, structures, operation and symbolic content of international 
law. Section 2.2’s analysis of gender bias in IHL demonstrates a structural bias feminism 
approach. Applied intersectionally, structural bias feminism can show how the law affects 
women of colour, indigenous women, and women from the Global South and people of 
diverse sexual orientations and gender identities and expressions in particular ways.220 
Ways to surface structural bias include what Charlesworth describes as “searching for 
silences” - reflecting upon what is ignored or treated as irrelevant, what ideas are feminised 
and devalued – and attending to how dichotomies and distinctions are drawn – such as 
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non-conflict related/conflict-related.221 I sought to be attentive to law operating not only in 
terms of formal prescriptions and proscriptions but symbolically; to go “beyond 
compliance” to the wide range of real-world effects that can be produced by involving and 
applying the law.222 For example, analysing when and how law was referred to in non-
prescriptive forms in relation to CRSV, with what apparent effect. 
My application of feminist legal method was enriched by exploring theorising and 
methodologies in feminist security studies.223 Reflexivity that is attentive to power, a 
hallmark of feminist method, is discussed in section 4.6. In exploring how international law 
directly engages with gender and CRSV I found it useful to apply Rosalind Cavaghan’s 
concept of “gender knowledge”.224 Cavaghan, who examines gender mainstreaming within 
the EU, explains this as examining: 
… explicit and implicit representations concerning the differences 
between the sexes and the relations between them, the origins and 
normative significance of these, the rationale and evidence 
underpinning them and their material form [such as text or speech] … 
an analytical concept that we can use to capture and analyse competing 
ideas about gender and gender inequality …225 
If we take as a baseline that all institutions are gendered, a gender knowledge approach 
helps to avoid the error of treating gender policy as dropped into a vacuum. It recognises 
that ideas about gender pervade and shape institutions. Introducing gender policy or 
training into an institution is not introducing ideas about gender and gender inequality but 
introducing competing ideas about gender and gender inequality. A gender knowledge 
approach helps one draw out “established ways of thinking about gender dominating 
within an institution … how gender and gender inequality is perceived and understood, or 
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indeed ignored”.226 Cavaghan’s research on the implementation of gender policy within the 
EU demonstrates the value of going beyond formal textual sources to how gender policy is 
understood “in action”; for example, how “re-interpretations of official or written policy 
occur on the ground”.227 In the context of this project, this approach directs attention to, 
for example, how CRSV as a “new” issue for militaries is understood in the context of pre-
existing discourses on women and gender, and the shifts that occur between policy texts 
and implementation. 
4.2 Case study selection  
This project explores its research questions through two case studies: NATO, a 
multinational security organisation, and the British Armed Forces.  
NATO is an important case to study by virtue of the scope of its influence on some seventy 
NATO member and partner armed forces, and the scale of its footprint. Katharine Wright 
has demonstrated that NATO acts as a “teaching machine” in relation to WPS and gender, 
with influence flowing amongst NATO members and Partners.228 NATO is a thirty-member 
political and military alliance. Established in 1949 by ten European nations, plus Canada and 
the United States, NATO has since expanded to include a further eighteen European 
nations. A broader group of fifty nations is part of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC): a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related 
issues among NATO Allies and partner countries.229 Moreover, another twenty nations 
cooperate with NATO through other modes of partnership, in some cases making 
substantial troop contributions to NATO missions and operations. In terms of conventional 
war capabilities, the seventy NATO members and partners include fourteen of the world’s 
twenty strongest militaries.230 NATO operations and missions have been on the increase 
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since the early 1990s. As will be outlined further in Chapter 6, it is active in a wide range of 
theatres and across a range of different types of operations.  
In terms of CRSV, since 2014 NATO has adopted a range of policy and training measures to 
direct and guide operational responses to sexual violence and claims to be a leader on the 
issue.231 While there is scholarship examining NATO’s engagement with WPS,232 and a small 
body of work looking at the intersections of gender and IHL in NATO operations,233 this has 
not yet holistically considered how NATO’s approaches WPS and CRSV are implemented nor 
examined NATO doctrine. 
The United Kingdom (UK) is likewise significant on a global stage, acting as a “norm-setter” 
or “norm entrepreneur”234 in relation to both WPS and CRSV. The UK is influential within 
the UN Security Council on both WPS and protection of civilians, described as “penholder” 
on both.235 The British Government has been at the forefront of advocating increased 
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military capacity to address CRSV, most notably during the Global Summit. The British 
Armed Forces are recognised as highly influential on other Western militaries on several 
levels. For example, the “Anglo-American Warrior” is described as a masculinity ideal for 
Norwegian soldiers.236 Concerning IHL, the Canadian Judge Advocate General notes that the 
UK and US armed forces “often set the example and the ‘best practice’ for the role and 
responsibilities of a military Legal Advisor, both in the armed forces and in government”.237  
In terms of CRSV, since 2005 the British Armed Forces have made prominent international 
statements affirming it as a priority for armed forces, including through the establishment 
of a Women, Peace & Security Chiefs of Defence Network in 2017. Whilst there is a mature 
body of scholarship on gender and the British Armed Forces,238 this has not yet considered 
either WPS or the role of international law. 
Additionally, there were pragmatic reasons for my focus on NATO and the British Armed 
Forces. With each, I have had prior professional contact, which facilitated access to 
interview subjects and opportunities for observation. The ethical issues that this raised are 
discussed in section 4.5.  
4.3 Data selection  
The case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 generate and synthesise qualitative content analysis of 
the following primary data. 
• Documentation in the form of: 
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o policies, action plans, doctrine, directives, guidelines, procedures and training 
standards and materials related to CRSV (through a broad lens encompassing 
protection of civilians, gender and women) and/or the application of IHL and IHRL 
in military operations: and 
o highest level defence strategy and policy (for example, NATO Summit Declarations, 
British Defence Doctrine). 
• Participant observation of military education and training sessions related to CRSV.  
• Qualitative semi-structured interviews with key personnel responsible for developing 
doctrine, directives, training and/or education related to CRSV, including military 
lawyers, gender advisors, trainers and doctrine writers. 
According to the ICRC, doctrine, education and training are important in transposing the 
rules of international law “into concrete mechanisms or measures to ensure compliance” 
by armed forces.239 The ICRC describes “doctrine” as the standard principles guiding military 
decision-making, tactics and behaviour, expressed not only in doctrine documents but in 
directives, policies, procedures, codes of conduct and reference manuals and their 
equivalents. In this thesis, I refer to these sources collectively as “documentation” and 
include training materials within this category. “Doctrine” has a specific meaning within 
NATO, because shared doctrine is the cornerstone of NATO’s ability to operate in unison 
and with Partners.  
NATO doctrine, as a common language for operations, is essential to 
interoperability. Accepted and applied doctrine is necessary for effective 
coalition building. At the intellectual level, doctrine allows commanders 
from different nations to apply a common approach to operations, while 
at the procedural level, it enables Allied forces to operate together … 240 
 
239 Integrating the law (2007) p. 1. The ICRC also frames equipment and sanctions as important. In 
this study, analysis of equipment is omitted, being of limited relevance to sexual violence response 
(although not irrelevant, for example as regards equipping militaries with post-rape treatment kits). 
Examination of sanctions, too, was not part of this project, beyond where sanctions are referred to in 
documentary sources. Whilst remaining alert for public discussion of relevant sanctions, I made a 
pragmatic judgement that I would be unlikely to be able to access information about internal 
disciplinary processes within NATO or the UK military concerning sexual violence cases. 






Doctrine also drives the development and content of militaries’ education and training 
curriculum, and the functions set out in doctrine dictate the allocation of resources.241 As 
such, formal military doctrine is a critical source for understanding the priority and meaning 
afforded to any issue and what militaries will do in operations. 
The documentary sources outlined above can be expected to reveal formal institutional 
norms concerning CRSV and military responses to it. The ICRC’s recent study on IHL 
compliance theorises informal norms as also important. These include the influences of 
informal social norms within peer groups (which might take the form of informal warrior 
creeds or group ethos) and of external contacts and networks, including leaders outside of 
the military, the media and international organisations.242 This study includes observation 
of military education and training and interviews as a way of seeking to understand these 
types of peer group and external influences on militaries’ understanding of CRSV and of 
military roles. More specifically, Michael Scharf and Laura Dickinson have shown how 
interviews with military lawyers can build nuanced accounts of how international law 
operates in shaping decisions and affecting policy around use of force and IHL.243 More 
generically, elite interviews and observations offer the possibility of “information not 
recorded elsewhere, or not yet available (if ever) for public release”.244 I hoped that 
through building personal rapport in interviews, I would access “depth, nuance, 
complexity” beyond that found in documents.245 
4.4 Data collection, generation and analysis 
A database of NATO and British Armed Forces documentation was created in the Computer 
Assisted Qualitative Analysis software NVivo 10. Only five relevant documents were not 
available electronically, so to be subjected to Nvivo analysis. The categories of 
documentation analysed and eventually included in this project were compiled through a 
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process of “theoretical sampling,”246 wherein ongoing collection and analysis of data, 
beginning with a small number of NATO and British policies, responded to concepts derived 
from initial data analysis. Other categories of data, including media statements, tweets and 
(in Britain) responses to parliamentary questions, were considered but discarded as less 
likely to influence military actions.  
The dataset created mirrors the period from which the first significant normative 
commitment to military engagement in sexual violence response was made, which I place 
as the adoption of UNSCR 1674 on the protection of civilians in conflict on 28 April 2006. As 
such, it contains documentation dating from the beginning of 2006. Upon reviewing this 
documentation, I collected earlier versions of key documents, where available, against 
which to compare changes made after April 2006. I continued data collection hand-in-hand 
with data analysis through to the end of January 2020.  
The comparably long time span of my documentary review is one of the distinctive 
methodological contributions of this project to scholarship on WPS and NATO. Existing 
research around NATO’s integration of gender in military operations is dominated by that 
conducted pre-2015, when NATO’s WPS rhetoric was most vocal. Many scholars working on 
that period drew optimistic conclusions based on NATO’s policy commitments and have 
seemingly turned their attention to other issues. This project’s extended focus leads its 
findings as concerns the institutionalisation of NATO’s policy commitments to WPS to be 
markedly less positive than some earlier and contemporary research, demonstrating the 
importance of returning to institutions to evaluate how policy developments are 
implemented or stagnate. 
The comprehensive review of a broad range of sources - policy, directives, guidelines, 
training standards and doctrine - is a second distinct methodological contribution of this 
project. Many comparable studies of approaches to gender and WPS in NATO and national 
militaries have neglected doctrine and operational guidelines as a key source, focusing 
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almost entirely on policy and high-level action plans.247 Moreover, my review of 
documentation is broader than comparable research in encompassing not only documents 
“on” WPS and CRSV and the most evidently relevant issues (such as peacekeeping and 
stabilisation), but the institutions’ overarching strategy and doctrine. This enables this 
research to situate discourse concerning commitments to CRSV within wider strategic 
narratives; and indeed, to analyse the disconnects. 
Policy, political guidance, reports, directives, guidelines, and procedures 
Political statements, policies and related reports and directives, guidelines and procedures 
relevant to CRSV and IHL were collected from the official NATO and British Government 
websites. I built a database of key documents related to CRSV by searching these websites 
using variants on the expressions “women, peace and security,” “sexual violence in 
conflict,” “protection of civilians,” “law of armed conflict,” “humanitarian law” and in the 
British case also “PSVI”.248 Preliminary analysis and later questioning of interviewees 
indicated these terms were adequate to identify all relevant documents. For the British 
Armed Forces case study, I also collected all the UK national reports to the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives from the NATO website. I continued to monitor these 
websites through to the end of January 2020, alert for any new documents that might be 
relevant to this research. During the course of interviews and analysis, a small number of 
reports, directives, guidelines and procedures referred to in other texts or by interviewees 
in a manner suggesting their relevance were added to the database. 
I used a more tailored approach to collecting highest level defence strategy and policy, 
informed by literature on NATO and on British security. For NATO, I collected all Summit 
Declarations and Communiqués and NATO’s Strategic Concept. For the British Armed 
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Forces, I collected successive National Security Strategies, Defence Engagement Strategy 
and related reports. 
Twenty-two NATO policies, action plans and political declarations were collected, listed in 
section 1 of Annex 2. Twenty-two NATO reports were collected, listed in section 2 of Annex 
2. Twenty-four NATO directives, guidelines and procedures were collected, listed in section 
4 of Annex 2. 
Twenty-eight British policies and action plans were collected, listed in section 1 of Annex 3. 
Nineteen British reports were collected. Additionally, ten UK Annual Reports to the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives (as it became known) were collected. These are listed 
in section 2 of Annex 3. Three British directives, guidelines and procedures were collected, 
listed in section 4 of Annex 3. 
Military doctrine 
Collecting military doctrine required a different strategy, as there is no doctrine titled 
“WPS” or “Sexual Violence” in the manner of policy and guidelines, and doctrine is not 
presented thematically. Existing literature contained hints of what might be relevant to the 
protection of civilians, and military informants made suggestions, but I found it necessary 
to actively and widely review the content of doctrine to gain a sense of potential relevance 
and where content at different levels would be found. Accordingly, I approached the 
potential relevance of doctrinal publications broadly. Initially, only items that did not 
appear to have any potential relevance to dealings with local populations in overseas 
operations, related understandings of IHL and IHRL obligations, or gender roles were 
excluded from my collection (examples being doctrine on Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
cyber, and maritime coordination).  
The following sections detail how and where doctrine was sourced, then how a smaller 
subset was identified for close analysis.  
Sourcing NATO doctrine  
In a first stage, NATO doctrine and training standards were assembled based upon 






sources helped to identify promising search terms. In a second stage, I conducted a 
comprehensive search as follows.  
a. Of the online NATO Standardisation Document Database for any publicly available 
and current document with following terms in their title: “law” “protection” 
“civilian” “women” “gender” “sexual” or “rules of engagement”. Those documents 
identified were reviewed for relevance. Then, the full list of 308 database items was 
scanned to identify further potentially relevant standards and to verify that the 
search terms were identifying all materials dealing with WPS, CRSV, or 
understandings of law in armed conflict.249 
b. In the NATO Terminology database as regards terms including “gender” or 
“sexual”.250 
I focused my searches from 2005 but looked back further to find specific withdrawn and 
superseded versions of key doctrine to permit the identification of relevant changes. Where 
documents identified as potentially relevant in doctrine were not available through the 
NATO Standardisation Document Database, I looked for them online using Google searches. 
Using this approach, forty-one NATO doctrine publications and standards were collected. 
Sourcing British doctrine 
The British Armed Forces ascribe to NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, so all of the doctrine 
compiled for NATO applies also to the British forces. However, I noticed early on that British 
personnel rarely referred to NATO guidelines and policies. For this reason, I collected British 
doctrine independently, to ensure I was identifying what was most relevant in a British 
context. 
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In a first stage, British doctrine was assembled based on a handful of doctrinal documents 
referred to by military informants. In a second stage, a more comprehensive database of 
doctrine was compiled drawing from: 
a. the “gov.uk” online collections of: “Joint Doctrine Publication,” “Joint Doctrine 
Note,” “Allied Joint Doctrine,” “Allied Joint Publication” and those “Joint Service 
Publications” listed under “law and legal issues”; and 
b. the National Archives’ Index of Joint Doctrine and Joint Warfare Publications and 
Index of Joint Discussion/Joint Doctrine Notes and Joint Doctrine Pamphlets.251 
These collections are not searchable, so relevant doctrine was compiled by searching 
individual texts for the terms “law,” “protection,” “civilian,” “women,” “gender,” “sexual,” 
or “rules of engagement”. Using this approach, sixty-nine British doctrine publications were 
collected. 
Selecting the most relevant NATO and UK doctrine for close analysis 
Initially, I attempted to review and close code all of the 110 NATO and British doctrine 
publications I had collected. Realising this was producing too fine-grained a level of detail 
for the scope of this project, I analysed the data to pare out less relevant material in two 
steps.  
First, I marked for analysis what the British Army describes as capstone and keystone 
doctrine (using its Army Doctrine Primer as a source to understand the doctrine 
hierarchy).252 This identified seven NATO plus seven UK-specific doctrine documents. 
Second, I ran Nvivo text search queries on NATO and British doctrine using the terms 
“gender,” “sexual,” “civilian” or “law”. Based upon a review of the results of these queries 
against the preliminary analysis and coding of doctrine I had already undertaken, I 
identified doctrine with at least 1.25% coverage of these terms or at least sixty-five 
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references to them as of high relevance. This identified thirteen high relevance NATO 
doctrine documents, as well as a further fourteen UK-specific doctrine documents.  
Combining these two strategies, twenty NATO doctrine documents and twenty-one UK-
specific doctrine documents were subjected to close analysis, as high level or highly 
relevant. These are listed in Section 3 of Annex 2 and Annex 3, respectively. 
Training materials and standards 
NATO-wide training standards and resources concerning IHL, IHRL, gender and/or sexual 
violence, were sourced from the NATO Standardisation Document Database and the 
webpages of NATO Allied Command Transformation,253 or shared with me by trainers. The 
thirteen training materials collected are listed in section 5 of Annex 2. 
In the British Armed Forces, individual trainers develop and adapt materials on CRSV for 
different training audiences and contexts. As such, I analysed British education and training 
materials on CRSV in the context of observations of training. There are standardised IHL 
training materials used in the form of Military Annual Training Tests, but these are 
classified, and I could not access them.  
Interviews  
Interviewees were identified through purposive snowball sampling, initially from pre-
existing professional contacts. Issues that this approach raised and dynamics within the 
interviews are discussed in section 4.6 below. I conducted twenty-four semi-structured 
interviews between June 2016 and November 2018, with six NATO staff and one 
independent advisor to NATO (three female, four male); and fourteen members of the 
British Armed Forces and three civilians working within British Armed Forces institutions 
(seven female, ten male).254 Interviews with NATO personnel are listed in section 6 of Annex 
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2, and with British personnel in section 6 of Annex 3. Interviews with seven people were 
conducted via Skype video call; one by phone; sixteen face-to-face, determined simply by 
the feasibility of getting physically together. The face-to-face interviews took place in a 
variety of places: military bases, cafés, New College, offices, an interviewee’s kitchen and 
my own study. I additionally conducted one focus group with British Army trainees in 
November 2016, when the opportunity to do so was volunteered by an interviewee.  
I developed a slightly different interview schedule for each interviewee, according to what I 
knew of their function. In general, interviews worked through their tasking as regards 
developing responses to CRSV; what initiatives had been or were being developed in terms 
of doctrine, training and education or operations; how they went about developing these 
initiatives; how they understand militaries’ IHL and IHRL obligations applying to CRSV; 
challenges; and gender culture within the military/NATO. A sample interview schedule is at 
Annex 4.  
It was not possible to identify personnel who had been working on developing doctrine, 
directives, training and education related to CRSV for the entire period since 2005. The 
frequent changes of post within both NATO and the British Armed Forces and lack of 
personal attribution of work generally made it impossible to identify people who had 
worked on older documents or delivered training and education in the past. Thus, data 
gathered through interviews and observations of training is a series of snapshots from 
January 2016 to June 2019, rather than a coherent dataset stretching back to 2005.  
Observation of education, training and public events 
Opportunities to observe education and training were pursued opportunistically, initially 
through an individual met at a WPS conference and a professional contact, and then in a 
snowball manner. I observed three NATO and three British Armed Forces 
education/training seminars, between January 2016 and January 2019. In two of these 
trainings, I myself delivered sessions as an invited expert. Additionally, I observed three 
public sessions of the Annual Conference of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives 






personnel, academics and practitioners. These served as further observations. Observations 
are listed in section 7 of Annex 2, and section 6 of Annex 3.  
The interviewees and trainees in this project can be seen as a purposive sample in the 
sense of this study using them to draw inferences about the entire population of the British 
Armed Forces and of NATO staff. To determine how many interviews or observations are 
“enough,” it is customary in qualitative research to strive for “saturation … the point at 
which no new information or themes are observed in the data”.255 I was left feeling that 
“saturation is reliant on researcher qualities and has no boundaries”256 – that new 
information and new potential themes could potentially have continued to emerge ad 
infinitum; I was bounded more by the scope of the project than the subject. Nonetheless, 
the key theoretical elements that I am working with in this thesis were in place by the time I 
had completed the bulk of my fieldwork in mid-2018. 
Analysis 
Twenty-two of my twenty-five interviews were recorded and transcribed (using a 
professional transcription service, which I checked against the recording). I made 
handwritten notes of three interviews (which I unexpectedly had the opportunity to 
conduct and was unprepared to record) and during observations. These I myself 
transcribed. All transcriptions were added to the NVivo database and subjected to 
qualitative data analysis. 
In the initial analysis of documentary sources, I coded around the following more empirical 
themes: military initiatives regarding CRSV; military recognition of CRSV (for example, who 
are the victims and perpetrators of sexual violence?); and military understandings of their 
obligations concerning CRSV, including applicable law. This was orientated to explore not 
only what militaries might and are doing in relation to CRSV, but whether this affects any 
gendered change within military culture, as discussed in Chapter 3. I also coded around the 
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following theoretical themes: feminist critiques of armed forces and international law; and 
mechanisms by and conditions under which international laws and norms have effect. 
These were dimensions to explore the questions posed in Chapter 2 as regards how 
militaries apply IHL and IHRL in relation to CRSV, gendered hierarchies of protection and 
prioritisation of military lives, how IHL might act to legitimate military practices, and what 
difference human-rights led approaches might make. This coding was helpful to iteratively 
shape my research; but as analysis developed, I largely worked with my sources 
chronologically, using text queries to explore a range of factors of interest. 
Throughout all analysis, I was attentive to what was not mentioned, what was framed as 
irrelevant or unreasonable or impossible, and gendered dichotomies and distinctions, as 
outlined in the discussion of structural bias feminism in section 4.1. As such, I analysed data 
simultaneously to explore what was being described as being done or directed, as well as 
underlying ideas, assumptions and understandings concerning women and men, sexual 
violence, military roles and the law. In developing this analytical frame, I was mindful of the 
tensions between examining data from a more theoretical perspective that risks 
“inhibit[ing] forming fresh ideas and promote[ing] tunnel-vision”257 and by avoiding theory 
missing connections between data and important research questions.258 As will be 
discussed further below, I endeavoured to be constantly reflexive as to my attitudes 
towards my data. 
4.5 Ethical considerations and data protection 
My research proposal was reviewed by the University of Edinburgh Law School’s Research 
Ethics and Governance Committee.259 Through the course of the project, I periodically 
reviewed my practices to ensure they complied with University guidance to meet evolving 
standards, including the General Data Protection Regulation and Data Protection Act 2018. 
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Early in the project, I assured myself through review of the guidelines and discussion with 
more experienced scholars and contacts within the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) that 
my research did not require formal approval by the MoD’s Research Ethics Committee.260 
There is no comparable process within NATO, as far as I was able to ascertain, for vetting 
and approval of research involving NATO staff.  
Since 2009, I have been in contact with some NATO and British Armed Forces staff through 
a position I hold with an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) that works on WPS. I here 
refer to this as “my IGO work”. My IGO work has involved attending NATO conferences as 
an expert speaker, facilitating NATO meetings, and conducting training for NATO and the 
British Armed Forces, all broadly encouraging NATO and the British Armed Forces to 
implement the WPS Agenda and/or promote gender equality. Through this, I had a pre-
existing professional relationship with some interviewees. This required careful attention to 
consent and reflexivity. 
Consent 
I paid particular attention to ensuring meaningful informed consent by interviewees, 
trainees and (co-)trainers, aware that military personnel likely could not opt out of 
delivering or attending training where I was conducting research and of the potential for 
confusion between my research and my IGO work. Interviewees and individuals authorising 
observation of training received a version of the research information sheet at Annex 5.261 
Where I was conducting participant observation, I endeavoured to make sure that my dual 
role as trainer and researcher was made clear (for example, in the training programme, on 
my badge) and took time to explain it. I made available and verbally presented the research 
information to trainees and (co-)trainers, explaining how participants could privately opt-
out of having any of their interactions noted or referred to (even anonymously). In several 
 
260 Ministry of Defence, Research Involving Human Participants, Part 1: Directive (2014) para. 7. 
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academics were actively invited to attend both, and I and other civilian participants were introduced 
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interviews and conversations during training sessions, individuals requested that specific 
comments be “off the record”. I respected this by omitting such material from my analysis. 
Where any participant had any contact or possible knowledge of me through my IGO work, 
I took care to explain that I was acting in a separate personal research capacity. I had 
thought when planning my fieldwork, that because I visited NATO sites from time to time in 
the context of my IGO job, I could conduct interviews on these occasions. I quickly realised 
that “running together” my IGO work and this research would be inappropriate in terms of 
both the professional confidentiality accompanying my encounters in my IGO capacity, and 
the integrity of my research. As regards the British Armed Forces, I had a less-developed 
pre-existing relationship so was more easily able to pursue interviews and observations as a 
researcher. The result was that I conducted fewer NATO interviews and observations than I 
intended. However, given that functions related to WPS and CRSV within NATO are 
concentrated in a small number of individuals, and there is more extensive documentation 
of NATO approaches, I do not believe that this compromised the comprehensiveness of my 
research.  
Anonymity 
Through the research process, my interview and observational data necessarily included 
identifiable personal information (name, email address, position), although no data in a 
“special category”.262 I pseudonymised this data, removing names and other identifying 
information. This thesis identifies participants only by generic functions, with care to 
preserve their anonymity, and as such contains no personal data.  
Data security 
I am the only person with access to my raw data, with the exception that recordings of 
interviews were shared with a professional transcriber (within the UK). All such files were 
anonymised, and password protected. Electronic data is stored in password-protected files, 
 






on a system that is encrypted and protected with Norton LifeLock. Paper records are 
anonymised and are stored in a locked filing cabinet.  
Personal information and recordings of interviews will be retained only until this project is 
complete. 
4.6 Reflexivity and spaces between  
Phyllis Rose said of qualitative research: “There is no neutrality. There is only greater or less 
awareness of one’s biases”.263 Feminist methodologies emphasise the reflexivity of the 
researcher: taking account of one’s subjectivity and how it inhibits or facilitates research 
and shapes the knowledge that one produces and shares; how our identities, values and 
attitudes shape the types of questions we ask, the nature of our interactions with 
interviewees and our interpretation of data.264 This is likewise an active discussion in critical 
military studies, although in writing on international law, as Sarah Nouwen discusses, 
explicit reflexivity is unusual.265 
Because this project intersects with work I have long done as a “practitioner,” I inevitably 
brought to it assumptions and emotions. I have found reflecting upon my own biases and 
perspectives a meaningful and productive aspect of this research. For example, in my 
project’s initial phase I did not intend to include SEA, on the hazy assumption that this was 
not a significant issue as far as my case studies were concerned. As I became aware through 
 
263 Rose (1985) cited S. C. Dwyer and J. L. Buckle, ‘The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider 
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politics of accountability in studying the British military’ (2016) 2 Critical Military Studies 70–83; C. 
Baker, V. Basham, S. Bulmer, H. Gray, and A. Hyde, ‘Encounters with the Military’ (2016) 18 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 140–54; S. M. H. Nouwen, ‘“As You Set out for Ithaka”: 
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interviewing of just how weakly SEA was addressed, I came to recognise this as a bias 
against fully seeing the forces I was studying as potential abusers, and to include SEA. I have 
been conscious of reluctance to draw conclusions critical of the work of individuals whom I 
like and believe well-intentioned. I found that progressively strengthening the 
anonymisation of my interview material helped to forestall this bias. I continued to read 
critical literature throughout my project, challenging my own attitudes toward militarism. I 
became aware that for reasons associated with race, class and family, I found much in a 
military environment comfortable that others might find alienating. 
In any engagement between researcher and researched, including interviews, there are 
complex and unstable power relations.266 My prior engagement with some of my 
interviewees and the institutions I was researching called for care concerning the dynamics 
between myself and those interviewees. I took various steps to establish a degree of 
formality and professionalism in my diverse interview spaces. At the same time, I was open 
“to bringing [my] personal role into the research relationship by answering participants’ 
questions, sharing knowledge and experience”.267 Literature on interviewing elites and 
peers articulates some of the dynamics I experienced, wherein we were each bringing our 
professional credibility into the interview space, mutually evaluating each other’s 
knowledge and insight.268 As an interviewer, I was often, I believe, neither an insider nor 
entirely an outsider, occupying a “space between”.269 With some interviewees, we would 
each identify as part of a shared global community of WPS advocates; yet, with military 
personnel, I was always an outsider/non-group member because of my civilian status.  
In critical military scholarship, research based on high levels of access to the military itself is 
often considered at risk of being “militarized,” in the sense of co-opted by the institution 
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and its priorities.270 But in feminist work, as Aiko Holvikivi discusses, complex dynamics 
between researcher and researched are not uncommon, “often done from locations that 
are neither fully inside nor fully outside an academic discipline, professional organisation or 
social formation.”271 Insider dynamics might risk bias though the interviewer and 
interviewee each having “an interest in appearing well to each other intellectually”.272 The 
impact is unpredictable: interviewees might seek to appear well either by playing up their 
institution’s performance or being highly critical of it. Mindful of this, wherever possible I 
checked interviewees’ key claims against documentary sources and between interviewees 
and sought out independent assessments and reviews. Balanced against risks attendant 
upon semi-insiderness, I believe that throughout this project my longstanding engagement 
with militaries as a practitioner helped me to an unusual level of access to interviewees, 
training sites and honest reflections. As will be evident in the case studies to follow, I was 
able to reach below the veneer of what is said on podiums and in policies. 
Conclusions  
The glaring limitation of this project is its weakness in terms of direct engagement with 
communities affected by CRSV. Ann Tickner talks of using women’s experiences as an 
indicator of the “reality” against which research questions are formulated.273 It was beyond 
my capacity (for multiple reasons) to attempt field research in communities that have 
experienced NATO or British military interventions since 2005. I have, however, sought to 
take account of women’s experiences in centring perspectives arising from grassroots 
feminist activism, as well as the theorising around “regendering” of militaries that has its 
roots in the experiences of Bosnian women (as described in Chapter 3). Ideally, this 
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research would also explore what women and girls affected by CRSV have to say about 
militaries being tasked to prevent and respond to it. Although there is some excellent 
research that engages with communities in this manner,274 it is not able to speak to NATO 
and British interventions in the period of this study.  
Recognising these constraints, this research does not aspire to decisively declare what 
militaries should do to prevent and respond to CRSV. Any such directions should always be 
developed through inclusive engagement with communities affected (discussed further in 
Part III). Still, through the unprecedented scope of its documentary analysis, combined with 
an unusual degree of access to military personnel and normally closed training spaces, it 




274 E.g. Baaz and Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?; Swaine, ‘Beyond Strategic Rape and 










PART II: THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 
Chapter 5  
CRSV and a military’s legal obligations 
The application of law in this contemporary operating environment is … 
challenging and demanding … uncertain and unpredictable. The soldier 
requires and deserves a degree of certainty and clarity which, 
regrettably, it is often not possible to provide. 
P. McEvoy, ‘Law at the operational level (Chapter 6)’ in D. Whetham 
(ed.), Ethics, Law and Military Operations, (Basingstoke, Eng.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), pp. 108–34 p. 110-111. 
 
Chapter 2 illustrated how feminist activism around CRSV has been grounded in the 
conviction that the content of international law matters. Likewise, the visions of human 
security and of cosmopolitan militaries described in Chapters 2 and 3 emphasise the 
importance of their compliance with international law, and in particular IHRL. Yet, activism, 
policy discourse and scholarship which consider military engagement with prevention and 
response to CRSV has paid little attention to the status of the suggested military tasks 
(measures to prevent and respond to CRSV) in terms of IHL or IHRL obligations. As such, 
questions running through this research are: how are the feminist legal victories concerning 
CRSV translated into military operations? Is international law playing a role in militaries’ 
transition toward cosmopolitanism, or regendering?  
This Part II of the thesis returns to the legal standards in relation to CRSV and goes on to 
explore how they are understood and internalised in NATO and the British Armed Forces. 
This chapter opens by explaining the complex interaction between IHL and IHRL in 
contemporary military operations (section 5.1). It then draws out in detail a military’s 
positive obligations under IHL and IHRL concerning prevention, investigation and 
prosecution of CRSV by third parties (section 5.2) and prohibition, prevention and 
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punishment of CRSV by their own forces (section 5.3).275 Its analysis is innovative in tracing 
the implications of applying a holistic vision of IHRL to military operations, including a 
state’s due diligence obligations in respect of violence against women. While legal analysis 
structured around tasks rather than around the context of the operation and/or the nature 
of the conflict is atypical, because the legal regimes applicable to contemporary conflict are 
so often fluid and contingent upon a difficult-to-determine set of facts, a task-orientated 
analysis can bring important insights.  
This chapter establishes a frame of reference for the third theme of this project: the 
obligations upon militaries under IHL and IHRL in relation to CRSV, and how militaries 
understand these. It is followed by the two case studies, of NATO (Chapter 6) and the 
British Armed Forces (Chapter 7), each tracing how the institution has engaged with the 
issue of CRSV over the last fifteen years. Chapters 8 and 9 then go deeper into examining 
how NATO and British Armed Forces understand their legal obligations in terms of CRSV, 
and how understanding of CRSV is mediated by the institutions’ gendered strategic 
cultures. 
5.1 Convergence and complexity in legal regimes applicable to 
military operations 
The legal frameworks governing a nation’s involvement in any overseas operation depend 
upon the legal basis for that operation. State armed forces deploy overseas within a wide 
range of legal and institutional contexts. These include (but are not limited to) where 
armed forces are: engaged in armed conflict as combatants, for example, based on an 
asserted right to self-defence or as an occupying force or acting unilaterally in support of 
another state; part of a UN peacekeeping force, under the ultimate authority and control of 
the UN; part of an operation carried out by a regional organisation (for example, the AU or 
EU) or a coalition of states (for example, NATO), which may have peacekeeping and/or 
 
275 This is not the full range of activities that legal obligations in relation to CRSV might potentially 
dictate, which might include, for example, providing medical care, education, special provisions for 
children or detainees. These are the activities, however, emphasized for militaries in the UNSCRs on 
sexual violence in conflict, as outlined in Chapter 3. 
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combat functions alongside non-combat functions; and deployed outside of conflict to 
provide bilateral assistance to an ally. Where an operation takes place within an armed 
conflict, the legal frameworks might simultaneously encompass IHL, IHRL, international 
criminal law, customary and general principles of international law, norms derived from the 
UN Charter (for example with regards the right to use force in defence of a Security Council 
mandate to protect civilians) and the requirements of the domestic legal frameworks of 
those states concerned (see Figure 2). The latter might incorporate a nation’s domestic 
criminal law regarding, for example, how sexual violence is understood. Host nation 
domestic law is also important, particularly in operations involving support to a national 
government. Its application to foreign forces might be regulated through a Status of Forces 
Agreement.  
Characterising the legal regime applicable to a military operation at any specific time is 
often an immensely complex task. It may be contingent upon inter alia: whether any armed 
conflict is characterised as international or non-international; the regional and national 
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Figure 2: Key legal frameworks for military operations 
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location of the operation; the characteristics of opposing armed forces or groups; the 
international and domestic law commitments of the state parties involved; the intensity of 
the violence and the organisation of the parties involved; the character, frequency and 
impact of actions of the force concerned; and the character and wording of any UN 
mandate in place.276 Against this complexity, applying the law cannot generate for militaries 
a series of lists of legally obligated tasks categorised by operation type. It can, however, 
identify the legal principles that should be applied in their policy, doctrine, training, 
planning and operations. In doing so, IHRL cannot be overlooked. 
The complex application of human rights law in armed conflict  
International juridical opinion since 2004 has confirmed that IHL and IHRL are 
complementary, rather than mutually exclusive during armed conflict. This is described as 
“convergence” of IHRL and IHL in armed conflict. The interaction between the two bodies of 
law depends upon the situation, activities and specific right in question.277 This co-
applicability of IHRL with IHL raises particularly complex legal questions for multinational 
operations amongst coalition partners that are party to different IHRL instruments, 
 
276 See discussion in: L. Colassis and K. Dörmann, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Iraq Conflict’ 
(2004) German Yearbook of International Law 293–342; S. Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in 
international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’ (2009) 91 International Review 
of the Red Cross 69–94; J. K. Kleffner, ‘Human rights and international humanitarian law: general 
issues’ in D. Fleck, M. Bothe (eds.), Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); T. Ferraro, ‘The applicability and application of international 
humanitarian law to multinational forces’ (2013) 891/892 International Review of the Red Cross 561–
612; D. Fleck and M. Bothe, The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law , Third ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2013); ICRC, ‘Commentary on the First Geneva Convention’.  
277 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) (2004); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 31: Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant (2004) para. 11. For discussion, see: N. Melzer, 
‘Conceptual distinction and overlaps between law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities 
(Chapter 3)’ in T. D. Gill, D. Fleck (eds.), Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 33–49; T. Hadden, ‘Battling for Human Rights?’ (2010) 17 
International Peacekeeping 309–26; A. Clapham, ‘The Complex Relationship between the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights Law’ in A. Clapham, P. Gaeta, M. Sassòli, I. van 
der Heijden, Académie de droit international humanitaire et de droits humains à Genève (eds.), The 
1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
pp. 701–35; H.-P. Gasser and K. Dörmann, ‘Protection of the civilian population’ in D. Fleck, M. Bothe 
(eds.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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including NATO and UN forces. The Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Armed Forces 
has bemoaned the “uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity for states and military 
commanders, particularly for commanders of multinational forces” caused by the 
convergence of IHRL and IHL.278 Twenty-eight of thirty NATO members, including the UK, 
are party to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); two (Canada and the United 
States) are not. On this basis, analysis is grounded in the legal position as established 
through ECtHR jurisprudence, whilst recognising that this is neither free from contradiction 
nor universally accepted. Treaties adopted in the Inter-American System279 and through the 
AU280 likewise provide important standards for their respective regions.  
Broadly, the applicability of IHRL to an armed force operating overseas depends upon 
determinations along two dimensions. First, whether the individuals whose human rights 
are being identified come within the jurisdiction of the state whose armed forces they come 
into contact and second, as to the nature of the situation, activities and rights in question. 
Jurisdiction is determined as a matter of a person being within the power or effective 
control of the armed forces in question.281 The ECtHR interprets the concept of “effective 
control” as where a State exercises “effective overall control” of an area (spatial 
jurisdiction), or where a person is in the hands of State organs or agents abroad (personal 
jurisdiction).282 Belligerent occupation is one such context where individuals are deemed 
 
278 Cathcart, ‘The Legal Advisor in the Canadian Armed Forces: Addressing International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Military Operations’, p. 285.  
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281 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 31, para. 10. 
282 For comprehensive list of pertinent ECtHR cases on this point see J. K. Kleffner, ‘Scope of 
application of international humanitarian law’ in D. Fleck, M. Bothe (eds.), The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 43–78 p. 76. n 170- 
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the Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court (Oxford University Press, 2018).  
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within an armed force’s control.283 Effective control can also be established by a 
peacekeeping force.284 Additionally, in a specific operational context there may be a 
technical agreement to apply specific IHRL standards. For example, the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) agreed with the Council of Europe to apply certain provisions of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.285  
When both IHL and a state’s IHRL obligations do apply to a situation, the International 
Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) 2004 Advisory Opinion on The Wall explained that their interaction 
depends upon the specific right under consideration; “some rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human 
rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law.”286 
Subsequently, even during the “active hostilities phase of an international armed conflict”, 
the ECtHR expressly rejected the contention that IHL displaces IHRL entirely.287 Much ink 
has been spilt elucidating the application of these principles, and how they apply to forces 
interacting with citizens of foreign states. Jann Kleffner, for example, cites cases where 
persons are detained, of belligerent occupation and of non-international armed conflict as 
amongst those situations understood to be, by their nature, ones in which IHL and IHRL 
apply simultaneously.288 Within such a situation, IHRL may help to find an answer to a given 
question upon which IHL contains a lacuna or is unclear - or vice versa.289 Where there is a 
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clash between the requirements of IHL and IHRL, the principle ex specialis derogat legi 
generali dictates that priority should be given to the rule or norm that is more specific.  
To determine priority between IHL and IHRL rules, several recent commentaries suggest 
drawing a dichotomy between militaries’ law enforcement and warfighting activities. Nils 
Melzer proposes a functional distinction between armed forces undertaking measures to 
maintain, restore or impose public security, law and order, this being law enforcement; and 
armed forces engaged in the conduct of hostilities. The legal standards governing law 
enforcement would be derived primarily from IHRL and, in the conduct of hostilities, from 
both IHL and IHRL.290 A similar approach is proposed by Daragh Murray, using the terms 
“security operations” vs. “active hostilities”.291 
What do human rights obligations demand of militaries? 
The convergence of IHRL and IHL is resisted by some states on the basis of military needs,292 
and by scholars who see normative dangers in blurring the boundaries between IHL and 
IHRL.293 Yet, as a principle, the co-applicability of IHRL and IHL obligations in military 
operations is firmly established. In practice, what this means remains mired in uncertainty. 
Steven Ratner’s analysis of the legal frameworks governing occupations suggests that 
militaries continue to treat IHL as their go-to framework because this seems natural to 
them and their lawyers.294 In other contexts, a state might choose to apply IHRL norms even 
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where IHL could be applied for policy reasons, such as to garner legitimacy.295 Certainly, 
scholarship and practice enunciating what IHRL means for military practice have been slow 
to emerge.296 The ICRC’s most recent summary of the challenges of contemporary armed 
conflicts highlights that the relationship between IHL and IHRL in terms of protection 
requires further “clarification and evolution” (and includes mention of the applicability of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which I 
will come to shortly).297 Some scholars assert that application of the vast body of IHRL is not 
“amenable to reasonable application”298 or consider that “too strict application of [ECHR] 
rules could impose unrealistic obligations on States”.299 These arguments have not been 
fully tested, as case law has focused on matters upon which the substantive rules of IHRL 
have a direct corollary in IHL obligations, such as the right not to be tortured, rights in 
detention, or the procedural requirements that follow the accidental killing of a civilian. 
But, Naz Modirzadeh is surely correct to argue that to suggest that armed forces must 
comply with only some human rights obligations of their state - “basic” rights and “core” 
provisions of IHRL that are coexistent with IHL - is at odds with the hard-fought recognition 
of human rights as indivisible.300  
It is not the intention of this project to unwind, let alone resolve, the full complexity of the 
application of IHRL in all the contexts in which a military might deploy. But this project 
works from the proposition that militaries that seek to be counted as professional and 
legitimate must meet IHRL standards in many of their activities. It is my contention that the 
co-applicability of IHRL and IHL in armed conflict demands that militaries, at a minimum: 
 
295 A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Metaphors, Maxims, and the Move to 
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a) develop expertise on IHRL, and mechanisms to provide advice on IHRL to the 
planning and conduct of operations, comparable to structures for advising on IHL;  
b) develop processes for assessing whether and how IHRL obligations apply to any 
operation, and to different aspects of operations, paying particular attention to 
when forces are undertaking measures to maintain, restore or impose public 
security, law and order; 
c) integrate knowledge of IHRL into military education, training and professional 
development, in a manner comparable to that of IHL;  
d) integrate IHRL standards in military doctrine, in particular concerning measures to 
maintain, restore or impose public security, law and order, and interactions with 
civilians; and 
e) implement mechanisms to hold their personnel accountable to IHRL standards. 
What does the convergence between IHL and IHRL in military operations imply regarding 
prevention and response to CRSV? First, that IHRL might be used to interpret any IHL 
requirement to prohibit, prevent and respond to CRSV, where it would fill a lacuna in IHL, 
or be a more specific set of norms appropriate to the circumstances. Second, that IHRL is 
likely to be considered the dominant legal paradigm for an armed forces’ dealings with 
civilian victims of CRSV; for example, observing and reporting indications of CRSV, providing 
emergency assistance to victims, detaining perpetrators – these all being of the nature of 
law enforcement activities rather than the conduct of hostilities. Third, that a principled 
approach would maintain the indivisibility of human rights - not seek to divide the rights of 
a victim of CRSV.  
The applicable legal frameworks for any military operation may be, as Phillip McEvoy 
describes, uncertain and unpredictable.301 Even so, any armed force should be ready and 
able to apply an IHRL-based understanding of what CRSV is and to engage with CRSV in a 
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manner that meets both their state’s IHRL and IHL obligations. The remainder of this 
chapter examines what this standard suggests. 
5.2 Legal standards concerning CRSV committed by others 
The expectation that armed forces take tactical action to protect civilians from CRSV by 
non-state armed groups runs through policy narratives concerning military engagement 
with CRSV. As described in Chapter 3, military discussants have proposed inter alia 
preventative patrols and escorts; safe havens; evacuations and freeing abductees. UNSCRs 
exhort special measures to protect civilians from sexual violence and training for 
peacekeepers on prevention of sexual violence. However, the scope of actual positive 
obligations to protect civilians or prevent CRSV is profoundly uncertain under either IHL or 
IHRL.  
Obligations to prevent CRSV in IHL 
Protection of civilians is a key concept in IHL, but primarily framed as a requirement not to 
attack civilians or submit them to violence oneself. States, however, do have the obligation 
to “respect and ensure respect” for the GCs, expressed in Common Article 1 to the GCs as 
well as Article 1 of Additional Protocol I.  
… they must take proactive steps to bring violations of the Conventions 
to an end and to bring an erring Party to a conflict back to an attitude of 
respect for the Conventions, in particular by using their influence on 
that Party. This obligation is not limited to stopping ongoing violations 
but includes an obligation to prevent violations when there is a 
foreseeable risk that they will be committed and to prevent further 
violations in case they have already occurred.302 
This is widely recognised as an obligation erga omnes in both international and non-
international armed conflicts for states to “exert their influence, to the degree possible, to 
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stop violations” of IHL, whether or not they are party to the specific conflict.303 This 
“influence” to prevent IHL violations is usually understood as taking the form of diplomatic 
protest or collective measures; for example, resolutions by international bodies, 
investigating possible violations, creating ad hoc criminal tribunals and courts, international 
sanctions and sending of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement troops; not to anticipate 
forceful measures, beyond any that might be decided upon by the Security Council.304 As 
concerns non-state actors, the ICRC Commentary describes states’ obligation as: 
… a general duty of due diligence to prevent and repress breaches of the 
Conventions by private persons over which a State exercises authority, 
including persons in occupied territory. This is an obligation of means, 
whose content depends on the specific circumstances, in particular the 
foreseeability of the violations and the State’s knowledge thereof, the 
gravity of the breach, the means reasonably available to the State and 
the degree of influence it exercises over the private persons.305 
In situations of belligerent occupation, armed forces have more explicit direct 
responsibilities toward the civilian population. Article 27 of GC IV requires that persons 
living under occupation be protected against any acts of violence, and that women be 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.306 Article 43 of The Hague Regulations obliges 
the occupying power to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety”.307 In its judgment on Armed Activities on the Territory of 
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the Congo (DRC v Uganda), the ICJ considered an occupier’s IHRL obligations to include to 
“protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to 
tolerate such violence by any third party”.308  
Therefore, it is clear that under IHL all states have an obligation to prevent CRSV by third 
parties over which they exercise authority, including in occupation. This is an obligation erga 
omnes applying in both international and non-international armed conflicts. What practical 
measures are required by virtue of this obligation are, however, an uncertain matter, 
determined by the circumstances, the means reasonably available and what would be 
considered “due diligence”. Due diligence is a standard more familiar in IHRL. Considering 
this, Robin Geiß describes Article 1 GC obligations as structurally similar to due diligence 
obligations to prevent violations in IHRL, to be considered below.309 
Obligations to prevent CRSV in IHRL  
It is well established that states must exert due diligence to protect individuals within their 
territory or jurisdiction from human rights violations by third parties, whether that third 
party is another state or a private actor. A Protocol developed by the British Government 
describes state responsibility in case of: 
… rape and sexual violence by non-state actors, including private 
persons and militia groups, if the state failed to act with due diligence 
under its duty to protect persons under its jurisdiction. States have 
indeed a positive obligation to prevent such acts. State responsibility 
may be engaged for instance where the police or army fails to take 
action to protect individuals known to be at risk of violence or because 
of a general environment which allowed such pattern of violence to 
happen.310 
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As outlined above, this responsibility can also apply extraterritorially. A foreign military 
force can be held accountable to at least certain of its state’s IHRL obligations where it 
exercises effective overall control of an area (spatial jurisdiction), including by virtue of 
belligerent occupation, or where a person is in its hands (personal jurisdiction). These 
include obligations with regard to the right to life and the prohibitions of torture and 
slavery. Because CRSV may violate non-derogable and also peremptory norms, states are 
bound by their respective obligations regardless of which IHRL treaties they have ratified.311 
There may be circumstances such that an armed force has a clear duty to act to prevent 
CRSV as a violation of the right to life. The ECtHR in Osman v the UK described the test as 
where the state “knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals”.312 This might well be 
satisfied with regards to immediate risk of CRSV in an armed conflict situation; for example, 
where a human rights defender has been individually threatened.  
The existence and nature of positive obligations to prevent the violation of peremptory 
norms concerning torture or inhumane treatment by third parties is uncertain in its 
extraterritorial application.313 But, jurisprudence and commentary concerning states’ due 
diligence obligation to prevent, investigate and punish GBV perpetrated by non-State actors 
provide some guidance.314 The Committee for the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has made clear that these obligations 
apply to a military acting extraterritorially:  
In conflict and post-conflict situations, States parties are bound to apply 
the Convention and other international human rights and humanitarian 
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law when they exercise territorial or extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
whether individually, for example, in unilateral military action, or as 
members of international or intergovernmental organizations or 
coalitions, for example, as part of an international peacekeeping force. 
The Convention applies to a wide range of situations, including 
wherever a State exercises jurisdiction, such as occupation and other 
forms of administration of foreign territory …315 
The Committee’s General Recommendation No. 30 on addressing GBV in conflict and post-
conflict situations suggest “gender-sensitive training and … codes of conduct and protocols 
for the … military, including peacekeepers” as well as training for military authorities on 
“protection challenges, human rights and the needs of displaced women.”316  
I thus argue that the principles governing the extraterritorial application of IHRL obligations, 
interpreted in light of IHRL jurisprudence concerning violence against women, infer that 
deployed militaries could be held to account to their state’s IHRL obligations to exercise due 
diligence to prevent CRSV by third parties. Training, codes and protocols are part of 
meeting this obligation. Still, what is expected in terms of concrete action and assumption 
of risk to one’s own forces remains unexplored. Due diligence obligations will be discussed 
further below. 
Obligations under a mandate to protect civilians 
Since 1999, at least fourteen UN peacekeeping missions have been given mandates to 
protect civilians; recent EU, Africa Union and NATO operations have likewise had protection 
of civilians as a core rationale.317 Activities related to prevention and response to CRSV, as 
one aspect of protection of civilians, are mandated for the UN missions in the Central 
African Republic, Darfur, DRC, Mali, and South Sudan.318 UN policy describes protection of 
civilians as an “active duty … Activities to protect civilians should be planned, deliberate and 
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318 Presentation by Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary General of UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, Handbook for Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual 
Violence (2020). 
Chapter 5  




on-going, and the mission should constantly work to prevent, pre-empt and respond to 
violence against civilians”.319  
A protection of civilians mandate in UN missions is generally seen as having a distinctive 
legal basis within the UN Charter, invoking different rights and responsibilities than those 
under IHL and IHRL.320 Central to the lack of conceptual and practical clarity is the question 
of whether it implies positive obligations. Within and around the UN, understandings of 
what protection of civilians implies vary widely.321 Haidi Willmot and Scott Sheeran’s 
research demonstrates that “the normative bases, content and responsibilities associated 
with practical implementation remain contested”.322 The majority view amongst 
commentators, with which I concur, is that a UN protection of civilians mandate and the 
accompanying rules of engagement authorise the use of force to protect civilians, but of 
themselves create no legal obligation.323  
Looking beyond UN peacekeeping to the EU, NATO, and the AU, there are differing 
rationales for protection for civilians, leading to different approaches to military protection 
tasks.324 As the UK’s 2010 Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict observed, 
“None of the major international or regional organisations running peace operations has a 
fully formed doctrine on the execution of protection tasks. At a very practical level, it is not 
always clear to troops and police what is expected of them.”325 Chinkin and Kaldor 
demonstrate that where, as in Libya in 2011, a political decision to authorise force to 
protect civilians is made, once the operation starts this is often read down as merely the 
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obligation under IHL to minimise civilian casualties.326 State practice does not demonstrate 
any acceptance that a mandate to protect civilians places any higher obligation to 
proactively engage in sexual violence prevention and response than might otherwise exist 
under IHL and IHRL.  
Obligations to investigate and prosecute CRSV  
A corollary to the discussion above concerning the prevention of and protection against 
CRSV is armed forces’ obligations in relation to punishing perpetrators. The UN’s “analytical 
inventory” of military strategies to address CRSV includes identifying, securing and 
preserving evidence to support prosecution and assisting in apprehension and hand over of 
suspected perpetrators.327 There have been examples of armed forces playing these roles, 
such as NATO forces arresting suspected war criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.328 
Both IHL and IHRL affirm states’ obligations to support justice processes.329 Under Article 49 
of each of the four GCs, states have an obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed CRSV, being (at least in its most egregious forms) a grave breach of the GCs; 
“the obligation to make every effort to cooperate, to the extent possible, in the 
investigation of war crimes and the prosecution of the suspects is part of customary 
international law”.330 Likewise in IHRL, a state has a due diligence obligation to investigate 
and, if warranted, prosecute and punish acts of violence by third parties (private actors), 
even during armed conflict and post-conflict.331 There is a wealth of IHRL jurisprudence 
articulating a state’s more specific obligations to investigate and punish violence against 
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women: for example, how evidence should be collected and victims protected.332 That this 
applies also to conflict-affected contexts is demonstrated by the Kosovo Human Rights 
Advisory Panel’s jurisprudence on violations of human rights by UNMIK (a largely civilian 
administration), which applied it in two cases claiming that UNMIK failed to investigate and 
prosecute CRSV by third-party non-state actors.333 
Based on principles of IHL and IHRL, one concludes that militaries have an “every effort” 
obligation to support the investigation of CRSV under IHL and, in parallel, where 
perpetrators of CRSV come within their power or effective control, an IHRL duty of due 
diligence to take steps to ensure investigation. In relation to both, they should apply IHRL 
standards concerning the handling of sexual violence crimes. These principles, however, 
have not been tested to determine what should reasonably be expected of armed forces, as 
opposed to civilian agencies. Military police will generally lack the specific operational 
guidelines, resources, skills and experience to investigate sexual violence cases so to 
appropriately protect the rights of victims.334 
Mechanisms of state accountability for failure to prevent CRSV by others 
The foregoing sections establish that while a mandate to protect civilians in and of itself 
may not create positive legal obligations, there are nonetheless obligations in relation to 
CRSV arising by virtue of peremptory norms, IHRL and IHL. State accountability for failure to 
meet these obligations could be pursued through a variety of judicial, quasi-judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms. Which are available and appropriate will depend upon the 
national law of the state in question, and the regional and international IHL and IHRL 
instruments to which the state is a party, and how these have been interpreted in judicial 
fora, as well as the circumstances of the perpetrator, victim and acts in question – 
acknowledging that there are many barriers to successful investigation, prosecution and 
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conviction of CRSV. 335 A victim of CRSV might bring a claim to a UN human rights treaty 
body using, for example, Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) or CEDAW; to a regional human rights court such as the ECtHR; or before the 
domestic courts of the responsible state. A victim might also bring their allegation through 
the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council. If the alleged acts were of the 
appropriate seriousness, another state might even bring a claim before the ICJ under IHL 
treaties or the Convention Against Torture, or before a regional court.336 The following does 
not attempt to imagine every possible CRSV scenario. As indicative cases, it briefly sets out 
bases for possible claims in relation to failure to prevent CRSV by a) a host nation force with 
which one is working; and b) non-state armed groups against civilians whom one has a 
mandate or mission to protect. 
Modern military operations often create circumstances in which armed forces have 
significant influence over other forces or armed groups; as with, I would argue, NATO 
support to the Afghan, Iraqi or Ukrainian forces, or the UN Mission in the DRC’s support to 
the national armed forces. Such a scenario might give rise to legal responsibility for CRSV 
committed by a partner state or armed group by virtue of complicity. This question was 
raised concerning the UN Mission in the DRC’s assistance to the Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo. The UN internally acknowledged that positive 
obligations under customary international law to uphold, promote and encourage respect 
for human rights and IHL gave rise to an obligation to cease “logistics or ‘service’ support” if 
there was reason to believe Congolese armed forces were violating IHL or IHRL.337 The same 
principles would apply to bilateral state support, with the standard being whether an 
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armed force was, in the terms of Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, aiding or assisting another 
State in the commission of a violation of IHL (or IHRL) “with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act”, such as by providing military assistance 
to countries found to be committing serious human rights violations.338 In view of these 
standards, one can imagine, for instance, a victim of bacha bazi in Afghanistan might 
hypothetically bring a claim against certain foreign nations that provided military assistance 
to the Afghan forces, on the basis that those nations had reason to believe at the time that 
Afghanistan was violating IHRL, and by not ceasing their assistance were complicit in those 
violations.339 
In a scenario where a foreign force fails to intervene to stop CRSV or fails to take action to 
protect individuals known to be at risk of CRSV, a claim might conceivably be brought by 
another state or by a victim on the basis of lack of due diligence. Due diligence to ensure, 
for example, that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, whether by their own, third state or private individuals; 
or due diligence to prevent grave breaches of the GCs. One can imagine, for instance, 
where bacha bazi occurred within a foreign force’s base and as such in an area under its 
effective control, a victim might hypothetically bring a claim against that foreign nation by 
virtue of its failure to exercise due diligence to prevent and punish the abuse. 
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old tradition’ (October 2009). A number of NATO militaries, including Canada and the United States, 
have faced allegations that their soldiers had witnessed sexual assault of Afghan minors by Afghan 
National Security Forces, had failed to intervene, and been ordered by their chain of command to 
ignore such behaviour, even in some cases where boys were being abused on a coalition military 
base: J. Goldstein, ‘U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies’ (2015); C. 
Stephen, Hand Covers Bruise: The Destruction of Afghanistan’s Boys (2015); N. D. Government of 
Canada, Board of Inquiry – Allegation of assault of a civilian by Afghan National Security Forces and 
the Canadian Forces response to such incidents (Redacted), Executive Summary (2016).  
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Accordingly, with reference to both IHL and IHRL obligations, an overarching question is: 
what steps are expected of an armed force in terms of due diligence to prevent CRSV by 
third parties? While a multitude of strategic, operational and tactical military protective 
measures to protect from CRSV can be envisioned, any armed force’s operations are 
constrained by resources, force protection requirements and other factors that will temper 
its ability to deliver protection. In its judgment Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (DRC v Uganda), the ICJ found state responsibility to be engaged by “… any lack of 
vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by 
other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own 
account”.340 Hans-Peter Gasser and Knut Dörmann describe the duty to protect civilians 
under occupation as requiring that “everything necessary must be done to ward off or 
reduce suffering … taking all measures required to ensure the safety of civilians”.341 But, 
IHRL jurisprudence confirms that the obligation to prevent violence is one of means, not 
ends. The ECtHR has said that a state is under a positive obligation “to take those steps that 
could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk of ill-
treatment”.342 Still, the ECtHR presents an arguably conservative view of what can be 
reasonably expected:  
… bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, 
the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices 
which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, such an 
obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.343 
Maintaining that the application of IHRL extraterritorially must not pick and choose 
between human rights, IHRL standards articulated in relation to violence against women 
apply to the actions of armed forces, as to any other state agent. Unfortunately, 
jurisprudence applying the “due diligence” standard to violence against women has 
 
340 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) 
Judgment, para. 179. 
341 Gasser and Dörmann, ‘Protection of the civilian population’, p. 234. 
342  Case of Z and others v. The United Kingdom (Judgment) (2001) para. 94. 
343 Case of Osman v. The United Kingdom (Judgment), para. 116. 
Chapter 5  




emphasized legal frameworks and criminal justice responses, offering little articulation of 
the reasonable expectations of the state in terms of prevention.344 As the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women explains, while “the concept of due diligence 
provides a yardstick to determine whether a State has met or failed to meet its obligations 
in combating violence against women … there remains a lack of clarity concerning its scope 
and content.”345 Offering some clarity: the ECtHR has in some cases found that the state 
should have detained a man threatening violence against his wife and provided shelter for 
her, where she had made numerous complaints to the police;346 case law in the Inter-
American system has found that “failure to adopt a ‘general policy’ concerning the known 
widespread rapes, disappearances, and murders committed against women in the region 
amounted to a breach of the obligation to prevent”.347 This suggests an expectation that 
where armed forces know of CRSV, something comparable to a policy to deal with it should 
be developed, and there should be mechanisms to offer protection where there are specific 
threats. 
5.3 Legal standards concerning CRSV by one’s own forces 
Where the preceding section has traced the uncertain parameters of an armed force’s 
obligations in relation to CRSV by third parties, the parameters of its obligations concerning 
its own personnel are better defined, and the expectations higher. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
among the directives of the UNSCRs on CRSV are for troops to be trained on the prohibition 
of sexual violence, and for this prohibition to be in military codes of conduct and clearly 
ordered through the chain of command. The resolutions likewise lay a heavy emphasis on 
militaries’ responsibilities to prevent and punish sexual violence by their own forces, and 
prohibition, prevention and punishment of SEA. However, where SEA is concerned, its 
characterisation in terms of IHL or IHRL is difficult to define. 
 
344 M. L. Pearce, ‘Gendering the Compliance Agenda: Feminism, Human Rights and Violence against 
Women’ (2014) 21 Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender 393–442 at 413; Edwards, VAW under IHRL, p. 
241. 
345 Ertuk, The due diligence standard: report of the Special Rapporteur on VAW, para. 14. 
346 Yildrim v. Austria and Goekce v. Austria, discussed in Edwards, VAW under IHRL, p. 242. 
347 González et al (‘Cotton Field’) v. Mexico, discussed in Edwards, VAW under IHRL, p. 243. 
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Prohibition and prevention of CRSV 
The obligation of states to prohibit, prevent and punish CRSV by their own forces is 
embedded in customary international law, IHL and IHRL. As highlighted in Chapter 2, 
individual criminal responsibility for CRSV has been developed through the expansion of 
international criminal law.  
Where an armed force is a party to an armed conflict, they are unequivocally bound by 
IHL’s prohibition of sexual violence. Each state party must enact legislation providing 
effective penal sanctions for grave breaches of the GCs.348 With respect to CRSV, this means 
that the domestic criminal and/or military law applicable to one’s armed forces should 
allow for prosecution of the full range of acts recognised as constituting sexual violence as a 
grave breach: not only rape but sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and 
enforced sterilisation, forced public nudity, with the possibility of recognising other forms 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity.  
In terms of prevention of CRSV, a fundamental tenet of the IHL framework is that that 
states must ensure respect for IHL by their armed forces.349 IHL requires that the law, 
including the prohibition against rape and other forms of sexual violence, be 
disseminated;350 for example, that “[t]he prohibition against rape and other forms of sexual 
violence should … be taken into account in military training and included in military … 
manuals …”351 According to the ICRC, if violations do occur, disciplinary or penal sanctions 
 
348 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (1949) Article 49. 
349 ICRC, ‘Commentary on the First Geneva Convention’, p. 43.  
350 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field Art. 47; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949) Art. 48; Geneva Conventionr 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) Art. 127; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War Art. 144; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (1977) Art. 83; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts Art. 19. 
351 ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, ‘Prevention and criminal repression of 
rape and other forms of sexual violence during armed conflicts’, p. 4. 
Chapter 5  




“should be imposed as quickly as possible after the act has been committed in order to 
have a significant deterrent effect”.352  
In IHRL, rape and other forms of sexual violence have been found to violate individuals’ 
right to physical and mental integrity as well as to be a form of torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment. As such, CRSV is prohibited by all the general human rights 
treaties. Sexual slavery also falls under prohibitions on slavery. States have positive 
obligations under IHRL to enact criminal law provisions effectively punishing sexual 
violence, and to apply them through effective investigation and prosecution.353 Under 
CEDAW, states must ensure that the human rights of women and girls are equally protected 
and put in place specific punitive measures to overcome trafficking and exploitation of 
prostitution.354 The CEDAW Committee has made clear these obligations apply “according 
to humanitarian norms in time of international or internal armed conflict”.355 There are 
further specific commitments in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) to protect 
children from sexual exploitation and abuse.  
Specific prohibitions on sexual violence are moreover found in several regional human 
rights instruments. Given that it is widely ratified by NATO members, the requirements of 
the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention) are pertinent – but so far neglected in the 
literature on CRSV. Article 2 of the Istanbul Convention explicitly states its application in 
situations of armed conflict. The Istanbul Convention obliges States Parties to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over a wide range of forms of violence against women (including 
psychological violence, stalking, physical violence, sexual violence and sexual harassment) 
 
352 ICRC, ‘Commentary on the First Geneva Convention’, para. 2842. 
353 For overviews: Edwards, VAW under IHRL; Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes 
and consequences (2013); L. Grans, ‘The State Obligation to Prevent Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: The Case of Honour-Related Violence’ (2015) 15 
Human Rights Law Review 695–719; Ferro Ribeiro and van der Straten Ponthoz, International 
Protocol. 
354 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women’ (1992) para. 
24(g). 
355 Ibid., para. 7(c).  
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committed “by one of their nationals”.356 This broadens the scope of offences for which 
members of the armed forces operating overseas should be able to be held domestically 
accountable.  
A recent ICRC study found that the prohibition of sexual violence in conflict is rarely explicit 
in military doctrine, or considered an issue of IHL.357 Beyond military law, given the breadth 
of forms of sexual violence recognised in international criminal tribunals and IHRL, many 
nations almost certainly have gaps in their national law in terms of comprehensively 
prohibiting all forms of CRSV that their forces might commit. If so, they would be falling 
short of both IHL and IHRL obligations. This has not been addressed in advocacy concerning 
militaries that are part of international missions (for example, UN, EU, AU, NATO), which 
has emphasised rules concerning SEA.358 
SEA 
The concept of “sexual exploitation and abuse”, explained in Chapter 3, evolved to prohibit 
UN peacekeepers from abusing or exploiting local women, men, girls and boys, including 
through fuelling prostitution.359 It has since been applied to AU, EU and NATO missions. The 
prohibition of SEA frames any sexual exchange between international personnel and 
intended beneficiaries of their assistance as inherently inappropriate, regardless of whether 
the exchange is illegal under either the national law of the host or deploying nation. The UN 
Secretary General’s 2003 Bulletin that established the prohibition of SEA purported to 
 
356 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and 
Domestic Violence (2011) Art. 44. 
357 ICRC, Engaging with State Armed Forces to Prevent Sexual Violence: A Toolkit for ICRC Staff on 
How to Engage State Armed Forces in Dialogue on Preventing Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict 
(2019) p. 11. 
358 E.g. M. Vandenberg, Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution (2002); S. Martin, Must Boys Be Boys? (2005); Hampson, 
Working paper on the accountability of international personnel taking part in peace support 
operations; S. E. Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels (2005). 
359 Some advocates argue that “prostitution” should be termed “sex work” (e.g. F. Delacoste, Sex 
Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry (Cleis Press Start, 2018)). Whilst acknowledging that 
this might be the case in some contexts, for clarity of reference to international legal standards, and 
recognising the disempowerment likely to accompany sex-for-payment in conflict-affected contexts, 
I retain the term “prostitution”. 
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extend it to military personnel in UN missions through the application of IHL in 
peacekeeping.360 Still, armed forces have been slow to integrate SEA into their codes of 
conduct, administrative rules and regulations as misconduct or crimes.361 
In legal and policy terms SEA is challenging because it encompasses misconduct of a wide 
span of severity. “Sexual abuse” may (it goes without saying) be very serious, an act 
recognised in international criminal law. However, there is legitimate debate as to whether 
banning consensual adult prostitution is always in the best interests of the individuals 
offering sexual services,362 and how consent can be judged in a conflict-affected 
environment.363 These are difficult questions upon which it is hard to pronounce divorced 
from context, but it remains that from a legal perspective, an act of SEA may or may not be 
a violation of international law.  
Mechanisms of state accountability 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the UNSCRs on CRSV and SEA have increasingly emphasised states’ 
responsibilities to ensure full accountability. Where SEA by peacekeepers is concerned, the 
Security Council demands swift and thorough investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution 
and repatriation of units.364 ECtHR jurisprudence gives guidance on what characterises an 
effective, independent investigation of one’s own armed forces during a situation of armed 
 
360 United Nations Secretary General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, para. 2.2. 
361 O’Brien, Criminalising Peacekeepers; G. Simm, Sex in Peace Operations (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
362 Otto critiques the UN’s “zero tolerance policy” on SEA as, inter alia, infantilising women and 
undermining their agency: D. Otto, ‘The Sexual Tensions of UN Peace Support Operations: A Plea for 
“Sexual Positivity”’ (2007) 18 Finnish Yearbook of International Law. 
363 Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Dis)contents’; J. Halley, ‘Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the 
Criminalisation of Rape in the International Law of Armed Conflict’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 78–124; E. Dowds, ‘Conceptualizing the role of consent in the definition of rape at 
the international criminal court: a norm transfer perspective’ (2018) 20 International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 624–43. 
364 Resolution 1888, para. 21; Resolution 2106, para. 15; Resolution 2242, para. 9; Resolution 2272, 
para. 8; Resolution 2331, para. 19. 
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conflict365 and – as noted above – how an investigation of an allegation of sexual violence 
should be handled. 
Accountability of individual perpetrators of CRSV or SEA or of their states can potentially be 
pursued through criminal prosecution and civil claims, or in judicial, quasi-judicial fora and 
non-judicial bodies. In reality, there are serious shortcomings in accountability processes 
concerning SEA and other forms of CRSV by foreign military personnel. There is not space in 
this project to survey all the legal complexities, which are well-covered elsewhere.366 
Briefly: a key challenge is that in multinational operations, states almost always retain 
disciplinary control and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their national contingents. In UN 
missions, the host state normally does not have jurisdiction over military peacekeepers 
because Status of Forces Agreements grant immunity from prosecution. Any perpetrator is 
usually repatriated to their own country to undergo some type of disciplinary process. The 
UN’s role is most often limited to the provision of investigative and logistical support to 
investigations conducted by the troop-contributing country. Jurisdictional gaps are only 
part of the problem. Where SEA allegations are made, they are often not investigated 
sufficiently thoroughly, rapid rotation of personnel hampers effective gathering of 
evidence, immunity is over-used, and charges and penalties may not adequately reflect the 
seriousness of what has occurred.  
In most contexts where forces are deployed, any allegation of sexual violence or sexual 
exploitation against their personnel would, in the first instance at least, almost always be 
investigated by their own military police. As well as the likely lack of appropriate skills 
within militaries to investigate sexual violence noted above, the independence of military 
investigations into allegations concerning their own forces is questionable.367 The literature 
discussed in Chapter 3 concerning militaries’ tendencies to be accepting of sexual 
harassment and violence within their own forces begs the question of whether militaries 
 
365 E.g. Jaloud v. The Netherlands 2014; see N. Lubell, J. Pejic, and C. Simmons, Guidelines on 
investigating violations of International Humanitarian Law: law, policy and practice (2019). 
366 See Ch. 3, n 154. 
367 Bastick, Gender and Complaints Mechanisms. 
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are accepting also of sexual violence by their forces against communities. These are 
questions that will be considered in Chapters 8 and 9.  
Conclusions 
Political and policy commitments to sexual violence response consistently invoke IHL and 
IHRL. But, until now, in the vast body of policy and academic work on CRSV, there has not 
been analysis of the content of the legal obligations invoked by these distinct normative 
frameworks regarding extraterritorial military operations. Specifically, the significance of 
due diligence obligations for a foreign military in relation to CRSV and the relevance of IHRL 
jurisprudence concerning violence against women has not been recognised. 
Based on this analysis, I propose the following as a summary of applicable law: 
a)  Where CRSV by third parties is concerned, in circumstances where a military force 
is exercising influence, offering support, or exercising authority or control over 
territory or persons, it has a positive obligation to prevent it and support the 
prosecution of it.  
b) Where a military knowingly exercises influence over or offers support to a 
perpetrator of CRSV, that military could be held accountable as complicit in that 
CRSV. 
c) Absent the above circumstances, a military’s obligations in IHL and/or IHRL 
concerning CRSV are of a general due diligence nature: a still-evolving notion of 
being vigilant and doing what is “reasonably expected”, but not “an impossible or 
disproportionate burden”.  
d) A military must take positive steps to prevent sexual violence by its own forces, and 
act to stop and punish it where it knows or ought to know of it. Investigation 
processes should be appropriate to the sensitivities of sexual violence crimes.  
These legal norms have been little discussed in military forums, and their practical 
implications neglected also in IHL and IHRL scholarship. Even in UN military training on 
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CRSV, connections to legal requirements are not always made.368 What do they require in 
terms of practical steps? Siobhan Wills argues the following in relation to UN troops 
mandated to protect civilians: 
…it will not be enough for the UN to say after the event that it tried; it 
must be able to prove it by producing the documents or other evidence 
(signed and dated) demonstrating its plan of action and the efforts 
made to implement it … it should shape the way the mandate is carried 
out both at the macro level (e.g. initial assessment of risks and 
operational planning in light of them) and at the micro-level (e.g. 
documenting and reporting of protection plans and of the steps taken to 
implement them at local level), and the continuous updating of 
protection plans in light of the continuous assessment of risks, assessed 
at both local and general level.369 
While a military with a looser commitment to protect civilians might not be held to such a 
rigorous standard, the above seems a sensible description of reasonable due diligence. It is 
reasonable to expect, I contend, that a military or military alliance that has made a political 
commitment to prevent and respond to CRSV demonstrates the implementation of 
systemised military processes to do so: an overarching strategy relating to CRSV; CRSV risk 
assessment; operational planning for prevention and response to CRSV; protection plans at 
local and general levels; mechanisms to respond to specific threats or risks of CRSV 
identified; and documentation, review and analysis of actions. Given the often hidden 
nature of sexual violence and the support needs of victims, mechanisms to consult and 
refer to women’s civil society organisations and local support services are needed. To 
enable all this requires training and education around CRSV and know-how concerning the 
engagement of civil society. Identifying, securing, and preserving evidence of CRSV requires 
procedures developed with specialist legal expertise. These are the very sorts of initiatives 
that were discussed back in 2008370 and at the 2014 Global Summit. The case studies to 
 
368 S. Axmacher, ‘Review of Scenario-based Trainings for Military Peacekeepers on Prevention and 
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follow will consider how far NATO and by the British Armed Forces’ approaches to CRSV 
conform.  
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NATO’s responses to CRSV 
At NATO, there are always countries  ̶  some are wanting to go faster, 
some slower. But, when it comes to gender, gender advising, we need to 
find the right minimum. 
Lt Gen Steven M. Shepro, Deputy Chair of the NATO Military Committee, 
4 June 2019 
 
This chapter explores how NATO, a key security organisation, has since 2005 progressively 
engaged with the issue of CRSV. It identifies key milestones in policy, practical guidance, 
leadership and institutional structures. The Chapter opens, in Section 6.1, with an overview 
of NATO: its purpose, governance and institutional structure, recent major operational 
engagements, and a snapshot of the participation of women in NATO. The Chapter then, in 
sections 6.2 and 6.3, answers one of this project’s key questions: what initiatives has NATO 
developed to respond to sexual violence in armed conflict since 2005? I chronologically 
analyse NATO political declarations, policies and reports; military doctrine, directives, 
guidelines and procedures; and training and education standards and materials, revealing 
the disconnects and congruences between different spheres: political and military, 
headquarters and operational. This documentary analysis is enriched by insights, 
particularly into operational implementation, gleaned from interviews with seven NATO 
staff and advisors, and six observations of NATO training or education on CRSV and public 
events.371 This chapter provides the scaffold for the analysis to follow, in chapter 8 of how 
understandings of legal obligations mediate NATO’s engagement with CRSV. Chapter 9 will 
go on to consider to what extent NATO’s responses to CRSV challenge feminist critiques of 
IHL and of militaries and inform theorisation of how militaries can be transformed. 
NATO is regarded with particular suspicion by feminists; for example, by Women Against 
NATO as “an ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine, primarily serving the 
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economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its member states”.372 NATO 
is described as “an institution of international hegemonic masculinity … reinforcing power 
hierarchies constructed along gendered and racialised lines.”373 When NATO invokes 
women’s rights, is this progress or co-optation of feminism for militarist ends? Yet, much of 
the prominent recent scholarship examining NATO’s engagement with gender and WPS is 
broadly positive, praising what it sees as progress, even transformation.374 This project’s 
close examination of NATO illustrates the value of looking beyond the policy/political level 
to doctrine, directives, training and feedback from operations, in understanding NATO as a 
gendered organisation and the factors that facilitate and inhibit transformative change.  
The chapter concludes by drawing out key stumbling blocks for NATO in translating 
commitments to sexual violence response into practice. As such, it paints a less rosy picture 
of NATO’s implementation of WPS than much of the analysis of the mid-2000s, seeing much 
of the progress promised in NATO’s policy and action plans as unfulfilled.  
6.1 NATO: setting the scene 
NATO’s purpose and structures 
As noted in Chapter 5, NATO is a thirty-member political and military alliance. Its 
foundational treaty, The Washington Treaty, of 1949 committed members to collective 
defence. That is, a reciprocal undertaking, under Article 5 of the Treaty, to consider an 
armed attack from an enemy against one or more of them as an attack upon them all, and 
to assist the party or parties attacked, if necessary using armed force.375 NATO’s concept of 
its purpose and tasks evolved with the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Pact. In 1999, it expanded its operational remit to encompass crisis response operations 
“outside the territory of its member countries with the aim of responding to new security 
 
372 Cockburn, ‘Snagged on the Contradiction’, 50. 
373 Wright, Hurley, and Gil Ruiz, NATO, gender and the military, p. 159. 
374 See: Prescott, ‘Feminist Critique of the Law of Armed Conflict’; Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, Gender, 
Military Effectiveness, and Organizational Change; Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell, ‘Cosmopolitan 
militaries and dialogic peacekeeping’; Wright, Hurley, and Gil Ruiz, NATO, gender and the military; 
Hardt and von Hlatky, ‘NATO’s About-Face’.  
375 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty (1949) para. 5. 
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threats such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts, and human rights abuses”.376 After 9/11 NATO 
placed greater focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.377 NATO is described 
as in a process of transition from an alliance solely concerned with defending its borders, to 
a global actor ready to address both military and non-military sources of insecurity.378 That 
said, since the beginning of the so-called “crisis” in Ukraine in November 2013, NATO’s 
strategic focus has shifted back to countering a perceived threat from Russia.  
NATO has been described as defining itself by values consistent with those that inform 
cosmopolitanism - human rights, rule of law, democracy – without being a cosmopolitan 
military. NATO is most centrally a collective defence organisation: it first and foremost 
pursues goals of defence and security, rather than of shared values, and is according to 
Terry Terriff “very much a self interested community.”379 NATO is reviled by many 
organisations working for peace and against nuclear weapons, including feminist 
organisations such as WILPF.380 However, my own engagement with NATO’s Civil Society 
Advisory Panel on WPS brought me to understand that some women’s groups in Europe’s 
east - in Estonia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, for example - see NATO as a friend and 
defender of their nation. During this research, a member of the Canadian delegation 
described NATO to me as a “peace organisation”. 
NATO is generally regarded as a military organisation but in fact, has a dual military and 
political/civilian structure. Its highest levels of governance and the vast majority of its 
Headquarters staff are civilian. NATO’s highest political decision-making body is the North 
Atlantic Council, upon which each NATO member country is represented. The North 
Atlantic Council serves as the interface between the civil and military levels of NATO. It is 
advised by NATO’s Military Committee - the senior military authority within NATO - on 
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military policy and strategy. The Military Committee, in turn, is composed of the Chiefs of 
Defence of all NATO member countries. Within NATO Headquarters in Brussels, there are 
separate staffs for what is referred to as “the political side” and “the military side”. On the 
political side is the International Staff, some one thousand civilians from NATO member 
countries. Their role is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the thirty 
member nations’ permanent delegations, under the leadership of the NATO Secretary 
General.381 On “the military side” is the International Military Staff: some five hundred 
military and civilian personnel from member nations’ militaries, which act as the executive 
of the Military Committee.382  
Under the authority of the Military Committee, NATO has two military Strategic 
Commands: Allied Command Transformation (ACT), based in Norfolk in the United States 
and Allied Command Operations (ACO), based near Mons in Belgium. ACO’s Headquarters is 
referred to as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE. Under it are the 
headquarters of NATO’s various missions and operations. All of these subordinate NATO 
military structures and commands are largely staffed by military personnel contributed by 
NATO members.  
NATO’s recent operational engagements  
Since 1990, NATO has conducted a total of forty-one operations. Only two have been 
classified as collective defence operations, the others as crisis response.383 The scope of the 
latter has ranged from the delivery of humanitarian relief and disaster response; enforcing 
maritime interdiction, embargoes and no-fly zones; train, advise and assist; to 
counterinsurgency and combat operations, including the air bombing campaign in Libya. 
NATO operations in Libya and Afghanistan have both asserted civilian protection as a core 
rationale. As of July 2020, NATO was conducting operations in Afghanistan, where it has 
been active since 2003 (the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, followed by 
Resolute Support Mission); in Kosovo – the Kosovo Force, where it has been present since 
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its 1999 bombing campaign; in the Mediterranean; in Iraq, a training and capacity-building 
mission; and providing missile defence capabilities to Turkey. NATO also supports AU 
peacekeeping missions on request. Responding to perceptions of a Russian threat, NATO is 
conducting air policing missions over the Baltics and Balkans.384 NATO has in recent years 
also increased capability development and capacity building in Ukraine.  
“NATO forces” are in fact multinational comprised of forces both from NATO member 
countries and from NATO Partner and other countries, such as Australia, Austria, Finland, 
Japan, Georgia, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Korea and Ukraine. NATO’s guidelines and 
commitments concerning gender and CRSV in NATO operations thus apply to the forces not 
only of its thirty members but potentially the many other armed forces that join NATO 
missions and operations. 
Women in NATO HQ and NATO operations 
As discussed in earlier chapters, this research is interested in how gendered institutional 
culture finds expression in military approaches to CRSV. As such, I am less interested in how 
many women are in NATO, as in NATO’s discourse concerning women. Nonetheless, the 
physical presence of women is critical to an institution’s gender culture - although the 
degree to and mechanisms by which women make a difference are contested.  
A Committee on Women in the NATO Forces has been a formal structure subordinate to 
NATO’s Military Committee since 1976, made up of female military officers from the armed 
forces of NATO member nations.385 In 2000, an Office on Women in the NATO Forces was 
established as part of NATO Headquarters’ International Military Staff. Despite these long-
established structures to promote women’s equality, NATO as an institution, and in 
particular its senior management remains extremely male-dominated. Charlotte Isaksson, 
former Gender Advisor (GENAD) at ACO, referred obliquely to NATO’s “own internal 
gender-related challenges,” highlighting “sexual harassment, discrimination, sexual abuse, 
 
384 NATO, ‘Operations and missions: past and present’ (June 2020); NATO, ‘Relations with Ukraine’ 
(June 2020).  
385 Office on Women in the NATO Forces Terms of Reference, 10 July 2000, para. 5(b), in Committee 
on Women in the NATO Forces Handbook (2005).  
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and sexual assault in our own institutions”.386 As of 2017, only 26% of just over 5,700 
civilian staff employed in NATO entities were female, for the most part, employed in 
support and administrative positions. NATO Headquarters was staffed by 39% at women, 
but only 20% women in senior leadership roles. Other NATO entities had “little-to-no senior 
positions filled by female civilian staff.”387 These poor figures may disguise the fact that 
many staff within any NATO entity are uniformed military, not civilian, personnel. NATO 
does not seem even to collect sex-disaggregated data on them. As such, one can only 
extrapolate from NATO-wide data on women in armed forces that women make up an 
average of 11.3% of active duty military personnel of NATO member nations.388 (This figure 
has crept up from 6.1% in 2001, but only modestly, from 10.2%, since 2006.) Occupations 
across NATO armed forces show strongly gendered patterns. For example, only 7.7% of 
women serve in the infantry, compared to 20.7% of men.389 Women are more likely than 
men to be officers (21% of women, 18% of men) but less likely to advance to senior officer 
levels (0.03% of women, 0.2% of men) women.390 When it comes to international 
deployments to NATO operations, female personnel are starkly underrepresented, even 
given their low overall representation in NATO armed forces; for example, in 2017, only 
5.6% of the personnel deployed to NATO operations were female.391  
6.2 Key phases and milestones in NATO’s engagement with CRSV 
This chapter now turns to how NATO has engaged with the issue of CRSV since 2005, when 
the UN Security Council first articulated its call for peacekeepers to “employ all feasible 
measures” to prevent sexual and other forms of violence committed against civilians in 
 
386 Isaksson, ‘Fighting for Gender Equality’, 59–60. 
387 P. Billaud-Durand, ‘Driving diversity at NATO’ (March 2019). 
388 Based on the most recent data compiled by NATO: Summary of the National Reports of NATO 
member and Partner Nations to the NCGP 2018 (2020) p. 15. 
389 Ibid., p. 51-52. 
390 Ibid., p. 55. A number of scholars have explored the participation of women in NATO member 
armed forces, and the attitudes, policies and practices that inhibit and enable women’s equal 
participation. NATO-wide studies include: H. Carreiras, Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed 
Forces of Western Democracies (Routledge, 2006); L. Obradovic, Gender Integration in NATO Military 
Forces: Cross-national Analysis (Routledge, 2016). 
391 NATO IMS, National Reports to NCGP, 2017, p. 45. The proportion was only slightly higher, 6.2%, 
as regards deployment to AU, EU, NATO, OSCE and/or UN operations combined. 
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armed conflict.392 The following identifies chronologically the key milestones in NATO 
policy, directives, doctrine and institutional structures related to CRSV. Figure 33 on page 
123 illustrates these, set against the key UNSCRs and other commitments concerning 
military responses to CRSV examined in Chapter 3.  
2007-2009: The emergence of institutional policy, structures and guidance 
concerning WPS 
It was scandal concerning NATO troops’ involvement with sex trafficking in the former 
Yugoslavia393 which prompted NATO’s first policy engagement with CRSV: the adoption, in 
2004, of policy and guidelines on combating trafficking in human beings.394 The 
commitments made are vague, stopping short of actually preventing and punishing 
trafficking-related crimes by NATO personnel, or prohibiting visiting brothels or paying for 
sex. Implementation of the policy and guidelines has been described as slow, stymied by 
lack of leadership within NATO and lack of unity across NATO as regards prostitution.395 
At the close of 2007, the North Atlantic Council approved a paper that was later described 
as NATO’s first policy on WPS: the NATO-EAPC Framework Document on Implementing 
United Nations SC Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.396 It described
 
392 Resolution 1674, para. 19. 
393 See Ch. 5, n 358. 
394 Policy on combating trafficking in human beings (2004); Guidelines on combating trafficking in 
human beings for military forces and civilian personnel deployed in NATO-led operations (2004). 
395 Ballesteros, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings and International Peacekeeping Missions’, 138. K. J. 
Allred, ‘Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women 
and New Hope for Stopping It’ (2006) 33 Armed Forces & Society 5–23 at 15–16. 
396 NATO/EAPC, Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2007). Wright, ‘NATO’s 
adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’ traces the political processes underlying 
this. 
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the rationale for NATO EAPC’s focus on the roles of women and on gender as “improv[ing] 
the effectiveness of NATO-led Operations and Missions to ensure overall mission success … 
ensur[ing] that maximum effect can be drawn from incorporating gender perspectives into 
NATO’s approach”.397 From the outset, WPS was strategically framed within NATO as a tool 
to make NATO more effective in its [other] business, attention to gender as conducive to 
“operational effectiveness” and a “force multiplier”. There is a clear effort to make the 
implementation of the UNSCRs on WPS “relevant to the day-to-day conduct of NATO-led 
Operations and Missions.”398 This Framework Document had strengths as a policy on WPS. 
It recognised “the unique contribution that women can make to conflict resolution” and the 
need for “their participation at all levels of decision-making,” as well as the need to protect 
women and girls.399 It implicitly recognised abuse by NATO’s own forces, in directing NATO 
Military Authorities to prioritise measures to “better protect the rights of women and girls 
in conflict zones, including through the setting of generic standards of behaviour expected 
of NATO-led forces”.400 The Framework Document did not explicitly refer to CRSV, but 
suggested missions consider how best to collect information on “gender specific violence 
issues.”401 It directed NATO Military Authorities to prioritise measures to “better protect 
the rights of women and girls in conflict zones” if stopping short of actively directing 
prevention of violence.402  
In mid-2008, as the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution dedicated to sexual 
violence in conflict, Sweden deployed the first GENAD in a NATO operation in Afghanistan. 
There followed a period of bottom-up innovation around gender mainstreaming in ISAF as 
Norway and the Netherlands followed suit.403 A study of ISAF’s implementation of 1325 was 
conducted and presented within NATO Headquarters. It contains an account of a NATO 
 
397 NATO/EAPC, WPS Framework Document, pp. 1–1. p. 
398 Ibid. p. 1-2. 
399 Ibid.  
400 Ibid.  
401 Ibid. p. 1-3. 
402 Ibid. p. 1-2. 
403 For broader analysis of the role of NATO GENADs: see S. Longworth and O. Engdahl, Getting 
perspective: Incorporating a gender perspective in military operations and the impact on 
international humanitarian law (2014); M. Bastick and C. Duncanson, ‘Agents of Change? Gender 
Advisors in NATO Militaries’ (2018) 25 International Peacekeeping 554–577.  
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force giving medical assistance to a victim of sexual violence but worrying that in so doing 
they had damaged her reputation such that she could not return to her village.404 The study 
concluded that soldiers needed further training, instructions and procedures to handle 
GBV, and conveyed ambivalence as regards NATO’s role, asking, “What are long term 
versus short term effects in terms of achieving the Mission mandate when intervening or 
not intervening?”405 
There was a surge of developments around WPS within NATO in 2009. The NATO Summit 
Declaration committed to putting in place “a comprehensive set of measures”.406 The 
mandate of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces and the International Military 
Staff’s Office on Women was changed to “gender perspectives”. In mandating these new 
structures, NATO’s adopted definition of gender mainstreaming, or integrating a gender 
perspective, is essentially the UN system’s: “… assessing the implications for women and 
men of any planned action…”407 However, NATO omits what should be the overarching 
purpose, as articulated within the UN: “…so that women and men benefit equally and 
inequality is not perpetuated … to achieve gender equality.”408 Instead, NATO, as in its 2007 
Framework Document, frames the purpose of integrating gender perspectives only in 
relation to its own operational effectiveness.  
Over 2009-2011, Gender Advisor positions were established within the NATO Strategic 
Commands, ACO and ACT. These GENADs would be instrumental in developing the key 
documents shaping NATO’s military approach to WPS. The first of these was issued in 
September 2009: the Supreme Commanders of SHAPE and ACT issued Bi-Strategic 
Command Directive 40-1 Integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO 
command structure.409 The Directive is authoritative for all the NATO military entities, as 
 
404 L. Olsson and J. Tejpar, Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 - Practices and Lessons 
from Afghanistan (2009) pp. 71–72. 
405 Ibid., p. 2.  
406 NATO, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration (2009) para. 36. 
407 The NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (2009) para. 10. 
408 UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Resolution 1997/2: Agreed Conclusions’ (1997). 
409 NATO ACO ACT, Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1: Integrating UNSCR1325 and Gender Perspectives in 
the NATO Command Structure Including Measures for Protection During Armed Conflict (2009). 
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well as all NATO establishments that deploy personnel in support of NATO operations and 
mission. This is the second milestone in NATO engagement with CRSV, being the first 
direction to NATO military operations on the issue. A NATO interviewee emphasised that 
this and successive versions of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 do not constitute 
“policy” as these directives are not negotiated and agreed between nations.410 Even so, 
they influence all the operational work that ACO directs: operational planning, NATO-
approved training, military exercises, work of GENADs, reporting templates etc.  
Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (2009) was progressive in its guiding vision that: 
“NATO's operational effectiveness includes making a contribution to sustainable and lasting 
peace, within which gender equality is a key factor” (emphasis added). Its “key concepts” 
included “analys[ing] measures available to protect against gender based violence, 
particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse and violence in situations of armed 
conflict”.411 Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 directed measures in the planning and 
conduct of NATO operations to protect women and girls; and that operations, “Analyse … 
whether procedures should be implemented (e.g. rules of engagement) to protect civilians 
with specific consideration given to women and girls, from violence, rape and other forms 
of sexual abuse”. 412 However, it remained vague in terms of what NATO forces should do 
about responding to any identified women’s/gender issues/concerns/perspectives. No 
concrete measures for protection or prevention were articulated, and the complexities and 
possible unintended consequences indicated by the ISAF study were not directly addressed. 
40-1 was significant in setting out for the first time the role of GENADs. Their 
responsibilities include: conducting gender and UNSCR 1325 assessments; gender 
mainstreaming operational processes and procedures; liaising with local and international 
women's organisations; and supporting any inquiry or investigation into allegations (against 
NATO personnel, the context implies) of violence or sexual abuse.413 As such, although the 
GENAD was not explicitly tasked with supporting responses to CRSV, their mandate 
 
410 Interview with former GENAD, 26 April 2018. 
411 NATO ACO ACT, Bi-St. Dir. 40-1 (2009), pp. 1-8(h). 
412 Ibid., pp. 1–7, 3-3(d). 
413 Ibid., pp. 1–11. 
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suggests they would at least assess it. 40-1 also included a set of NATO Standards of 
Behaviour, although this only partially addressed SEA. It refers to “not commit[ing] any 
illegal act” that could harm women are girls,414 as such leaving open the possibility of 
prostitution. But it does direct and set out procedures for swift investigation into any 
allegations of violence or rape that directed NATO commanders to prevent exploitation of 
women and girls and ensure rapid inquiry into allegations. 415  
NATO, therefore, made strong progress over 2008 and 2009 in articulating and 
institutionalising an approach to implementing WPS in operations. From just hesitant policy 
engagement at the close of 2007, within nineteen months it had translated this into an 
operational directive and created new gender structures both at Headquarters and in 
missions. Moreover, in including the abuse of women and girls by NATO forces, it was 
grappling with a contentious issue among NATO forces. Broader sexual violence response 
was an element of all of these developments, although not yet a distinct focus.  
2010-2013: WPS and CRSV move into the mainstream of NATO policy discourse, but 
remain poorly addressed in operations  
By 2010, the narrative that gender perspectives and a focus on WPS enhance NATO’s 
mission success was well embedded within NATO Headquarters. The successes attributed 
to ISAF GENADs, for example, are framed in terms of “… enhancing situational awareness … 
improving trust and rapport with the civilian population … [counterinsurgency] and 
operational effectiveness force multipliers”.416 The Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee 
is quoted as saying that “… gender is an asset to improve operational effectiveness ... a 
force multiplier that helps to win hearts and minds … the gender perspective has to be 
perceived as a key component in NATO’s new Strategic Concept.”417 Nonetheless, when the 
new NATO Strategic Concept was adopted during the 2010 Lisbon Summit, it did not refer 
to WPS or gender. (The Strategic Concept was and remains a key document, often referred 
 
414 Ibid., pp. 2–2. 
415 Ibid., pp. 3–2. 
416 Comprehensive report on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on 
women, peace and security and related resolutions (2010) para. 5.2.4.2. 
417 NCGP, Template for Pre-deployment Gender Training (2010) p. 9. 
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to by NATO staff as having established NATO’s “Comprehensive Approach.”) Still, NATO’s 
2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration described the implementation of the WPS Policy and a 
new WPS Action Plan as “an integral part of our work to improve the Alliance’s 
effectiveness”.418 This was the beginning of a process over 2010-2013 wherein WPS entered 
the mainstream of NATO’s public policy discourse, with CRSV a growing focus.  
NATO’s WPS policy was revised in June 2011, referring now to the three UNSCRs on sexual 
violence in conflict. Still, no clear NATO commitments, objectives or actions related to CRSV 
were identified; rather, the reference in the 2007 Framework Document to collecting 
information on gender-specific violence was lost. Reference to NATO standards of 
behaviour was also dropped, and there was no reference to the existing policy and 
guidelines on trafficking in human beings. In 2012, NATO’s Chicago Summit Declaration had 
a clear emphasis on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). WPS was prominently placed 
as paragraph 6, beginning: “Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict 
situations, the lack of effective institutional arrangements to protect women, and the 
continued under-representation of women in peace processes, remain serious 
impediments to building sustainable peace.”419  
Further steps were now initiated to translate NATO’s WPS policy into operations and 
missions. In December 2010, a “gender annex” had been added to the Operation Plan for 
the NATO Mission in Afghanistan.420 GENADs were being deployed in Kosovo as well as 
Afghanistan (many Swedish, Norwegian or Dutch). Alongside GENADs, US Marines had 
introduced Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan, based on the all-female 
“Team Lioness” used in Iraq. By 2012, 149 FETs were operating, from at least eight different 
NATO nations.421 Although some FETs did health and hygiene outreach, they were primarily 
 
418 NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration (2010) para. 7. The Action Plan adopted at the Summit has 
never been publicly released. 
419 NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration (2012) para. 16. 
420 E. Rorvik, ‘Annex X – Gender COMISAF OPLAN’ (2011); J. D. Kem and F. A. Smith, Gender 
Integration: An Afghan Priority (2011) p. 9. 
421 Z. Bedell, ‘United States Marine Corps Female Engagement Team’ (2011). Mederios, cited in B. 
McNierney, ‘Female Engagement Teams: An Evaluation of the Female Engagement Team Program in 
Afghanistan’ (U.S. Naval War College, 2015) p. 82. 
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tasked with intelligence gathering, psychological operations and building support for ISAF, 
not with contributing to women’s physical protection. Scholarship is generally critical of 
their impact, either on operations or on local women.422  
At NATO Headquarters, in 2012 the position of NATO Secretary General’s Special 
Representative on WPS (SGSR WPS) was created to coordinate NATO’s policies and 
activities on WPS within NATO and externally. The Office of the SGSR WPS provides political 
focus and leadership on WPS, leading work on the successive iterations of the WPS Policy 
and Action Plan. The Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) was 
established to increase NATO’s gender training capacity. Although hosted by the Swedish 
Armed Forces and not formally a NATO entity, NCGM plays a pivotal role in developing 
approaches to gender training for NATO member and Partner armed forces and in 
delivering training.  
Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 was revised in August 2012, now with a much stronger 
emphasis on CRSV.423 It highlighted women, girls and boys as potentially vulnerable to SGBV 
and SEA and needing special protection. Compared to the 2009 Directive, the 2012 version 
is stronger in terms of response to CRSV by third parties in three ways. First, references to 
SGBV are more comprehensive and recognise the frequent victimization of boys. The 
definition of sexual violence used is strong, being drawn from the ICC Elements of Crimes, 
and inclusive of any “act of a sexual nature,” and with a broad understanding of coercion as 
including inter alia “psychological oppression or abuse of power … or by taking advantage 
of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine 
 
422 A. C. Coll, ‘Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan’ Honors, Wellesley 
College 2012; S. L. Dyvik, ‘Performing gender in the “theatre of war”: embodying the invasion, 
counterinsurgency and exit strategy in Afghanistan’ PhD, University of Sussex 2 July 2013 p. 137; S. 
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consent"424 Second, the Directive adds a tactical level to implementation, suggesting 
engaging with the local population whilst on patrol to gather information about their 
situation. Third, the provisions on reporting of SGBV and trafficking of human beings are 
stronger: reporting is explicitly required – although the processes for this are not set out.425 
Reports are directed to “include information about the situation of women, boys and girls; 
the impact of NATO interventions on women, men, girls and boys; and statistics 
disaggregated by sex”.426 However, the Directive remains vague about the legal framing of 
the protection activities it directs, tying them only to increasing operational effectiveness.  
It is significant here to highlight the policy choice reflected in the above, which would 
persist in subsequent instruments defining NATO’s approach to CRSV. The UNSCRs (and the 
2013 Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict) focus only on “sexual 
violence in conflict.” NATO uses the language of “conflict-related sexual and gender-based 
violence”. There is no one internationally agreed-upon definition of GBV, and it is 
conceptually difficult; for example, to distinguish violence that is directed against a man 
because he is a man or that affects men disproportionately, without the concept collapsing 
into all violence.427 This makes NATO’s subject matter more uncertain in legal terms than 
merely referring to “sexual violence” - the meaning of which is enunciated extensively in 
national and international jurisprudence and texts. Indeed, while NATO would continue to 
define “sexual violence” using the ICC Elements of Crimes, it would attempt no definition of 
GBV in subsequent WPS policy, iterations of 40-1, later Military Guidelines on Conflict-
 
424 Ibid., paras 1-4(f). 
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Related SGBV or the compendium of NATO agreed terminology.428 NATO training materials 
likewise do not attempt to explore “GBV” conceptually.429 
On request by the North Atlantic Council, from October 2012 NCGM led a study to review 
NATO’s implementation of WPS in operations and missions. The review team’s analysis 
included fieldwork in Afghanistan and Kosovo over February to April 2013, conducting 142 
interviews. This Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of 
NATO-led Operations and Missions remains significant as still the most recent official, 
operations-based analysis of NATO’s implementation of its WPS commitments. The report’s 
headline finding was “significant progress”430 but a close reading shows that in terms of 
protecting women and girls from CRSV, little was being done. The Review found that few 
commanders and staff officers were aware of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1; the 
Kosovo Force’s security analyses omitted attention to gender; ISAF’s analyses omitted 
attention to the security of the population altogether, aside from efforts to reduce the 
civilian casualties of their own actions.431 One of the researchers told me: 
We had some meetings while we were in Kabul with the Legal Advisors 
… and they didn’t deal with any external cases of any violence, any 
human rights abuses at all … I also got the answer, “This is not our 
problem. We don’t deal with this.” “This is not our mandate.”432  
The Review “could not find any indications of ISAF efforts to address the security needs of 
those Afghans, women and men, whom it interacts with.”433 Local men and women are 
cited as expressing the view that ISAF had not increased the population’s security in any 
substantial way.434  
 
428 A footnote in a NATO doctrine cites a UNHCR source to define SGBV (see NATO Standardization 
Office, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (2018) p. B-1) but this can hardly be 
regarded as agreed NATO language. 
429 E.g. NCGM and NATO ACT, Gender education and training package for nations (2015). 
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In 2013, the Annual Conference of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) 
took as the theme of their annual conference: “How NATO can prevent and respond to 
sexual and gender based violence in conflict?” Delegates’ recommendations included 
referencing CRSV in orders and the Key Operating Concept of a mission mandate; issuing 
rape kits to medics and kits to support investigations; training and analytical and reporting 
tools; and mechanisms for engagement with SGBV support agencies. They recommended 
military police be trained to document for and report to the International Criminal Court. 
Discussion focused on the need for more detailed guidance around mandates, standards 
and resources. The pages of concrete, practical measures identified by the NCGP 
demonstrate that there is a great deal that could be done by NATO military forces to 
address CRSV and a high degree of enthusiasm for doing so amongst staff working on 
gender in NATO Allies and Partners.435 But, within NATO Headquarters, efforts to publicise 
the NCGP’s recommendations were openly resisted by the Public Diplomacy Division on the 
basis that sexual violence was “not a topic for NATO”.436  
Insiders describe a profound resistance to the WPS Agenda within NATO: 
… in 2009, ‘10, ‘11, ‘12, gender, 1325 was like the person who had a 
sickness that you could get … They said, “… We are a military machine, 
we don’t deal with human rights issues. We don’t deal with women, 
women and girls, 1325, gender, what are you talking about?” … In 2013 
and 2012, if you spoke about sexual violence in conflicts, “What? Are 
you crazy?” … protection of civilians, protection from sexual violence, 
blah, blah, blah it was like, they don’t know.437 
This echoes Hurley’s interviews with NATO staff in 2012, describing how they avoided a 
focus on “female stuff” to establish the relevancy of WPS, instead framing WPS in terms of 
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NATO’s operational effectiveness.438 It suggests a mismatch between political commitments 
made by NATO, actual commitment within NATO’s walls, and operational realities.  
2014 - 2015: Strengthening mechanisms for concrete action to prevent and respond 
to CRSV 
When the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan for WPS were revised in 2014, now against 
the backdrop of the third UNSCR on sexual violence and conflict and widespread 
endorsement of the Deed of Commitment, they made clearer and more specific 
commitments, objectives and actions related to assessing and preventing CRSV.439 The 
Action Plan committed to: 
7.1. Ensure that mandates and plans for any future NATO-led operation 
and mission, as relevant, provide direction on how to respond to 
conflict-related sexual and gender based violence, and direct creation of 
systematic and robust monitoring and reporting mechanisms in order to 
follow trends.  
7.2. Develop military guidelines on prevention and response to conflict- 
related sexual and gender based violence and integrate these aspects 
into the operational planning processes.  
[….] 
7.4 Develop the analytical tools necessary to understand the level of risk 
of sexual and gender-based violence, including development of early 
warning indicators.440  
NATO’s September 2014 Wales Summit Declaration affirmed this commitment to 
preventing conflict-related SGBV.441 However, compared to previous Summit Declarations, 
WPS plunged in prominence from one of the opening paragraphs to paragraph 90 
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(positioned below NATO’s partnership initiatives) and the commitment was essentially 
merely to carry on. This has remained the treatment of WPS in Summit Declarations since. 
Katharine Wright’s interviews with staff working on gender in NATO Headquarters and ACT 
during 2014 testify to the challenges they continued to face during this period: that WPS 
was tacitly resisted, perceived as outside of NATO’s core remit, as a “personal agenda” 
concerning women rather than an institutional priority.442 ACO’s GENAD described progress 
on WPS as hampered by lack of resources and “the internal perception that a narrow focus 
such as ‘gender’ should not command so much influence”.443  
Even so, in 2015 ACT, ACO and NCGM developed a suite of gender education and training 
and guidance for military exercises.444 When NCGM delivered this training, they set out a 
range of military actions to counter CRSV including detaining perpetrators; deterrent 
patrolling; supporting the evacuation of civilians at risk; providing post-exposure 
prophylaxis to victims, and capacity building of local forces.445 The training materials have a 
section dedicated to armed forces’ codes of conduct concerning SEA, although do not go so 
far as asserting a ban on sex with prostitutes.446 Simultaneously, SHAPE and ACT developed, 
in essence, an extended job description for GENADs, the Gender Functional Planning Guide. 
The Planning Guide has a three-page annex on conflict-related SGBV. This lists sixteen 
possible military tasks and actions to combat, prevent or address it and fourteen potential 
organisation actions, shown in Table 1 on page 135.447 This breadth and detail, again, 
demonstrate the potential for there to be focused and sustained commitment of military 
attention and resources to address CRSV. 
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Table 1: NATO’s identified military and organisational tasks to address conflict-related SGBV 
 
Possible military tasks and actions to combat/prevent/address conflict-related SGBV 
(1) Preventive Physical Protection: Armed Patrols and Escorts 
(2) Joint Protection Teams 
(3) Quick Impact Projects 
(4) Deterrent Tasks, Including through Visible Presence 
(5) Cordon-and-Search Operations 
(6) Community Liaison 
(7) Securing the Environment for Delivery of Humanitarian Aid 
(8) Gender-Sensitive Camp Design and Management 
(9) Information: Monitoring, Reporting, Behavioural Change Communication 
(10) Reviving the Political Process: Electoral Security for Women 
(11) Restoring Rule of Law: Fostering Gender Justice 
(12) Gender-Sensitive DDR/Demilitarization and Ceasefire Monitoring 
(13) Gender-Sensitive Justice and Security Sector Reform 
(14) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 
(15) Counter Human Trafficking Operations 
(16) Ensuring women in detention are correctly treated 
Potential Organisational Actions to Combat Sexual Violence 
(1) Good leadership backed by strong C2 structure 
(2) Integrating effective responses to sexual violence into the planning and execution 
(3) Understanding the links between sexual violence and the restoration of peace and 
security 
(4) Willingness and wherewithal to patrol and operate in unconventional space. 
(5) Consultation with all segments of the community 
(6) Incentives that recognize and reward successful initiatives to combat sexual violence 
(7) Training of Medics and MPs in response to survivors of rape. 
(8) Effective coordination between military and other protection stakeholders 
(9) Operational scenario-based pre-deployment and in-mission/refresher training 
(10) Role-modelling and capacity-building to help leave a legacy of security for women and 
girls 
(11) Gender balance in force generation and deployment 
(12) Gender awareness training programmes for the force based on UNSCR 1325 and related 
resolutions 
(13) Development of a sustainable internal and external complaints system. 
(14) Effective development of SOPs, TTPs and FRAGOs.  
 
At Headquarters, work commenced to draft the military guidelines called for in the Action 
Plan. One of the staff involved described how difficult a process this was, with nations “Not 
ready, not willing”, except for a small supportive handful (including the UK, Norway and 
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Canada); and staff within different NATO structures in disagreement as to whether GENADs 
should be responsible for protection activities.448 Nonetheless, in June 2015, NATO’s 
Military Committee did endorse Military Guidelines on the Prevention of, and Response to 
Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related 
SGBV), one of the most significant milestones in NATO’s institutional engagement with 
CRSV.449 The Guidelines were developed with close reference to initiatives within the UN on 
CRSV and for some were seen primarily to support NATO’s coordination with UN 
missions.450 They direct commanders to “undertake, either within their organisation, or in 
close coordination with international or local actors, measures to prevent and respond to 
conflict-related SGBV”.451 They direct risk assessment, reporting, cooperation with other 
actors, and education and training of their own and partner forces.452 However, as with the 
Policy and Action Plan, the Guidelines avoid directing NATO forces to protect civilians from 
CRSV; using the weaker language of “reduce the risk of conflict-related SGBV and improve 
responsive measures that take protection needs into consideration”.453 They are an 
ambiguous blend of strong language concerning NATO’s mandate and responsibility as 
concerns CRSV, and weak language around the expected actions. The Guidelines do not 
directly address SEA, although obliquely refer to developing mechanisms to ensure 
allegations and incidents of conflict-related SGBV are investigated and disciplined.454 
September 2015 saw an added political impetus for NATO attention to CRSV. The New York 
Times reported that United States military personnel were aware of bacha bazi abuse by 
Afghan police and militia whom they were mentoring, but had instructions not to 
intervene, even when boys were being abused on a coalition military base.455 One GENAD 
 
448 Interview with former GENAD, 26 April 2018. 
449 NATO, ‘Military guidelines on the prevention of, and response to, conflict-related sexual and 
gender-based violence’ (2015). 
450 Interview with NATO GENAD, 4 October 2017.  
451 NATO, ‘Military guidelines on the prevention of, and response to, conflict-related sexual and 
gender-based violence’, para. 11. 
452 Ibid., paras 12-14.  
453 Ibid., para. 8. 
454 Ibid., para. 17(b); read with Women, Peace and Security Action Plan, p. 5. 
455 See Ch. 5, n 339. 
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described this as the “breaking point” for NATO.456 A commander’s tactical guidance was 
issued that month, making clear that if NATO personnel “suspect” Afghan National Security 
Forces have violated human rights, they must report it within their chain of command as 
well as to Afghan officials.457 
2016-2019 Policy and structures position WPS alongside the protection of civilians 
and emphasise human security 
Within NATO Headquarters during 2015, responsibility for the protection of civilians and 
reduction and mitigation of civilian casualties had been transferred to the SGSR WPS, along 
with the topics of children and armed conflict, conflict-related SGBV and human trafficking. 
This was part of a new focus on the protection of civilians within NATO. In mid-2016 NATO 
adopted its first Policy for the Protection of Civilians. This policy was a significant milestone, 
in committing NATO not only to minimize negative effects of its own operations on the 
civilian population but for NATO operations to actively “when applicable … protect civilians 
from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors” and 
“prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations in which civilians suffer physical 
violence or are under threat of physical violence”.458 (To be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8.) The Policy committed to a gender-sensitive approach and framed protection of 
civilians as complementing and reinforcing work on WPS and conflict-related SGBV.459 
Nonetheless, it makes no specific commitments as regards CRSV. 
There were several signals that momentum within NATO around CRSV was dropping. 
Although reporting on CRSV remained weak, NATO now said it did not intend to build a 
specific system: reporting and information sharing “must be completed in the existing 
reporting structures, building no parallel structures”460 NATO’s SGSR WPS described the 
 
456 Interview with GENAD, 4 October 2017; same point made in Interview with NATO Legal Advisor, 
30 May 2018. 
457 PowerPoint presentation “Gender, Sexual Violence and Exploitation (GSVE) on Operations,” 
Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
458 Policy for the Protection of Civilians (2016), paras 5, 9, 11. 
459 Ibid., paras 12, 16. 
460 Outcomes of the Workshop on the Military Guidelines on the Prevention of, and Response to, 
CRSGBV – Progress and Way Ahead (2016) para. 9. 
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ongoing challenge of keeping WPS on NATO’s political and decision-making agenda,461 and 
her early departure would leave the post vacant for much of 2017. Civil society 
commentators observed that NATO was not adequately resourcing implementation of its 
WPS Policy and Action Plan.462 Looking across to the UN Security Council, France was in the 
spotlight for abuses alleged against its troops in the Central African Republic,463 but there 
was apparent silence on this within NATO. 
In October 2017, the third iteration of Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 was issued. This 
remains NATO’s most recent operational guidance document on WPS. It is built upon 
surprisingly sophisticated gender concepts, introducing new language to NATO. For 
example, its rationale being that: “… men, women, boys and girls are components of a 
gendered system … it is necessary to assess notions equated with traditional masculinity 
and femininity that underpin organisations, societies and communities.”464 Directive 40-1 
now notes conflict-related SGBV as being part of a wider continuum of violence, also 
affecting men and boys.465 (This continuum framing of CRSV began to appear in other NATO 
documents: presenting CRSV as part of a spectrum of wartime violence.466) The Directive 
makes several references to data and reporting on conflict-related SGBV, but as just one 
facet of a gender perspective. For example, it refers to collecting sex-disaggregated data on 
CRSV, as well as on “political, military, economic civil society, education, refugees, internally 
 
461 M. Schuurman, ‘NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Time to Bring It Home’ (2015) 
14 Connections: The Quarterly Journal 1–6; M. Schuurman, ‘The women, peace and security agenda: 
integrating a gendered perspective into a security operations’ (2017) 41 The Fletcher Forum of World 
Affairs 103–11. 
462 Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security, Report of the Second Annual Meeting 
(2017). 
463 E.g., M. Deschamps, H. B. Jallow, and Y. Sooka, Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by 
Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International 
Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic (2016); ‘France to fight against sexual 
exploitation and abuse’ (April 2016).  
464 NATO ACO ACT, Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1: Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into 
the NATO Command Structure (Revision 2) (2017) p. 3. 
465 Ibid., p. 7. 
466 E.g. NATO organises second workshop on military guidelines on the prevention of, and response 
to, conflict-related sexual and gender based violence (2018); Inclusive Security Conflict-Related Sexual 
and Gender-Based Violence (2018). 
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displaced persons, prisoners, human rights violations”.467 It suggests geo-mapping incidents 
of CRSV, but also any “events and incidents that have a disproportionately negative effect 
on men, women, boys, and girls”.468 As such, the Directive lacks a focus on CRSV that is 
clearly distinct from a very broad range of issues and concerns identified as related to 
gender. The Directive’s Standards of Behaviour now refer to fostering an environment that 
prevents SEA but continues to fall short of issuing any clear prohibitions.469 At the close of 
2017, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and celebrity activist Angelina Jolie 
published an Op-Ed arguing, “Nato can become the global military leader in how to prevent 
and respond to sexual violence in conflict”.470  
The 2018 revision of the WPS Policy amplified some of the conceptual shifts noted above: 
away from a focus on gender mainstreaming within traditional military tasks, towards a 
more expansive vision of NATO’s role in promoting gender equality. The new SGSR WPS, 
Clare Hutchinson, was questioning the entire basis of NATO’s approach to WPS, arguing 
that in WPS terms, “Operational effectiveness is not effective”; that NATO did not know 
what gender as an enabler of operational effectiveness meant.471 NATO’s 2018 WPS Policy, 
under her stewardship, highlights the alignment of the “WPS mandate” with NATO’s 
“holistic approach to human security”.472 It declares, “NATO aims to address gender 
inequality” and “support the advancement of gender equality”.473 This is a more expansive 
policy goal and new language for NATO; while previous policies had mentioned cooperation 
with organisations working for gender equality, NATO had not previously committed itself 
to address or support the advancement of gender equality. The commitment to prevent 
and respond to sexual violence is stronger, with training “mandatory,” and leadership to be 
accountable “for ensuring that personnel/ troops are trained on preventing and responding 
to conflict-related sexual violence and take all possible measures to prevent it.”474 For the 
 
467 NATO ACO ACT, Bi-St. Dir. 40-1 Rev. 2 (2017), p. 8. 
468 Ibid., p. 11-12. 
469 Ibid., p. 14-15. 
470 Stoltenberg and Jolie, ‘Why Nato must defend women’s rights’. 
471 Ms Clare Hutchinson, open session of the Annual Conference of the NCGP, 29 May 2018. 
472 Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan (2018) para. 6. 
473 Ibid., paras 9–10. 
474 Ibid., para. 34. 
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first time, there is an explicit reference to SEA in a NATO policy. (NATO’s approach to SEA 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.) 
Despite these demonstrations of apparently increasing political commitment by NATO to 
prevent and respond to CRSV, a number of key enablers and elements remain missing. 
6.3 Key shortcomings 
In mid-2017, NATO commissioned an independent assessment of progress on 
implementation of its WPS Action Plan. While it found that there had been advances in 
integrating a gender perspective in military commands, operations and missions since 2013, 
the review identified a gulf between NATO’s rhetoric and implementation.  
A respondent in a senior leadership position said that “We have not 
found a comfort zone on how to integrate gender and it’s not part of 
day to day work.” An [Assistant Secretary General] described it as “Not 
in the DNA of NATO” … The highest military leadership had lofty 
ambitions and promoted the implementation of the WPS agenda. At the 
same time, it was not an obvious component of the everyday work of 
chiefs and staff at lower levels.475 
A GENAD put the problem more bluntly: “… at the end of the day, this is a very sexy agenda 
and you have a Special Representative going here and there, United Nations, blah blah 
blah, showing the flag. But always you don’t allocate resources…476  
The review also highlighted that none of NATO’s WPS/gender activities, e-learning courses 
or face-to-face training programmes had been evaluated as to their impact.477 Civil society 
has called for a robust, field-based assessment of the impact of NATO’s approach to WPS 
on communities affected by NATO operations.478 Absent this, my research can draw from 
interviews, observations and secondary literature a picture – if fragmented – of what is 
happening in operations concerning CRSV. The following necessarily draws heavily upon the 
 
475 H. Lackenbauer, #BeBoldForChange (2017) p. 19. Hardt and von Hlatky, ‘NATO’s About-Face’. 
reports similar findings as regards the low priority afforded to gender amongst civilian leadership. 
476 Interview with former NATO GENAD, 26 April 2018. 
477 Lackenbauer, #BeBoldForChange, pp. 25–26. 
478 DCAF/NATO CSAP, Report and recommendations of the Second CSAP Annual Meeting (2017) p. 22. 
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missions in Afghanistan, which dominated NATO in the period under examination. Four 
clear weaknesses in NATO’s engagement with CRSV are apparent: in doctrine, there is only 
piecemeal reference to WPS or sexual violence; there is weak operational implementation 
of WPS policy and directives; there is active resistance to reporting CRSV; and there are 
disconnects between NATO’s approaches to gender mainstreaming and CRSV. These are 
explored in more detail below. 
Piecemeal integration of CRSV in NATO doctrine  
As explained in Chapter 4, doctrine is at the heart of how militaries function, and how NATO 
coordinates its multilateral forces. In a seminar on SGBV within a NATO subordinate 
command trainees were told that “without rules and doctrine” there was “no answer” to 
many of the questions and challenges raised.479 NATO doctrine is developed under the 
coordination of ACT, but the writing process is “caretaked by the nations” and they have 
specific personnel that they send to doctrine development meetings.480 A NATO insider 
described doctrine development as “a very archaic, very slow process.”481 Even accounting 
for doctrine revision being a slow cycle, NATO’s policy and directives on WPS and CRSV are 
only partially and shallowly translated into doctrine. The following is merely a selection of 
examples. 
In December 2014, NATO’s doctrine for peace operations, AJP 3.4.1 Military contribution to 
peace support, was reissued. Given the by now strong commitment to CRSV at a policy level 
and its perceived significance where NATO was supporting UN Missions, one would expect 
content on CRSV. Indeed, for the first time in NATO doctrine, a substantive connection with 
WPS is made, with a discrete section focused upon “gender: understanding different 
perspectives”. It refers to Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, and advises that a Peace 
Support Force should, “understand [its] role in protecting vulnerable groups such as 
 
479 Observation of seminar on SGBV, 28 April 2016, NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. 
480 Interview with GENAD, 29 May 2018. 
481 Ibid. 
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women, children and elderly people”.482 However, the doctrine gives no guidance at all 
concerning CRSV: anticipating, preventing or responding to it.  
At the end of 2015 (after the release of the Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV), a 
new doctrine on Military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction recognised CRSV. 
It specifies that: “Mission mandates should specifically address gender issues, earmark 
resources for gender work, and establish accountability and monitoring mechanisms.”483 
Nonetheless, the doctrine’s directions appear random and disconnected from typical 
military activities. In terms of prevention, it suggests, “specific attention should be paid to 
investments in the required infrastructure (e.g. forensic laboratories), and human resources 
needed for the reception of victims”.484 In terms of protection, it suggests reviewing and re-
drafting constitutions and creating new systems of governance, reform of customary and 
formal judicial systems.485 These are not typical military tasks.  
In 2016, NATO’s capstone document for planning and conducting operations on land (as 
distinguished from maritime, air or space operations), Allied Joint Doctrine for Land 
Operations, was reissued. Given that almost all of NATO’s consideration of WPS has been 
within the context of land operations, one might expect this doctrine to be a significant 
resource for embedding into operations new approaches to integrating a gender 
perspective. It mentions neither gender nor CRSV. Emphasising battlefield manoeuvre and 
firepower, it positions fighting power and combat as a military’s core functions, peppered 
with quotes from military leaders of past eras. Protecting civilians is referred to only in the 
sense of “minimal, essential stability tasks”.486  
At the end of 2018, NATO’s doctrine on civil-military cooperation was reissued. Compared 
to the previous version of 2013, it now has a well-developed section on how gender is 
relevant to analysing the civil environment.487 The doctrine notes protection of civilians, 
 
482 NATO Standardization Office, Military Contribution to Peace Support (2014) para. 0337. 
483 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction, Edition A, 
Version 1 (2015), para. 0309. 
484 Ibid., para. E007. 
485 Ibid., para. E006. 
486 NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (2016) pp. 2–27. 
487 NATO Standardization Office, Civil-Military Cooperation (2018), para. 1.32, 5.8. 
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children and armed conflict, and WPS as cross-cutting topics. Sexual violence against 
children is identified as a grave violation, and NATO suggests it can “add value” in reporting 
violations, supporting monitoring, awareness-raising and training of local forces, and 
dialogue. 488 The only other suggestion of action related to CRSV, however, is the vague 
claim that “Deploying gender advisory teams could … protect [women] from sexual 
violence”.489  
Alongside doctrine, NATO sets training standards for nations. In November 2016, a training 
standard for peace operations was issued. Training objectives to respond to CRSV include: 
 … knows the obligation to report CRSV when observed, knows the 
obligation according to UN zero tolerance to report any sexual 
exploitation and abuse, internally as well as externally … are able to 
advise leadership and staff on how to mitigate CRSV, are able to address 
CRSV in accordance with ROE [rules of engagement] and legal 
framework … addresses effectively the procedures to mitigate CRSV in 
the mission area, applies the mandate of protection as well as 
prohibition of sexual violence in accordance with regulations … 490 
This is a mark of progress: detailed and direct coverage of prevention and response to 
sexual violence in a document that is not specifically about gender or WPS. But, when only 
three months later a training standard was issued for operations in urban environments, it 
contained no reference to gender or women.491 This suggests commitment across NATO 
structures to engage with WPS and sexual violence was uneven, and there were no 
coordination mechanisms within NATO able and willing to ensure these issues were 
reflected in all standards and doctrine. A GENAD said of the doctrine writing “old boys’ 
club” that “their ability to actually take this on, or willingness to take this on independently 
isn’t really there.”492 
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Slow progress in integrating CRSV in operational planning 
A major step forward in translating WPS policy to operations has been the development of 
“gender annexes” to NATO operational plans. The operational plan for Afghanistan from 
2015, for example, contains references to developing training on SGBV.493 A GENAD 
working on operational planning for that mission nonetheless underlined gaps in NATO’s 
commitments regarding CRSV:  
… they are picking three areas: education and training, reporting, and 
support to monitoring and security forces assistance. Yeah, but what is 
the area which is missing? Our response. How do our own operations 
look like? … What is in between our arrival and the capacity building and 
handover of the security response?494 
The GENAD was highlighting the failure of the Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV 
to specify any concrete tactical measures by which NATO would prevent, protect from or 
respond to CRSV. As late as mid-2018, another GENAD explained that, if CRSV is identified 
as a concern for NATO in a particular area, commanders are asked to “react pre-emptively,” 
and to consider how NATO can ensure services and effectively communicate with 
international organisations and with NGOs.495 But, this was described as “theoretical”; as in, 
“We certainly aren’t quite to that stage yet, we’re in the more, just figuring out how we 
would put this in operational context stage right now, I would say, on our exercises.”496  
Other GENADs made this point more generally: the gap between political and operational 
levels in implementing commitments to CRSV. “Translation of political documents into 
actions on the ground is very difficult.”497 “The political, the raising awareness or raising the 
questions, is not physically touching the soldier on foot.”498 If training is a prerequisite to 
 
493 On 1 January 2015, NATO’s operation in Afghanistan made a significant transition: from ISAF, 
which had run since 2003, to Resolute Support Mission. Excerpt from Annex WW to the SACEUR 
OPLAN 10312 for Resolute Support in Afghanistan (on file with author). 
494 Interview with GENAD, 24 June 2016. 
495 Interview with GENAD, 29 May 2018. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Former NATO IMS GENAD, open (to public) session of the annual conference of NCGP, 4 June 
2019. 
498 Interview GENAD, 7 October 2017 
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being able to address sexual violence in operations: the NATO Mission in Iraq’s GENAD 
described half the NATO personnel as arriving with no gender training, and nations as 
having an inconsistent commitment to integrating gender.499 By 2019, there did seem to be 
some integration of CRSV content into NATO training for ministries and defence institutions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.500 But, a NATO Advisor told me there remained “not much to tell” 
in terms of people reporting or intervening in sexual violence in operations and missions 
and, of protection of civilians more broadly, “We are not doing it yet”. 501 The Advisor 
distinguished between NATO’s “moral code” and “reality”.502 Progress on incorporating 
actions around CRSV in NATO’s operational planning remains slow and partial.  
Failure to develop a CRSV reporting system 
NATO emphasises reporting of conflict-related SGBV as a key element of its institutional 
response. The Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV direct that “objective, accurate 
and reliable information on the types of conflict-related SGBV” be collected and reported in 
a timely manner, including through Periodic Mission Reviews; and that efforts be made to 
share information on conflict-related SGBV with relevant UN authorities.503 In his 2017 Op-
Ed, the NATO Secretary General claimed that to report on CRSV was “now one of the tasks 
of Nato commanders” and that NATO was developing “a reporting system to record 
instances of gender-based violence” which NATO soldiers will use “to discern patterns and 
trends so that they will be able to respond more quickly to prevent potential violence.” 504 
NATO staff have for years been trying to develop a common NATO mechanism for reports 
of CRSV that would allow information to be shared with, for example, the UN or NGOs. But, 
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reporting CRSV raises concerns about potential implications of the loss of control of 
sensitive information, including for NATO forces’ local relationships and security. 
… What happens if you provide a report on sexual violence … with 
information like names, streets, with details? This report will … affect 
your contingent, will affect your people, your soldiers, while you are 
deployed … they didn’t want anything restricted to leave their area of 
responsibility and to go to the ISAF HQ in Kabul and to be an 
information that could be shared with the Afghan National Police, for 
example. They didn’t want this because … this will go back to them and 
they will be punished for this.505  
Other informants confirmed that nations’ concerns around the possible “cultural 
repercussions” of reporting CRSV and loss of control over sensitive information are “a huge 
problem”.506 This is why the Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV’s commitment for 
NATO even to share information with the UN is specified to be “without prejudice to force 
protection and to the primary requirement of operational security”.507  
In 2016, the format for NATO’s six-monthly Periodic Mission Reviews was updated to 
include parts on conflict-related SGBV.508 Still, as of October 2017, reports of conflict-
related SGBV were not coming up from missions and operations.509 Efforts have shifted to 
frame indicators of SGBV as “strategic intelligence requirements” and connect them to 
higher-profile issues such as hybrid warfare, terrorism and violent extremism.510 During the 
2019 UN Security Council debate on sexual violence, the SGSR WPS said NATO was still 
“working to find better ways to identify and report” CRSV.511 As will be discussed in Chapter 
8, a NATO reporting mechanism concerning SEA is also lacking. 
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Disconnect between gender mainstreaming and CRSV  
As has been highlighted, NATO locates the issue of CRSV within integrating a gender 
perspective. Gender perspective, in turn, is framed as a tool for operational effectiveness. 
In practice, this has led to perceived tensions between gender perspective and action 
concerning CRSV. 
NATO consistently frames the use of GENADs in headquarters and operations as the 
primary mechanism for its “institutionalising” of WPS. GENADs are framed as playing a 
pivotal role concerning CRSV, including advising on what procedures should be put in place 
to protect and respond. But, at least in Afghanistan, GENADs reportedly did not regard 
dealing with CRSV or other human rights abuses as part of their role, and did not, for 
example, participate in inter-agency sexual violence coordination structures:  
When you talk to the Gender Advisors in Kabul, all of them told you the 
same: … “We don’t have a mandate to work on human rights abuse or 
sexual violence … You only work on implementation of the gender 
perspective” … they said that specifically, “We don’t deal with cases of 
sexual violence. It’s not our job. It is forbidden.”512 
Even within NATO Headquarters, advising on policy or guidelines to protect women or 
about CRSV was not regarded as part of a GENAD’s job.513 This evidences a twisting of 
gender mainstreaming objectives in their incorporation into NATO operations: taking 
gender mainstreaming as an inwards-looking strategy to make NATO stronger, but 
neglecting gender mainstreaming aimed at CRSV or protection or empowerment of local 
women and girls. 
Conclusions 
All of the shortcomings discussed above speak to a deeply rooted problem: that NATO has 
built its policy and operational engagement with WPS, and likewise CRSV, upon a narrative 
of utility: that integrating gender perspectives is a means by which to increase NATO’s own 
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“operational effectiveness”. This narrative allows WPS and gender to be “inserted” into any 
priority issue: cyber warfare, counter-terrorism, COVID-19, for example. When applied to 
CRSV, it implicitly claims that there is alignment between NATO’s strategic aims 
(operational effectiveness) in any mission and protection of the civilian population from 
CRSV. As NATO’s Deputy Director of the Operations and Planning Divisions said, “Conflict-
related SGBV affects NATO mission’s success … Empowering and protecting women is not 
just the right thing to do but the smart thing to do.”514 In reality, however, NATO mission 
mandates are not constructed around the protection of civilians. Mission priorities are 
more likely to be to defeat enemy armed groups in combat, to support particular local 
forces, to deter terrorism, et cetera. This, with the overarching demand to ensure NATO’s 
own force security, will in many contexts mitigate against prevention and response to CSRV. 
NATO conflates its strategic interests with the rationale for addressing CRSV, however, 
when one comes down to the nuts and bolts of deterring CRSV, preventing CRSV and 
fighting impunity, they do not easily fit together. 
Jody Prescott, former Legal Advisor to the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan, argued that to 
meaningfully implement gender mainstreaming would require “expensive and far-ranging 
… changes in military systems and policies,”515 “an extensive and critical re-appraisal of 
military doctrine, education and training, and intelligence gathering and analysis.”516 This 
analysis demonstrates that such far-reaching changes have not occurred. There has been 
progress in including protection issues within NATO training materials. Doctrine is at least 
now introducing gender ideas and language to NATO operations, but only partially 
translating this to concrete responses. There has been institutional progress through the 
development of GENAD roles, but these individuals remain under-resourced and do not 
necessarily see CRSV as their responsibility. Most significantly, NATO deploys the language 
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516 J. M. Prescott, ‘NATO Gender Mainstreaming: A New Approach to War Amongst the People?’ 
(2013) 158 The RUSI Journal 56–62 at 59. 
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of WPS and gender mainstreaming – even gender equality – without having made a critical 
reappraisal of the purposes and characteristics of NATO operations.  
The following chapter turns to the UK, an important NATO member, to examine how 
engagement with sexual violence has faced similar and different constraints in a national 
context. Chapter 8 will return to discussing both NATO and the British armed forces, 






Chapter 7  
The British Armed Forces’ responses to CRSV 
At its core, the promotion of WPS and PSVI is bringing about a shift in 
culture and changing people’s attitudes. Inevitably, not everyone will 
agree with the prominence we afford this agenda and some will actively 
reject its teachings, particularly if some elements do not accord with 
deeply held cultural or religious beliefs.  
MoD written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict, 5 February 2016 Sexual Violence in Conflict: 
Written and oral evidence (2016), p. 511.  
 
This chapter explores how the British Armed Forces have since 2005 progressively engaged 
with the issue of CRSV. The UK is an influential NATO member (currently holding the Chair 
of NATO’s Military Committee), but its engagement with CRSV has followed a different 
trajectory, as this chapter explores. The findings set out in this chapter will themselves be 
examined in more detail in chapters 8 and 9, concerning how the British Armed Forces’ 
response to CRSV is shaped by their understandings of international law obligations, by 
ideas connected to gender, and by their understanding of their strategic priorities. 
As with the preceding case study, this chapter opens with an overview of the British Armed 
Forces’ purpose, governance and institutional structure, their major operational 
engagements since 2005, and a short analysis of how women are integrated. The chapter 
then, in section 7.2, traces chronologically the British Armed Forces’ initiatives to respond 
to CRSV. This is grounded in original analysis of political declarations, policies and reports; 
military doctrine, directives, guidelines and procedures; and training and education 
standards and materials.517 This documentary analysis is further enriched by insights 
gleaned from seventeen interviews conducted between 2015 and 2018 with British military 
personnel, advisors or educators; plus observations of three British military training 
 
517 The materials reviewed and details of fieldwork conducted are listed in Annex 3. 
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sessions and one workshop. Section 7.3 synthesises progress and challenges, drawing out 
disconnects and congruencies between policy, doctrine and operations. 
7.1 The British Armed Forces: setting the scene  
The British Armed Forces’ purpose and structures  
Although not one of the largest militaries globally, the UK ranks in the world’s ten top in 
terms of military spending and its armed forces’ conventional war capabilities.518 The UK 
has some 191,600 armed forces personnel. Although this top-level figure has remained 
constant over the last decade, the number of full-time, trained regular personnel has 
dropped from around 180,000 to around 140,000. Each of the services, but particularly the 
Army, has been under pressure to reduce numbers. In January 2018, the Armed Forces 
considered themselves 5.7% below their required workforce.519 On the civilian MoD side, 
between 2006 and 2015 staff were reduced from around 110,000 to 58,160, and the 
Department remains under pressure to reduce staff numbers by a further 30%.520 This 
environment of personnel cuts and pressure to save is explained as was often referred to 
by interviewees as impacting upon the Armed Forces’ appetite for engaging with WPS. 
Over the last decade, the UK’s national security policy has come to emphasise military 
action as embedded within an overarching political strategy. The 2010 National Security 
Strategy and 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review emphasize “integrated action” 
between defence, diplomacy and development. The concept of “stabilisation” has likewise 
come to the fore, emphasising that UK overseas engagement be directed toward long term 
political settlement. Peacekeeping has also enjoyed new political attention, with the 2015 
Strategic Defence and Security Review committing to double the UK’s commitment to 
peacekeeping. It has been observed in the past that while the British Armed Forces do 
 
518 M. O’Sullivan and K. Subramanian, The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World? (2015). 
519 Service Personnel Statistics July 2019 (2019); UK Armed Forces Revised Quarterly Personnel 
Compendium: 1 May 2009 to 1 October 2011 (2012); National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence 
Departmental Overview (2018) p. 19.  
520 National Audit Office, A Short Guide to the Ministry of Defence (2015); National Audit Office, 
Ministry of Defence Departmental Overview. 
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conduct such “cosmopolitan-like” operations, defence planners prefer “to continue to 
structure Britain’s military forces for high intensity wartime operations” and “focus their 
efforts on more traditional war-fighting tasks and capabilities.”521 
The governance structure for defence in the UK is comprised of a Board, Council and 
Executive Committee, each a combination of senior military and civilian MoD personnel. 
These sit under Prime Minister and National Security Council.522 The Armed Forces 
themselves are headed by a Chief of the Defence Staff, with a Vice Chief of the Defence 
Staff (VCDS) as deputy. Command and control of overseas operations sit with Joint Forces 
Command, responsible also for preparing for operations, preparing “for the future with 
capabilities and thought leadership” and for joint forces’ education and training.523 
The British Armed Forces’ recent operational engagements  
Since 2005 the British Armed Forces have been involved in a broad range of types of 
conflicts in terms of legal contexts: international armed conflict (Iraq) and 
(internationalized) non-international armed conflict (Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, depending 
upon the period in question), occupation (Iraq), peacekeeping (Cyprus and South Sudan) 
and peace enforcement operations. 524 They also conduct operations in peacetime contexts, 
as when responding to Sierra Leone’s Ebola outbreak and the Nepal earthquake; and 
training and advisory missions, as in Afghanistan since 2015. The UK has supported several 
UN-led peacekeeping missions, notably in Cyprus and South Sudan, although in relatively 
small numbers; and several EU missions, including in Bosnia and Mali. In recent years, the 
British Armed Forces’ biggest operations have been in Iraq and Syria, countering Daesh, 
with significant activities also in Afghanistan and the wider Gulf region. As of early 2019, 
 
521 A. Dorman, ‘The United Kingdom (Chapter 14)’ in L. M. Elliott, G. Cheeseman (eds.), Forces for 
Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-first Century, (Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 
237–49 pp. 242, 246. 
522 ‘Our governance’ (August 2019); National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence Departmental 
Overview. 
523 ‘Joint Forces Command: About us’. 
524 Classification of these conflicts in debatable, of course, and incidental to this project. The current 
clarifications are drawn from: Colassis and Dörmann, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Iraq 
Conflict’; Vité, ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law’; DCDC, Legal Support 
to Joint Operations (2018). 
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although numbers deployed to each of counter-Daesh operations and Afghanistan was 
similar (1,100 to 1,200 personnel), expenditure for counter-Daesh operations dwarfed 
other UK operations.525 In 2020, it will scale up support to the UN mission in Mali.526 
The UK is an important contributor to NATO, providing as much as 14% of total NATO 
capability. The UK hosts two NATO headquarters (the Maritime Command and ARRC, the 
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps).527 The British Armed Forces deployed heavily to NATO 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and as of early 2019 had nearly one thousand personnel 
deployed on NATO missions in Estonia and Poland. 528  
Women in the British Armed Forces and operations 
As at April 2019, the British Armed Forces were 89.4% male and 10.6% female.529 When 
compared with the most recent NATO-wide data from 2017, the UK’s 10.3% participation of 
women was below the NATO member average of 11.1%, and significantly less than some of 
the UK’s close military allies: the United States (16.2%), Canada (15.7%), Australia 
(17.1%).530 Women’s integration into the British Armed Forces has followed different paths 
within the Army, Navy and Air Force. Women’s functional integration has been slowest 
within the Army - the service most closely involved in the issue of CRSV. It was only in 1992 
that the separate Women's Royal Army Corps was disbanded, allowing all women to be 
recruited through joint processes. 531 As of April 2019, 9.5% of Army personnel, 12% of 
Army officers, but only 4.2% of senior Army officers were female.532  
 
525 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence Departmental Overview; Ministry of Defence, Ministry 
of Defence Annual Report and Accounts, 2018-2019 (2019). 
526 J. Beale, ‘British military steps up West Africa involvement’ (2020). 
527 Indispensable allies: US, NATO and UK Defence relations (2018) para. 66. Noting that there are a 
variety of means by which to calculate contribution to NATO: K. H. Hicks and J. Rathke, Counting 
Dollars or Measuring Value: Assessing NATO and Partner Burden Sharing (2018). 
528 Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence Annual Report. 
529 UK Armed Forces Biannual Diversity Statistics, 1 April 2019 (2019) p. 5. 
530 NATO IMS, National Reports to NCGP, 2017, p. 16. 
531 C. Dandeker and M. W. Segal, ‘Gender Integration in Armed Forces: Recent Policy Developments 
in the United Kingdom’ (1996) 23 Armed Forces & Society 29–47. 
532 UK Armed Forces Biannual Diversity Statistics, 1 April 2019, p. 5. 
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The ban on women serving in ground close combat roles was lifted only as of October 2018, 
and gender-free physical fitness standards adopted from April 2019.533 The exclusion of 
women from ground close combat roles, and accordingly, the most prestigious regiments, 
has profoundly shaped and been shaped by how women are perceived within the Army.534 
But, this is not to suggest that women have not been active in operations. Women 
comprised 2.8% of British forces in the 1990s Gulf War.535 It is difficult to find detailed data 
on women’s operational deployments since, but, women served in Iraq and Afghanistan as, 
for example, medics, dog handlers, Royal Military Police, fire support team commanders, 
engineers, signallers, and in psychological operations; technically “attached to” combat 
units rather than part of them.536 Women’s combat identities are in flux. Anthony King 
describes the women who successfully performed de facto combat roles in Iraq and 
Afghanistan over the last decade as having begun to be afforded the status of “honorary 
men”.537 He sees such women as “treated as gender equals”, arguing that “in a highly 
professionalized military culture, as long as a woman can perform, she might be accepted 
by male colleagues.”538 Nonetheless, King’s interviews with British female personnel attest 
to their acceptance as equals being contingent on some level of suppression of their 
femininity, effacement of sexuality, and ability to match men’s physical standards. They 
may be accommodated as individuals with the norms of a masculinized military culture, but 
those gendered norms are not transformed.539  
 
533 ‘All British Armed Forces roles now open to women’; ‘New Physical Employment Standards for the 
Army’. 
534 Described e.g. in V. Basham, ‘Effecting Discrimination: Operational Effectiveness and Harassment 
in the British Armed Forces’ (2009) 35 Armed Forces & Society 728–44. 
535 Dandeker and Segal, ‘Gender Integration in Armed Forces’. 
536 King, ‘The female combat soldier’, 122; Berkshire Consultancy, Qualitative Report for the Study of 
Women in Combat (2009) pp. 1, 90. 
537 King, ‘The female combat soldier’, 126. 
538 Ibid., 126, 132.  
539 See also C. Brownson, ‘Rejecting Patriarchy for Equivalence in the US Military: A Response to 
Anthony King’s “Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat”’ (2016) 42 Armed Forces & 
Society 235–42. 
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7.2  Key phases and milestones in the British Armed Forces’ 
engagement with CRSV 
This chapter now turns to how the British Armed Forces have engaged with the issue of 
CRSV. It maps the development since 2005 of policy, institutional structures, doctrine, 
education and training related to CRSV, and presents examples of how CRSV has been 
perceived and addressed in recent UK operations. Figure 4 on page 156 illustrates key 
milestones, set against the key UNSCRs and other commitments concerning military 
responses to CRSV. The section to follow will synthesise analysis of the key constraints.  
2006 – 2011: Business as usual 
The British MoD was ahead of the curve in 2006 in making a high-level policy commitment 
to incorporate gender perspectives in military training, doctrine and operations. The UK’s 
first 1325 National Action Plan (NAP), an inter-departmental document developed with 
MoD input, committed to: 
… undertake audit of gender content of Pre-Deployment Training. 
Where necessary, develop gender awareness training, and raise 
awareness of the UN Code of Conduct on personal behaviour. Where 
appropriate, incorporate gender perspective related training into other 
military and conflict related personnel doctrines. For example, by the 
MOD investigating the inclusion of gender considerations in operational 
planning and training.540  
This NAP was developed and formally launched as the “official” first UK 1325 NAP in 2007. 
The above commitments were expanded to periodic review of the gender content of pre-
deployment training and including gender perspectives in military doctrine and planning for 
peace operations. But defence’s training audit concluded nothing further was required: 
“personnel generally receive sufficient training … to ensure that they are compliant with 
the intent of the Resolution”.541 
 
540 ‘UNSCR1325 – United Kingdom High Level National Action Plan’ (2006); A. Long, ‘UNSCR 1325 – 
UK Presentation on National Action Plan’ (Warsaw: OSCE, 2007).  
541 Updates to the UK National Action Plan to Implement UNSCR 1325 (2007) p. 7. 
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Even with a 1325 NAP in place, when the UK issued a new National Security Strategy in 
2008, there was but fleeting reference to the WPS Agenda (“promoting the role of women 
in building peace and reconciliation (including through UN Security Council Resolution 
1325”)).542 The Strategy recognises inequality as fuelling conflict but omits any recognition 
of gender inequality as either a form of insecurity or a contributing factor. When the 
National Security Strategy was updated in 2009 and 2010, even this sole reference to 1325 
was lost.543  
By 2010, CRSV had become a more prominent issue for the British Government, which was 
closely involved in the adoption of UNSCR 1960 (2010) on sexual violence in armed conflict. 
A cross-Government Protection of Civilians Strategy referred to the importance of militaries 
being responsive to gender-based and sexual violence.544 An updated 1325 NAP had a 
stronger emphasis on SGBV, and more extensive commitments by (or directives to) the 
MoD. The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) was to review all doctrine to 
ensure UNSCR 1325 was referenced where appropriate and the principles of WPS 
“covered”; pre-deployment training and exercises were to include scenarios related to 
UNSCR 1325; FETs were to be developed, with a particular view to improving military 
engagement with Afghan women; and a commitment to using “cultural/gender advisors” 
was made for the first time.545 Whilst the foregoing might suggest a high level of 
engagement by the MoD, of the fifty-four country-level actions outlined in the NAP (many 
in Afghanistan, where British military forces were deployed in large numbers) and fifteen 
multilateral activities, none were to be led by defence.546 The subsequent British Defence 
Doctrine, the highest level doctrinal guidance for UK forces, mentioned attention to women 
 
542 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world (2008) 
p. 34. 
543 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 - Security for the Next 
Generation (2009) p. 73. 
544 UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, p. 1. 
545 UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security (2010) pp. 13–
14. Female Engagement Teams were discussed in text at Ch. 6, n 421. 
546 UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security, p. 43. 
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as a “vulnerable group” but in the context of “respect for local traditions, customs and 
practices” - perceptions of which could mitigate against confronting GBV.547 
The Armed Forces did deploy FETs in Afghanistan from October 2010,548 but they were not 
expected to contribute to women’s protection from any kind of violence; their tasking was 
more aligned with psychological operations than civilian protection.549 FETs struggled with 
lack of female linguists, lack of applicable doctrine, insufficient training, difficulties 
accessing local women and cynical male colleagues. The Army’s internal analysis of FETs’ 
impact was largely very negative and in 2013 the Armed Forces would move away from 
using them.550 The British FET experience for some coloured attitudes to engaging with 
CRSV and WPS. 
2012 – 2014: Britain puts CRSV at the forefront of foreign policy 
In May 2012, the British Government launched the PSVI (described in Chapter 3), which 
would come to catalyse a leap forward in defence engagement with CRSV. The PSVI was 
initially framed in terms of supporting survivors and tackling impunity, rather than 
prevention and protection,551 but drew attention to possible roles for militaries concerning 
CRSV. The G8 Declaration on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Declaration of Commitment to End 
Sexual Violence and Chair’s Summary of the Global Summit would make a range of 
commitments as concerns military doctrine and training.552  
Training of British military personnel on gender and CRSV began in 2013 in an ad hoc 
manner, prompted by a training request from Uganda. A one-day “Gender Deep Dive” was 
delivered to prepare some thirty-five “stabilisation operators” to deliver gender training to 
 
547 DCDC, British Defence Doctrine (2011) paras 169–170. 
548 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Female Engagement in Afghanistan (2011) para. 
1; Army Secretariat, ‘Response to FOI request concerning Female Engagement Teams’ (2017) p. 18. 
549 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Female Engagement in Afghanistan (2011), 
para. 18. 
550 Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Seeking out their Afghan sisters, pp. 25, 46; Army Secretariat, ‘Response 
to FOI request concerning Female Engagement Teams’, pp. 37–38; United Kingdom National Action 
Plan on Women, Peace and Security: Final Annual Review (2013) p. 19,30. 
551 W. Hague, ‘Foreign Secretary launches new Government initiative to prevent sexual violence in 
conflict’ (2012). 
552 See Ch. 3, text at ns 142-145. 
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foreign forces.553 With this foundation, a British Army unit delivered a four-day training-of-
trainers for Kenyan military police on female engagement and investigation of sexual 
offences, and a week-long gender training for Ugandan Army peacekeepers,554 and 
subsequently, training at Bosnia Herzegovina’s Peace Support Operations Training Centre, 
and to other African peacekeepers.555 As there were no systematised British military gender 
training materials, trainers adopted those developed by other Government agencies, NCGP, 
NCGM, GAPS UK, civilian advisors and other organisations.556 Much of this training initially 
relied upon a single female reservist Army officer plus a handful of civilian consultants.  
Through this period, responsibility within MoD Headquarters for WPS sat with a small team 
that was also tasked with conventional weapons, nuclear proliferation, and the MoD’s 
engagement with the UN, OSCE, NATO and Europe. Staff had no prior experience working 
on WPS. In early 2014, what was variously called a “Working Group on 1325” or “Defence 
Gender Community” was initiated, bringing together staff across the three services 
responsible for human resources, recruitment, equality and diversity. However, the 
structure was never formalised and was not sustained. Likewise, in 2014 a Defence 
Implementation Plan on Women, Peace and Security was drafted but never adopted. 
During the Global Summit in mid-2014, the British Defence Secretary chaired a session, but 
there was minimal visible participation of British military personnel. 
The UK’s third WPS NAP, for 2014-2017, was for the MoD more ambitious and better 
aligned with NATO’s approaches. CRSV was now a stand-alone priority, with the MoD 
committed to design and deliver “projects” on preventing sexual violence.557 The NAP also 
re-committed to using GENADs, and an officer deployed with the UN mission in the DRC 
 
553 L. C. K. Knell, M. R. Grimes, and M. K. McCourt, ‘Gender in the military - locating the “G” spot’ 
(2014) 22 Gender & Development 173–77. 
554 Ibid. 
555 United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security: Final Annual Review, p. 34; 
Evaluation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security: Baseline Study (2015) p. 35; 
United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: Report to 
Parliament (2015) p. 56, WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 
22 May 2017, MoD Headquarters, London. 
556 Knell, Grimes, and McCourt, ‘Locating the ‘G’ spot’, 175.  
557 United Kingdom National Action Plan on women, peace and security, 2014–2017 (2014) p. 13. 
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was nominated Gender Field Advisor. Still, when the overarching British Defence Doctrine 
was re-issued in November 2014, it referred to the WPS NAP merely in a footnote and 
repeated its questionable linking of women as a “vulnerable group” and “respect for local 
traditions, customs and practices”.558  
A WPS NAP assessment was conducted in the first months of 2015 found that the MoD still 
had no standalone gender or WPS guidelines or strategies. It questioned the effectiveness 
and coherence of the overseas training being delivered on gender issues, observing the lack 
of training on WPS in mainstream military curricula. In Afghanistan, Britain’s most 
significant military training mission, there appeared to be no institutionalised training or 
capacity development on CRSV.559 
2015 – 2018: Leadership and gradual progress  
In April 2015, a stronger leadership structure for WPS was put in place with the 
establishment of a senior-level defence Steering Group on WPS, to meet bi-annually.560 It 
was chaired by Lt. General Gordon Messenger, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, the second-most 
senior individual in the Armed Forces. General Messenger took up the role of MoD 
Champion for WPS and the PSVI. This, finally, triggered a seismic shift in the profile of WPS 
within the MoD and Armed Forces. During the UN High-Level Review of SCR 1325 in 
October 2015, General Messenger committed that within one year all UK troops to deploy 
on overseas missions would receive training on WPS and preventing sexual violence; all 
future relevant military doctrines would be “gender-sensitive (where appropriate and 
applicable)”; to “grow and strengthen the pool of gender advisors within the MoD” and to 
strengthen UK overseas training of foreign troops.561 The Chief of the Defence Staff issued a 
 
558 British Defence Doctrine (2014) p. 48. 
559 Evaluation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security: Baseline Study, pp. 15, 21, 
35. 
560 United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: Report to 
Parliament, p. 5. 
561 NATO, Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO 
Committee on Gender Perspectives 2015, p. 171. 
Chapter 7  




Defence Instruction and Notice on WPS.562 The UK’s 2015 National Security Strategy 
included new sections dedicated to WPS and the PSVI, and linked women’s rights and 
stability: 
… equality of opportunity, including the empowerment of women and 
girls, are the building blocks of successful societies. They are part of the 
golden thread of conditions that lead to security and prosperity. Their 
absence limits opportunities for the individual and drives resentment, 
political instability and conflict. Ensuring that rights are protected and 
respected is essential in order to tackle the root causes of conflict and to 
promote better governance.563 
Although these references in the National Security Strategy are brief, they had a significant 
impact, “cascading down to National Security Council strategies” and therefore 
programmes and funding mechanisms for international work.564  
Still, day-to-day MoD responsibility for WPS remained until 2018 with a small, 
overstretched and at times sceptical team.565 Take-up of WPS or CRSV initiatives was 
perceived as “reliant on goodwill and personal perspectives”.566 Even with such limited 
headquarters resources, there were steps forward in developing GENADs and in education 
and training, outlined below. 
 
562 Not publicly available but noted in Report Endline Evaluation: The UK National Action Plan on 
Women, Peace and Security 2014-2017 (2017) p. 28.  
563 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom (2015) para. 1.6, see also paras. 5.106, 5.112-5.115.. 
564 Report Endline Evaluation: The UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2014-
2017, p. 5. 
565 The team’s leader admitted the MoD had been “sceptical” about funding WPS training for its own 
forces: Defence Gender Training of Trainers course, Worthy Down Barracks, Hampshire, 25-28 
January 2016. Fresh impetus was given in 2018 when leadership of the WPS team was reclassified 
from a civilian to a military post. The new incumbent was the Army officer who had in 2014 worked 
as a Gender Field Advisor, then with the UN.  
566 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017, MoD 
Headquarters, London. 
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Commitments to develop and use GENADs had been made in 2010, 2014 and 2015, and in 
2016 the MoD committed to using GENADs on all UK missions overseas.567 In mid-2016, a 
WPS Training Needs Analysis (TNA) was published - the first substantial piece of 
documentation the MoD produced on WPS. It emphasized the need for capability to 
recognise and respond to CRSV; for example, training for all personnel on indicators of 
CRSV and integrating gender perspectives into patrol and deterrent tasks; training exercises 
to simulate scenarios where opposing forces use CRSV as a battlefield tactic.568 The TNA 
estimated that the Armed Forces needed 50 GENADs and 221 Gender Focal Points,569 and 
recommended GENADs be trained to mitigate SGBV through prevention, protection and 
reporting.570  
The GENAD role was only slowly developed; by 2018, there were still fewer than ten.571 
Some contingents, including that deployed to South Sudan, did appoint a Gender Focal 
Point.572 In others, at times this was perceived to be at the cost of another necessary 
function. As one officer said, “So hang on, I’ve now got a Focal Point or Advisor in the 
company, yeah, but that means someone else has got to go … the person who’s qualified in 
driving a truck, or qualified in using this weapon system or is my French speaker.”573 One 
GENAD who had deployed with units going to West Africa, East Africa and Ukraine 
described how she supported the forces to understand the UK’s strategic framework 
around human rights and gender and helped them conduct human rights assessment of the 
mission area.574 
 
567 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Government Response to the Report of 
the House of Lords Sexual Violence in Conflict Committee (2016) p. 41. 
568 Ministry of Defence, Women, Peace and Security Training Needs Analysis (2016) p. E3_6 - E4_2, 
F_1. 
569 Ibid., p. iv. 
570 Ibid., p. E-1-11. 
571 NATO IMS, National Reports to NCGP, 2017, p. 253. 
572 UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2018-2022: Annual Report to Parliament 
2018 (2018) pp. 9, 28. 
573 Interview with Army doctrine writer, 26 June 2017. 
574 Interview with GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
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GENAD and Focal Point training remained ad hoc until a course for “Gender and Protection 
Advisors and Focal Points” was launched at the end of 2018. This course was designed to be 
offered to overseas as well as British personnel, and in its first run, there were thirty British 
and twelve international students.575 It framed gender – using the NATO concept of 
“integration of a gender perspective” and NATO definition of “gender analysis” - as a 
unifying concept for focusing upon the participation of women and CRSV, as well as child 
protection, human trafficking, refugees, and protection of civilians more broadly. CRSV was 
a key topic, covered on the second day through a combination of lecture and small group 
work.576  
Education and training  
Although progress was initially sluggish, training of British and foreign troops on CRSV 
would come to be seen as the primary defence contribution to the PSVI.577 The following 
reviews integration of CRSV and WPS in pre-deployment, across-the-board and overseas 
training. 
Pre-deployment training 
In advance of the focus that the PSVI brought, CRSV was apparently touched upon in some 
pre-deployment training. In the wake of media attention to bacha bazi, some - although not 
all - soldiers deploying to Afghanistan received training on obligations under IHRL.578 
General Messenger’s commitment that the PSVI would be part of pre-deployment training 
by November 2016 put the Army’s Mission Training and Mobilisation Centre (MTMC) in a 
difficult position. It needed to develop training on CRSV quickly, but without a formal 
command to do so, nor the usual defence systems approach to training processes being 
 
575 UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2018-2022: Annual Report to Parliament 
2018, pp. 2, 17. 
576 PowerPoint “Day 1 Overview and Human Terrain Terms and Definitions” (on file with author). 
577 The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative: Joint Review (2020) p. 12. 
578 Observation of Defence Gender Training of Trainers course, Worthy Down Barracks. Soldiers I 
spoke with in November 2016 who had previously deployed to Afghanistan said CRSV had never 
before been directly addressed in their training (see n 580). Bacha bazi was explained: see Ch.5 n 
339. 
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followed.579 MTMC’s session on “Gender, Sexual Violence and Exploitation (GSVE) on 
Operations” was first delivered in March 2016 for a contingent about to deploy to South 
Sudan - the UK military’s first institutionalised training on CRSV and WPS. It was a forty-five 
minute scripted series of PowerPoint slides, to which were added practical serials within 
mission rehearsal exercises.580 The presentation emphasised, first, the high political profile 
of CRSV, signified by an image of Angelina Jolie and William Hague. Second, the risk of 
reputational damage: “The importance of the subject is to avoid international/UK headlines 
blaming UK soldiers for failing to adhere to the relevant guidelines and failing to act.” 
Trainees were given a pocket-sized booklet with references to the UN and NATO 
frameworks, checklists for analysis and planning, and a template for reporting incidents. 
Both the PowerPoint session and the booklet presented “5 Rs” to guide response to CRSV, 
extracted in Table 2 on page 165.581 This was a proactive positioning concerning CRSV, 
clearly envisioning the potential for offensive UK action against perpetrators, direct 
engagement with (even transport of) victims, and documenting the scene (presumably for 
future investigation). These messages were emphasised by the trainer, who referred, for 
example, to providing first aid, food, water and clothing to victims of sexual violence and 
taking photographs or videos as evidence.  
It is difficult to assess how consistently and well this pre-deployment training was delivered, 
and what impact it had. Discouragingly, in mid-2018, a GENAD commented: 
… when I deploy on the ground, I do not meet British soldiers who 
actually really get this [WPS] yet … it’s a PowerPoint presentation on day 
three of five days of PowerPoint presentations. When I speak to people, 
they’re like, “I think I heard something about that at MTMC” … It’s not 
actually good enough for people to really understand it.582 
 
579 Interview with developer of pre-deployment training, 1 November 2016. 
580 I observed this mission-specific pre-deployment training of an Army contingent soon to deploy to 
Afghanistan at Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. I conducted interviews with five of the 
trainers and a focus group with nine trainees.  
581 PowerPoint presentation “Gender, Sexual Violence and Exploitation (GSVE) on Operations,” 
Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
582 Interview with GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
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Across the board training and education  
In terms of understanding how core training requirements are set, and where WPS needs to 
be inserted for it to become integrated, I was consistently referred to the Military Annual 
Training Test (MATT) on Operational Law. This is the Armed Forces’ core training on the law 
of armed conflict (LOAC). It must be completed yearly by all deployable personnel and 
includes modules on investigations and accountability, captured persons and use of 
force.583 The WPS TNA had in 2016 identified the need for new content to be added to the 
Table 2: The British Armed Forces' 5 Rs to guide response to CRSV 
 
REFRAIN 
Follow the rules on Sexual Exploitation & Abuse and refrain from acts that may do harm – buying 
sex is prohibited. Respect the rights of other genders.  
REACT 
React by intervening and deterring if safe to do so. Deter future crimes with your responses by 
active patrolling such as patrolling market places, water/firewood collection points and other 
places frequented by women … 
Including female peacekeepers.  
Bring the survivor of the crime of sexual violence to safety and inform of referral system and 
assistance.  
REPORT 
Report immediately to your chain of command to allow swift reporting however maintain 
confidentiality as best as possible.  
Start documenting the event and if possible take photographs/videos but not of the victims.  
It is important to know who to speak to beyond your own immediate chain of command … NGOs, 
DfID … 
REFER 
Develop a referral network of trusted organisations … Ensure support is victim centered and 
confidential.  
RESPOND 
Mount operational response – offensive or defensive reaction as required or directed by higher. 
Will require SA [coordination] and assistance of key actors.  
 
583 S. Doughty, Written Question to Parliament - International Law: Training (2016). 
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MATTs on gender perspectives. As of January 2019, although there were apparently plans 
to include CRSV in the MATT on Operational Law, and SEA in the MATT on values and 
standards, this still had not happened.584 (The British Armed Forces’ approach to SEA will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.) 
To integrate WPS and CRSV into military education, a key site is the Defence Academy, 
which delivers postgraduate courses as well as extended training for more senior officers 
and leaders. In 2015, with the WPS TNA underway, course directors were tasked to 
incorporate WPS into their teaching.585 However, “resource constraints” and “competing 
requirements” set plans back, such that the direction became “just including WPS ‘as and 
when’”. 586 With staff already feeling that their courses were “overloaded”, adding WPS was 
resisted by some.587 The result is usually just one gender lecture or workshop in a course, as 
well as one course offering an elective non-assessed gender module.588 At Sandhurst, which 
trains Army officers, scenarios were developed for cadets around “increase[ing] the 
participation between civilian women and military personnel.”589 It has not been possible to 
review the materials for all of this training. However, Army Learning Development Officers, 
whose role it is to introduce WPS into the education and training of soldiers, have said that 
they themselves did not understand WPS, nor the rationale nor context for training on it, 
and this made it difficult to “sell” to soldiers.590 
Overseas training 
Despite the paucity of the UK’s own WPS education and training offer, from 2015 it ramped 
up the focus on CRSV in its overseas training. Training on gender, protection of civilians and 
PSVI-related issues was delivered by British military “gender experts” to Kurdish Security 
 
584 Observation of Officer Tutors' training on gender and WPS, 14 January 2019. 
585 Interview with staff member of military college, 2 August 2018.  
586 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017, MoD 
Headquarters, London. 
587 Ibid. 
588 Interview with staff member of military college, 12 June 2018; interview with staff member of 
military college, 2 August 2018. 
589 UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2018-2022: Annual Report to Parliament 
2018, p. 29. 
590 Observation of Officer Tutors' training on gender and WPS, 14 January 2019. 
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Forces (Peshmerga) and coalition partners in Iraq to increase understanding of how to 
respond to civilians and CRSV in the battle against Daesh. After an initial pilot phase, all 
British trainers deployed to Iraq were trained to deliver these modules and 
gender/protection/the PSVI was adopted as a core training objective for Kurdish infantry 
training courses.591 In Afghanistan, British mentors now delivered or supported training on 
“PSVI … women’s rights in the context of international law, Islamic attitudes, including 
towards women and the rights of the family, and the role and equality of women in 
contemporary Afghan society”.592 In Africa, Britain provided gender and/or SGBV training to 
personnel from a range of African countries contributing troops to AU and UN missions. 593 
By the end of 2016, the British Armed Forces had provided some sort of training on sexual 
violence to over 10,000 African peacekeeping military and police personnel.594  
Much of this international training was developed by individual trainers with little oversight 
from MoD. A civilian working with one of the British military training bodies highlighted 
serious problems with the CRSV/WPS training being delivered: lack of assessment of 
training needs, poor pedagogy (“classroom rote-type learning”), variable content and 
quality, lack of reference to the international legal framework, lack of expertise within the 
military to deliver the training (trainers having themselves often had no training on human 
rights, protection of civilians, gender or CRSV), lack of understanding of the contexts they 
were training for, and failure to evaluate the training’s impact - even whether the trainees 
ever deploy. Although CRSV/WPS training was paid for and reported as if delivered by 
 
591 United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: Report to 
Parliament (2015) p. 16-17. 
592  House of Lords Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Written and oral evidence, p. 
512. 
593 United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: Report to 
Parliament, p. 54; United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: 
Report to Parliament (2016) p. 8; UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–
2017: Report to Parliament (2017) pp. 9, 11.  
594 United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: Report to 
Parliament, p. 10. 
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British personnel, it was often developed and delivered by local partner military personnel 
with the UK having limited influence over quality. 595 
Operational directives and orders 
It is evident from the foregoing that under General Messenger’s leadership, significant 
milestones were reached in building UK military capacity on CRSV: pre-deployment training 
was in place, WPS was being addressed in mainstream education and training (albeit to 
variable quality), training on CRSV was being offered to foreign militaries and a course for 
GENADs had commenced. Each of these achievements was hard-won. Still, there remains a 
question mark over the impact that this had on operations. At the end of 2018, a GENAD 
told me, “I am very sceptical about the high-level vocalisation of what the military is doing, 
and actually what is happening on the ground … I don’t think the military is doing anything 
to prevent sexual violence in conflict.”596 Another that “people won’t take it up seriously 
until it’s clearly in orders.” 597  
Several interviewees pointed to the importance of each operation or mission’s directive or 
orders, which determine its objectives and tasks.598 Operational orders are classified so 
could not be directly reviewed. Interviewees’ views on whether CRSV is referenced in them 
were contradictory. A DCDC staff member claimed that mission and operational directives 
do now include CRSV and WPS: “… if the mission is to support training in Africa … WPS 
issues will be pretty central to it. If it’s counter-piracy missions … you will see guidance on 
dealing with children or dealing with women.”599 Conversely, in 2017 an Army trainer said 
that because gender was not written into mission objectives, there were no mechanisms to 
measure the effect of any gender training done.600 The following year, a GENAD said that 
 
595 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017; 
interview civilian advisor to British international training centre, 5 June 2017. 
596 Interview with GENAD, 28 November 2018 
597 Interview with GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
598 The NATO case study noted that a “gender annex” to an operational order as a significant tool in 
ensuring planners and those in the mission consider gender. See Ch. 6, text at n 493. 
599 Interview with Legal Advisor at doctrine writing centre, 12 June 2018. 
600 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017, MoD 
Headquarters, London. 
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whether and how to include gender in operational orders was still “under discussion” at 
senior levels.601 Another GENAD told me:  
… sometimes the military piggy-backs off what the other two 
departments [DfID and FCO] are doing without necessarily tangibly 
enacting anything themselves. I’d be really interested to know how 
many military orders have been delivered with a conflict-related sexual 
violence factor in the planning. I think the answer is none.602  
If this is the case, it suggests a serious gap between the training on CRSV being delivered to 
British personnel, and what they are tasked to do when deployed.  
2019: Dawn of a human security approach 
At the opening of 2019, the British Armed Forces’ structures for engagement with WPS and 
CRSV were transformed. A WPS “statement of policy” was finally released in the form of an 
84-page Joint Service Publication titled Human Security in Military Operations. Human 
Security in Military Operations is “not doctrine” but seen as something that “might lead to 
doctrine in future”.603 Part 1 of the document is labelled “policy”, Part 2 “guidance”. WPS, 
CRSV children and armed conflict, and trafficking and slavery, are the policy references for 
its new “human security” approach, which is intended to be applied at every level in any 
military operation.604 GENADs are replaced with “Human Security Advisors”, the first 
training for whom was delivered in June 2019.605 
Human Security in Military Operations explains what human security means for the military 
as protection from physical violence but also wider issues: “how the military can contribute 
to the empowerment and access to equal rights for women and girls; the prevention of 
conflict and human rights violations”.606 It describes the protection of civilians as an 
expectation in all operations, including during armed conflict, failure of which will 
 
601 Interview with GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
602 Interview with GENAD, 28 November 2018 
603 Observation of Officer Tutors' training on gender and WPS, 14 January 2019. 
604 Ibid. 
605 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 2 (2019), pp. 36–38. 
606 Ministry of Defence, Human Security in Military Operations, Part 1: Directive (2019) p. 2. 
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undermine other objectives.607 After this strong conceptual opening, the document has 
surprisingly little content on how the military should provide protection. It identifies a wide 
range of issues as important to consider and encourages analysis through, for example, 
needs assessment and participatory data collection; but it largely fails to then connect the 
issues to military/security tasks. For example, Human Security in Military Operations has a 
long section on best practice in managing IDP camps, but nothing on providing security for 
them. It lists the UNSCRs on children and armed conflict but does not unpack what it means 
to say that militaries should “respond to girls and boys affected by armed conflict”.608 
CRSV is presented as one of the issues the policy on human security is built around. It 
recognises that addressing sexual violence is a departure from traditional military roles: 
From Nigeria to Syria we see how the bodies of women and girls 
through kidnapping and rape have become an extension of the 
battlefield … Although now a familiar aspect of conflict, considering and 
responding to sexual violence and the impact of conflict on children is 
not traditionally viewed as military business, even though the military 
are often the first international actors on the ground.609 
But, comparing Human Security in Military Operations with the 2016 pre-deployment 
training and Army doctrine from that period, references to tactical interventions to prevent 
CRSV or to reporting CRSV have dropped away. In the “guidance” half of the policy, there is 
no section on CRSV. CRSV is placed under a heading “protection through participation”, 
wherein strengthening protection refers not only to women and girls’ physical security but 
to their mental security, human rights and dignity. Indeed, the paragraph on CRSV ends on 
a note that might deter action: “The range and complexity of underlying causes and the 
many resulting consequences of sexual violence make it a difficult issue to address.”610  
Britain’s new human security framing is a clear departure from the established NATO 
approach to WPS; that shared by close allies such as Australia and Canada; and approaches 
 
607 Ibid., p. i. 
608 Ibid., p. 39. 
609 Ibid., p. i. 
610 Ibid., p. 16. 
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within UN and EU Missions, all of which have institutionalised GENADs. It is also a 
departure from approaches to CRSV and GBV in other UK departments working on these 
issues internationally, which are said to “take issue with the MOD’s use of ‘human security’ 
as masking the gendered nature of sexual violence”.611 British GENADs describe the shift 
from WPS to human security as an effort to overcome the difficulty of gender and WPS 
language for British military audiences. “Gender” is perceived as too confusing in part 
because it may be conflated with accommodating people of different gender identities in 
the military.612 A WPS framing is perceived as attracting too much resistance as a feminist 
agenda. As a trainer explained: 
“Next period is on Women, Peace and Security” - I believe they would 
be lost already. They would just switch off. They would perceive that … 
as some sort of feminist agenda and questioning what is the relevance, 
as opposed to seeing it as a military capability that needs to be 
embraced.613 
Whilst these are negative reasons for moving away from WPS and CRSV as a policy focus, 
there was as also a more constructive rationale. One GENAD explained that engagement 
with the issues of WPS and CRSV has helped defence to realise that it needs doctrine and 
training not only on those issues but on the protection of civilians, child protection, child 
soldiers, human trafficking and modern slavery. It is perceived that terminology around 
human security will both resonate better with a British military audience and conceptually 
be a more coherent framing for wider issues that defence wants to address.614 In terms of 
challenging militaries to think more deeply about conflict and their role, this shift toward 
articulating a human security approach for the Armed Forces might be a transformative 
opportunity. Yet, as highlighted above, at present what it means in terms of military tasking 
(and thus doctrine and training also) remains cloudy. Moreover, the overarching challenges 
 
611 The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative: Joint Review, p. 15. 
612 E.g., Interview with GENAD, 28 November 2018; Interview with GENAD, 3 September 2018. 
613 Interview with developer of pre-deployment training, 1 November 2016. 
614 Interview with GENAD, 28 November 2018. 
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to firm action on WPS and CRSV, described below, might well hold back progress on 
implementing a human security approach. 
7.3 Key constraints and shortcomings  
Analysis of British Armed Forces’ engagement with the issue of CRSV over the last fifteen 
years reveals two challenges and two persistent shortcomings: confusion and resistance 
concerning the foundational values and concepts; complacency; weak integration of WPS 
and CRSV in doctrine; and the long delay in establishing mechanisms of institutionalisation. 
These are explored in more detail below. 
Conceptual confusion and contestation  
A range of conceptual clashes has followed the British Armed Forces’ engagement with the 
WPS Agenda, which has, in turn, weakened its substantive focus on CRSV. First, there is a 
persistent, although quietly spoken, perceived conflict between gender mainstreaming and 
cultural sensitivity. The idea of deploying cultural knowledge in military operations came to 
the fore in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.615 British Defence Doctrine argues: “Force used 
in another country needs to reflect the highest morals and ethics of the culture to which it 
is being applied if campaign authority is to be maintained. This implies respect for local 
traditions, customs and practices …”616 WPS in military operations was early framed as one 
aspect of cultural understanding.617 This shaped a non-intervention stance as regards 
violation of women’s rights and confronting GBV. FETs’ guiding doctrine, for example, 
emphasised, “we should never seek to influence the values of the indigenous culture and 
their attitudes towards the rights of women”.618  
 
615 M. McFate, Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire , 1 
edition ed. (Oxford University Press, 2018); N. Manchanda, ‘Queering the Pashtun: Afghan sexuality 
in the homo-nationalist imaginary’ (2015) 36 Third World Quarterly 130–46. 
616 British Defence Doctrine, paras 169–170, with the language on “respect for local traditions, 
customs and practices and appropriate attention to the needs of … vulnerable groups, such as 
women” unchanged in the 2014 version. 
617 UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security (2012) p. 11.  
618 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Female Engagement in Afghanistan (2011), 
para. 1.  
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Contestation between deference to local practice and challenging CRSV was evident in 
reactions to pre-deployment training of a group about to deploy to Afghanistan.619 The 
soldiers were extremely sensitive to the difficulty of proactive response to CRSV where 
Afghan military or police personnel were involved, and the risk of friction with the host 
nation. One said, “There, it’s an eye for an eye. If you report someone, you could end up 
with a bullet in your head.” Some described having seen “chai boys”620 standing by the 
road, and having been told not to respond, to keep going, as it would cause too much 
conflict with locals if one confronted the boy or told locals that what they were doing was 
wrong. The soldiers saw contradictions between being told to build up trust and respect 
local culture and being told to intervene on CRSV. One asked, “What’s the borderline with 
culture? For example, if girls are getting married to old men at 13 years old? What do we 
enforce?” Another said, “We are not going to Afghanistan to stop sexual exploitation. 
We’ve got our own job to do. If it’s not your business don’t make it your business.” 
A second area of conceptual confusion (and as highlighted above, part of the rationale for 
the shift to “human security”) was between the “external” dimensions of incorporating 
WPS commitments in operations (such as tactics to prevent CRSV) and issues “internal” to 
the British forces, such as gender equality, sexual assault and rights of transgender 
personnel. Efforts to secure MoD policy on WPS coincided with the decision to lift the ban 
on women serving in ground close combat roles.621 At times gender perspective was 
misconstrued as relating to this or implying quotas for female personnel.622 An external 
evaluation of the WPS NAP noted that senior officers could not distinguish between work 
on WPS and work on workforce diversity.623 Those working on WPS at times saw any focus 
on personnel dimensions as risking progress on operational dimensions. The individual who 
led the development of CRSV pre-deployment training described making WPS “… as distinct 
 
619 I observed this mission-specific pre-deployment training in November 2016: see n 580. Quotes 
are from notes of the focus group held afterwards. 
620 See Ch.5 n 339. 
621 Ministry of Defence UK, ‘Ban on women in ground close combat roles lifted’ (July 2016); National 
Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: First Annual Report (2016). 
622 Draft Learning Specifications for Senior Non Commissioned Officers, 2018 (on file with author). 
623 Report Endline Evaluation: The UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2014-
2017, p. 29. 
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as possible, otherwise people will just associate it with more G1 equality nonsense that 
we’ve got to jump through.”624 Still, it is clear that omitting discussion of the relationships 
between women’s participation and WPS capabilities did not forestall confusion and 
resistance, and a clear leadership narrative on this was lacking.  
Complacency and over-confidence 
The British Armed Forces engagement with WPS has been hampered, secondly, by a robust 
sense of “nothing needed”. As a GENAD described: 
… people think that we’re already doing it, but they don’t know what it 
is that we’re doing, but they think we’ve been doing it well … we’re the 
dog’s bollocks at this. But, then, yet if you were to say to them, “Well, 
what are we really good at?” they’d probably scratch their heads and 
say, “Oh, I don’t know, I just feel like we’re doing some good.”625 
Even back in 2007, a defence training audit concluded that nothing further was required on 
WPS or SEA; that “the UK Armed Forces were fully compliant through existing training 
provisions, as well as with the UK’s own values and standards”.626 (As will be discussed in 
Chapter 8, this confidence that British values and standards are sufficient to guard against 
sexual misconduct persists.)  
The British Armed Forces have projected this posture of confidence and innate capability on 
WPS internationally. This is evidenced in their willingness, as early as 2013, to train a range 
of African as well as Kurdish forces in WPS, CRSV, SEA, whilst having no, or extremely ad 
hoc, training of their own forces. Some Gender Focal Points apparently had as little as half a 
day’s training on gender/WPS themselves before delivering training for foreign 
peacekeepers.627 It is evidenced by Britain deploying GENADs in advance of any formal 
structure for their role or training. In 2017, General Messenger asserted Britain’s leadership 
 
624 Interview with developer of pre-deployment training, 1 November 2016. 
625 Interview with GENAD, 3 September 2018. 
626 Updates to the UK National Action Plan to Implement UNSCR 1325. 
627 Interview with civilian advisor to British international training centre, 26 October 2017. 
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on the global stage, launching a “WPS Chiefs of Defence Staff Network”.628 As will be 
highlighted below, at this point the Britain Armed Forces had no policy or strategy for WPS.  
Uneven integration of CRSV into doctrine  
As with NATO, doctrine development seems to be one of the processes most resistant to 
WPS and CRSV, despite as far back as 2006 being identified as a priority. Even in mid-2018 
DCDC staff claimed not have received “any formal tasking as such” to take account of CRSV 
and the WPS Agenda in doctrine.629 “Doctrine” has the same meaning in the British as the 
NATO context: “ … fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions … 
conduct themselves on operations.”630 The content of doctrine should shape the syllabus in 
staff courses, and cascade down through planning, exercises and operations.631 Doctrine 
that applies to all services – the Army, Air Force and Navy (“joint doctrine”) is developed by 
DCDC, “the MoD’s think tank”.632 Doctrine is also developed within each of the Army, Air 
Force and Navy. Importantly, as the UK is part of NATO, all NATO doctrine also applies to 
the UK, with DCDC staff involved in drafting and approving it.633  
In 2011 small references to CRSV and WPS began to appear in British doctrine. A Doctrine 
Note on peacekeeping referred to UNSCRs 1325 and 1888. It highlighted CRSV as a 
protection of civilians issue, but the reference was confusing, seeming to equate SEA with 
sexual violence by warring parties.634 Over 2016-2018, doctrine began to engage in more 
detail with gender, CRSV and WPS. Some good language was developed, but CRSV is 
integrated piecemeal and often mentioned but not connected with military activities.  
 
628 UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2014–2017: Report to Parliament, p. 1. 
See: UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Women, Peace and Security CHODS Network’ (2020). 
629 Interview with Legal Advisor at doctrine writing centre, 12 June 2018. 
630 DCDC, Developing Joint Doctrine Handbook (2013) para. 101. 
631 Interview with legal advisor at doctrine writing centre, 12 June 2018. 
632 Ibid. 
633 Although it was only from mid-2012 that a clear directive was issued that UK should use NATO 
doctrine to the extent possible and ensure that UK doctrine was coherent with it. 
634 DCDC, Peacekeeping: An Evolving Role for Military Forces (2011) para. 413. 
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An Army Doctrine Note entitled Human Security - The Military Contribution emphasised 
that “human security factors must be considered across all types of operation”.635 It 
outlined protection of civilians, WPS, CRSV, SGBV, SEA, gender perspective, children in 
armed conflict and human trafficking, using some of the language of NATO Bi-Strategic 
Command Directive 40-1.636 CRSV is presented as often used strategically, against men and 
boys as well as women and girls. The Doctrine Note describes the roles of the military as 
“disrupting” SGBV, suggesting tactical responses such as consulting women’s organisations 
when planning patrol routes, and monitoring and reporting on CRSV. The author of the 
Doctrine Note explained that the phrase “disrupting” was consciously chosen over 
“preventing” because the military are short-term “tactical deliverers,” as in, “on patrols, 
you know, you’re deterring, you’re recording, you’re challenging would-be assailants,” 
whereas “prevention” suggests a “longer term developmental aspect”.637 Like the authors 
of MTMC’s gender pre-deployment training, working in parallel, they described it being 
“cart before horse,” written in the absence of top-down direction as to intent and context 
that would normally come through the defence “lines of development” process. Key parts 
of the matrix of equipment, personnel, organisational structures, logistics, infrastructure, 
information and resourcing needed to support the development of WPS as a new capability 
were missing.638  
This Human Security Doctrine Note was written as a vehicle for further discussion, to have a 
“shelf-life” of just a year. Its CRSV/WPS content survived almost complete into the 
subsequent more long-lasting Army Field Manual on Tactics for Stability Operations - but 
there merely in annexes. So, while the tactics manual does have strong content on CRSV it 
is not referenced in the core chapters on, for instance, the operating environment or 
stability activities.639 The tactics manual lists of different types of advisors and experts 
 
635 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Human Security: The Military Contribution 
(2016) pp. i, vi. 
636 See text at Ch. 6 n 423. 
637 Interview with Army doctrine writer, 26 June 2017. 
638 Ibid. 
639 Tactics for Stability Operations (2017). 
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available for operations, but omits GENADs. Neither women nor gendered needs are not 
mentioned under the discussion of human security.  
This siloed treatment of CRSV and WPS appears also in joint doctrine on stabilisation. It has 
a paragraph on “gender perspectives,” reference to the PSVI and acknowledgement of the 
need to address women’s possible vulnerability to abuse.640 However, these references are 
not followed through in subsequent sections on ends/ways/means or operations, such that 
“understanding” gender or CRSV is not translated into any military response.  
Far more significant Army doctrine in this period was 2017’s Land Operations, “the British 
Army’s core doctrine”.641 In Land Operations local populations seem invisible, abstracted 
only as enemies and adversaries. Most of the images are of explosions and tanks, and the 
vignettes and quotes predominately from the Second World War era and earlier. There is a 
brief reference to providing security for the population and protection of civilians, but the 
latter framed only in terms of sustaining one’s own force. Likewise, “keystone” doctrine for 
operations on land issued in 2017 refers to providing “security and protection to both 
people and places” but does not mention women or CRSV.642 
In contrast, there is gender mainstreaming in 2018’s doctrine on Legal Support to Joint 
Operations: a section on WPS (the first time featured in British doctrinal materials relating 
to law in operations) that outlines key messages of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820.643 It directs 
Legal Advisors as well as GENADs to “… advise the commander during the planning and 
execution of operations to ensure that …investigations and documentation of sexual 
violence in conflict are improved; and greater support and assistance is provided to 
survivors, particularly children.”644  
This illustrates how over 2016-2018, both in Army doctrine and doctrine for all three forces, 
WPS and CRSV began to be included, but often without any clear connection to military 
 
640 DCDC, Shaping a Stable World: The Military Contribution (2016). 
641 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Land Operations (2017) p. i. 
642 DCDC, UK Land Power (2017) p. 4. 
643 DCDC, Legal Support to Joint Operations (2018). 
644 Ibid., p.70. 
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action or as an add-on. Additionally, there were no references to WPS and CRSV in higher-
level Army doctrine. 
Lack of policy, institutional architecture and resourcing 
Many of my interviewees identified General Messenger’s leadership from 2015 (for some, 
combined with the profile that Angelina Jolie lent the PSVI) as setting the ball rolling in 
terms of WPS. Nonetheless, despite commitments in the WPS NAP and such international 
gestures, there remained no formal defence policy on WPS until 2019. In early 2016, the 
MoD had developed a WPS strategy around three objectives - gender mainstreaming, 
improving the participation of women in the British Armed Forces and overseas training.645 
However, this was never formally approved amidst “organisational questioning on 
resources and priorities”.646 WPS was thus through crucial years an issue without a formal 
“proponent” or “capability sponsor”, “passed around like a hot potato”.647 There was no 
authority to set training requirements or ensure resources, no budget for hiring people into 
new WPS or gender positions.648 Staff trying to develop work on WPS at times felt a 
preoccupation with gender and countering violent extremism was “subsuming” all other 
aspects,649 or that strategic space for WPS was shrinking with a reorientation toward 
“‘metal on metal’ fighting”.650 A senior GENAD said in late 2018, “… women, peace and 
security, it’s almost invisible, unfortunately” with one of “the biggest challenges” as the lack 
of WPS “architecture”.651 
The adoption, finally, of Human Security in Military Operations in early 2019 did enable 
progress as concerns training development, including the transformation of the GENAD 
 
645 Report Endline Evaluation: The UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2014-
2017, p. 28. 
646 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017. 
647 Participant in the Defence Gender Training of Trainers course, Worthy Down Barracks, Hampshire, 
25-28 January 2016. 
648 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017. 
649 Interview civilian advisor to British international training centre, 26 October 2017. 
650 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017. 
651 Interview with GENAD, 3 September 2018. 
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course into a course for Human Security Advisors. Some had a sense that the tide of 
resistance had turned: 
I think that in the next year or two years we’re going to see action. But 
it’s as if you’ve had to do all this talking and prevaricating to get to the 
point, which is weird for a military organisation …. because normally … if 
you want to do something and a more senior officer says we’re going to 
do it, it gets done ….652 
It is early to say whether this optimism will be realised. The British military’s structures 
around CRSV, WPS and now “human security” capability are in their infancy. There are 
indications, moreover, of waning interest. Work on WPS since 2013 relied heavily on the 
sustained engagement of a handful of highly committed women, most of whom have left 
the military over the last two years. General Messenger retired in May 2019, with no new 
WPS Champion announced. In April 2019, the Defence Secretary announced that the UK 
would establish a “Centre of Excellence for Human Security” with some two million pounds 
annual funding.653 As at the time of writing, the “Centre of Excellence” concept has 
morphed into a “virtual” centre of excellence, apparently comprised of the many excellent 
people in the British Armed Forces who know about human security - and as such requiring 
no additional resourcing.654 The momentum and opportunity generated through the PSVI 
and the 2014 Global Summit, which within NATO generated key implementing actions such 
as the Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV, was in the British context lost. This loss 
of momentum is not limited to defence: a recent evaluation of the PSVI attests to waning 
interest and resourcing across departments since the 2014 Global Summit.655 
Conclusions 
Comparing British engagement with CRSV to NATO’s: within NATO, WPS policy was adopted 
in 2007. Operational guidance on CRSV followed, developing from the first version of Bi-
Strategic Command Directive 40-1 in 2009. GENAD positions, training infrastructure, 
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653 ‘MOD to establish Centre of Excellence for Human Security’ (April 2019). 
654 Informal conversation with Army informant, January 2020. 
655 The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative: Joint Review, p. ii. 
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coordination structures, planning guides and standard operating procedures likewise 
followed driven by successive policies, actions plans and directives. These elements were 
the hallmarks and drivers of institutionalisation of approaches to gender mainstreaming 
and WPS within NATO. Although NATO’s implementation of commitments concerning CRSV 
and WPS remains incomplete and perhaps – as discussed in Chapter 6 – essentially flawed 
by subordinating gender mainstreaming and WPS to operational effectiveness, in NATO 
WPS structures, process and expectations have been established that one would expect will 
endure. 
In the British Armed Forces, this process was in many ways inverted. Training, gender 
advisory positions and doctrine were generated without a clear policy framework or 
coordination. As one interviewee summed up: 
… it’s the ad hoc-ery which has been the theme of the last few years … 
there is no integrated approach to the whole thing, which means that 
it’s not entirely clear which messages are being disseminated and to 
what overarching, umbrella conceptual thinking/policy this might link.656  
Without a clear policy narrative, leadership and institutional structures, the British Armed 
Forces’ approaches to CRSV have been mired in confusion, scepticism, resistance, and 
under-resourcing. With the shift to a human security approach, defeat has seemingly been 
conceded as regards establishing a discrete commitment to the WPS Agenda.  
It is yet too early to draw firm conclusions as to whether the British Armed Forces’ 
reframing of WPS and CRSV within a concept of human security will lead more easily to 
changes in operational practices so to protect individuals from CRSV, support victims or 
counter impunity. The deeply held assumptions about what the military can and should do 
that underlie these struggles and shifts, and how they also shape and are shaped by 
understandings of legal obligations in military operations, will be explored further in the 
chapters to follow. 
 
 




Understandings of legal obligations 
Some [Human Rights] provisions, such as … Article 3 ICCPR (equal 
treatment of men and women) … state obligagons slightly ― 
“unreasonable” in times of war or armed conflict, but do not show a 
corresponding LOAC provision which would then apply as lex specialis. 
NATO Legal Deskbook, 2nd Edition (2010) p. 305. 
 
The foregoing chapters drew on a range of previously unexamined doctrinal sources, 
interviews and observation to map the trajectory of NATO and the British Armed Forces’ 
engagement with CRSV since 2005. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, advocacy for recognition of 
CRSV in international law and legal articulation of sexual violence in conflict has been a key 
feminist strategy. This builds upon and contributes to a wider feminist critique of law in 
armed conflict, which suggest that the laws of war fail to adequately prevent and punish 
violence against women; rather, (re)produce a hierarchy wherein civilian lives are valued 
less than military lives. Chinkin and Kaldor argue that while retaining the safeguards for 
persons developed through IHL, we must see war through fresh eyes, as “… a violation of 
human rights, in which case human rights law should be the predominant legal regime”.657 
This would redouble the emphasis on IHRL as governing armed forces when they are active 
outside of conduct of hostilities and where IHRL fills gaps in IHL’s protections. It would 
place IHRL in sharper view as the predominant standards for a wide range of contemporary 
military operations. 
This chapter, therefore, enquires into what I have described as the first theme of this 
project: what roles understandings of the law play in NATO and British military responses to 
CRSV. It first gives an overview of NATO and British approaches, respectively, to IHL and 
IHRL in armed conflict, because how IHRL standards are understood to apply is an 
important dimension of analysis. Section 8.2 examines understandings of obligations where 
 
657 Chinkin and Kaldor, International Law and New Wars, pp. 230, 282. 
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CRSV is committed by other state forces or armed groups. Section 8.3 examines how 
obligations concerning CRSV by one’s own personnel are understood. Chapter 10 will go on 
to consider more closely how its findings speak to feminist legal activism and critique. 
8.1 Application of IHL and IHRL in operations and missions 
NATO’s application of IHL and IHRL in operations and missions  
To situate this analysis of how NATO understands its legal obligations as concerns CRSV, it is 
necessary to outline in general terms the legal bases for NATO operations and NATO’s 
approach to IHL and IHRL. A NATO collective defence operation rests upon the assertion of 
a state’s inherent right to self-defence. For other types of operations, the legal basis for 
NATO action can be either: a) the request of a state for NATO support; b) a UNSCR 
mandating action (as in the cases of ISAF and Libya); or c) a regional mandate from an 
international organisation based on principles of the UN Charter.658 At times NATO acts 
independently, at times in support of a mission under the auspices of another organisation, 
such as the UN. In both circumstances, NATO’s North Atlantic Council retains the direction 
and authority for deployment of NATO forces.  
Because only states may become ‘High Contracting Parties,’ NATO is not directly or formally 
bound by IHL or IHRL conventions. Amongst the thirty NATO members, all are states parties 
to the GCs, but not all (significantly, the United States) to its Additional Protocols. Twenty-
eight NATO members are party to the ECHR. There is no overarching NATO doctrine on the 
interrelationship between IHL and IHRL.659 Whether NATO has international legal 
personality such that it could potentially be held responsible for violations of IHL or IHRL is 
a complex question, which for the purposes of this project can be left to one side.660 NATO’s 
 
658 Ochmannova, ‘NATO: Evolution and Legal Framework for the Conduct of Operations’, 122–23. 
659 K. Abbott, ‘A brief overview of legal interoperability challenges for NATO arising from the 
interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in light of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 
96 International Review of the Red Cross 107–37 at 108, 122.  
660 For discussion: N. Rosen, ‘How are Multinational NATO Operations Responsible for International 
Humanitarian Law Violations’ (2013) 37 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 163; P. Olson, ‘Immunities of 
International Organizations: A NATO View’ (2014) 10 International Organizations Law Review 419–
33.  
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approach is, first, to apply IHL rules to any military operation, “‘irrespective of there being 
an armed conflict according to the definition in the Geneva Conventions”.661 Beyond this, 
the law applicable to an operation is a “pragmatic” blend of the individual legal 
commitments of all of the participating nations, and nations’ understandings of them.662 
This pragmatism is asserted through the process whereby all Allies agree by consensus the 
operational plan and associated rules of engagement for any operation, this then 
constituting the legal framework for that operation. As a Legal Advisor interviewed put it, 
NATO “come[s] to a happy medium that satisfies all nations.”663 Accounts by former NATO 
Legal Advisors confirm that this “happy medium” is based on IHL: that NATO rules of 
engagement and targeting doctrines display “a very traditional IHL, ‘lex specialis’ 
approach”; 664 and that the protection of civilians elements of an operational plan and rules 
of engagement are drafted on the basis of IHL.665 Differences between nations’ IHRL 
obligations are left to be addressed at the level of operational implementation. Nations 
“caveat out” of tasks that are problematic for them from a national (legal and/or political) 
perspective.666 The result for a NATO multilateral venture is not necessarily straightforward, 
such that a former NATO Legal Advisor argues that ECHR obligations pose serious 
challenges to NATO missions’ legal interoperability.667 
The British Armed Forces’ application of IHL and IHRL in operations and missions 
Britain has ratified all of the major IHL and IHRL treaties most relevant to CRSV; namely, the 
ICCPR, the GCs and their Additional Protocols, the CRC, CEDAW and the Rome Statute. The 
UK has also ratified a range of IHRL treaties concluded within the Council of Europe, most 
significantly the ECHR, accepting the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. 668 All British personnel 
 
661 NATO Legal Deskbook, 2nd Edition (2010) p. 268. 
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666 Interview with NATO Legal Advisor, May 2018; see also Olson, ‘A NATO perspective’, p. 235. 
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serving abroad are subject to the criminal law of England and Wales, including the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, by virtue of the Armed Forces Act 2006. Under the law of England and 
Wales, paying for sexual services is legal only so long as the prostitute is not subjected to 
force, threats or coercion.669 
The UK as a matter of policy apparently chooses to apply the rules of the GCs to its 
engagement in all foreign armed conflicts, internal and international.670 As regards 
applicability of IHRL obligations extraterritorially in armed conflict, the UK is subject to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR but has persistently resisted expansion of the application of 
IHRL. The MoD and the Parliamentary Defence Committee argue that “tension and overlap” 
between IHL and IHRL result in a lack of certainty and clarity.671 Some Armed Forces 
personnel see the application of IHRL in military operations - the “extension of legal rules 
into the sphere of military autonomy and the increased density of these rules” - as a 
significant challenge requiring strategic efforts of reversal and mitigation.672 The UK 
Government announced in 2016 that it would introduce a presumption to derogate from 
the ECHR in future conflicts, to protect the armed forces from “persistent legal claims”.673 
Whether Britain could do so and with what legal effect is debated. Kemp argues that in 
certain of the contexts in which the UK deploys overseas, including UN peacekeeping, 
derogation would be impermissible, as not in a “time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”.674 Even were the UK to attempt such a derogation, some 
ECHR obligations relating to CRSV concern prevention and response to torture or inhumane 
treatment, and as such are presumably non-derogable. 
 
669 R. Campbell, P. Hubbard, and T. Sanders, ‘England and Wales’ Assessing Prostitution Policies in 
Europe, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), p. 31. 
670 McEvoy, ‘Law at the operational level’, p. 128. 
671 S. Tudor, Armed Forces: Legal Challenges and Derogation from the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2016) p. 4.  
672 N. Quenivet and A. Sari, Human Rights and Military Operations: Confronting the Challenges (2015) 
p. 15. 
673 ‘Government to protect Armed Forces from persistent legal claims in future overseas operations’. 
674 S. L. Kemp, British justice, war crimes and human rights violations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) p. 
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8.2 CRSV committed by others 
A 2009 study of ISAF’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 asked, “What right or obligation do 
soldiers have to intervene in situations of gender-based violence?”675 Chapter 5 argued that 
when militaries exercise authority or control over territory or persons, they have a positive 
obligation to exercise due diligence and do what would reasonably be expected to prevent 
CRSV, as a violation of peremptory norms, treaty-protected rights and/or of IHL. Where 
forces are in a position of influence over or offering support to a force perpetrating abuses, 
there is an even clearer positive obligation to act. But, do NATO or the British Armed Forces 
understand their obligations in this manner? 
NATO: aspiration rather than obligation 
During the open session of the 2013 Annual Conference of the NCGP, NATO’s second-most-
senior military leader, the (British) Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, clearly 
framed NATO’s obligations to prevent SGBV and to support prosecution in legal terms: 
… the first reason for action is not only moral and ethical. It is legal; we 
are legally bound to take action … The International Criminal Court is 
absolutely clear on the responsibility of commanders in preventing 
sexual violence. it [sic] is a war crime and a crime against humanity. This 
means that we in the military have a responsibility to provide support 
for those who search for, prosecute and hand over for trial, anyone 
accused of these crimes, regardless of nationality … We need to ensure 
that our tactics, techniques and procedures focus upon identifying 
situations where conflict related sexual violence could occur and allow 
us to take action to preventing it from happening. Our commanders … 
must ensure that every officer and soldier knows how to address and 
respond to conflict-related sexual violence, including how to assist the 
victims, and how to deal with the perpetrators.676  
But, whilst there seemed then to be leadership acceptance of the legal dimensions of 
NATO’s roles, NATO’s “Legal Deskbook”, a resource for NATO Legal Advisors on NATO 
 
675 Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 - Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan, p. 2. 
676 NATO, ‘Report of the 2013 Open Conference of the NCGP’ (2013) para. 6. 
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practices and policies, makes no reference to CRSV.677 It describes the equal treatment of 
men and women as an example of an IHRL obligation that is “slightly ‘unreasonable’ in 
times of war or armed conflict” (citing no authority for this extraordinary claim).678 Until 
work on the Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV commenced in 2014, it appears 
there was little attention to CRSV from a legal perspective within NATO. In 2013, a NATO 
Standard for training of armed forces in the law of armed conflict was issued. Its sole 
references to CRSV are to reiterate GC IV, Article 27(2) and note that female prisoners of 
war must “be specially protected against rape and other sexual assaults”.679 The document 
omits inter alia to identify other forms of sexual violence - by 2013, well established in 
international jurisprudence and national legal systems, as discussed in Chapter 2. It does 
not refer to sexual violence in the enumeration of grave breaches of the GCs; nor recognise 
the possibility of male victims of sexual violence. This suggests that NATO Legal Advisors 
were not attending to the inclusive understandings of CRSV articulated in international 
legal fora. In NATO operations in Afghanistan, as was highlighted in Chapter 6, neither Legal 
Advisors nor GENADs regarded reacting to human rights abuses as within their 
responsibilities. 
Obligations to protect civilians from CRSV 
It has been understood that NATO regards the protection of civilians as an aspect of 
counter-insurgency, or to minimise the negative implications of collateral damage, not an 
operational objective for NATO in itself.680 But, over the period of this research, NATO’s 
language around the protection of civilians, including prevention of CRSV, became more 
proactive. NATO’s 2014 doctrine for peace operations described force used to protect 
civilians as a last resort, “predominantly reactive rather than pre-emptive”.681 In the 2015 
Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV, it is apparent that the limits of legal authority 
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were a point of discussion, with the Guidelines stating, “The understanding of mandates, 
international law and self-defence will be interpreted in favour of action and intervention, 
whenever possible …”682 The Guidelines do not commit to prevent or protect individuals 
from CRSV, but direct NATO forces to “reduce the risk of conflict-related SGBV and improve 
responsive measures that take protection needs into consideration”.683  
NATO’s 2016 Protection of Civilians Policy strikes a new direction. As well as IHL aspects of 
protection of civilians (“efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects 
that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population”) it 
commits NATO “when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence 
or threats of physical violence by other actors”.684 “[A]ctivities up to and including the use 
of force” are foreseen “to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to situations in which 
civilians suffer physical violence or are under threat of physical violence”.685 At a policy 
level, NATO’s Protection of Civilians Policy also for the first time affirms the applicability of 
IHRL to NATO operations: “All NATO and NATO-led operations, missions and other Council-
mandated activities are conducted in accordance with applicable international law, which 
may include international human rights law”.686 Some GENADs began to frame CRSV within 
this protection of civilians policy framework to more squarely link CRSV to NATO’s mission 
mandates (for example a mandate to establish a “safe and secure environment”), and so to 
make CRSV more “relevant” to NATO.687 Conversely, another told me, “Protection of 
civilians is a UN doctrine … I would not incorporate protection of civilians as part of our 
doctrinal framework for planning because NATO has no doctrine on protection of 
civilians.”688 A NATO Legal Advisor explained that NATO still interprets protection of 
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civilians through IHL: “… protection of civilians is something we always take into account … 
before even the policy came out. … But, I mean, our obligations are, we understand our 
obligations under IHL.”689 In no NATO materials is there any consideration of specific 
obligations implied by applying IHRL standards in relation to protection of civilians or CRSV; 
for example, of any action required by a real and immediate risk of CRSV to identified 
persons, or whether there might ever be a responsibility to pre-emptively detain. 
There are questions as to whether a NATO operation would even have the authority to use 
force to protect civilians in the manner that might be required to prevent an act of CRSV. 
Authorisation to do so depends upon the higher-level orders governing the operation. Rules 
of engagement have been noted by NATO insiders as limiting action on CRSV.690 NATO’s 
compendium of rules of engagement does not include any rule explicit to protecting 
civilians from third party attack. The most relevant rule authorises the use of force “to 
prevent commission of [designated] crimes that are occurring or are about to occur in 
[designated] circumstances”.691 Even if this were to be used with CRSV as a designated 
crime, according to NATO training standards, “some nations’ laws or policies on self-
defence may not include the use of force to protect persons not belonging to NATO/NATO-
led forces (e.g. civilian population).”692 A NATO GENAD explained that if, in a mission, 
information about CRSV was received, for forces to be able to act pre-emptively to prevent 
it, more “aggressive,” more “offensive” rules of engagement than the “default set” would 
need to be in place; describing the pre-emptive response to CRSV as “push[ing] the 
envelope” for NATO.693 In summary: NATO training materials, trainers and GENADs 
acknowledge that rules of engagement might not allow action in relation to CRSV. This is a 
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strong indication that NATO institutionally does not regard forces as having a positive 
obligation to protect civilians from third party attack, including CRSV.  
The above might be inferred also from NATO’s very terminology concerning CRSV, which, as 
described in Chapter 6, includes the slippery concept of GBV within a broad notion of 
“conflict-related SGBV”. Likewise, when NATO talks about “gender” it highlights a broad, 
human rights-based legal framework, emphasizing not only physical risks but issues such as 
access to justice, land rights, informal justice systems, labour rights, and reproductive 
rights.694 While this might be welcomed as a holistic recognition of gendered needs, NATO’s 
discourse omits exploration of what standards under IHL or IHRL should be met in its 
operations. This was also my observation of NATO training on CRSV: references were made 
to IHRL, IHL, international criminal law, UNSCRs on WPS, mandates for the protection of 
civilians in UN peacekeeping, and the domestic law of the host nation, but none in a 
systematic or detailed manner, linked to specific obligations. Rather than being grounded in 
legal obligation, the rationale for addressing CRSV was linked to, on the one hand, ethics, 
values and standards, and on the other, the sustainability of mission achievements. Dealing 
with SGBV was described as “fundamental to operational success”; for example, suggesting 
that CRSV contributes to radicalisation.695 The idea that NATO is legally bound to take 
action by virtue of obligations in international criminal law (articulated in 2013 by the 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, cited above) has seemingly sunk without trace. 
This strongly characterises NATO’s commitment to prevent and respond to CRSV as 
aspirational and essentially political, rather than grounded in acceptance of legal 
obligations. 
Obligations to support the prosecution of third party perpetrators of CRSV 
NATO’s Secretary General has described NATO as having a role in “reporting crimes and 
supporting work to bring perpetrators to justice”.696 Doctrine directs NATO forces engaged 
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in peacekeeping to systematically and accurately record all evidence relating to human 
rights abuses and war crimes for future investigations and envisions NATO forces assisting 
in apprehending war criminals697 and conducting investigations.698 But, neither successive 
WPS policies nor the 2015 Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV refer to NATO 
forces supporting investigations or justice processes regarding CRSV; nor do they make 
recognition of any legal obligation to do so.  
Chapter 6 described the resistance from nations even to share reports of CRSV outside of 
their command structure, due to concerns about negative ramifications for their own 
forces. In a training observed, NATO Military Police discussed (where their mandate 
permitted) reporting and recording sexual violence offences, collecting evidence, taking 
witness statements, providing security to investigation teams and training local police on 
sexual violence investigations. However, a commander present offered a “real word of 
caution,” that Military Police must be careful to have the support of their chain of 
command for any investigation, and that investigations do not interfere with any 
subsequent alliances and deals the military might want to make. He said, Military Police 
“must be realistic” and “not ruin the ground for our masters … If you report something it 
can impact upon your ability to work in a situation.”699  
The omission from WPS policy and CRSV guidelines of investigation of allegations of CRSV, 
and the caution and resistance associated with even reporting CRSV, suggest that NATO 
recognises no legal obligation to support prosecutions, and moreover is unwilling to play 
this role.  
British Armed Forces: outside the scope of the manual 
For the British Armed Forces, guidance from a legal perspective on obligations concerning 
CRSV is scant. Apparently Legal Advisors were not consulted or involved in discussions 
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around integrating gender perspectives.700 In my own association with the British Armed 
Forces over the last seven years, there was never a Legal Advisor present in WPS training or 
meetings, neither as presenter nor trainee. 
Obligations to protect civilians from CRSV 
The key reference for operational law in the British Armed Forces is the 2004 Joint service 
manual of the law of armed conflict.701 The manual’s language closely follows that of the 
GCs and its APs, with no additions recognising any growing awareness, since 1949, of the 
prevalence of CRSV. For example, there is no inclusion of the broad definitions of sexual 
violence developed through international criminal jurisprudence and incorporated into the 
Rome Statute;702 no reference to the possibility of male victims of CRSV, nor the particular 
vulnerability of children. The section on grave breaches, likewise, confines itself to 1949 
language, not mentioning that a serious act of sexual violence would be considered a grave 
breach. The section outlining the prohibitions on certain types of attacks does not refer to 
sexual attacks, nor make clear that sexual violence is a prohibited act. The manual includes 
more detail on the management of canteens in internment camps than on CRSV. 
Considering the protection of civilians, the text focuses on “sparing the civilian population” 
rather than protecting them. In summary, the key reference for the law of armed conflict 
for the UK military in no way suggests any positive legal obligation to prevent or respond to 
CRSV by third parties. The other key legal reference is the doctrine on Legal Support to Joint 
Operations issued in 2018. But, in setting out the rationale for the UK forces’ role in 
preventing and responding to CRSV, the doctrine argues not in legal terms, but merely that 
“UK Armed Forces have a unique role in providing security and stability.”703  
IHL and IHRL obligations are mentioned in British training sessions. The Armed Forces claim, 
for example, that in pre-deployment training for Afghanistan: 
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… all UK troops received extensive training in the Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and the need to protect civilians from all kinds of violence – 
including sexual violence. After the abuse came to light, troops were 
also briefed on the issue of ‘bacha-bazi’; they were made aware of their 
obligations under International Human Rights Law … that such abuse 
violates International Law and that UK forces on operation are required 
to intervene.704 
Observing mission-specific pre-deployment training, indeed, CRSV was framed as a violation 
of IHL and IHRL as well as host national law. It was broadly defined to include domestic 
violence, female genital mutilation, early and forced marriage, and honour killing. 
Emphasised over IHL or IHRL, however, were the UNSCRs on WPS, the UK 1325 NAP and 
host nations’ 1325 NAPs, and the ‘political agenda,’ in the sense of CRSV being an issue of 
high-level political prominence and interest to the Chief of Defence Staff. Sexual violence 
response was described as ‘mandatory’.705 Trainers described presenting a more nuanced 
approach in other training sessions: that personnel were taught that intervening to stop a 
sexual assault was subject to protecting their own safety. Moreover, it was explained to me 
that the UK’s national rules of engagement would authorise intervention where a person 
was being raped, as this is perceived as a threat to a person’s life, but not where other 
types of GBV, such as domestic violence or early marriage are concerned.706  
But, as described in Chapter 7, as engagement with CRSV matured, there was seemingly a 
retreat from tactical interventions to prevent or even report it. In Human Security in 
Military Operations, protection of civilians is referred to diffusely, as “a moral, political, 
legal, and strategic priority.”707 The “guidance” part of the document (as Table 3 on page 
212 illustrates) makes no meaningful distinction between CRSV (or torture) as an 
international crime or violation of IHL or IHRL and less serious acts such as name-calling 
military recruits. Gender-related abuses by third parties and gender aspects related to the 
 
704 House of Lords Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Written and oral evidence, p. 
511. 
705 Observation of 45 minute pre-deployment training briefing on “Gender and sexual violence and 
exploitation,” Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
706 Interviews with British military trainers, Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
707 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 2 (2019), p. 2. 
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British forces’ own discipline are conflated. Platoon commanders are described as “having a 
responsibility for preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence due to 
the national and international legal frameworks” but seemingly only where their own 
troops are “perpetrating or complicit.”708 Rather, this new British approach to human 
security approach deploys some of NATO’s instrumentalising of WPS, stating: “beyond our 
obligation to protect civilians, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 will spark deeper 
analysis, broader plans and more effective operations.”709 One GENAD resisted this 
emphasising the absence of the appropriate legal framing:  
I disagree with the way that the military is framing gender perspective 
will achieve operational effectiveness. That’s not why we should do this 
… We should do it because it’s the right thing to do under international 
humanitarian or international human rights law. It has been mis-framed. 
One, because I don’t think it will necessarily achieve operational 
effectiveness. And two, because they’ve hijacked the whole agenda for 
a military gain, which is not where it should be.710 
From a critical perspective on militarism, this question of whether it is appropriate to frame 
gender mainstreaming as promoting operational effectiveness, or prevention and response 
to CRSV as an aspect of operational effectiveness, depends upon the dominant objective of 
the mission. For example, is it orientated toward combat or toward human security? I will 
return to this point in the chapter to follow. 
The Joint service manual of the law of armed conflict does not attempt to grapple with IHRL 
standards in terms of protection of civilians, unhelpfully noting: “civilians will be entitled to 
protection under applicable human rights law. However, this topic falls outside the scope of 
this Manual.”711 Nonetheless, subsequent doctrine does anticipate IHRL applying to 
 
708 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 2 (2019), p. 9. 
709 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 1 (2019), p. i. 
710 Interview with Gender Advisor, 28 November 2018. 
711 The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, para. 1.9.2. The 2010 amendment to the 
manual notes “the development of human rights law and its relationship with the law of armed 
conflict” but does not give any guidance. This is surprising given that, already by 2008, military 
doctrine (e.g. Campaigning) was acknowledging that IHRL applied, at least in some way, to military 
campaigns. 
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operations,712 and military lawyers consider that IHRL in a European context “is moving in 
th[e] direction of positive obligations” to protect civilians.713 One Legal Advisor observed:  
If you’re in occupation, you’re responsible for peace, security, law and 
order, and human rights apply, then I think the responsibilities for 
sexual violence would also be expected to apply … it is a high standard.  
… the nature of the missions that we’ve been asked to do, whether it’s 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria are not straightforward. And the legal 
frameworks are not straightforward, the legal frameworks are evolving. 
If you’d have said twenty years ago that human rights will apply to a 
situation when special forces are helping the Kurds in Syria, everyone 
would have thought you were mad. But actually, that’s the position 
we’ve got to. 714  
Ultimately though, this Legal Advisor framed whether IHRL even applies and what it might 
require as a question of practicability: 
… we recognise that not all [IHRL] obligations can apply all the time, but 
which ones can apply? … Now if you’re in a position to do something 
about sexual violence and we say that human rights law applies, then 
you should do something about sexual violence. But if it’s just a 
situation where human rights law might apply but you can’t do anything 
about it, then our position, the Government position would probably be 
if you can’t do something about it then you don’t have a legal obligation 
to do something about it. 715  
For UK forces, as in a broader NATO context, there remain questions as to whether rules of 
engagement even authorise the use of force to prevent or disrupt CRSV. Peacekeeping 
doctrine clearly anticipates the possibility of British forces taking casualties to protect 
civilians.716 But, in general, rules of engagement authorise the use of force where it is 
 
712 E.g. DCDC, Campaigning (2008); DCDC, ADP Operations (2010); DCDC, UK Joint Operations 
Doctrine (2014); DCDC, Shaping a Stable World (2016); Land Warfare Development Centre, British 
Army, Human Security: The Military Contribution (2016); Land Warfare Development Centre, British 
Army, Land Operations (2017); DCDC, Legal Support to Joint Operations (2018). 
713 Interview with Legal Advisor at doctrine writing centre, 12 June 2018. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. 
716 DCDC, Peacekeeping (2011), para. 424. 
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proportionate and necessary to prevent imminent loss of life or serious loss of limb to 
individuals under the individual’s control. This is perceived as a difficult operational 
judgement in relation to CRSV:  
… If you’re protecting civilians, you as an individual would have to be 
able to justify why you use lethal force to protect a civilian. Now in the 
case of an armed insurgent group driving through a camp shooting 
people, that’s really easy. In terms of someone maybe being taken [for 
sexual exploitation] … it’s a really difficult issue because I may have one 
view, you may have a different view and a good barrister in a court 
room might have a very different view …717 
A GENAD argued, moreover, that soldiers are not taught how to apply IHL standards and 
rules of engagement to CRSV:  
… it’s really hard for people to figure out, well, how does sexual violence 
fit within our international humanitarian law obligations, so 
proportionality, necessity? … at which point is it a life-threatening issue 
that they can respond to? … We don’t do anything like that that helps 
them understand, is this an environment in which I can or can’t respond 
to the sexual violence? 718 
They bemoaned that Army training remains focused on IHL, self-defence and rules of 
engagement, omitting protecting the human rights of local populations as either a strategic 
objective or an obligation, making it difficult to communicate to soldiers how CRSV fits 
within their mission responsibilities. Conversely, a Legal Advisor pointed to “the sensitivity 
surrounding human rights” itself as limiting how forces can intervene to stop CRSV. They 
described a new reluctance for British forces to detain people, because after Afghanistan 
and Iraq “the whole detention thing is so political, it’s so sensationalised,” going on to say:  
…. it’s not just the resources, training and capacity. It’s the human rights 
issues … The standards get higher and higher and higher and it just 
makes everything very, very difficult …. And don’t get me wrong, people 
 
717 Interview with Royal Military Police officer, 28 June 2017. The Army doctrine writer, interviewed 
26 June 2017, also noted the difficulty of operational judgements around protection, force 
protection and other operational objectives. 
718 Interview with British GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
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are desperate to do the right thing and to comply with human rights, it’s 
just very, very difficult. 719  
Thus, a pessimism that applying IHRL standards to detention and co-culpability for partner 
armed forces’ human rights failures has had a dampening effect on stopping CRSV. This is 
pertinent also to the discussion below concerning investigation and prosecution of CRSV. 
Obligations to support the prosecution of third party perpetrators of CRSV 
Investigation and prosecution of CRSV was a priority of the PSVI from 2012,720 but without 
any focus on a role for British forces. As in NATO, British doctrine for peace operations 
suggests that military peacekeepers might monitor and report human rights abuses; record 
evidence and arrest war criminals.721 Moreover, doctrine pertaining to a wider sphere of 
operations refers to Legal Advisors engaging with police concerning investigation and 
prosecution of CRSV722 and improving investigation and documentation of CRSV723 and 
implies that an individual might be detained for a sexual offence.724 When pre-deployment 
training on CRSV began in March 2016, personnel were directed to document any instance 
(“if possible take photographs/videos”725) for future investigation. Likewise, the Royal 
Military Police began to incorporate SGBV into their training, exercise scenarios and pre-
deployment training.726 But, Military Police explained the difficulty of training their 
personnel generically on the potential investigation of CRSV offences, as their roles in this 
 
719 Interview with Army Legal Advisor, 7 August 2018. None of my interviewees conveyed the much-
discussed perception that the British military is under “legal siege” from claims based in IHRL: D. 
Whetham, ‘Killing Within the Rules’ (2007) 18 Small Wars & Insurgencies 721–33; R. Kerr, ‘A Force 
for Good? War, Crime and Legitimacy: The British Army in Iraq’ (2008) 24 Defense & Security Analysis 
401–19; Quenivet and Sari, Human Rights and Military Operations. 
720 Evidenced by the successive versions of Ferro Ribeiro and van der Straten Ponthoz, International 
Protocol and activities to promote and support its use. 
721 Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (2004). 
722 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Human Security: The Military Contribution 
(2016), pp. 3–15. 
723 DCDC, Legal Support to Joint Operations (2018), p. 70., p.70. 
724 DCDC, Captured persons (2011). 
725 PowerPoint presentation “Gender, Sexual Violence and Exploitation (GSVE) on Operations,” 
Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
726 Interview with Royal Military Police officer, 28 June 2017.  
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regard depended upon the mandate of any specific mission.727 Some soldiers who received 
the November 2016 pre-deployment training raised the contradictions between their 
mandate and what they were being told as regards CRSV, questioning what procedure 
would follow a report of sexual violence or sexual exploitation and where the local police fit 
in where – in Afghanistan, as in most places Britain deploys – British forces have no powers 
of detention. The trainees expressed bewilderment and frustration: “Britain says ‘yes’ to 
everything – it will do everything – but it is confusing” and “It blew my head off. It doesn’t 
make sense”.728  
Both these troops deploying to Afghanistan and the Military Police officers interviewed 
expressed clear caution, moreover, as regards the risks of going beyond “report and 
record” of allegations of CRSV by third parties or getting involved in investigations. On the 
one hand, there was a concern to do no harm, and an awareness of the potential danger 
for a victim in bringing forward a complaint on their behalf. Bluntly, if you reported a child 
being abused, the “boy might end up with a bullet in the head.”729 On the other hand, there 
was awareness of the political sensitivity of “stepping into” other nations’ jurisdiction.730 
Even merely recording an incident of CRSV was perceived as difficult and potentially 
dangerous:  
… people, they’re still sceptical of it … It’s really, really difficult, 
depending again on the security situation, how benign or otherwise the 
situation is, you often just, you can’t, it’s impossible to record to the 
level you’re required to record it to, whether for investigation then, or 
for retrospective scrutiny of allegations when allegations are made.731 
As a soldier put it, “We are not going to have an effect on [sexual exploitation], as Kabul 
would turn into a warzone between us and the ANA [Afghan National Army]”.732 There was 
seemingly, even within the Military Police, no consideration of how international standards, 
 
727 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017. 
728 Focus group held at Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
729 Ibid. 
730 Interview with Royal Military Police lead on WPS, 11 June 2018; also Interview with Royal Military 
Police officer, 28 June 2017. 
731 Interview with Royal Military Police lead on WPS, 11 June 2018. 
732 Focus group held at Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
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IHL or IHRL, might require or inform the investigation of CRSV.733 Rather, the senior 
commander was encouraging training on CRSV “because he feels it is morally right, but in a 
vacuum,” without higher-level strategic direction.”734  
8.3 CRSV by their own forces 
There are clear obligations in customary international law, IHL and IHRL to prohibit, prevent 
and punish rape and other forms of sexual violence by one’s armed forces, as Chapter 5 
discussed. As concerns SEA, these prohibitions would cover acts of sexual abuse, but not 
necessarily sexual exploitation – depending upon the circumstances. The following 
discussion focuses primarily on this legal grey area as concerns how legal obligations are 
applied. 
NATO’s “boys will be boys” 
NATO’s documents and training offer little acknowledgement of NATO forces as potential 
perpetrators of CRSV. Where they do, it is through the lens of SEA. The issue seems 
shrouded in silence - surprisingly, given the extensive media coverage of allegations of 
sexual abuse of young children made against France’s military peacekeepers in the Central 
African Republic in 2015.735 In 2017, an allegation of child rape was substantiated against a 
member of Romania’s military.736 Sexual abuse is clearly a problem that applies to NATO 
forces. 
In the 2015 Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV nations obliquely agreed that 
NATO would develop Codes of Conduct and mechanisms to ensure allegations of CRSV 
 
733 Interview with Royal Military Police officer on WPS, 11 June 2018  
734 WPS Agenda in the British Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange Workshop, 22 May 2017, Ministry 
of Defence Headquarters, London. 
735 See Ch. 6, n 463. 
736 ‘UN peacekeeper “had child with minor”’ (2017); United Nations, ‘Data on Allegations: UN 
System-wide’ (2018); United Nations, ‘Sexual exploitation and abuse’ (2020). Soldiers from Georgia, 
a significant troop-contributor to NATO operations, were also accused of SEA in the Central African 
Republic. 
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were investigated and appropriate disciplinary or legal proceedings followed.737 Years later 
though, operational reporting tools still did not include any mechanism to report 
allegations of SEA (or other forms of CRSV), with nations resistant to compromising their 
exclusive disciplinary control over their own personnel. A GENAD explained: 
We don’t have anything that tells a commander what exactly his 
response should be in that scenario … So, it really becomes an 
uncomfortable discussion within NATO almost immediately, because 
first you have to get over the "Yes, it can be your troops …" And then 
you have to get into the “What is the nation willing to give up to the 
NATO commander in order for him to address sexual exploitation and 
abuse within the contingent that he’s working?” 738 
According to this informant, likewise, while human trafficking was referred to in certain 
NATO operational plans, it was not reported on by missions, nor was reporting even 
requested by headquarters.  
It would not be until 2020 that a NATO policy on SEA was agreed.739 This makes a key 
advance in asserting that NATO personnel are prohibited to pay for sex, and committing 
national authorities to vetting, training, prevention strategies, investigation and 
punishment. With the negotiation of the policy coming only after fieldwork was complete, 
this research is unable to probe the extent to which understandings of international 
criminal law, the CRC, CEDAW and Istanbul Convention obligations, for example, were 
invoked in the negotiation of the policy. The text itself states that “NATO is committed to 
the principles of … human rights and the rule of law” and that SEA “runs counter to NATO’s 
principles and core values, and undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the Alliance 
and risk [sic] mission success.”740 This is an ambivalent framing in legal terms, avoiding any 
statement of SEA as a violation of law. Moreover, it is unclear what effect the policy will 
have, given that it affirms that the jurisdiction of NATO members over their own forces is 
 
737 Women, Peace and Security Action Plan, p. 5; NATO, ‘Military guidelines on the prevention of, and 
response to, conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence’, para. 17(b). 
738 Interview with NATO GENAD, 29 May 2018. 
739 Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (2020). 
740 Ibid., paras 1, 3. 
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not compromised. 741 As a Legal Advisor explained, any NATO SEA policy is “just to influence 
the nations, for lack of a better word, to do the right thing. Because at the end of the day … 
nation X soldier is doing some heinous crime in Kosovo … it’s up to nation X to discipline 
that person under their law.” 742 
Why, when policy and guidelines on human trafficking had been in place since 2004, was 
progress so slow around SEA? Three themes emerged in interviews. First, NATO informants 
describe SEA as an issue upon which nations are very sensitive to any infringement upon 
their jurisdiction over their own forces. This is familiar territory from the challenges of 
addressing SEA in UN missions.743 Second, conversations about SEA seem to treat visiting 
brothels (vs. sexual abuse) as the problem being considered. This being an act in a grey 
zone in terms of international criminality, there is no clear set of standards within IHL or 
IHRL to be invoked. Third, according to a NATO GENAD: “… you’re always going to be 
fighting the boys will be boys mentality … if not a spoken part of the discussion, an 
unspoken part …”744 Another NATO staff member expressed their view that “Sex is a basic 
need. Brothel, it’s like a shop” and while coerced sex and trafficking were problematic, that 
soldiers “need it, you know … We have to be reasonable.”745 These comments, read in light 
of the resistance within NATO to implementing the trafficking policy and the long delay in 
agreeing a policy on SEA, suggest that ideas about men’s sexual needs and entitlements 
constrain NATO’s approach to SEA: because of attitudes that NATO national representatives 
hold, attitudes assumed by NATO staff, and even the attitudes prevalent amongst NATO 
staff themselves. This theme of the relationship between gender dynamics, legal norms and 
response to CRSV will be returned to Chapter 10. 
British soldiers “do it anyway” 
Compared with NATO, SEA has been a more visible priority in British engagement with 
CRSV, although predominantly framed as an issue upon which Britain can teach the world 
 
741 Ibid., paras 16, 17. 
742 Interview with NATO Legal Advisor, May 2018. 
743 See Ch. 3, n 154. 
744 Interview with NATO GENAD, 29 May 2018. 
745 Interview with NATO Advisor, 30 May 2018.  
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by delivering training for foreign forces. There has been scant recognition of the need to 
strengthen the British Forces’ own legal or doctrinal framework or sanctions procedures. As 
a GENAD observed of training foreign troops on SEA, “I find that slightly arrogant … because 
we don’t do anything like that to our own soldiers ….”746 
According to Michael Noone, since at least 1914 the British military has had some 
prohibitions on prostitution where girls under 16 are involved or where women are 
coerced.747 Neither these, nor any other legal standards, are explicitly referred to in British 
policy or doctrine related to SEA, nor did any of my interviewees (some of whom are 
Military Police and Legal Officers) refer to any prohibition in such terms. The gender pre-
deployment training which commenced in 2016 refers to “the rules on Sexual Exploitation 
& Abuse … buying sex is prohibited.” An annex to the 2017 Army Field Manual Tactics for 
Stability Operations likewise describes “using prostitutes” as forbidden in all multinational 
operations.748 Interviewees explained that this, however, is not a formal policy. Indeed, 
after the pre-deployment training observed, one soldier questioned the stern prohibition of 
going to a brothel in Cyprus (where the UK is part of a UN Mission) while in Germany 
personnel are known to visit brothels frequently.749 According to a Military Police officer, 
forces deployed to countries where prostitution is illegal are prohibited from engaging in it; 
outside of this, whether deployed personnel may visit brothels or otherwise pay for sex is at 
the discretion of the mission’s commander.750 A GENAD set out an even less restrictive 
approach: 
… we’re not actually even saying you can’t sleep with prostitutes, 
although we discourage it from a health perspective because people can 
pick up STDs. Soldiers do it anyway … what we’re saying is we need to 
get our troops to understand, how do they make a decision as to 
whether a prostitute is vulnerable or not? So, hiring a prostitute in Kiev 
or in Nairobi is probably not a problem, hiring a prostitute next to an IDP 
 
746 Interview with British GENAD, 3 September 2018. 
747 M. Noone, ‘The U.S. Approach to Combating Trafficking in Women: Prosecuting Military 
Customers. Could it Be Exported?’ (2005) 4 Connections: The Quarterly Journal 81–89 at 84–85. 
748 Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Tactics for Stability Operations (2017), pp. 10A – 
13. 
749 Focus group held at Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016.  
750 Interview with Royal Military Police Officer, 28 June 2017.  
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camp probably is. … So, tell them don’t sleep with prostitutes – they will 
… 751  
This GENAD said that an annex to a recent operational order for East Africa included “a 
little bit on sexual exploitation.”752 They seemed unaware that prostitution is illegal in 
Nairobi, and in Kiev too.753 The 2019 policy Human Security in Military Operations only 
implies that prostitution and visiting brothels should be prohibited during operations. It sets 
no standards beyond “uphold[ing] the values and standards of the UK Armed Forces”.754 Its 
example of training standards on SEA is that senior non-commissioned officers should 
“avoid sanctioning” having female prostitutes within the camp.755 There seems a creeping 
awareness that SEA might infer IHRL obligations, Human Security in Military Operations 
cryptically noting: “While it is agreed that SEA must be viewed through a human rights lens, 
the UN is in the process of determining under what criteria SEA rises to the level of a 
human rights violation or conflict-related sexual violence.”756 So, even in 2019, the British 
Armed Forces were unwilling to replicate the UN’s clear prohibitions on SEA, nor 
acknowledge the possibility of their own personnel committing sexual abuse. As recently as 
March 2020, media reports described over 100 British personnel having sex with prostitutes 
who had “set up temporary brothels next to the British Army Training Unit Headquarters” 
in Kenya, prompting local disapprobation.757  
 
751 Interview with British GENAD, 26 June 2018.  
752 Ibid. 
753 NSWP, ‘Nairobi County Assembly Bans Sex Work in the City’ (2017); P. Kurmaiev, ‘Global Market 
of Sexual Nature Services. Case for Ukraine’ (2020) 9(26) Amazonia investiga 19–27. 
754 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 2 (2019), p. 14,21.Part 2, p. 14, 21 
755 Ibid., p. 7. 
756 Ibid., p.21 
757 J. Wanjohi, ‘British Soldiers in Lockdown After Night of Unprotected Sex with Kenyan Sex 
Workers’ (2020). Reported in the British press: M. Nicol, ‘Army lockdown British soldiers in barracks 
over HIV fears’ (2020). This follows many years of local debate concerning British solders’ 
involvement with prostitution: K. Sengupta, ‘Two British soldiers suspected of murdering Kenyan 
woman’ (2012). 
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Chapter 2 described how developing the prohibition of CRSV in international law has been 
an important feminist strategy. Chapter 5 argued that armed forces in some circumstances 
have a legal obligation, by virtue of IHL, peremptory norms and/or IHRL, to exercise due 
diligence to prevent and respond to CRSV. The law requires that IHRL standards in relation 
to violence against women should be applied as far as is reasonable. Visions of human-
security orientated armed forces emphasise their compliance with IHL and IHRL as a key 
characteristic. Chinkin and Kaldor’s strategy for “second-generation human security” goes 
further: arguing for IHRL to be the framework for any humanitarian or defensive military 
intervention in conflict.  
This chapter demonstrates that in both NATO and British military spaces, narratives 
regarding CRSV do consistently invoke both IHL and IHRL, but loosely. The law is referred to, 
but not at the level of detail where due diligence obligations are discussed, complicity 
considered, nor particular customary nor treaty obligations worked through. Military 
training addresses the applicable legal norms in a cursory and chaotic manner. Both NATO 
and the British Armed Forces see the law applicable to military operations primarily as IHL. 
While their doctrine does reference IHRL, formal legal references largely ignore it. There is 
no engagement with what contemporary understandings of IHRL and more specific 
obligations in relation to preventing violence against women might demand. Neither NATO 
nor the British Armed Forces acknowledge that SEA implies obligations under IHRL - even 
potentially under IHL – where their personnel commit acts of sexual violence. 
In both NATO and the British Armed Forces, efforts to address CRSV have been tied to and 
communicated with reference to the WPS Agenda. There are good reasons for this – such 
as recognising the importance of consulting women to protect them effectively. But 
packaging CRSV (including SEA) within this broader agenda risks obscuring that CRSV 
demands specific military tasks and capabilities. In interviews with British Military Legal 
Advisors and Military Police, when CRSV was discussed as a form of violence, they were 
able to be more clear and directive about how rules of engagement might authorise 
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intervention to protect, and the processes that a commander would go through in deciding 
what action to take.  
Interviewees within NATO Headquarters emphasised that perceptions of NATO values and 
bolstering NATO legitimacy rather than NATO legal obligation were steering commitment to 
sexual violence response. One advisor said, “we have to do it because this is actually our 
own, our purpose. This is core values. I never heard that this is because of IHL.”758 When I 
raised ambiguities around legal requirements with senior training personnel in the British 
Armed Forces, I was told ambiguities were addressed with the advice, “If it doesn’t feel 
right, report it up the chain of command.”759 This reliance on soldiers’ subjective “feeling” 
frames CRSV as an issue of “values and standards” rather than legal obligation, in the 
context of an assumed convergence between “moral integrity” and legal requirement. The 
assumption is, “Most Servicemen and women have an intuitive feel for what is right and 
good and can be relied upon to deplore what is either illegal or unethical.”760  
The Chapter 10 will return to these findings in considering their implications for theorising 
around the legal characteristics of norms related to military response to CRSV, the promise 
of applying IHRL as the predominant legal framework in military operations, and feminist 
strategy. Before, however, Chapter 9 will return to gender: the potential for militaries to be 
effective in combating CRSV in light of their profoundly gendered institutional culture. 
  
 
758 Interview with NATO Advisor, 30 May 2018. 
759 Interview with British military trainer, 2 November 2016. 
760 DCDC, British Defence Doctrine (2011), para. 414. 
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Chapter 9  
Gendered institutional and strategic culture 
For the unravelling of hegemonic masculinity, men must be encouraged 
not so much to change their ways as to change the way in which they 
negotiate their identities in relation to others. Rather than forge their 
identities through relations of opposition or domination, men and 
subjects in general need to construct their identities through 
recognition of similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy, and 
equality with others. 
C. Duncanson, ‘Hegemonic Masculinity and the Possibility of Change in 
Gender Relations’ (2015) 18 Men and Masculinities 231–248 at 233. 
 
The foregoing chapter traced how legal obligations are invoked and understood with regard 
to CRSV in NATO and the British Armed Forces. It looked for how the nuances of legal 
obligation, developed through feminist legal advocacy and the expansion of IHRL norms 
into armed conflict, are reflected. It concluded that military policies, directives and training 
regarding CRSV only inconsistently invoke IHL and IHRL and in generalised terms, making 
weak connections to concrete positive legal obligations. 
This chapter analyses NATO and British Armed Forces’ response to CRSV from the 
perspective of theorisation of military “regendering” and shift toward “cosmopolitanism”:  
a vision of militaries emphasising care and protection over dominance and killing. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, theorising around regendered militaries emerged as an attempt to 
move forward feminist critiques of militaries and peacekeeping which appeared over-
deterministic and too pessimistic,761 and to take seriously calls from women in conflict-
affected contexts for military protection. This chapter considers how engagement with 
CRSV might disrupt the gendered assumptions which shape how militaries engage with 
communities and reshape gendered dynamics within militaries. It examines whether the 
call to prevent CRSV shifts the gendered hierarchies of protection that feminists have 
 
761 Duncanson and Woodward, ‘Regendering the military’. 
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mapped within IHL and, as such, militaries’ strategic approaches to protection. This analysis 
brings together institutions’ structural discourses (as expressed in policy and doctrine) with 
how personnel articulate their understandings of these discourses. In so doing, it explores 
what I have described as the first and second themes of this project: the potential for 
militaries to be effective in combating CRSV in light of, on one hand, their problematically 
gendered institutional cultures and, on the other, the gendered operation of law in war. 
9.1 Unravelling the gendered binaries of CRSV? 
Duncanson theorises the possibility of progressive change in military masculinities (and as 
such, militarism) to be richest where relations between military actors and others are 
constructed in ways that overcoming “radical othering,” that break down hierarchies of 
“us” and “them” 762  ̶  as described in the quote opening this chapter. She finds examples of 
this in British soldiers in Bosnia “taking women’s groups seriously as political actors, 
subverting the positioning of women as passive victims in warzones, and of British soldiers 
in Iraq and Afghanistan building relations of empathy and mutual respect with local people 
and the soldiers of the local security forces”.763 Indeed, responding to sexual violence is 
cited as one area which might build militaries’ capacity for empathy and recognition of 
similarity.764 Bergmann and Kronsell likewise identify ethics of care and “empathetic 
cooperation” with local populations as central to achieving a cosmopolitan military.765 
Woodward and Duncanson additionally emphasise the importance of overcoming or 
displacing binaries: “challenging the systems which categorise people or activities as 
masculine and feminine”.766 In this, their scholarship shares a key theme with the feminist 
critique outlined in Chapter 2, which problematises the binary ways in which CRSV is 
understood, the gendered binaries that flow through IHL, and the overarching binaries of 
the male/masculine protector and the feminised victim. The following examines this, with 
 
762 Duncanson, ‘Hegemonic Masculinity and the Possibility of Change in Gender Relations’, 242. 
763 Ibid. 
764 Ibid., p 244. 
765 Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell, ‘Cosmopolitan militaries and dialogic peacekeeping’, 175. 
adapting the term “empathetic cooperation” from Laura Sjoberg’s work. 
766 Duncanson and Woodward, ‘Regendering the military’, 7. 
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regard to discourse around perpetrators and victims of CRSV, local women, and 
understandings of CRSV. 
Perpetrators 
After watching a film about CRSV against men in the DRC, a (middle-aged) British male 
soldier said: “I don’t know whether I’m more ashamed to be a human being or a man”.767 
Willingness to relate one’s own masculinity to the masculinity of perpetrators of CRSV was 
not often voiced in British or NATO training spaces, but CRSV did open discussion of 
violence against women in their own communities and – as will be discussed in the 
following section – violence against women within the armed forces. A NATO training 
observed included a substantive component on the trafficking of persons for forced labour 
as a gendered security issue at home.768 British pre-deployment training opened with 
images of British newspapers highlighting child sexual abuse within the UK, to support a 
narrative, “We don’t tolerate this at home, why would we in […]?” 769 In this way, there was 
some recognition of similarities between different cultures, and connections made 
between male violence in both war and peace. This could be read as engagement with the 
issue of CRSV chipping away at the warrior’s “proud vision of male identity,” 770 breaking 
down us/them binaries and processes of “radical othering”. 
These observations are, of course, in tension with the institutionally inadequate response 
to SEA detailed in the previous chapter. In NATO, there is silence around grave allegations 
of sexual violence by NATO forces and partners, citing this as “cultural” and “sensitive”. In 
the British Armed Forces, SEA is framed as a problem of forces with inferior values, which 
could perhaps be taught how to behave properly, whilst British soldiers exercise good 
judgment in choosing prostitutes sensibly. In both NATO and British contexts, interviewees 
referred to a subtext belief that their male personnel could not reasonably be constrained 
 
767 Defence Gender Training of Trainers course, Worthy Down Barracks, Hampshire, 25-28 January 
2016, after watching Otim Patrick’s 2011 documentary, “They Slept with Me” 
768 Observation of daylong seminar on SGBV, 28 April 2016, NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. 
769 PowerPoint presentation “Gender, Sexual Violence and Exploitation (GSVE) on Operations,” 
Napier Barracks, Kent, 2 November 2016. 
770 Ignatieff (1998) cited in Kinsella, The Image before the Weapon, p. 123. 
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from having sex whilst deployed. Their own victims are not victims in the manner that 
others’ victims are victims, and their acts do not render them perpetrators, as African and 
other non-Western soldiers who commit SEA are. This reads as a neo-colonial racialized 
othering, reproducing the narrative that Gayatri Spivak famously described as "white men 
saving brown women from brown men,"771 where the white soldier is represented as an 
emblem of civilisation and modernity. Within NATO, the racialised aspects are not so 
straightforwardly, insider/outsider. There is an additional internal binary because some 
NATO members’ “culture” is regarded as problematic.  
Victims 
Advocates of the WPS Agenda maintain the importance of challenging stereotypes of 
women’s victimhood: that CRSV discourse obscures the holistic experiences of women in 
conflict-affected countries; disconnects CRSV from pervasive structural patterns of 
patriarchal domination; and reproduces stereotypes of women’s passive victimhood and 
subordination. These too reproduce gendered binaries. The construction of a weak, 
innocent victim is apparent in both NATO and British policy, directives and training around 
CRSV. Women are frequently grouped with children (sometimes also with refugees and 
internally displaced persons) as a “vulnerable group”.772 In training materials, in observed 
training and interviews, the trope of a woman apparently raped at random by strangers 
springing from the undergrowth is common. Female victims are never framed as women 
who might hold power, as when sexual violence targets a woman to deter her from political 
activism or joining security forces or to capture her financial resources.773  
The second recurring victim trope in both British and NATO discourse is boys abused 
through bacha bazi; male victims innocent by virtue of their boyhood and position of 
 
771 G. C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in C. Nelson, L. Gross (eds.), Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture, (London: Macmillan, 1988) p. 92. 
772 E.g., in NATO: Allied Joint Doctrine (2010); in the British Armed Forces: UK Government Strategy 
on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict; DCDC, British Defence Doctrine (2011); Land Warfare 
Development Centre, British Army, Human Security: The Military Contribution (2016).  
773 These types of motivations have long been documented: e.g. C. O. N. Moser and F. C. Clark (eds.), 
Victims, perpetrators or actors? gender, armed conflict and political violence (Zed Books, 2001); Q. 
Lawrence, ‘For Afghan Policewomen, Sex Abuse Is A Job Hazard’ (March 2012). 
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servitude, and as such presented in a feminised manner. In a NATO context, male victims 
are only partially visible: mentioned in operational directives and training materials, but not 
in WPS policies and action plans.774 British policy and doctrine do more consistently 
recognise men and boys.775 The 2019 policy on Human Security in Military Operations 
specifically identifies the exclusion of men’s victimisation within the WPS framework as one 
of the rationales for framing policy instead around “human security”.776 On two occasions in 
observed British training, a male participant shared an anecdote of male-on-male rape of 
another soldier. That such military victims are missing in NATO and British CRSV materials, 
hints at discomfort with the feminisation-through-rape of the male soldier. In British and 
NATO contexts, there is moreover no recognition or analysis of CRSV (or other types of 
discrimination or violence) targeting LGBTIQ individuals, reproducing the privileging of the 
heterosexual. 
This signals the needs for a fresh appraisal of arguments that men and boy are invisible 
victims of CRSV, although it would be inferring too much to argue that reproductions of 
feminised vulnerability and innocence are displaced, given that the emphasis is on boy 
victims. CRSV is acting as a means within NATO and the British military to surface both 
female perpetration of violence and male victimisation, disrupting pre-existing gender 
binaries. Yet, CRSV remains a symbolically feminised issue. A British GENAD captured this 
perfectly: 
… for years what’s happened to the sexual gender based violence is that 
it’s gone into the gender bin with everything else [laughs] and it’s on the 
side-lines. And you hand it over to the Gender Advisor who then has 
hankies and cups of tea for people who can come and cry and tell her all 
about it. It’s not discussed as a strategic issue, it’s not discussed as a 
security issue, so it’s not discussed even as an early warning signal. It’s 
not discussed in military man terms. It becomes a woman’s thing.777 
 
774 NCGM and NATO ACT, NATO gender education and training package, 'Pre-deployment training 
lecture 1'. Also: NATO ACO ACT, Bi-St. Dir. 40-1 Rev. 1 (2012).  
775 E.g. United Kingdom National Action Plan on women, peace and security, 2014–2017; UK National 
Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2018-2022 (2018) pp. 2018–22 
776 Human Security in Military Operations, Part 1: Directive. 
777 Interview with NATO Advisor, 25 May 2018. 
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Beyond a focus only on the protection of women and girls, a WPS perspective on conflict 
centres women’s knowledge and potential agency. This is what feminist critique sees as 
particularly threatened by the political focus on victimhood through CRSV. In new visions 
for both regendered and cosmopolitan militaries, building relationships and collaboration 
with local populations is considered an important trait. Duncanson considers it an aspect of 
breaking down “hierarchies between self and Other” in favour of “ideals and practices of 
manliness created through relations of equality, empathy and respect.”778 A GENAD 
described enabling response to CRSV as requiring exactly such a change in institutional 
culture: “… rather than .. creating special initiatives and it becoming a new military task … 
actually what you need to do is change the culture, so it thinks differently …. what we need 
to do is create a sensitive, empathetic armed force …”779 
In NATO’s WPS discourse women are framed as knowledgeable about their security 
environment, not only as victims: 
Local consultations with women can also help address specific 
protection concerns for women and girls, such as vulnerability to sexual 
violence and trafficking in human beings … Such consultation is crucial, 
as measures taken to protect women and girls without consultation 
often result in ineffective or counterproductive effects.780  
NATO’s GENAD guide suggests “liaison and links as early as possible with organisations that 
respond to conflict-related SGBV, women's security, safety and human rights also social, 
political and economic development”.781 Likewise, the British Armed Forces’ Human 
Security in Military Operations embeds CRSV under a subheading “protection through 
participation” and advocates involving women and women’s groups in conflict early 
warning and prevention processes.782 
 
778 Duncanson, ‘Hegemonic Masculinity and the Possibility of Change in Gender Relations’, 242.  
779 Interview with British GENAD, 28 November 2018. 
780 NATO ACO ACT, Bi-St. Dir. 40-1 Rev. 1 (2012), paras 3–6. 
781 NATO ACO, ‘Gender Functional Planning Guide’, pp. C–5. 
782 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 1 (2019), p. 16. 
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But, acknowledgement on paper of women’s potential does not in isolation enable 
engagement, empowerment or collaboration. Moreover, engagement activities can be 
meaningless where not grounded in the necessary knowledge of the context.783 Meaningful 
consultation requires investment in mechanisms for organisation, dialogue, trust-building 
and feedback. Neither NATO nor the British Armed Forces have produced any concrete 
guidance on how to consult with local women’s groups or representatives. Rather, British 
guidance on engaging local civil society refers only to London-based processes, as if civil 
society engagement is not something for the operational level.784 In training, when civil 
society consultation was referred to, participants invariably cited Amnesty International 
and comparable international – not local - organisations. Other scholarship on NATO FETs 
and GENADs testifies to their difficulties in engaging with local women: lack of resources, 
linguistic and cultural barriers, and the danger in which it can put “engaged with” 
individuals and communities.785 GENADS have underscored that in the short deployments 
that characterise military action, there is little scope to build meaningful relationships. For 
NATO, the picture is not universally poor: in Kosovo, there has been some collaboration 
between NATO and local women’s organisations;786 in Afghanistan, less so. The Afghan 
Women’s Network has described since 2015 having almost no direct contact with the staff 
of the NATO Mission and NATO’s Civil Society Panel on WPS has highlighted lack of 
mechanisms for communication with local communities.787 As regards the British Forces, I 
uncovered no examples of military engagement in any operational context with local 
women’s civil society organisations.  
 
783 As demonstrated with regard to some of ISAF’s attempts at engaging Afghan women: Azarbaijani-
Moghaddam, Seeking out their Afghan sisters. 
784 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 2 (2019), pp. 16, 22. 
785 Bastick and Duncanson, ‘Agents of Change?’. See text to Ch. 6 n 422 and Ch. 7 ns 548 - 550 in 
relation to FETs. 
786 J. Rošul-Gajić, ‘Women’s Advocacy in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. Implementation of UNSCR 
1325 on Women, Peace and Security’ (2016) 17 Journal of International Women’s Studies 143. 
787 DCAF/NATO CSAP, Report and recommendations of the Second CSAP Annual Meeting. 
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Breadth and continuum of violence  
A fourth important theme in feminist engagement with CRSV is that CRSV should be 
understood as part of a continuum of violence suffered by women and girls, rooted in 
structural relations of power and domination. Recall that NATO adopted broad terminology 
in relation to CRSV: “conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence”, and that CRSV is 
“part of the wide continuum of violence” became an explicit part of its discourse. In training 
observed, CRSV was presented as including, for example, SEA, female genital mutilation and 
forced marriage, and situating these within gendered patterns of exploitation and violence. 
British Armed Forces’ training and doctrine likewise highlight diverse forms of GBV, 
including bacha bazi, forced marriage, domestic violence, trafficking for sexual exploitation 
and female genital mutilation. In Human Security in Military Operations, CRSV is situated 
alongside SEA and GBV more generally, as well as a variety of other forms of violence, 
harassment and sexism – as the extract of its early warning indicators in Table 3 illustrates.  
Table 3: Extract of British Armed Forces’ military/security "Early Warning Indicators Related to 
Human Rights Violations," Human Security in Military Operations, Part 2, p. 4 
Are members of armed groups/armed forces implicated in sexual exploitation or GBV? …. 
Is CRSV being used as a strategy of warfare, a strategy within armed groups or as a result of a 
breakdown of public order? …. 
Does military training inculcate violence and aggression an equate this with masculinity? Are 
recruits to military training ill-treated, called by derogatory names of a sexual and racist nature? 
Are there frequent relationships between men and women in the same command structure? 
Are forces allowed to visit brothels and use prostitutes or has this been placed out of bounds? 
 
That NATO and British policy, doctrine and operational tools look beyond rape used as a 
“weapon of war” and beyond CRSV to broader forms of gendered violence and insecurity 
should, scholarship suggests, facilitate mechanisms of protection and accountability that 
better address the full range of gendered harms.788 This shift, from a focus on CRSV used 
strategically to a holistic approach to human security, could be read as a progressive 
response to the feminist critique of CRSV discourse presented in Chapter 2. One might 
argue it is so: in Afghanistan, mission planning considered targeting of girls' schools and 
 
788 See Ch. 2, ns 73-79. 
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acid throwing as forms of conflict-related SGBV.789 NATO constructed Family Response 
Units where mostly female police officers support victims of domestic violence, sexual 
abuse, child marriage and other harms.790 In Kosovo, the NATO mission has supported 
shelters for victims of domestic violence.791 But, a NATO GENAD explained that NATO’s 
conflict-related SGBV terminology was “challenging” because it refers to both sexual and 
gender-based violence, and in doing so asks forces to respond to situations “beyond the 
rule of engagement … beyond the use of force, so there’s no use of force procedure in 
place.”792 This shows that there are apparent costs to NATO’s broad approach to conflict-
related SGBV in terms of setting out any clear directions about using force to deter and 
protect.  
This illustrates a point made in Chapter 8 and a key dilemma in framing the role of armed 
forces in relation to CRSV. On one hand – concordant with feminist critique – one would 
want armed forces to understand the dynamics of GBV in a broad sense. On the other, one 
would want armed forces to recognise that a narrower subset of acts of GBV – violations of 
IHL, of peremptory norms, CRSV as torture – oblige all reasonable efforts to prevent them. 
The conundrum is that by using inclusive concepts of GBV, over a narrow focus on CRSV as 
a violation of international law, both NATO and the British Armed Forces have orientated 
themselves closer to human security in a broad sense. In so doing, they have also placed 
CRSV in this legally and strategically indeterminate space, such that missions do not 
recognise any positive obligations. I will return to this dilemma in Chapter 10. 
9.2 Disrupting militaries’ internal gender order  
To be a cosmopolitan military is theorised to require not only external strategic realignment 
but internal transformation. The cosmopolitan soldier would be motivated by humanitarian 
rather than national ideals, committed to the importance of individual human life and 
 
789 Interview with NATO GENAD, 24 June 2016. 
790 NATO Resolute Support, ‘Afghan police provide shelter for domestic crime victims’ (June 2017).  
791 Col. Andreas Pichert, KFOR GENAD, open (to public) session of the annual conference of NCGP, 4 
June 2019. 
792 Interview with NATO GENAD, June 2016. 
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human rights, and willing to risk their life for a person regardless of their country.793 The 
changes in how militaries think about CRSV, how they relate to local organisations, how 
they reflect upon their own behaviour as potential perpetrators, discussed above, could be 
seen as aspects of this transformation. More specifically, Kronsell suggests that one aspect 
of cosmopolitanism would be being a “gender-aware military,” in the sense of having the 
ambition to rethink masculinity within the forces (which Kronsell links to the concept of 
being a more “democratic” military).794 This suggests the importance of inquiring as to 
whether engagement with CRSV prompts militaries to reflect upon their own internal 
gender dynamics. 
Within NATO, there has long been a discourse that women were understood to have 
distinct yet unspecified effects on “readiness and multinational interoperability”795 and 
“improving performance”.796 NATO doctrine claims that female soldiers are: “… often 
perceived as a lesser threat than their male counterparts … able to meet and talk with a 
much broader range of actors, including men, women and children … [have] potential to act 
as role models, inspiring local men, women and girls to improve women’s rights …”797 In 
British doctrine and training, female personnel are systematically presented as a particular 
asset in sexual violence response because local cultures are assumed to problematise male 
soldiers speaking with local women.  
Looking beyond how female personnel are seen, with NATO and the British military the 
WPS Agenda has prompted differing degrees of engagement with the gendered dynamics 
of their own organisations. NATO’s successive WPS Action Plans have included a focus on 
women’s leadership and working conditions within NATO. For example, the 2014 plan 
included managers be appraised on their ability to “promote improved gender balance and 
 
793 Elliott, ‘Cosmopolitan ethics’, pp. 27–28; Kaldor, New and old wars, p. 139; Kronsell, Gender, Sex, 
and the Postnational Defense, chap. 3. 
794 Kronsell, Gender, Sex, and the Postnational Defense, pp. 70, 90. 
795 Office on Women in the NATO Forces Terms of Reference, 10 July 2000, para. 5(b), in Committee 
on Women in the NATO Forces Handbook. 
796 Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related 
resolutions, para. 22. 
797 NATO Standardization Office, Military contribution to peace support (2014), para. 0340; also 
NATO Standardization Office, Counterinsurgency (COIN) (2016) para. 0442. 
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a respectful and safe working environment”.798 As described in Chapter 7, NATO directives 
have come to appropriate feminist language: “… men, women, boys and girls are 
components of a gendered system … notions equated with traditional masculinity and 
femininity that underpin organisations, societies and communities”.799 Still, when it comes 
to implementation of WPS commitments, NATO gender staff have been frank about 
“resistance to change at the organizational as well as individual levels”.800 A NATO Advisor’s 
comments attest to a dichotomy in thinking and messaging around CRSV and organisational 
culture: 
I am not talking about women, I am talking about SGBV … this is not 
some “rights for some women that want something,” feminist, crazy, 
whatever, to be equal, hello! … It’s rape. … if you are normal, normal in 
a most basic way, you will understand it as injustice, as against 
humanity. You will not understand inequality among men and women as 
inhuman ….801 
This conforms to my earlier analysis, that because NATO’s WPS narrative is grounded in 
operational effectiveness and the “relevance” of WPS, it is ill-suited to prompt critical self-
reflection. 
In the British Armed Forces, while the focus of WPS policy (in the form of Human Security in 
Military Operations) is entirely external, in training that I observed older female trainees 
often spoke out about sexual harassment, even rape, within the forces. Male trainees at 
times drew attention to gendered hierarchies of prestige between different types of 
functions (for example, “teeth arms” as compared to the Education and Training Service). 
Training on gender and WPS gave some trainees a safe space and a new vocabulary in 
which they could situate their own and other’s experiences of injustice in their military 
careers. An educator told me that as WPS became established as part of the course she 
delivered, female students became increasingly willing to speak openly about sexual 
 
798 Women, Peace and Security Action Plan, Action 11.1. 
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800 Isaksson, ‘Fighting for Gender Equality’, 62. 
801 Interview with NATO Advisor, 30 May 2018. 
Chapter 9 




harassment in the military.802 Another British trainer saw strong potential for training on 
CRSV to shepherd self-reflection, transformation, and so a change in operations: 
… suddenly you can see pennies dropping when they realise what it 
means to be a man in this society … introducing sexual violence unwraps 
so many different sorts of layers of that onion and gets really quite deep 
inside a soldier’s psyche. … I think one of the positive consequences 
probably will be the fact that there will perhaps be a less masculine 
response on operations …803 
However, my impression is that in more mainstream WPS training, where gender content 
was not delivered by individuals with gender expertise, internal gender issues were less 
likely to surface, and this type of reflective process was less likely to occur. A staff member 
of one of the British training centres in Africa said of its organisational culture:  
… it’s highly biased, shall we say, in terms of gender. It’s very male 
focused. … ingrained in their psyche and the way they behave with 
women … they don’t see where they are in themselves in terms of their 
own gendered or ungendered organisational culture, and they don’t 
connect that with the training that they’re delivering. 804 
The British pre-deployment training that I observed did not touch upon internal gender 
culture; indeed, as described in Chapter 8, the trainers took care to steer clear of “equality 
nonsense” and any “feminist agenda”.805  
Perhaps more tellingly, in both NATO and the British Armed Forces, preventing and 
responding to CRSV are consistently articulated as “in line with” values, rather than 
requiring modification of existing values and organisational structures pertaining to either 
gender relations or combat. Where modification is required, as concerns SEA (as 
established in Chapter 8), there is deep resistance to confronting attitudes toward male 
sexuality. 
 
802 Interview with educator at British military college, 2 August 2018. 
803 Interview with British military trainer, 27 June 2017. 
804 interview civilian advisor to British international training centre, 26 October 2017.  
805 See also text at Ch. 7, n 624. 
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9.3 Locating CRSV within militaries’ strategic culture 
If the internal ideational changes of a cosmopolitan military include challenging military 
masculinities, discussed above, the external ideational change envisioned is a shift from a 
strategic focus on combat to protection. Here we see clearly how a military commitment to 
prevent and respond to CRSV is a testing ground for a military’s cosmopolitan values. 
Running through the commitments made concerning CRSV is the projection of the 
willingness to use force, where necessary, to stop or deter CRSV. Were militaries to use 
force to protect civilians from CRSV, this would challenge the critique – made within the 
feminist analysis of IHL and elsewhere - that militaries prioritise their own lives over all 
others’. It would affirm the possibility of cosmopolitan militaries or human-security forces, 
willing to lay down their lives for the people of foreign lands. To what extent do we see this 
in NATO or the British Armed Forces? 
Protection of civilians vs. force protection 
NATO policy states that militaries might use force to protect civilians.806 Delivering 
protection of civilians from CRSV requires more than policy; one would expect to see 
tactical-level guidance documents being trained on and practised in exercises. The review 
of operational directives and guidance outlined in Chapters 6 and 7, the trainings observed 
and my interviews indicate that neither NATO nor the British Armed Forces have developed 
or are implementing tactics or procedures designed to protect women, men, boys or girls 
from CRSV. As is particularly apparent in the NATO context, there remain still no agreed 
common mechanism even to report CRSV. Peacekeeping doctrine says that forces should 
“expect to inflict and suffer casualties”, but references to protection of civilians invariably 
emphasise finite resources, and managing expectations of what a force “can and cannot 
do”.807 A British trainer explicitly said that CRSV response is predicated on the primacy of 
 
806 Policy for the Protection of Civilians. 
807 NATO Standardization Office, Military contribution to peace support (2014), paras 0115, 0335. See 
also DCDC, Peacekeeping (2011), para. 409; Land Warfare Development Centre, British Army, Human 
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one’s own and one’s force’s safety.808 As described in Chapters 6 and 7, discussions around 
even reporting CRSV showed that many nations see it as presenting security risks to their 
forces that they are unwilling to accept. Several interviewees spoke frankly of the public 
and political unwillingness to sacrifice soldiers to save civilians in other countries:  
… the public reaction to coffins coming back and the public’s desire to 
support missions. So, I think there’s a choice here because if too many, 
if Brits are killed on operations and people say, ‘Well, the protection of 
civilians camp set-up, that’s pretty intractable really, isn’t it? Well, why 
are our people dying for this?’ So, there’s a balance to be struck, they 
can’t have it both ways. 809 
NATO doctrine describes the acceptable risk of casualties to one’s own forces as “a 
measure of the political importance of the campaign, proportional to the threat to the 
member nations or national interests.”810 The measures of political will is manifest in a 
mission’s operational orders and rules of engagement. As the discussion concerning rules of 
engagement in Chapter 8 established, the “default” NATO rules will not permit pre-emptive 
force to prevent CRSV and some NATO forces will not be authorised to use force to protect 
civilians. British rules of engagement are not necessarily so restrictive. Still, interviewees 
explained that CRSV is still not meaningfully incorporated in operational orders or training 
on rules of engagement, and that it is difficult to relate CRSV response to the rules of 
engagement currently used. Unwillingness and indeed inability to respond to CRSV with 
force could be said to be hardwired into NATO and British operations at the 
political/strategic level.  
Risk, raison d’être and reasonableness  
British – and, to a lesser degree, NATO - trainees and interviewees seemed to be personally 
very engaged and motivated by the new attention to WPS and CRSV. For many, training on 
WPS was eye- and mind-opening. Some described feeling reinvigorated, with a new sense 
of purpose and passion. But they frequently voiced experience or expectation of resistance 
 
808 Interview with military trainer, 2 November 2016. 
809 Interview with Army doctrine writer, 26 June 2017. 
810 NATO Standardization Agency, Allied Joint Operations (2007) para. 0135. 
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to action around WPS from colleagues or, in a NATO context, also from nations contributing 
personnel to missions. Two strong and interrelated themes are conceptions of risk to the 
mission and a military’s raison d’être, the latter being closely related to what is perceived as 
reasonable. 
As the “bullet in the head” comment in the preceding chapter shows, occasionally 
discussions around CRSV touch upon a fear that military intervention exacerbates risks to 
victims. A NATO GENAD shared a possibly apocryphal story of an Afghan woman asking for 
help, being taken into a NATO base, then being sent home – and there facing increased risk 
through questioning as to why she had been at the camp.811 In a British gender training, an 
officer with a background working with the UN argued that patrolling to deter CRSV can 
frighten women and put civilians at risk of reprisals from rebels; and that female 
engagement initiatives can put women in greater danger. However, risk to victims is a 
muted undercurrent in NATO or British discourse. More prominent is the idea that 
prevention and response to CRSV risk other aspects of the mission. Most obviously, in a 
NATO context, political risks to the partnership aspects of a mission – understandable given 
the difficulties that bacha bazi allegations presented for relations with Afghan national 
forces, and “green on blue” attacks.812 My fieldwork with the British Armed Forces 
observed a more nuanced discourse around the risks of focusing on CRSV. There were 
frequent references to not “doing nothing” in the face of CRSV but being mindful of the 
overall “effect” the mission wants to achieve. A British Army officer explained, “the 
consequence of getting involved [in CRSV] may be something that is quite damaging in 
terms of reputation, in terms of impartiality, in terms of our ability to do other things.”813 
These articulations of risk slide into ideas about what the role and purpose of the military 
are. Soldiers saw contradictions between being a combat-ready and CRSV-ready force:  
 
811 Interview with NATO GENAD, 7 October 2017. 
812 N. Shortland, E. Nader, H. Sari, M. Palasinski, and C. Hilland, ‘Murder on Maneuver: Exploring 
Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan’ (2019) 45 Armed Forces & Society 368–388. 
813 Interview with Army doctrine writer, 26 June 2017; with similar discussion during the Defence 
Gender Training of Trainers course, Worthy Down Barracks, Hampshire, 25-28 January 2016. 
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… we see ourselves generally as an enabling element, so we’re providing 
the security for the humanitarian actors to go about their business. And 
to provide that level of security means particular military skills in terms 
of an ability to conduct offensive activities or give a sense of a threat to 
would-be adversaries and enemies. And if you’re going to concentrate 
on that, it’s going to be to the detriment potentially of the ‘softly softly’ 
element required potentially of dealing with victims of sexual violence. 
814  
Most of my British interviewees did not argue against engagement with CRSV, but for a 
modest and moderated response within an overarching aim to create a secure environment 
for civilian humanitarian actors. This shines a light on a subtle but important struggle in the 
British context over the appropriateness of military tactical measures to prevent and deter 
CRSV. Prevention and deterrence were, as Chapter 3 highlighted, prominent in early 
political commitments around military engagement. NATO materials have adopted from UN 
peacekeeping sources suggestions of, for example, proactive patrolling. In Britain, however, 
an Army doctrine writer described how negative feedback on the first doctrine note on 
human security led to a refocusing of messaging - away from monitoring, disrupting and 
deterring CRSV, to reporting CRSV “when they’re seeing it” and referring to civilian 
agencies, to “recognise the limits of our ability to actually get involved and make a 
difference”.815 This still requires new training: “just having an awareness it’s a thing, it’s a 
thing you need to be able to see, because otherwise you look right past it”.816 But, it is more 
passive; it is training to report and refer, not prevent and deter. As Chapter 7 described, in 
the new British “human security approach”, references to tactical interventions to prevent 
CRSV - and even to report CRSV - have dropped away, with the protection of civilians 
referred to less as tactical than as “a moral, political, legal, and strategic priority.”817  
Again and again, interviewees conveyed the idea that dealing with CRSV and protecting 
civilians more generally is “niche,” not “the main bit”818 of what NATO or the British Armed 
 
814 Interview with Army doctrine writer, 26 June 2017. 
815 Ibid. 
816 Interview with British GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
817 Ministry of Defence, JSP 1325 Pt 1 (2019), p. 2. 
818 House of Lords Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Written and oral evidence, p. 
450. 
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Forces do or are for. NATO doctrine states, “The ability to fight – to bring violence, or the 
threat of violence, to the operating space – remains NATO’s raison d’être and is critical to 
success wherever there is the possibility of hostile opposition.”819 A Legal Advisor described 
the rationale for NATO’s interest in CRSV as an aspect of “Projecting Stability,”820 - which 
aims to provide a security buffer for NATO nations, rather than global humanitarian 
principles. British interviewees, in discussing CRSV, frequently juxtaposed it with “hard 
military activity.”821 A British Army officer described using a “functionalist approach” when 
training foreign forces to handle victims of CRSV: “This is what you do, so that you can 
move these civilians out as quickly as possible, and get on with your kinetic operation.”822 
That is, the kinetic operation is the key activity, handling CRSV secondary. These comments 
frame armed forces’ essential role, their raison d’être, as combat. But, such informants 
often reflected thoughtfully on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan as that a military cannot 
win peace, but can only create a secure environment in which a political process can take 
place; and made reference to debates between military, humanitarian and development 
actors around the appropriate limits of military action. From this perspective, dealing with 
CRSV is best done by civilian agencies. GENADS, whilst likewise emphasising the importance 
of political processes to resolve conflict, saw a more active role for the military in it, 
referring to newer strategic narratives of “defence engagement” and “political effect”.823 
For them, dealing with CRSV is part of the military’s role. CRSV surfaces a critical and 
complex debate as to proper use of military force, which speaks to willingness to embrace 
human rights in operations, and the forces’ approach to human security narratives. The 
implications of these debates will be considered further in Chapter 11. 
It should also be acknowledged that several British interviewees argued that slow progress 
in implementing WPS commitments was less because of a resistance to the subject matter 
than pressures associated with the massive staff cuts between 2006 and 2015, which were 
 
819 NATO Standardization Office, Allied Joint Doctrine (2010), para. 0217. 
820 Interview with NATO Legal Advisor, 30 May 2018. 
821 Interview with British GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
822 Observation of Officer Tutors' training on gender and WPS, 14 January 2019. 
823 Interviews with British GENADs 26 June 2018 and 3 September 2018.  
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highlighted in the opening of Chapter 7. As has been observed in connection with 
resistance to gender training, it can be “triggered by a feeling of incapacity (due to 
insufficient resources, time, knowledge, and so on) rather than any resistance to the very 
goal of gender equality”.824 But lack of resourcing and resistance to the agenda are 
entwined. A British GENAD described a typical reaction to asking soldiers to consider 
gender and human rights: “All I want to do is teach these people to run and shoot, and now 
you’re telling me I need to do all of this not military stuff in a way I don’t understand with 
time I don’t have”.825  
For individuals involved in promoting WPS in the British military, these challenges 
translated into a sense that asking too much concerning CRSV was unreasonable and 
reflected poorly on one’s credibility. It is important to note this because, as Chapters 5 and 
8 explained, what is reasonable for militaries to do defines under a due diligence obligation 
what they are legally required to do. A British doctrine writer observed: 
So my point about the gender perspective has always been, if you want 
to implement it you have to do it in such a way that it’s not deemed as 
unreasonable by practitioners … because otherwise people will just say 
‘I like your idea and I sympathise, but you’re out of touch with our 
reality on the ground which has many, many competing demands’. And 
those who come across as reasonable and situationally aware tend to be 
heard … 826 
When the CRSV session was introduced to pre-deployment training, trainers were 
apparently reticent to deliver it because it was perceived as “not a very sexy sort of 
subject” and “outside of their comfort zone.”827 One explained frankly that within an 
institutional environment (the Army) in which individuals constantly jockey to align 
themselves with frontline fighting, talking about CRSV was at odds with “people’s 
 
824 E. Lombardo and L. Mergaert, ‘Gender Mainstreaming and Resistance to Gender Training: A 
Framework for Studying Implementation’ (2013) 21 NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender 
Research 296–311 at 307. 
825 Interview with GENAD, 26 June 2018. 
826 Interview with Army doctrine writer, 26 June 2017. 
827 Interview with developer of pre-deployment training, 1 November 2016. 
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preconceived ideas of conflict and soldiering”.828 This illustrates feminist insights into how 
ideals of combat and masculinity are mutually constitutive. A GENAD reflected wryly on 
how championing WPS impacted how she was perceived: “I can see them all groaning when 
I walk up to them. But I don’t know, I’m like a dog without a bone, and I don’t care, I think 
there’s something bigger to be achieved than making friends.”829  
These debates did not come to the fore so strongly in my NATO interviews and 
observations. I believe that this is, first, because CRSV response is in NATO embedded 
within the narrative of gender perspective being a means to increase NATO’s operational 
effectiveness. There is less scope for apparent contradiction between response to CRSV and 
achieving the mission because response to CRSV is instrumentalized as something that 
helps achieve the mission. NATO nations apparently see little contradiction between their 
commitment to gender mainstreaming (an “enabler”) and unwillingness to share reports of 
SEA or CRSV in their operational environment. Secondly, NATO has more consistently 
maintained that it “has a limited role, mandate and capacity” concerning CRSV.830 This is 
more natural for NATO, wherein protection of civilians is a recent concept; compared to the 
British Forces that have UN and EU peacekeeping within their portfolio of operations. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has laid bare the contradictions that run through NATO and the British Armed 
Forces’ engagement with CRSV. Feminist analysis of CRSV and of militaries centres gender 
discourses: how militaries represent women, how they represent themselves. Doing so, one 
can trace an evolution in gendered narratives within both NATO and the British Armed 
Forces’ policy, doctrine and training: disruption of passive, infantilised constructions of 
women; incorporation of the WPS Agenda’s proposition that women have distinctive 
knowledge and potential; recognition of men and boys as possible victims of CRSV. Through 
 
828 Ibid. 
829 Interview with GENAD, 3 September 2018. 
830 NCGM training materials used in Gender Training of Trainers course, Worthy Down Barracks, 
Hampshire, UK, January 2016. 
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engagement with CRSV, shifts in what Cavaghan describes as “gender knowledge”831 do 
appear to be occurring. Engagement with CRSV has likewise, at least in a British context, 
helped to open discussions around sexism with the forces, and GBV within the community.  
However, a focus only on how WPS and CRSV are discussed, on gender discourse, on 
subjectivities or constructions of masculinity and femininity, risks failing to see the 
persistence of combat in military identities and strategy. NATO and (to a lesser extent) the 
British Forces articulate a pro-active commitment to prevention and response to CRSV, but 
the understanding that combat is the raison d’être of militaries and aversion to loss of 
military life to protect civilians remain. Entrenched ideas about the proper scope of 
militaries’ tasks, what is reasonable and appropriate, run deep at institutional and personal 
levels. As others have found, alternative military identities associated with protection- and 
engagement-orientated practices do not successfully displace identifies constructed around 
the hegemony of combat. 
The relationship of CRSV with any transition towards being a force orientated toward 
human security, however, is complex. For some individuals, thinking about CRSV reinforced 
their perception of the inadequacy of military force to create human security. It 
underscored the complexities between social, security and economic factors; that there are 
many forms of violence which militaries are ill-equipped to address. Their response was less 
a sense that the military should transform to be more oriented toward protection of 
civilians, than an assertion of the limits of the appropriate roles of armed forces, in favour 
of space for humanitarian actors and diplomatic initiatives. Nonetheless, as earlier chapters 
demonstrated, at a strategic level engagement with CRSV and WPS more broadly has 
helped bring into existence new policy commitments to human security and protection of 
civilians. These being so recent, it is premature to draw definitive conclusions as to how 
NATO’s Military Guidelines on Conflict-Related SGBV and Protection of Civilians Policy and 
Britain’s policy on Human Security in Military Operations are being and will be implemented 
in operations. These new policies and associated doctrine represent a potential for the 
 
831 Cavaghan, Making Gender Equality Happen. 
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ideational and operational shifts associated with cosmopolitan and human security forces 
to evolve.  
Accepting this project’s uncertainty as to the future of NATO and British military responses 
to CRSV, it nonetheless offers a range of contributions to understandings how international 
law is applied, in particular by militaries, and how militaries’ transformation might be 
moved along. These are explored in the final part of this thesis. 
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PART III: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS  
Chapter 10 
Moving beyond reasonable law for a reasonable war  
If the law does not serve the purpose of human survival and flourishing, 
then the law must be changed. If the law violates our high values, then 
the law must be changed. If the law does not serve the common good, 
then the law must be changed. If public power, under the spurious 
authority of law, causes human suffering, then the law must be 
changed.  
P. Allott, Eutopia: New Philosophy and New Law for a Troubled World 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) p. 232. 
 
This thesis opened by highlighting how feminist legal activism has helped to strengthen and 
expand the recognition of CRSV in international law, and how feminist scholarship has 
highlighted the gender biases implicit in IHL. The inadequacies of IHL from a gender 
perspective form part of the argument for convergence between IHL and IHRL in armed 
conflict or even, as Kaldor and Chinkin propose, framing IHRL as the predominant legal 
regime for understanding war and by which to govern humanitarian intervention.832 High-
level commitments for militaries to prevent and respond to CRSV made since 2005, and in 
particular since 2013, present a concrete issue upon which military engagement with the 
convergence of IHL and IHRL can be explored, in a manner which takes account of the rich 
feminist engagement with CRSV.  
This chapter starts by synthesising this project’s findings, developed through Chapters 6 to 
9. It reflects upon how and why they diverge from comparable work on NATO, and the 
methodological, conceptual, and strategic implications of this. It then returns to how 
international law obligations (under both IHL and IHRL) related to CRSV are understood in 
militaries and draws out the contribution this project makes to understandings of 
 
832  Chinkin and Kaldor, International Law and New Wars, pp. 222, 284. 
Chapter 10 




international law, gender and power, and the processes through which international law is 
created. This leads to reflections upon two aspects of feminist engagement: the pivot 
towards emphasising a continuum of violence within women’s lives, and the focus on the 
Security Council. It draws out the need for new types of feminist engagement with law, war 
and CRSV. 
10.1 Rhetoric and reality in military responses to CRSV 
This project explores a straightforward empirical question, “What initiatives have NATO and 
the British Armed Forces developed to prevent and respond to CRSV?” Its findings are not, 
however, simple to interpret. In drawing my conclusions, I struggle for a fair balance 
between optimism and pessimism, hope and cynicism.  
There are many marks of progress in both NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement 
with CRSV. I am keenly conscious that each is testament to committed work by women and 
men who have championed the WPS Agenda within their institution, faced resistance, 
risked ridicule, often put their careers on the line to work for WPS. A GENAD role, for 
example, is perceived by many as a “pink ghetto” and gender work as a distraction from a 
person’s “real career”.833 Compared to 2006, when this project’s analysis began, huge 
strides have been made in integrating CRSV and WPS within NATO and British Armed Forces 
policy. Moreover, the language used is not only a focus on protection but on gender 
equality and women’s participation and empowerment. Likewise, there have been 
significant achievements in developing institutional structures to work on WPS. These 
include positions with responsibility for WPS, training requirements and training courses 
and – to some extent – operational guidelines and doctrine. NATO has come much further 
than the British Armed Forces in terms of institutionalising GENADs and Gender Focal 
Points throughout their structures, developing and promoting gender training, and in 
developing operating procedures and directives on gender. In the British Armed Forces, 
 
833 Deputy Chair NCGP, open (to public) session of the annual conference of NCGP, 31 May 2016. 
Claire Duncanson and I discussed these challenges in: Bastick and Duncanson, ‘Agents of Change?’. 
Matthew Hurley too explores the difficulties of being a gender advocate within NATO: Hurley, ‘The 
‘genderman’’. 
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progress towards policy and institutionalising GENADs and training has been painfully slow. 
Nevertheless, there has been scope for individuals and units to take initiative to implement 
WPS initiatives, such as training of the Iraqi Peshmerga. Moreover, the British Armed Forces 
have had deeper conversations about the implications of a shift toward WPS and 2019’s 
adoption of a policy on human security could be a foundation for more far-reaching change. 
These are some of the achievements that have been celebrated by others who have studied 
gender and NATO.834 By deploying a wider lens, however, to analyse how WPS texts are 
(not) reflected in mainstream doctrine, how operational directives and rules of engagement 
(do not) address CRSV, how difficult questions are answered in training, this study identifies 
profound disconnects between both NATO and the British Armed Forces’ commitments and 
directives as concerns CRSV and WPS and their implementation. This is a form of listening 
to silences. Some of these gaps are failures of political will: failure to appropriately resource 
GENAD positions and gender training, unwillingness to surrender exclusive disciplinary 
authority over one’s forces as regards SEA, unwillingness to take the step of banning the 
use of prostitutes. Some of these gaps are failures of understanding: failure to recognise 
that work on WPS requires specific knowledge and skills, unwillingness to confront internal 
gender dynamics. Some are deeper conceptual and strategic tensions: instrumentalisation 
of gender mainstreaming for ends such as counter-terrorism and intelligence, not 
necessarily aligned with promoting the vision of WPS. As concerns both NATO and the 
British Armed Forces, it is difficult to find substance in their engagement with CRSV: 
examples of any potential victims protected, victims assisted or referred, reports logged 
and passed to authorities for investigation or evidence collected. Neither NATO nor the 
British Armed Forces have developed the equivalent of the UN’s Analytical Inventory of 
practices to address CRSV.835 Direction as to operational and tactical engagement with CRSV 
remains poorly articulated and in the British context, has become even more diffuse since 
2016.  
 
834 See Chapter 6, n. 374. 
835 See Chapter 3, text at n 128. 
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Certain of the questions that this project raised remain unanswered. Chapter 3 noted 
Henry’s questions to the Norwegian military as to whether victimised communities would 
trust militaries to protect them, how short deployments might mitigate against 
effectiveness, how military involvement might impact civilian humanitarian work. Assisting 
victims of CRSV is a sensitive and difficult task; civilian agencies work with a range of 
guidelines to avoid doing harm.836 How could militaries mitigate the risks that their 
intervention might bring unintended further harm? Is suggesting militaries might, for 
example, provide emergency health care to victims of CRSV a good idea? Neither NATO nor 
the British Armed Forces have engaged in any depth with the challenging practicalities of 
how they would implement the tasks to which they have so visibly committed. As such, we 
just do not know enough to answer these questions. 
Although adopting the language of WPS, militaries continue to see CRSV and WPS as an 
add-on to some other “real mission”. This means that they prioritise their own force 
protection above protecting people from CRSV and prioritise their good relations with 
partners above confronting partners’ commission of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation. 
Understandings of legal obligations in relation to CRSV both affirm and contribute to this: 
prevention and response to CRSV is understood as a dimension of the WPS Agenda, which 
is, in turn, understood as political and values-oriented, but not an articulation of obligations 
under IHL and IHRL.  
These gaps between rhetoric and reality, I argue, are not reasons to dismiss the possibility 
that militaries can meaningfully integrate principles of protection and participation of 
women into their culture and practices. Rather, they suggest the importance of scholarship 
and of advocacy that reaches behind the curtain of policy and public statements to internal 
processes and accountability structures. It speaks to a place for research conducted in 
collaboration with insiders, to permit this. It signals the need for work that engages with 
local communities to trace the impact between what is said in Brussels and London, and 
 
836 E.g. IASC Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action 
(2015); Care and Support of Male Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (2016). 
Chapter 10 




what is done in Mosul, Kabul, Bamako and beyond. Ways to move forward will be discussed 
further through this and the following chapters. 
10.2 CRSV and international law: an unfinished project 
This project is grounded in the belief, which underpins feminist engagement with 
international law, that the content and interpretation of legal rules do matter. One sees this 
belief manifest in the advocacy concerning CRSV described in Chapter 2. In Megan Pearce’s 
words, “The deconstruction and reconstruction of the rules of international law would not 
be a central concern of feminist international lawyers unless the idea of ‘law as powerful’ 
did not underpin the feminist conception of international law”.837  
Feminist legal advocacy and scholarship on CRSV have been rich and powerful, as described 
in Chapter 2. Feminist work on IHL has drawn attention to the limited ways in which women 
are portrayed and protected, and the overarching hierarchies of protection that prioritise 
military over civilian lives. However, feminist legal advocacy in international criminal law 
has faced a sort of backlash, where many have said there has been too much focus on 
CRSV, and even too much focus on international law. The following sets out why, 
conversely, I argue that feminist legal projects concerning CRSV must be recognised as 
incomplete. 
Indeterminacy of obligations to prevent and respond to CRSV 
Chapter 5 explored state responsibilities in relation to prevention and response to CRSV, 
drawing linkages between protection, justice, IHL, IHRL and due diligence. It argued that 
obligations of due diligence to prevent CRSV are located not only in IHRL and the laws of 
occupation, but by virtue of Article 1 of the GCs and peremptory norms. Stronger positive 
obligations arise where forces could be held complicit in abuse by partners and, of course, 
where their own forces are abusing. However, there remains a paucity of interpretation of 
what legal standards related to protection, violence against women and responsibility for 
 
837 Pearce, ‘Gendering the Compliance Agenda’, 441. Discussed also in O’Rourke, Gender Politics in 
Transitional Justice, pp. 25–30. 
Chapter 10 




one’s own forces require in relation to CRSV. The picture this study paints is one of 
immense challenge and complexity when it comes to applying IHRL standards and the 
standard of due diligence to military operations.  
In Thomas Franck’s classic articulation of “legitimacy” in international law, one of the key 
characteristics of a rule’s “compliance pull” is its determinacy, being the clarity and 
transparency of the commitment.838 There are differing theorisations of the relationship 
between a rule’s determinacy and compliance with it, but they share, as Kinsella describes 
it, “a common presumption that compliance and indeterminacy are inversely correlated”.839 
An armed forces’ obligations to prevent and respond to CRSV in overseas operations are 
indeterminate at many levels. Part of this indeterminacy sits with the lack of clarity as to 
what is required by virtue of a due diligence obligation. There has been some, but still little, 
judicial interpretation of what is reasonably expected of a state to prevent violence against 
women. Then, amidst the contestation as to when IHRL applies to armed forces operating 
overseas, neither international organisations, scholars nor – it seems - armed forces’ legal 
advisors have given due attention to what IHRL obligations around women’s and children’s 
rights, human trafficking, violence against women, or protection more generally require. 
This is just one aspect of how, according to Modirzadeh, even legal scholars have confined 
discussion of militaries and IHRL to a handful of specific issues governed by IHL (such as 
detention), allowing the values of IHRL to be shrunk to fit the spaces between 
warfighting.840 
My case studies demonstrate how this indeterminacy surrounding human rights obligations 
and civilian protection is manifested and sustained within militaries. In both NATO and the 
British Armed Forces, policy, doctrine and training address legal norms related to civilian 
protection in a cursory and fragmented manner. Militaries continue to see the law as 
primarily IHL. IHRL is given but passing attention in NATO and British legal manuals, and 
 
838 Franck (1988) cited in K. Raustiala and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations 
and Compliance’ Handbook of International Relations, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002), pp. 
538–58 p. 541. 
839 Kinsella, The Image before the Weapon, p. 189. 
840 Modirzadeh, Dark Sides, pp. 369–70. 
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policy and doctrine offer no guidance as to its interpretation as regards civilian protection. 
Whilst courts have said militaries must apply IHRL, militaries resist, they read down, they 
apply it in small areas of their activities, exceptionally. British sources described how Britain 
draws back from activities, such as detaining perpetrators of crimes, where it perceives a 
risk of being held accountable to IHRL standards. References to CRSV recognise it as a 
violation of the law, but neglect to recognise how the obligations of a state concerning 
grave breaches of the GCs, torture and inhumane treatment apply to sexual violence. The 
last fifteen years’ jurisprudence concerning the applicability of IHRL to militaries operating 
overseas, and the development of due diligence obligations has had little impact upon 
military doctrine and - concerning the protection of civilians - seems to have had little 
impact upon practice. Feminist developments in international jurisprudence concerning 
due diligence and violence against women are not translated into military doctrine, 
training, or thinking.  
Determinacy, gender and power 
I use the word “sustained” to describe the indeterminacy of military obligations as concerns 
CRSV. This indeterminacy can be interpreted as an expression – as regards IHRL an 
extension - of a perennial instability and continued iteration, what Kinsella describes as the 
“productive process,” of IHL, wherein the “porosity” of the law both aids and hinders 
compliance.841 Law in war certainly needs some degree of fluidity to retain the capacity to 
adapt to changing technologies and needs. But here, what one observes concerning the 
law’s requirements in terms of prevention and response to violence against women and 
CRSV in situations of armed conflict is less that the law remains fluid, but that it remains 
largely unimagined. Kinsella’s work emphasises that determinacy is not an intrinsic quality 
of legal norms but “is an outcome of the process of definition, debate, and disagreement 
occurring in an already extant world among preconstituted actors”.842 It is important not 
 
841 Kinsella, The Image before the Weapon, p. 189. Rebecca Sutton’s work on how the principle of 
distinction is practised in contemporary contexts likewise demonstrates that it is contingent, fluid 
and dynamic: Sutton, ‘Enacting the ‘civilian plus’’, 30. 
842 Kinsella, The Image before the Weapon, p. 190. 
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only to observe “indeterminacy” as to what international law requires, but to recognise the 
political nature of the processes that sustain it, and their gendered dimensions.  
Positive obligations to protect civilians in armed conflict and positive obligations to support 
justice for victims appear indeterminate because militaries and their states choose not to 
invest resources in processes to build determinacy: for example, updating manuals, drafting 
directives concerning the application of IHRL, convening meetings to develop shared 
guidelines between nations. Regarding the application of Franck’s concept of a rule’s 
“legitimacy” to sexual violence against women, Catharine MacKinnon said: 
 … as to gender crimes, men behaving in their gendered roles tend to 
reflexively create, obey, and enforce on other men those rules that 
respect and enhance their power as men, according to norms that, 
because they preserve male dominance over women and other men, 
are seen as being in their interest … Rules that serve this end, they will 
obey and see to be legitimate. … Translated in a gendered perspective, 
legitimacy is a flag flown for those conditions under which men think it 
is right to accede to other men's power.843 
The point that MacKinnon makes is that the grant and acceptance of legitimacy is a 
function of power, which in all societies is profoundly gendered as male power. Franck 
argues that compliance with a rule is increased when it accords with the moral values of the 
“community in which the legal system operates”.844 The lack of tactical initiatives to 
protect, the widespread impunity for sexual violence committed in conflict, the “boys will 
be boys” attitude to SEA, can be read as communicating moral values tolerant of pervasive 
violence against women. More profoundly, the sense that protecting civilians is not feasible 
and not what militaries’ (immense) resources are for is an expression of the acceptance of 
civilian death and injury in war that characterises militarism. These values and beliefs are 
not confined to militaries and military organisations. A state military’s strategic priorities 
are determined to variable degrees by its civilian political leaders and bureaucrats alongside 
uniformed leaders, and NATO’s highest leadership is civilian. 
 
843 MacKinnon, ‘Creating International Law’, 116. 
844 Franck (1995) cited in Pearce, ‘Gendering the Compliance Agenda’, 420. 
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We cannot see and understand this without, in Rhonda Copelon’s words, “surfacing 
gender.”845 We must be alert to how gendered power, and other forms of power (such as 
class, ethnicity and race), inform any challenge and failure to challenge the normative 
status quo. Thinking about determinacy as constructed, and indeterminacy as sustained 
through processes at different levels suggests ways in which the law’s determinacy might 
be strengthened and the law progressively developed. I shall come back to this below. 
Changing constructions of women and victims in IHL 
In articulating a vision for ongoing feminist legal activism around IHL and CRSV, one must 
ask if international law continues to construct women in limited ways and to ignore certain 
types of victims. This project has traced how, through the impact of the WPS Agenda, 
women are now presented as knowledgeable about their security environment, as 
potential leaders and peacemakers in military policy, doctrine and training. This can be seen 
as a significant achievement of WPS: women are invoked not only as victims. However, 
where CRSV is considered, this breadth of understanding of women is absent. To the extent 
that armed forces consider strategies for protection from CRSV, they revolve around 
patrolling, imagining potential rapists lurking in the undergrowth. Approaches to 
prevention fail to consider strategies to protect women who might be targeted because 
they are politically active, or control resources, or join the police, for example.  
Male victims of CRSV are now at least partially recognised in military doctrine and training, 
with emphasis on boy victims in NATO and British Armed Forces’ discourse. But, again, 
recognition of male victims has not been translated into military protection strategies 
focused on the particular vulnerabilities of boys and men. Vulnerability connected to actual 
or perceived sexual orientation and gender expression continues to be ignored. These 
problems could be interpreted as demonstrating the need for new legal standards, as some 
have argued.846 In advance or in parallel, the progress that has been made on drawing male 
victims from the shadows demonstrates that less formal processes can shape policies, 
 
845 R. Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law Rape as 
a Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia’ (1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243–66. 
846 See Ch. 2 n 65. 
Chapter 10 




doctrine and operational guidelines in ways that raise awareness of communities whose 
vulnerabilities have been long overlooked. 
The gendered logic of warfare and persistence of gendered hierarchies of 
protection 
A second theme of the feminist critique of IHL discussed in Chapter 2 is how IHL 
(re)produces hierarchies between military and civilian lives that are in tension with norms 
concerning the protection of civilians. The protection needs of women, girls and 
marginalised men are accorded less weight than the needs of the military.847 Kinsella argues 
that among combatants, respect derives from a sense of collective recognition and honour, 
of being a network of equals. She cites David Forsythe to argue that the “civilian is 
frequently viewed as nothing: weak … old … female … there is nothing to command 
respect” and that, because they do not respect civilians, combatants have less reason to 
strive to protect them.848 This has been part of the impetus for feminist (and other) lawyers 
to advocate convergence between IHL and IHRL, theorising that accountability under IHRL 
will demand more caution as regards civilian casualties.  
Although never explicitly stated in doctrine, interviewees consistently told me that any 
action to prevent or respond to CRSV was subject to the security of their own force. Thus, 
IHL’s hierarchy of protecting military over civilian lives is not displaced, even by an express 
mandate to protect civilians. In determining what steps are required by virtue of an 
obligation of due diligence, jurisprudence falls back to notions of what can reasonably be 
expected. The ECtHR has qualified this as not “an impossible or disproportionate burden on 
the authorities.”849 The self-referential nature of this logic was demonstrated by a British 
Legal Advisor who summarised the application of IHRL as: “If you can’t do anything about it 
then you don’t have a legal obligation to do something about it”.850 Within NATO, there 
 
847 See Ch.2, text at n 100. 
848 P. D. P. Forsythe (1977) cited in H. M. Kinsella, ‘The image before the weapon: A genealogy of the 
“civilian” in international law and politics’ Ph.D., University of Minnesota 2004 p. 123.  
849 Case of Osman v. The United Kingdom (Judgment), para. 116. 
850 Interview with Legal Advisor at doctrine writing centre, 12 June 2018. 
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seems no explicit consideration of what IHRL standards require as regards CRSV. Again and 
again in my fieldwork, military personnel invoked forces’ capacities and “reality” as a limit 
on what militaries could be expected to achieve regarding CRSV. However, this research 
demonstrates that whether a force “can” do something about CRSV is a question of its 
operational orders, rules of engagement, resources and training – a cocktail of capability 
and political will. To date, we see that militaries habitually operate under rules of 
engagement that do not permit them to assertively protect civilians, but it should not 
follow that we cannot expect them to. To date, we see that militaries have weak capacity to 
respond to CRSV, but it should not follow that we thus cannot expect them to improve.  
Critical work on IHL, discussed in Chapter 2, argues that IHL works to lend legitimacy to 
customary military practices, rather than restraining them, permitting civilian injury and 
death where militaries consider this proportional to their need.851 This critique has not yet 
been levelled at IHRL; rather, the operation of IHRL in armed conflict has been framed as a 
progressive restraint upon militaries. When one drills down into how due diligence 
obligations are expressed in jurisprudence, however, one can see that discourse around 
human rights obligations in armed conflict is being shaped, unconsciously and explicitly, at 
military but also at political and academic levels, around existing ideas of the possible and 
reasonable in war. The gender biases inherent in standards of “reasonableness” in law have 
been soundly mapped in feminist legal work; the “reasonable person” standard is premised 
on the behaviour of the “reasonable man”.852 These gendered constructions of 
reasonableness are enmeshed with the perceived legitimacy of legal standards, in the 
terms used by Franck and others, discussed above. Where human rights norms would 
appear to demand the impossible as regards issues such as sexual violence, their legitimacy 
will be weak; the content of the law is constrained by acceptance of existing gender order. 
“Surfacing gender” in examining how militaries integrate IHL and IHRL, here focusing on 
 
851 In particular: Jochnick and Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence’; Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and 
warfare’; Stephens, ‘Behaviour in war’; Chinkin and Kaldor, International Law and New Wars. 
852 A summary of this body of work is Edwards, VAW under IHRL, p. 176.  
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CRSV, reveals what is unspoken, unexamined, deprioritised. Surfacing gender shows how 
the interpretation and application of IHRL, like IHL, is being shaped by military priorities. 
What does this mean for hopes of regendered, cosmopolitan militaries? Theorisation of 
cosmopolitan militaries emphasises the importance of them complying with the laws of 
war, framing this as part of both the “ends” and the “means” of a military mission being 
moral.853 Assumed convergence between legal and moral requirements is, of course, 
robustly challenged by the critical work on IHL referred to above. This is part of the 
rationale for Chinkin and Kaldor’s vision of forces willing and able to deliver human security 
setting IHRL as the standard for any humanitarian intervention or defensive operation. They 
propose hybrid military/civilian human security forces be held to IHRL’s higher standards in 
terms of inter alia avoiding civilian casualties, but retaining IHL’s special protections.854 I do 
not reject Chinkin and Kaldor’s agenda: if states and international organisations made an 
explicit commitment that their forces would meet IHRL standards, this might help them to 
better meet the ideals of human security and human rights. But this project shows that 
striving toward IHRL compliance, in and of itself, will not transform how militaries act. 
Jurisprudence demonstrates that not only IHL, but IHRL is being understood through the 
lens of military priorities. Absent transforming militaries’ expectations of what they are for 
and can do, absent transforming notions of a state’s obligations to keep individuals safe, 
the transformative promise of asserting IHRL obligations in armed conflict is frustrated. I 
will return to this issue of strategic transformation in the next chapter. 
10.3 Reassessing feminist engagement with the law  
This chapter has built an argument for seeing feminist work concerning CRSV, IHL and IHRL 
as incompletely realised. The jurisprudential recognition of CRSV as a crime has not trickled 
down to practices of protection or justice. However, this project suggests a tension 
between the work still needed to achieve this, and recent feminist framings of sexual 
violence and WPS strategy. 
 
853 Elliott and Cheeseman, Forces for Good, p. 5. 
854 Chinkin and Kaldor, International Law and New Wars, pp. 230, 282. 
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A continuum of violence, continued inaction 
Chapter 2 explained how the need to understand CRSV as part of a continuum of violence 
and harm that women suffer, not only during conflict but in pre- and post-conflict phases 
and peacetime, has become a prominent theme in feminist work. It is grounded in the 
diverse lived experiences of women and girls experiencing conflict, and recognition of 
structural gender inequality as a root cause of sexual violence. Recognising what O’Rourke 
terms a “web of gender-based harms” has particular importance for transitional justice 
processes, which aim to acknowledge the fullness of victims’ experiences, shape 
reparations in a manner that might address the underlying causes of violence, and lay a 
strong foundation for institutional and legal reform.855 It is also important in offering 
healthcare and other services to victims and communities, where it is problematic to 
privilege victims of CRSV. However, complex understandings of CRSV are “a difficult-to-
manage policy agenda”, because they seem to demand addressing an enormous diversity 
of complex social, political and economic issues.856 This is a dilemma for feminists – scholars 
and activists – working to eradicate GBV in all contexts; but it has particular dimensions in 
the context of international law obligations. 
Chapter 9 outlined how in both NATO and the British Armed Forces discourse on sexual 
violence in conflict has evolved from the language of the UNSCRs to more inclusive 
concepts of GBV and structural violence. NATO’s 2015 operational guidance concerning 
CRSV is directed also at GBV, and NATO discourse in recent years has used feminist 
language around the sexual violence as part of a continuum of violence. The British Armed 
Forces have moved from emphasising rape as a “weapon of war” to asking its soldiers to 
consider GBV more generally, including harassment and sexism. In terms of policy that 
unravels binaries between conflict-related and non-conflict-related violence, recognises 
relationships between sexualised microaggressions within institutions, exploitation within 
workplace relationships and human rights, the British Armed Forces’ early warning 
 
855 O’Rourke, Gender Politics in Transitional Justice, pt. VI; Ní Aoláin, O’Rourke, and Swaine, 
‘Transforming Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Principles and Practice’. 
856 J. Boesten, ‘Of exceptions and continuities: theory and methodology in research on conflict-
related sexual violence’ (2017) 19 International Feminist Journal of Politics 506–19 at 515.  
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indicators (extracted on page 212) could be read as a model. However, any distinct framing 
of CRSV as a violation of IHL, international criminal law or IHRL is lost. The narrative that 
framed sexual violence atop a hierarchy of atrocity has been displaced by narratives that 
place it on the same level as name-calling in military boot camp. Early language around 
CRSV as an international crime has morphed into diffuse language around GBV and 
structural violence – but without militaries having yet taken steps to meet the obligations 
attendant on recognising CRSV as an international crime. In a comparable manner, as 
discussed in Chapter 8, SEA is “read down” in military spaces as a conversation about 
paying for sex with prostitutes – but without militaries having yet taken steps to effectively 
prohibit and punish sexual abuse. 
The “rape as a weapon of war” narrative is, I agree, too blinkered a lens in most policy and 
research contexts. Nonetheless, “exceptionalising” CRSV as a war crime, crime against 
humanity or violation of peremptory norms, for example, invokes the positive obligations of 
bystander states under international law. Militaries simply do not hold comparable 
obligations in relation to structural violence, sexual exploitation and pervasive GBV in 
society. Discussing continuum vs. exceptionalist framings of CRSV, Jelke Boesten likewise 
makes the point that using international law to regulate and punish CRSV, “relies on the 
idea of rape in war as exceptional, as a political act rather than a private act, as an 
intentional and condoned, or even ordered, act of violence”.857 This is no way suggests, as 
some infer, that criminal law is “the utmost solution” to CRSV,858 but that both approaches, 
continuum and exceptionalist, are needed. 
This continuum of violence is important to keep in view, as without a 
gender analysis, one might only address the immediate, not the 
structural, causes of such violence. This does not mean that sexual 
violence in conflict should always be analyzed along a continuum—on 
the contrary, highlighting the exceptional nature of any experience of 
 
857 Ibid., 515-166. 
858 A. B. Houge and K. Lohne, ‘End impunity! Reducing conflict-related sexual violence to a problem 
of law’ (2017) 51 Law & Society Review 755–89 at 756. 
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sexual violence, including those perpetrated in war, is essential to 
criminal accountability. 859 
I contend that, in a corresponding manner, highlighting CRSV as an act distinct from other 
forms of gendered harm associated with conflict and a violation of international law is 
essential to military response. Militaries may need access to guidance from civilian experts 
on the complexities and subtleties of the CRSV they might encounter. Militaries should be 
aware of the structural factors underlying CRSV. But, the continuum of violence narrative, 
emphasising nuances and complexities, risks compounding the indeterminacy of legal 
obligations and detracting from accountability for fulfilling them. For military audiences, it 
is necessary to return to a more explicit emphasis on the exceptional forms that CRSV 
takes, CRSV as standing out from a continuum of structural and physical violence, CRSV as a 
violation of international law, and accordingly, states’ associated obligations. 
In this context of military operations, strategic selection between continuum and 
exceptionalist narratives around CRSV can also be approached by thinking about military 
mandates and capabilities. The rationale for framing CRSV within a continuum of violence is 
inter alia to lay bare its root causes, to repair the harms of war more holistically and to 
shape long term social transformation. But these are not tasks that we would generally ask 
of a military deployment: by its nature, limited in time, without a sophisticated 
understanding of the cultural context, with no mandate or legitimacy to pursue social 
transformation - especially if we aim to constrain the role of military in society rather than 
expand it (this to be discussed in Chapter 11). As one of my interviewees said, “the military 
is the military, and they’re actually only the military, … they’re not running civil affairs or 
human rights … Why are we trying to get soldiers to pretend to be political scientists?”860  
Strategic sites for feminist legal activism 
Intersecting with feminist concerns around focusing so strongly on the issue of CRSV, is 
concern about the risks and unintended consequences of feminist engagement with the 
 
859 Boesten, ‘Of exceptions and continuities’, 517. 
860 Interview civilian advisor to British international training centre, 26 October 2017. 
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Security Council and the Council’s resolutions on CRSV – which are a key normative 
reference point for both NATO and Britain’s engagement with CRSV. It may be that the 
fragmentation of norm creation represented by the WPS Agenda weakens structures that 
include more robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms, such as the human rights 
treaty bodies.861 As O’Rourke underlines, the WPS Agenda offers the “allure, but not the 
effect, of robust legal status”.862 She and Swaine observe that the Security Council has not 
set up accountability mechanisms to monitor WPS implementation (as it has for children 
and armed conflict), nor pressured states to use the UN’s global WPS indictors.863 It should 
not be overlooked, however, that in relation to CRSV the Security Council has set up a 
monitoring and sanctions regime for situations on its agenda.864 This suggests a recognition 
within the Security Council that some aspects of the WPS Agenda – including CRSV – deal 
with matters of binding legal obligation, even if most of the Agenda is not seen as having 
robust legal status. But, in NATO and the British Armed Forces this recognition is absent. 
Their commitments as regard CRSV and the UNSCRs on WPS are framed and treated as 
(merely) political, issues of values, obfuscating that they speak in certain respects to 
binding treaty obligations. Within these military structures, the WPS Agenda catalyses 
action on political terms, but not a re-evaluation of legal obligations, nor engagement with 
processes of accountability under IHL and IHRL.  
Scholarship on feminist WPS strategy has tended to contrast the Security Council as a site 
of normative power with CEDAW or the UN General Assembly. The hegemony of the 
Security Council over CRSV since 2008 has also, I argue, perpetrated a sleight of hand as 
regards the international criminal law regime: states’ responsibilities inter alia under the 
Rome Statute to ensure accountability for CRSV as a war crime, crime against humanity or 
act of genocide. As my study of NATO records, in 2013 the Deputy Supreme Allied 
 
861 F. Ní Aoláin, ‘International law, gender regimes and fragmentation: 1325 and beyond’ in C. M. 
Bailliet (ed.), Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: From the Margins, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 53–68. 
862 O’Rourke, ‘Feminist Strategy in International Law’, 1027.  
863 C. O’Rourke and A. Swaine, ‘CEDAW and the Security Council: Enhancing Women’s Rights in 
Conflict’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 167–99 at 186–87. 
864 Ibid., 189. 
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Commander Europe asserted NATO’s legal responsibility by virtue of state responsibilities 
under the Rome Statute to prevent CRSV and support prosecution. This narrative seemingly 
withered on the vine. Since the high point of feminist international criminal law advocacy at 
the beginning of this century, feminist transnational advocacy has in large part turned from 
IHL, international criminal law and the International Criminal Court to WPS and the Security 
Council. 865 Yet, the immense achievement of establishing recognition of CRSV as a grave 
breach of the GCs, as torture, has not been followed through with sustained advocacy for 
recognition of responsibilities for bystander states and their militaries.  
There is likewise a relative dearth of feminist legal engagement with questions of the 
content and limits of state responsibility for violations of IHL and IHRL in armed conflict, 
including articulation of due diligence. Some of this work has proceeded through CEDAW 
and is evidenced in General Recommendation No. 30. But, as this study shows, state 
militaries do not look to the CEDAW Committee for legal guidance; they primarily look to 
IHL forums, so different work needs to be done to create linkages. Suggestions for feminist 
engagement in other spaces are explored further below. 
10.4 Raising reasonable expectations of militaries 
In this chapter, I am arguing that it is important not to abandon legal advocacy around 
CRSV, and to push this advocacy further in spheres which influence how military operations 
handle it. My findings as regards NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with 
CRSV suggests the importance of, on one hand, strengthening the determinacy of militaries’ 
legal obligations related to CRSV; and, on the other, challenging the prevailing low 
expectations of militaries in relation to preventing and responding to CRSV  (while 
reinforcing the appropriate boundaries between policing and military roles - to be 
discussed further in the following chapter). Processes of implementation of WPS and CRSV 
 
865 Although there has been sustained feminist academic attention upon international criminal law: 
such as the International Feminist Journal of Politics Special Issue and Louise Chappell’s associated 
work: L. Chappell and A. Durbach (eds.), ‘The International Criminal Court: A Site of Gender Justice’ 
(2014) 16 International Feminist Journal of Politics; and E. Dowds, Feminist Engagement with 
International Criminal Law: Norm Transfer, Complementarity, Rape and Consent (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2020). 
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norms within NATO and the British Armed Forces since 2005 suggest three potential 
strategies for feminist legal advocacy: joining communities of practice around human rights 
obligations in armed conflict; engaging with military lawyers; and fostering feminist agents 
of change within militaries. 
Joining communities of practice concerning human rights obligations in armed 
conflict 
The processes through which human rights norms are constructed and through which their 
rules attain clarity and acceptance at domestic and transnational levels have been 
theorised in myriad ways, many of which emphasise persuasion and interaction between 
states.866 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope’s “interactional account” of international law is 
distinctive in emphasising the importance of “communities of practice” in shaping and 
sustaining international law through ongoing, productive processes of engagement. 
Exchange between staff of governments and international organisations, scholars, 
independent experts, NGOs, think tanks and the like constantly maintains or expands 
shared understandings of what international law requires. 867 Through the operation of such 
communities of practice, “norms may become richer and more demanding”.868 This account 
maps well onto the processes of engagement between NATO staff, gender experts, NGOs, 
national representatives and the like which I have observed through this project (and in a 
more sustained way through my IGO work).  
There are many examples of substantive and productive collaboration between military 
lawyers, scholars and ICRC which enunciate and develop thinking about human rights 
 
 
866 Key accounts include: Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’; A. Chayes and A. H. 
Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 1998); Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change’; O. A. Hathaway and H. H. Koh, Foundations of International 
Law and Politics (Foundation Press: Thomson West, 2005); K. Sikkink, T. Risse, and S. C. Ropp, The 
Persistent Power of Human Rights: from Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 
2013).  
867 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, pp. 62–64, 352. 
868 Ibid., at pp. 356-7. 
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obligations and protection of civilians in armed conflict.869 Government lawyers develop 
shared understandings of state and armed forces’ responsibilities in forums such as the 
International Law Commission,870 Red Cross Red Crescent Conferences, and through 
proceedings before the ICJ, the Human Rights Committee, the ECtHR, and other regional 
equivalents. Some feminist lawyers are already making important contributions in these 
spheres, but few when one considers the great wealth of expertise on WPS and CRSV (and 
recalling Bennoune’s observation that scholarship on women, armed conflict and IHL is 
little cited in mainstream IHL references). There is a need for voices there that assert 
militaries’ obligations as concerns CRSV and protection of civilians and that articulate what 
these obligations might mean in practical terms. This would help counter the prevailing 
indeterminacy around obligations to protect civilians, obligations to support prosecution, 
IHRL obligations in armed conflict, due diligence obligations, and the like, and to counter 
the logics of inevitability and irresponsibility that permit militaries to get away with doing 
so little to prevent and respond to CRSV.  
Influencing military lawyers 
This project has mapped profound differences between the understandings of IHRL in 
jurisprudence and the understandings in military doctrine and training and as expressed by 
Legal Advisors. For norms requiring militaries to prevent and respond to CRSV to be 
meaningfully operationalised, there needs to be better vertical translation of these norms 
within militaries. But, militaries’ understandings of the law tend to be constructed in 
relatively closed spheres.871 Gardam observes women’s absence: 
 
869 E.g. the projects that resulted in: Elliott and Cheeseman, Forces for Good; Quenivet and Sari, 
Human Rights and Military Operations; Lubell, Pejic, and Simmons, Guidelines on investigating 
violations of IHL. 
870 Noting the International Law Commission’s work on draft articles on crimes against humanity and 
debate on peremptory norms touch upon these issues, but so far seem to have little developed 
prevention obligations: S. D. Murphy, Fourth report on crimes against humanity (2019); D. Tladi, 
Fourth report on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) (2019). 
871 D. Luban, ‘Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 315–49; Clapham, ‘The Complex Relationship between the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and International Human Rights Law’, para. 3; Modirzadeh, Dark Sides, p. 380. 
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LOAC deals with the conduct of war, and women’s voices are 
particularly muted in the intensely masculine environment that 
surrounds decision-making about such issues as national security and 
the resort to force. Women may have found a provisional place at the 
peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction table, but any 
meaningful participation in debates centering on the strategic and 
tactical issues of the conduct of hostilities continues to elude them.872 
Likewise, this research has observed that while senior military leaders and GENADs actively 
discuss and compare approaches to WPS with outside experts (such as counterparts in the 
UN, practitioners and academics),873 military lawyers are absent from these conversations. 
“Gender expertise” in militaries is framed as dislocated from legal expertise, despite the 
rationale for and content of gender mainstreaming being grounded in IHRL norms. A NATO 
civilian advisor on WPS spoke publicly about the need to educate military Legal Advisors on 
the protection of civilians.874 Likewise, a British Legal Advisor suggested that the complexity 
of the application of IHRL in operations “puts more onus on Governments and on the 
militaries to invest in trying to a) make the law simpler, b) teach people what the law is and 
what their responsibilities are.”875 
This lack of military engagement in WPS processes belies the tendency to portray legal 
communities as globalised; with civil society playing a key role in shaping and cascading 
human rights norms. Institutional barriers act to largely exclude civil society organisations 
from influencing processes of norm internalisation within militaries. As feminists, we should 
look for ways to bring together military lawyers and experts on CEDAW, IHRL more 
generally and WPS, whether this is through engagement in “military spaces” such as the 
International Society for Military Law and the Law of War and its national counterparts, 
 
872 Gardam, ‘Silences in the Rules’. 
873 In a NATO context, this documented also J. Wittwer, ‘Mainstreaming WPS in the Armed Forces: 
The Case of Australia’ and S. von Hlatky, ‘WPS and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’ in S. E. 
Davies, J. True (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security, (Oxford University 
Press, 2019). 
874 Observation of NATO session during public seminar on “Conflict related sexual violence and 
Military Leadership in UN and NATO Operations”, 6 December 2017, Norwegian Defence University 
College, Oslo. 
875 Interview with British doctrine writer, 12 June 2018. 
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through brokers such as ICRC, or by actively inviting military lawyers into feminist 
conversations. In such engagement, we should recognise and promote expertise in ways 
that overcome its tendency to be closed, elite, and exclusive.876 For example, by creating 
space for women and men from communities affected by CRSV to articulate what might 
have been done to better protect them, as well as what they want and need, military 
assumptions and uncertainties about what they should and must reasonably do in terms of 
CRSV might be shifted.  
Fostering feminist agents of change 
Alongside the institutional, personal influencing can be effective. It became apparent 
through my research that although less visible, a handful of women and men within each of 
NATO and the British Armed Forces has played a critical role in driving forward work on 
WPS, acting as “feminist bureaucrats”.877 Some described being influenced and supported 
at critical junctures by feminist scholars and practitioners outside their organisation. My 
research suggests that these feminist bureaucrats were unable to act as “WPS envoys” to 
the closed spaces wherein military interpretations of law are shaped. For example, in the 
British Armed Forces, there seemed to be no direct engagement between military lawyers 
and GENADs on legal norms associated with CRSV or WPS, and integration of WPS issues 
into LOAC training remained a long outstanding task. While NATO GENADS are tasked in 
relation to CRSV (including SEA) they do not necessarily have knowledge or training on 
relevant legal frameworks to empower them to advocate on the basis of legal standards 
with Legal Advisors and others. 
 
876 Discussed in: G. Heathcote, ‘From “people with projects” to “encountering expertise”: a feminist 
reading of Kennedy’s “A World of Struggle”’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 467–76. 
877 The working and influence of such “femocrats” is explored in: G. Caglar, E. Prügl, and S. Zwingel, 
Feminist Strategies in International Governance (Routledge, 2013); R. Eyben and L. Turquet (eds.), 
Feminists in Development Organizations: Change from the Margins (Practical Action Publishing, 
2014). The working of “gender experts” as influencers is considered in: Holvikivi, ‘Gender experts 
and critical friends’; R. Kunz and E. Prügl, ‘Introduction: gender experts and gender expertise’ (2019) 
2 European Journal of Politics and Gender 3–21. Examining feminists in the US military, and their 
relations with feminists outside of it: M. F. Katzenstein, Faithful and fearless: moving feminist protest 
inside the church and military (Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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As feminist lawyers, we might look for ways to support feminist bureaucrats within 
militaries to build a more robust institutional approach to CRSV - albeit in a manner that 
reflects the sensitivity of preventing and responding to CRSV, such that generally the 
appropriate military role will be highly circumscribed. We could be offering mentoring, 
briefings and training on gender and human rights, introducing them to grassroots feminist 
activists, suggesting new ways to think and speak about what militaries could and should 
“reasonably be expected” to do concerning CRSV - and human security more broadly.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has drawn together two of the three themes running through this study: the 
legacy of feminist legal strategies concerning CRSV, and how militaries understand their 
legal obligations in relation to CRSV. These are considered against the backdrop of rather 
widespread rejection of CRSV as a distinct focus for feminist advocacy. My research leads 
me to argue that feminist work around CRSV as a violation of international law remains 
manifestly unfinished. Military efforts to protect communities from sexual violence remain 
seen as a corollary to, if not distraction from, the real military mission. There is inadequate 
recognition within militaries of CRSV as a violation of international law that they may be 
obliged to prevent, and inadequate clarity within broader legal discourse as to what any 
such obligations require. Within this partial and unsatisfactory military recognition of CRSV, 
feminist scholarship is playing an uncomfortable role. Narratives that blur the lines 
between CRSV as an international crime and “everyday” violence seem to make it less likely 
militaries acknowledge positive obligations. For IHL and IHRL standards to “do their work” 
we must use them as a language against which to demand accountability. 
Some feminists working around IHL and international criminal law have invested hope that 
if militaries are additionally held accountable to IHRL standards in conflict, some of the 
deeply problematic connections between IHL and military priorities might be mitigated. 
However, viewed through the lens of CRSV, the reliance of IHRL upon notions of reasonable 
expectations suggests that IHRL is tainted by the same stain as IHL: of being interpreted in a 
manner that legitimises the military’s own raison d’être and practices. If IHRL is to act as the 
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regulatory framework for Kaldor’s “new type of hero with a mandate to help humanity”878 
and other regendered, cosmopolitan models, what we expect of militaries and what they 
expect of themselves needs to radically improve. The following chapter focus on this wider 




878 Beebe and Kaldor, The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon (Kindle location 1854).  
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Moving to  ̶  and beyond  ̶  cosmopolitan militaries 
Military actors like NATO subsequently need to begin addressing SGBV 
as they do traditional modern security threats such as terrorism, piracy, 
weapons proliferation, or cyber warfare. 
C. Isaksson, ‘Fighting for Gender Equality: Why Security Sector Actors 
Must Combat Sexual and Gender-Based Violence’ (2014) 38 Fletcher F. 
World Aff. 49 at 50. 
 
Alongside its focus on feminist engagements with international law concerning CRSV, this 
project brings into dialogue international law scholarship and critical scholarship concerning 
militaries and militarism. Critical scholarship on IHL problematises how the laws of war are 
understood in ways that legitimate hierarchies of lives and hierarchies of protection. This is 
just one aspect of the contradiction of relying upon militaries to protect women (and 
others) in conflict when militaries are so deeply implicated in the practices of violence, 
colonialism, exploitation and patriarchy that are root causes of conflict. Still, feminist 
scholarship around “regendering” theorises ways by which relations of dominance within 
and by militaries might be transformed, and visions of cosmopolitan militaries imagine a 
new strategic focus on human security. Both models imagine militaries orientated toward 
protection of and collaboration with local populations, rather than orientated to combat.  
This chapter reflects upon how this project’s findings concerning NATO and the British 
Armed Forces’ engagement with CRSV speak to hopes of regendering of militaries and 
militaries’ transformation toward cosmopolitanism. It emphasizes how understandings of 
military roles and legal obligations are mutually constitutive. On this basis, it considers the 
risks of endorsing militaries’ narratives around WPS and protection of civilians and 
advocates a decentring of militaries in feminist discourse around international intervention. 
It nonetheless continues to argue for constructive, critical engagement with militaries. 
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11.1 The pervasiveness of combat in militaries’ strategic culture 
and its relationship with the law 
Chapter 9 explored how NATO and the British Armed Forces’ engagement with the issue of 
CRSV informed theorisations of militaries better suited to protect communities, to 
cooperate with local communities and to promote human security. As the demands of 
military operations have changed, including for peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and 
stabilisation tasks, new qualities have come to be expected of soldiers - such as 
“empathetic cooperation” with local populations.879 Duncanson and Woodward see in 
these shifts possibilities for disrupting the problematic gender binaries that are constitutive 
of hegemonic masculinity and wider practices of war, and as such theorise them as 
“regendering”.880 This includes disruption of binaries that construct women as 
weak/victims, and men as fighters/protectors, as well as hierarchies of “us” and “them” 
between militaries and local women and men, saviours and perpetrators. This work, coming 
from feminist security studies, dovetails with a body of work theorising “cosmopolitan 
militaries” or “human security-oriented forces,” which likewise identifies the potential for 
ideational change within militaries toward a human security orientation.881 In these new 
models, militaries would see peacekeeping and law enforcement tasks as “core 
business”.882 That militaries value their own lives over the lives of civilians – critiqued also in 
feminist work on IHL – is emblematic of the changes seen as needed.883 Elliott and 
Cheeseman imagine that for a cosmopolitan military: “Mission success is measured in lives 
saved and individuals protected rather than enemies killed or ‘force protection’, the 
minimisation of casualties among one’s own troops.”884  
 
879 See Ch 3, ns 187-188. 
880 Duncanson and Woodward, ‘Regendering the military’.  
881 Elliott and Cheeseman, Forces for Good; Beebe and Kaldor, The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon; 
Kaldor, New and old wars.  
882 Elliott, ‘Cosmopolitan ethics’, p. 27. 
883 Elliott and Cheeseman, Forces for Good; Kaldor, New and old wars. Shaw argues that willingness 
to incur casualties is a critical question for the broader utility and ethics of military force: M. Shaw, 
The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq (Polity, 2005). 
884 Elliott and Cheeseman, Cosmopolitan theory, militaries and the deployment of force, p. 42. 
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This project’s inquiry into CRSV demonstrates but modest progress toward these visions of 
transformation. It did observe that WPS discourse within NATO and the British Armed 
Forces brought acknowledgement of women’s potential for leadership and influence, 
alongside their potential vulnerability to sexual violence. It brought acknowledgement and 
even direction to consult with local women and men about their security concerns. It 
brought acknowledgement that men and boys, as well as women and girls, might be victims 
of sexual violence, disrupting gender binaries of victimhood. However, when one delved 
below the level of political statement, policy and directives, practices of consultation and 
cooperation with local women and communities more broadly remain scant and (as 
demonstrated by the difficulties experienced by FETs in Afghanistan) often unsuccessful. 
SEA remains only weakly prohibited or prevented, sustaining racialized binaries around who 
is seen as a perpetrator of CRSV. Practices of protection of local women and communities 
remained undeveloped and even resisted. Commitments to CRSV have not yet altered the 
perceived political unwillingness for militaries to risk their own forces to protect foreign 
civilians. I find little to counter Elliott’s analysis of NATO forces, that “neither militaries nor 
governments are yet prepared to sacrifice their soldiers’ lives to protect strangers. War and 
the deployment of force are increasingly risk-averse.”885 As regards the British Army, I come 
to a similar conclusion as Duncanson (and others): that it resists replacement of the 
hegemonic ideal of the infantry combat soldier with “softer” skills associated with the 
practices of peace operations and response to CRSV.886 The objections framed around the 
risks to a mission and the reasonableness of what they could do as concerns CRSV (evident 
primarily in my fieldwork with the British Armed Forces) illustrates the tensions in military 
culture between the primacy of high-intensity war-fighting and contemporary military tasks 
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requiring more restrained use of force, collaboration with humanitarian agencies and 
community engagement.887 Militaries conceive combat as their raison d’être, and the call to 
prevent and respond to CRSV has challenged but not displaced this. 
Scrutinising CRSV through the lens of military understandings of the law reveals that 
contest over military “mandate” and raison d’être is located not only in discourses of 
military identity and strategy but in discourses of legal authority and legal culpability. 
Inability to protect civilians is framed not only in strategic and tactical terms but in terms of 
what is (not) allowed by rules of engagement. A British informant feared that because rules 
of engagement authorise the use of force only where proportionate and necessary to 
prevent imminent loss of life or limb, acting to prevent other forms of CRSV might expose a 
soldier to prosecution. Militaries continue to understand their legal obligations almost 
exclusively in terms of IHL, rather than IHRL. The manner in which IHL’s ethos prioritises the 
demands of “military necessity” leads militaries to subjugate action associated with CRSV to 
the demands of the mission and to weight military over civilian lives. It leads them to see 
preventing human rights abuses as outside their scope. Looking at law allows one to better 
understand how deeply ingrained the legitimisation of combat practices is, and how 
comparatively new practices oriented towards human security are.  
In considering the legal frameworks under which cosmopolitan forces might operate, this 
project problematises a particular aspect of formulations of new types of human security-
promoting forces. Kaldor and colleagues suggest military and civilian personnel working in 
an integrated manner, such that the force retains capabilities for combat, while 
predominantly doing more policing-type tasks. The military component is seen as essential 
to create and protect space where humanitarian work and political processes can occur, as 
well as offer protection to the population.888 At times human security forces might need to 
capture or defeat an enemy, although ideally arresting rather than killing them. Compared 
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to current forces, they may in fact require greater readiness to use force to protect 
people.889 Chinkin and Kaldor consider a model that is roughly two-thirds military, one-third 
civilian. 890 As emphasised, a critical part of these visions of human security forces is that 
they work under a predominantly IHRL framework, with a human rights mindset. How could 
this be achieved? This is little considered in either cosmopolitan or human security force 
literature, although Kaldor and Beebe propose that hybrid military/civilian forces can be 
created through joint military-civilian training and exercises that emphasise human dignity 
and respect for local populations.891 This study suggests that such proposals vastly 
underestimate the difficulty of the change in military culture and practices that would be 
required for militaries to work predominately to human rights standards. It illuminates the 
discord between existing military-strategic culture and identity, resolutely shaped around 
capacities for combat, and an institutional culture focused upon law enforcement and 
collaboration with communities. To achieve militaries that are willing and able to 
operationalise a human-rights led approach to operations will require sustained and far-
reaching processes of institutional transformation, that would no doubt face strong 
resistance.  
11.2 Reassessing feminist engagement with militaries 
Chapter 10 considered feminist strategy concerning legal advocacy around CRSV. This 
chapter considers how this project’s findings speak to debates within feminist scholarship 
and activism around the risks and rewards of engaging with militaries and military 
organisations.  
(Inevitable) risks 
In broad terms, this project adds some validation to the long-held feminist scepticism 
toward militaries as a force for good. WPS policies have catalysed attention to gender in 
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operations, but so far largely absorbing it into existing military practice, rather than 
transforming the nature of military force. 
Lack of implementation of gender equality commitments is a familiar theme in feminist 
work. However, feminist scholarship around gender and the ethics of war problematises in 
distinct ways allowing militaries to claim that they protect women when they do not. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, it argues that tropes of the Just Warrior (the soldier protecting the 
woman from sexual violence) and Beautiful Soul (the female victim) provide a justificatory 
logic for waging war and massive military spending.892 More specifically, Peet and Sjoberg 
argue that narratives around civilian protection paint women (and various feminised 
“others”) as ideal targets during war, the ideal of civilian immunity itself becoming an 
“active cause of the harming of women in war and conflict”.893 Cockburn, Otto, Engle and 
others have written about the risks of lending feminist/gender legitimacy to the hegemonic 
power of the UN Security Council.894 One might present a corresponding argument as 
regards feminist engagement with NATO and with state militaries, and the risk that feminist 
concepts and advocacy are co-opted in the service of militarism. Some argue for instead 
remaining “at arm’s length from hegemonic power” so to maintain the ideological integrity 
of resistance and critique from the outside.895 This has become part of a vigorous and 
sometimes divisive debate amongst feminist scholars and activists around the 
achievements of the WPS Agenda, and the paradoxes, perils and possibilities of critical 
feminist engagement.896  
These debates often frame engagement within institutions of power, I contend, in 
insufficiently nuanced terms. The UNSCRs on sexual violence in conflict were the result of 
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Chapter 11 




feminist groups lobbying the Council to address sexual violence in the context of conflict in 
a more focused way.897 To read these resolutions as reducing women to victims itself 
obliviates this agency. Ongoing engagement with Security Council members by advocates 
such as the NGO Working Group on WPS is far from silent on the need for disarmament, 
inclusive decision making, justice and accountability. Feminists addressing NATO have used 
their voices to call out the shortcomings of NATO’s engagement in their countries and 
faulty implementation of WPS. I agree, there are risks of strategic error.898 Nonetheless, the 
risks demonstrate the need not to disengage, but to engage in more savvy and 
collaborative ways, in dialogue not only with the “WPS community” but a much broader 
community of advocates for peace, good governance and human rights.  
Moreover, this project demonstrates how institutional capture of feminist ideas within 
NATO and militaries is not complete nor is it necessarily irrevocable. As the foregoing 
chapters have argued, there are marks of progress in both NATO and the British Armed 
Forces’ engagement with CRSV.  NATO’s policy framework has positively evolved in recent 
years from framing gender mainstreaming as a tool to make NATO operations more 
effective – largely a co-option of feminist ideas - to a commitment to gender equality and 
forward movement on SEA. Likewise, there has been slow but positive progress within the 
British Armed Forces wherein WPS has paved the way for policy on human security, and in 
the minds of many prompted reflections about gender inequality, at home and in places 
where they deploy.  
Feminist work on militaries and militarism should, I contend, be attentive to lessons of 
feminist change within international development organisations and other bureaucracies: 
that change can happen incrementally, and through a combination of insider and outsider 
strategies.899 As such, I argue for constructive, if vigilant, feminist engagement with 
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militaries and with military organisations. The following section will propose three 
principles which might guide critical efforts to reorient militaries from combat to a feminist 
vision of human security, to progress toward visions of regendered, cosmopolitan 
militaries. Such engagement, however, should not be commenced without first questioning 
assumptions about why and when militaries are needed, which I discuss below.  
Advocating alternatives to military protection 
Returning to Cockburn and Hubic, who proposed “regendered” militaries: they reported 
that Bosnian women wanted the NATO-led mission to be friendlier, more respectful of the 
local population and more accessible, but simultaneously “pursue, even more energetically, 
its military work of pacification, demilitarisation, weapons collection, landmine clearance 
and protection … arrest of war criminals.” 900 It was on this basis that they articulated the 
need for a new kind of soldier, and other feminist scholars took up the concept, theorising 
it further. But, security governance scholarship examining Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
this period critiques the “militarisation of law enforcement” that occurred in the NATO 
mission, wherein militaries were used to perform a wide range of policing tasks (in part to 
ward off soldiers’ boredom). Using police for crowd and riot control, arrest of suspected 
war criminals, to fight organized crime gangs and for counter-terrorism has, it is argued, 
become “a major feature of post-cold war international security,” including 
peacekeeping.901 
There are normative reasons why a clear distinction should be maintained between the 
roles of police forces – civilian, subject to civilian control, trained to apply minimum force - 
and the roles of militaries. As this research illustrates, militaries bring not only culture and 
ethos but legal norms referent to conduct of hostilities and are widely observed to be ill-
suited in training and experience for law enforcement. As such, in a conflict-affected 
context, while militaries should be used to ensure the necessary security for peacebuilding 
and reconstruction, as soon as possible law enforcement should be taken over by police. 
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Militaries tend to agree: “Afraid of ‘mission creep’, military forces often exclude law 
enforcement when interpreting mandates.” 902 The “security gaps” which result might 
include, one imagines, prevention and response to CRSV. The security governance critique 
of using militaries for law enforcement is part of a broader call for approaches to 
peacekeeping and other forms of international intervention to be more dominantly policing 
orientated.903 
Considering this, one might suggest that the women with whom Cockburn and Hubic spoke 
in Bosnia were implicitly asking not for a new kind of military, but stronger policing capacity 
in the mission. Feminist engagement with militaries (often focused on their role in 
peacekeeping, stabilisation or counterinsurgency) generally argues that militaries should 
change to be less combat-oriented and more orientated towards the diverse security needs 
of local communities. But, a security governance perspective questions why one would ask 
militaries, rather than police, to do essentially civilian law enforcement roles. Cheeseman 
and Elliot’s suggestions that militaries do “global policing rather than war-fighting”904 and 
Kaldor and colleagues’ suggestions of blended civilian/military intervention forces likewise 
fail to ground their proposals in analysis of appropriate lines between police and military 
roles in international interventions.  
International policing has been a neglected dimension in advocacy and policy concerning 
CRSV and WPS. To illustrate: the influential UN “Global Study on the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 1325” presents a robust critique of militarism; nonetheless, its 
chapter on peacekeeping has five pages on military peacekeeping and armed forces and 
just one page on policing in peacekeeping.905 Likewise, there is scant feminist analysis of the 
deployment of gendarmes (paramilitary police) as an alternative to military units. There is 
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an evidence base on policing-led approaches to protection that could be brought more 
clearly into both policy and scholarly narratives. Charlotte Anderholt’s work on Formed 
Police Units (FPUs) in peacekeeping questions the accepted wisdom that soldiers are 
needed for protection tasks. She underscores that FPUs have this capacity, are already 
protecting UN personnel and conducting patrols, high-risk arrests and hostage negotiations. 
In doing so, in contrast to militaries, FPUs maintain “a strict code of respect for human 
rights law”.906 Jennifer Klot likewise argues for greater attention to how civilian police and 
FPUs protect women in peacekeeping, acknowledging feminists’ “moral and ethical 
dilemma regarding the use of military force”.907 Specialised police teams could also play a 
larger role in CRSV prevention and response, as illustrated by the successful deployment of 
a Norwegian team of police specialised in SGBV to the UN mission in Haiti.908 Further 
consideration should also be given to unarmed civilian protection. There is evidence from 
South Sudan that it can be effective in preventing sexual violence and harassment.909 In 
thinking through what militaries should and shouldn’t be used for, a security sector 
governance lens can help to overcome binary conceptualisations of pessimism/optimism, 
idealism/pragmatism. 
11.3 Reshaping militaries 
The search for nonviolent alternatives, even amidst conflict, is central to the feminist anti-
war tradition.910 As feminists, we might seek to “demilitarise” discourse around the 
protection of civilians, including protection from CRSV. As discussed above, one strategy is 
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exploring credible alternatives to relying upon armed forces, such as FPUs, as part of more 
broadly advancing the primacy of civilian approaches to international intervention.  
I do appreciate that working directly with militaries is anathema to some. I am not 
suggesting that continuing to challenge militarism and militaries is not vital parallel feminist 
work. Meaningful engagement with militaries on law, CRSV and protection, nonetheless, 
offers potential to change minds and actions that cannot be achieved only by, in 
Charlesworth’s words, “talking to ourselves”.911 As in the previous chapter, I suggest three 
potential strategies for feminist advocacy: here, with militaries and military organisations 
such as NATO, the military staff of the UN Department of Peace Operations, and 
equivalents in the EU and AU. 
Seek to influence overarching military strategy 
One of the risks of feminist engagement with militaries is that by celebrating the small wins 
we see (for example, the introduction of gender training), we become complicit in 
rhetorical WPS performances that mask lack of meaningful transformation. We need 
deeper thinking around how institutions might shift from the traditional combat mindset to 
the skills and values associated with promoting human rights. This project is testament to 
how legal frameworks and high-level strategy – national security strategies and defence 
reviews, high-level defence doctrine et cetera – shape a strategic environment that either 
constrains or enables progress on CRSV and WPS. This is thus an endorsement of the type 
of feminist activism that dares to infiltrate mainstream security debate and policymaking 
and can articulate its goals in those terms.  
Make space for engagement between militaries and local communities  
Breaking down hierarchies of “us” and “them” and enabling “empathetic cooperation” with 
local populations have been identified as having the potential to transform the way 
militaries work and think and disrupt practices of hegemonic masculinity.912 To foster values 
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and practices of respect and empathy between militaries and the communities they deploy 
to, one of the most important things that feminist scholars and advocates can do is support 
processes of meaningful and consequential engagement. Experiences in supporting 
consultation processes around WPS NAPs and peace agreements and in ensuring safety for 
human rights defenders913 could be applied in helping militaries and communities come 
together.  
Centre the voices of communities affected by conflict 
Feminist ethics of engagement imply prioritising the voices of those most affected by 
military actions. The WPS Agenda has magnified this idea by emphasising women’s full and 
meaningful participation. O’Rourke articulates its ideal as “participation as deliberation,” 
wherein “Through involvement and debate with those most affected by conflict and 
insecurity, resultant decision-making will arrive at thoughtful and reflective outcomes that 
will respect the manifold and evolving concerns of women.”914 This means creating spaces 
for involvement and debate between representatives of marginalised communities and 
invisible victims of conflict, women and men, and military and civilian leaders. This means 
also, as scholars, seeking out, listening to, and amplifying diverse local perspectives. This is 
not to assert any unity or “purity” of local narratives, nor to ignore the marginalisation that 
these, too, can perpetrate.915 We should seek women and men with a connection to 
grassroots communities, and be mindful of the vested interests of elites. This is a 
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prerequisite for activism and ultimately policy and practice grounded in context and 
complexity, that empowers other women rather than speaks for them.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has drawn out the connections between how militaries understand their 
obligations under international law and the centrality of combat in their self-understanding 
and strategy. In so doing, it adds new dimensions to critical scholarship concerning 
militaries and militarism. Where Chapter 10 reflected upon feminist engagement with CRSV 
and international law, this chapter focused on feminist engagements with militaries and 
military organisations.  
Introducing WPS into NATO and the British Armed Forces has elevated ideas about women, 
both in the military and in communities where they deploy. Attention to CRSV has helped 
them to contextualise their activities with reference to human security, and to recognise 
the vulnerability of men as well as women. Focus on WPS and CRSV has contributed to a 
recognition in policy of the values of gender equality, human rights and human security, 
and steps to operationalise these principles. While these developments have disrupted 
militaries’ hegemonic masculinities and strategic culture of combat in but limited ways, 
they demonstrate capacity for change. Such advances should - with due vigilance - be 
amplified and encouraged, rather than dismissed. To this end, I proposed three strategies 
by which feminist scholars and activists might deepen their engagement in changing 
militaries, whilst advocating attention to the appropriate limits of military roles.  
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As feminist antimilitarist women, do we need to step up more boldly 
and make ourselves heard raising tough questions about the part played 
by gender power relations in militarism, militarisation, foreign and 
military policy and war fighting, including the way an institution like 
NATO functions? Should we grasp the political responsibilities that come 
with ‘participation’ in ‘women, peace and security’? If so, how and 
where? 
Cockburn, ‘Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO, Resolution 1325, and 
Feminist Responses’, 56. 
 
This thesis began and ends with thinking about feminist engagement with militaries. For 
me, the project has been a journey toward understanding how best to approach feminist 
practice, seeking to navigate by constellations of international law and feminist security 
studies. If theory is the sky above, our landscape is the individuals and communities who 
have suffered, do suffer, or may suffer the pains of sexual violence during conflict. This is 
not a study that relates their experiences, but it holds their voices in mind. It is grounded in 
a hope that international law holds power to strengthen their protection, and to grant the 
consolations of justice. 
This final chapter recaps the questions that shaped this research, its key findings and 
theoretical contribution, and its overarching recommendations. 
12.1 Feminist challenges to the international legal and military 
order 
CRSV has been both a galvanising and divisive issue for feminist advocacy and scholarship. 
It has been used to demonstrate how existing structures of legal and political action and 
accountability neglect the experiences of women and girls. This meshes with a broader 
critical scholarship on IHL, which demonstrates how IHL is predicated upon military rather 






hierarchies of protection, within which CRSV and protection of civilians more generally are 
neglected. At the same time, feminists have problematised the focus on CRSV as a limited 
and limiting representation of the harms that women experience in and from war. A focus 
on CRSV is frequently understood as problematic not only in denying women agency but in 
reproducing tropes of protection and victimisation that provide a justificatory logic for 
waging war and massive military spending.  
A range of strategies has been articulated to address these dilemmas. Feminist legal 
scholars have argued for justice and reparations that recognise the nuance and complexity 
of sexual violence and other harms in conflict. Feminist security scholars have examined 
new forms of military masculinities and developed a narrative of how militaries might be 
“regendered” such that binary relationships of dominance are transformed into 
relationships of empathy, respect, and collaboration. Visions of cosmopolitan militaries and 
hybrid military/civilian human security forces have likewise emphasised less martial modes 
of international intervention. Chinkin and Kaldor’s examination of how international law 
can better regulate political violence argues that IHRL should be the legal framework for 
humanitarian interventions as well as actions predicated upon a right of self-defence.916 
This builds upon the convergence of IHL and IHRL obligations in armed conflict over the last 
fifteen years. 
Behind and amidst these debates, from 2005 the UN Security Council has developed 
language around peace operations preventing sexual violence against civilians. A series of 
resolutions, the first adopted in 2008, is specifically directed at sexual violence in conflict. In 
2013, CRSV was propelled into the international limelight through Britain’s PSVI, with a 
procession of political and military leaders promising to do more to prevent CRSV and 
overcome impunity. Since, NATO and several state militaries have adopted commitments 
and measures toward prevention and response, both as regards CRSV by third parties and 
the potential for SEA committed by their own forces. This study sought to trace how these 
commitments were fortified by recognition of obligations under IHL and IHRL, and how 
 






militaries’ institutional and strategic cultures enabled or prevented action on the 
commitments. 
12.2 Military responses to CRSV  
I adopted NATO and the British Armed Forces as my case studies for this project based on 
indications that there was in each an active engagement with CRSV, and because each 
exerts a strong international influence. NATO acts as a “teaching machine” for its members 
and partners.917 Britain has been a global leader on the issue of CRSV and is highly 
influential in the Security Council around the protection of civilians and WPS.918 Inevitably, a 
two-case model limits this research’s focus. For example, a comparison of approaches 
between state militaries might allow for greater comparison of factors driving and inhibiting 
change; different findings might be expected in researching states more prominently 
aligned to UN peacekeeping. However, I am confident that the substantive findings of this 
research, in terms of approaches to the protection of civilians, IHL and IHRL and the raison 
d’être of militaries, have longevity and relevance beyond its institutional boundaries. 
Chapters 6 and 7 traced how NATO and the British Armed Forces have engaged with the 
issue of CRSV since 2005, drawing out key milestones, progress and constraints. In both 
NATO and the British Armed Forces there remain shortcomings in terms of essential 
organisational structures to prevent and respond to CRSV. WPS and CRSV are weakly 
integrated in doctrine. There is a lack of tactical guidance to prevent and respond to CRSV. 
There are no proper mechanisms by which to report CRSV. There is inadequate support to 
and resourcing of GENADs, and Legal Advisors lack detailed understanding of the 
international law dimensions of CRSV and WPS. Perhaps most importantly, operational 
directives and rules of engagement are not sufficiently orientated to CRSV prevention and 
response.  
The nature of the constraints in NATO and the British Forces are different. NATO has made 
greater progress on the institutionalisation of training, expertise and guidelines concerning 
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gender mainstreaming, but has relied upon narratives of this increasing NATO’s 
“operational effectiveness”. Gender mainstreaming is framed to make NATO more effective 
at what NATO already does – for example, contributing to NATO’s intelligence-gathering or 
own force protection. Unless NATO action is strongly aligned toward gender equality goals 
– the protection and empowerment of women and girls – this divorces the process of 
gender mainstreaming from the aim of gender equality. This dislocation is demonstrated by 
NATO members refusing to implement WPS commitments where they perceive them as 
compromising a mission’s goals, such as reporting allegations of CRSV against partner 
nations. Unwillingness to transform in the manner that WPS commitments demand is 
demonstrated by the long inaction on SEA. Yet, in just the last few years NATO has adopted 
new policy commitments to the protection of civilians, gender equality and SEA, and begun 
to use the language of human security. These developments might open space for a deeper 
examination within NATO of how it can align with human security goals and approaches, 
such that “operational effectiveness” could more meaningfully serve gender equality and 
the WPS Agenda.  
The British Armed Forces have more frankly understood a focus on CRSV as a challenge to 
“business as usual”. Those championing training and resources on WPS have faced 
incomprehension and resistance: simultaneously a narrative that “this is not what the 
Armed Forces are for” and an assertion that it is already being done. The institutionalisation 
of GENADs and gender training remains piecemeal. The difficulties in moving forward with 
WPS have led to a repackaging of the agenda in 2019 as “human security”. There are 
worrying signals that there is little resourcing through which to implement this new 
perspective on the role of the British military. Nonetheless, as with NATO, this new 







Other literature on NATO has recognised some of these challenges; I believe this is the first 
piece of substantial research on the British Armed Forces’ engagement with WPS.919 
However, this project’s analysis, in Chapter 8, of how international law obligations are 
manifested in military policy, doctrine and training, and how they are articulated by 
insiders, contributes an original and significantly different perspective. It illustrates how in 
both NATO and the British Armed Forces, CRSV is framed through WPS, as a policy/political 
rather than IHL/IHRL issue; consideration of military obligations in respect of human rights 
and IHL is minimal. While there is an acknowledgement of the potential applicability of IHRL 
standards, NATO and the British Armed Forces fail to engage with what contemporary 
understandings of IHRL might demand concerning CRSV. In both, the legal indeterminacy of 
the concepts of SEA and GBV mediate against CRSV obligations being framed in 
international law terms. Importantly, in both NATO and the British Armed Forces, 
operational orders and rules of engagement are not yet aligned to the political 
commitments made for forces to proactively protect civilians. 
A golden thread through feminist legal scholarship is to scrutinise how gender discourse 
shapes understanding and application of the law. This thesis demonstrates that feminist 
critical military scholarship can offer much in understanding how military institutional 
culture mediates the application of the law. Applying Duncanson’s theorisation of 
overcoming or displacing gendered binaries to achieve regendering and shifts in 
institutional culture,920 Chapter 9 traced NATO and British Armed Forces’ 
conceptualisations of the perpetrators and victims of CRSV, of women, and of the nature of 
CRSV. A picture emerges wherein women begin to be recognised as influential in their 
communities, men and boys as vulnerable to CRSV, and CRSV as part of a continuum of 
violence, but without translating this to strategies for engagement or protection. The issue 
of CRSV creates space on interpersonal levels and (in NATO) in policy to acknowledge 
 
919 Although commentary has been made by a trio of female officers (Knell, Grimes, and McCourt, 
‘Locating the ‘G’ spot’), and there are a number of Masters theses by military personnel touching on 
WPS. 






aspects of sexism within armed forces, but resistance to doing so runs deep, and there 
remains a disturbing tolerance of SEA.  
Burrowing beneath the surface of NATO and the British Armed Forces’ policy reveals the 
difficulties of fitting response to CRSV within military-strategic culture. My interviews 
surfaced the perceived political unwillingness to lose lives to protect civilians; perceived 
risks attendant on reporting CRSV, in particular to achieving higher-level mission objectives; 
and persistently, the belief that preventing and responding to CRSV is not what militaries 
are for. In the British context, it was clear that the latter is a site of contestation and 
debate: some see the Armed Forces’ raison d’être as combat, others advocate for 
embracing a human security approach, including as regards CRSV. In NATO actively 
protecting civilians – of which CRSV is a dimension –  is a new topic of discussion, and still 
perceived as predominately a UN approach. The possibilities for transforming armed forces 
such that preventing and responding to CRSV becomes a serious priority thus remain 
contingent upon inter alia competing narratives around whether forces should focus on 
combat or human security capabilities. 
12.3 CRSV and the law through a military lens 
As highlighted in the Introduction, feminist critical work on IHL has focused primarily upon 
IHL texts and jurisprudence. This research answers the call to engage more closely with 
militaries to understand how IHL is internalised and implemented. It makes an original 
methodological contribution in comprehensively exploring civilian protection through a 
review of military doctrine - an important although neglected source - as well as other key 
documentary sources, interviews and observation of training. I offer the key theoretical 
contributions of this project to international law scholarship as identifying lacunae in how 
state obligations to prevent and respond to CRSV are articulated and integrated; 
problematising the concept of “reasonable expectation” as a standard for military action; 
and accordingly, bringing into question arguments that applying an IHRL framework to 
international interventions will transform the gendered logics of war. For feminist work, 
this study highlights risks attendant upon emphasizing continua of violence. It calls for 






humanity and genocide – at least when engaging with institutions where there is as yet 
weak recognition of responsibilities to act concerning CRSV. 
Chapter 5 interrogated IHL and IHRL standards relating to situations when CRSV is 
committed by third parties in contexts where an armed force exercises some measure of 
influence over the abuses or personal or spatial jurisdiction. It breaks new ground in 
exploring the nature of a military’s obligations concerning CRSV arising by virtue of Article 1 
of the GCs, peremptory norms, and IHRL due diligence obligations. It concludes that the 
application of a standard of due diligence in armed conflict remains indeterminate: there 
has simply been not enough examination of what might be “reasonably expected” of 
militaries where abuses are committed by third parties. I propose five “minimum 
standards” for militaries as demanded by the co-applicability of IHRL and IHL in armed 
conflict, addressing: expertise and advice, assessment, education and training, doctrine and 
accountability.921 Applying principles articulated in jurisprudence concerning state 
obligations relating to violence against women and sexual violence, I argue that where a 
commitment is made to prevent and respond to CRSV, due diligence to do so requires a 
systematic approach. At a minimum: an overarching strategy relating to CRSV; CRSV risk 
assessment; operational planning for prevention and response to CRSV; protection plans at 
local and general levels; mechanisms to respond to identified threats or risks of CRSV; 
documentation, review and analysis of actions; and mechanisms to consult and refer to 
women’s civil society organisations.922 
These observations illuminate how the indeterminacy of international law norms is 
sustained through neglect and resistance at different levels. Not only are IHRL obligations in 
armed conflict weakly articulated in scholarship as well as in jurisprudence, they remain 
referent to notions of what can be “reasonably expected” of militaries. The notion of 
“reasonableness” defining how due diligence is applied means that obligations are filtered 
through gendered and militarised assumptions regarding the proper role of militaries, and 
the apparent inevitability of CRSV. Gendered power informs any challenge, and failure to 
 
921 See Ch. 5, text to ns 300-301300. 






challenge, the normative status quo. This means that asserting IHRL as the legal framework 
for humanitarian and other forms of international intervention (as do Chinkin and Kaldor) 
will be, in itself, insufficient to achieve a cosmopolitan vision of militaries that proactively 
protect civilians. IHRL at present is not transforming the “ideational structures of military 
forces”.923 Associated processes are needed to reshape militaries’ strategic cultures and to 
build the processes, capabilities and mindsets to prevent the commission of CRSV, to 
sensitively assist and refer victims, to collaborate on a basis of respect with local women’s 
services, to support investigations, and so on. A reshaping of military culture is needed such 
that it is no longer considered unreasonable to prohibit deployed personnel from paying for 
sex. 
For feminist scholarship and advocacy, this research adds a note of caution as regards the 
deconstruction of the “rape as a weapon of war” narrative. Whilst agreeing that it is 
problematically partial, when one looks at the still very recent engagement of militaries in 
the issue of CRSV, as a strategic narrative its work is not yet done. The feminist activism of 
the 1990s around CRSV as an international crime sought to ensure (amongst other things) 
accountability for prevention. This has not been achieved in NATO missions nor the 
operations of the British Armed Forces. Yet, these institutions have moved in recent years 
to adopt the language of a continuum of violence and structural violence. I argue that this 
risks displacing an understanding that CRSV is an international crime and as such implies 
positive obligations under the Rome State and GCs, to the space of mere political agenda - 
worthy of understanding but obliging no clear response. 
12.4 CRSV and militaries through a legal lens  
This project adds an international law dimension to scholarship on gender and militaries. In 
particular, it explores the concept of regendered militaries: a simultaneously radical and 
pragmatic imagining of how hegemonic military masculinity might be transformed. It draws 
parallels between this and theorisation of cosmopolitan militaries and human security 
response forces. All share a vision of militaries working more closely with communities, 
 






more focused on law enforcement tasks and civilian protection, maintaining some capacity 
for combat operations but no longer building their core identity around combat.  
Feminist lawyers have demonstrated that understanding how the law works can help 
understand the interplay of formal and informal gender rules within institutions.924 This 
project provides a further demonstration of this: that asking questions around IHL and IHRL 
enables a depth of analysis that is missed if one asks only about gender, WPS or CRSV. This 
study of NATO and the British Armed Forces suggests that although militaries’ internal 
“rules” around preventing and responding to CRSV have changed since 2005, militaries’ 
understanding of the legal rules in which CRSV is embedded has changed little.925 Militaries 
do not understand IHL or IHRL as requiring them to act to prevent or respond to CRSV by 
others. Militaries understand international law as deferential to what it, the military, 
understands as its needs and objectives. In this manner, international law and military-
strategic culture shape each other. This demonstrates that any feminist transformation of 
militaries will need to engage with militaries’ understanding and integration of 
international law. 
At the same time, there is a risk that feminist advocates of military regendering (and 
likewise of cosmopolitan militaries) uncritically advocate for an expanded role for militaries, 
one which militarises law enforcement still further in (especially) post-conflict contexts. 
This is problematic from the perspective of democratic governance of the security sector, 
as well as from a human rights perspective. This project has illuminated how far militaries 
are from integrating human rights into their practices and mind-set; how far from being 
credibly able to tailor their approaches between the conduct of hostilities and law 
enforcement, applying an IHRL ethos and approach to the latter. There are contexts where 
(I believe) the extremity of violence does require military protection and military 
capabilities to secure space for humanitarian, political and judicial work. But this project 
urges engagement with normative approaches to security sector governance which 
 
924 C. O’Rourke, ‘Feminist Legal Method and the Study of Institutions’ (2014) 10 Politics & Gender 
691–97.  






circumscribe the role of militaries, and to explore more actively alternatives to using 
militaries to protect civilians. 
12.5 Moving beyond rhetoric to better confront CRSV 
This project closes with many questions unanswered. In August 2014, the British Armed 
Forces were to help evacuate Yazidis from Mount Sinjar but called the rescue off after 
“special forces on the ground found their condition was better than expected.”926 Who 
made this assessment and how? What steps were taken to assess CRSV and assist victims? 
This research is able only partially to identify what it is that NATO and the British Armed 
Forces have done to prevent and respond to CRSV since 2005. Collaborative research with 
communities impacted by NATO and British military operations is needed to explore more 
deeply what militaries are doing, the impacts, and what communities would see as useful. It 
would be useful to extend the scope of organisations and forces examined: for example, to 
compare approaches within NATO to the UN, AU and EU, and to compare approaches 
between militaries with strategic frameworks more or less aligned with cosmopolitan 
values. It could be important to understand how feminist foreign policy927 influences state 
militaries’ engagement with WPS.  
The shortcomings in military responses to CRSV imply the need for many things to be done 
better: better doctrine, training and education; new processes for planning, assessment 
and monitoring that are sensitive to CRSV and other gendered security needs; a renewed 
strategic vision aligned with human security; integration of a holistic understanding of IHRL. 
The preceding chapters have mapped out these recommendations. The overarching call 
that this project makes is for engagement: for feminists to bring their radical, 
transformative visions into militarized spaces, and help to ensure that those who are most 
affected by conflict and militarism are heard. This project suggests three strategies by 
 
926 ‘Iraq crisis: US and Britain call off rescue of Yazidis on Mount Sinjar’ (August 2014). 
927 At time of writing, declared by Sweden, Canada, Mexico, France, and pledged by Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, and Spain (R. Vogelstein, J. Bigio, and R. Turkington, ‘The Best Foreign Policy Puts Women 






which to strengthen the potential for militaries to play a more effective role in preventing 
and responding to CRSV, in protecting communities and supporting justice. 
1. Raise the bar in terms of what the law expects of militaries. There needs to be more 
detailed articulation of military obligations with respect to violations of IHL and IHRL 
(including with respect to violence against women) in conflict. This should consider the 
range of potential modes of liability, and range of potential institutional actors 
(including UN, NATO and other multilateral missions). It should develop a more 
complete and coherent articulation of due diligence obligations, including in armed 
conflict. Standards could be developed through the ICRC or UN mechanisms, as well as 
through the ongoing work of the ICJ, the Human Rights Committee, the ECtHR and 
other regional human rights courts. This work needs to include a focus on diverse forms 
of CRSV as a violation of international law, and recognise vulnerability associated with 
intersectional identities, including sexual orientation and gender identity. 
 
2. Raise the bar in terms of what militaries expect of themselves. There needs to be a 
more sophisticated engagement by militaries in their IHRL obligations, including 
standards concerning violence against women. Legal Advisors and Military Police 
should become expert in applying human rights standards in complex contexts. IHRL 
standards should be implemented comprehensively through doctrine, education and 
training, including the induction of recruits, with a view to building a new ethos and 
culture around human rights in militaries. High-level policy and strategy, operational 
orders and directives should be developed with reference to human rights obligations 
and political commitments to human security. Militaries need to systematise 
meaningful and consequential consultation with communities to learn from them how 
they can better protect them and increase their security.  
 
3. Raise feminist and women’s voices in military and security spaces. Feminists 
committed to WPS should seek to influence militaries and military organisations such as 
NATO – such as through supporting feminists within militaries and NATO and engaging 






strategy are shaped, claiming a place in those conversations, not only where the topic is 
women or gender. Feminists should create and demand ways for communities affected 
by militaries’ actions to be listened to, in ways that ensure that the different and 
diverse experiences of women are heard. Discourse around continua of violence should 
be invoked with caution in the context of military obligations, recognising the tensions 
between nuance and clarity. 
From such processes we might expect that militaries’ limited thinking around IHRL 
obligations and the reasonable scope of their action to protect human rights is challenged. 
We might expect this to translate into richer and more demanding legal guidance as to 
obligations to exercise diligence to prevent CRSV and to support justice. We might hope 
that militaries’ understandings of CRSV and how to prevent and respond to it become more 
substantial and better meet communities’ needs. We might hope that this is part of an 
overarching process of transforming militaries and military action toward a primary focus 
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Annex 1: Summary of what armed forces are being asked to do in relation to CRSV 
 
APPLIES TO COMMITMENT 
UN peacekeepers 
 
• be trained in the gender-related provisions of 
international humanitarian and human rights law 
(Resolution 1265 (1999) preamble; Resolution 1325 
(2000) para. 6) 
• employ “all feasible measures” to prevent sexual 
violence against civilians and to address its impact 
(Resolution 1674 (2006) para. 19) 
• consider steps they could take to heighten awareness 
and the responsiveness of their personnel participating 
in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, 
including women and children, and prevent sexual 
violence against women and girls in conflict and post-
conflict situations, including wherever possible the 
deployment of a higher percentage of women 
peacekeepers” Resolution 1820 (2008) para. 8) 
• be trained to prevent, recognize and respond to sexual 
violence and gender-based violence (Resolution 1820 
(2008), para. 6, 8; Resolution 1960 (2010) para. 15; 
Resolution 2467 (2019) para. 24) 
• encourage integration of this competence into the 
performance and operational readiness standards 
against which troops and police are assessed; be trained 
on responding to trafficking in persons in the context of 
armed conflict, gender expertise, SEA prevention and 
assessing sexual violence in conflict, and these be 
integrated into the performance and operational 
readiness standards against which troops are assessed 
(Resolution 2331 (2016) para. 19; Resolution 2467 
(2019), para. 24) 
 
As regards SEA:  
• take preventative action, including robust pre-
deployment and in-theater awareness training, and 
vetting of peacekeeping personnel (Resolution 2106 
(2013) para. 8; Resolution 2272 (2016) para. 10) 
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• ensure full accountability, including through swift and 
thorough investigations and, if appropriate, 
prosecutions, informing the United Nations in a timely 
manner of the status and outcome of investigations 
(Resolution 2106 (2013), para. 10; Resolution 2272 
(2016) para. 11) 
• repatriate units when there is credible evidence of 
widespread or systemic SEA by those units (Resolution 
2106 (2013), para. 8) 
 
 
Armed forces party to 
an armed conflict  
• protect children, in particular girls, from rape and other 
forms of sexual and gender-based violence (Resolution 
1261 (1999) para. 10) 
• put an end to rape and other sexual violence against 
children and take special measures to protect children 
(Resolution 2068 (2012) para. 2) 
• listed parties to prepare concrete timebound action 
plans to halt violations and abuses, including rape and 
other sexual violence against children and undertake 
specific commitments and measures (Resolution 1882 
(2009) para. 5) 
• take special measures to protect women and girls from 
gender-based violence, particularly rape and other 
forms of sexual abuse (Resolution 1325 (2000) para. 10)  
• train troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of 
sexual violence against civilians (Resolution 1820 (2008) 
para. 3; Resolution 1888 (2009) para. 7) and to 
« debunk[…] myths that fuel sexual violence » 
(Resolution 1820 (2008) para. 3) 
• vet armed and security forces to take into account past 
actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence” 
(Resolution 1820 (2008) para. 3; Resolution 1888 (2009), 
para. 7) 
• where reports of sexual violence by one’s own forces are 
received, ensure thorough and timely investigation and 
accountability Resolution 1888 (2009), para. 7; 
Resolution 1960 (2010), para. 5), enforce appropriate 
military disciplinary measures and uphold the principle 
of command responsibility (Resolution 1820 (2008) para. 
3; Resolution 1888 (2009), para. 3) 
• make and implement specific and time-bound 
commitments to combat sexual violence, which should 
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include, inter alia: issuance of clear orders through 
chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and 
accountability for breaching these orders, the 
prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, 
military field manuals, or equivalent (Resolution 2106 
(2010), para. 5, 10; Resolution 2467 (2019) para. 1) 
• encourages designation of high-level … military … focal 
points … who will be responsible for the implementation 
of [time-bound commitments and implementation plans 
by all parties to conflict to prevent and address all acts 
and forms of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict 
situations] (Resolution 2467 (2019) para. 2) 
Member states • all non-United Nations forces authorised under a 
Security Council mandate to take adequate measures to 
prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation 
and abuse by their personnel, and appropriate steps to 
investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, 
hold perpetrators accountable and repatriate units 
when there is credible evidence of widespread or 
systemic sexual exploitation or abuse by those units 
(Resolution 2272 (2016) para. 7, 8) 
• take concrete steps aimed at preventing and combating 
impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse by members 
of United Nations peace operations (Resolution 2272 
(2016) para. 9) 
• support countries to address sexual violence in conflict 
and post-conflict situations … including to enhance the 
capacity of military structures to address and prevent 
sexual violence related crimes (Resolution 2467 (2019) 
para. 26) 
155 states that 
endorsed "A 
Declaration of 
Commitment to End 
Sexual Violence in 
Conflict" 2013 
 
• Ensure military doctrine and training is aligned with 
international law so as to enable more effective 






Annex 2 NATO materials reviewed and fieldwork conducted 
1. Political guidance, policy  
Year of Issue, Document Title 
(2004) NATO Policy on combating trafficking in human beings 
(2004) Guidelines for NATO staff on preventing the promotion and facilitation of trafficking 
in human beings 
(2004) Guidelines on combating trafficking in human beings for military forces and civilian 
personnel deployed in NATO-led operations 
(2005) Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF) Handbook 
(2006) Riga Summit Declaration 
(2007 December) EAPC Framework Document on implementing UNSCR 1325 on WPS 
(2008) Bucharest Summit Declaration 
(2009) Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration 
(2010 Nov) Active Engagement, Modern Defence - Strategic Concept for the Defence and 
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(2010 November) Lisbon Summit Declaration 
(2011 June) Revised EAPC Policy for implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and 
Security, and related Resolutions 
(2012) Chicago Summit Declaration  
(2014 April) Revised EAPC Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security and related Resolutions 
(2014) Revised EAPC Action Plan for the implementation of the NATO EAPC policy 
(2014) Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales 
(2016 July) Warsaw Summit Communiqué 
(2016 July) NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians 
(2016) NATO EAPC Action Plan on implementing UNSCR 1325 
(2018 July) Brussels Summit Declaration 
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(2018-2020) Revised EAPC Policy for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security and related Resolutions 
(2018-2020) Revised EAPC Action Plan for the implementation of the NATO EAPC policy on 
WPS 
(2020 January) Gender Education and Training Package for Nations NATO Policy on 
Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
 
2. Reports 
Year of issue, document title 
(2005) CWINF meeting record 
(2009) Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 - Practices and Lessons from 
Afghanistan 
(2009) Policy Recommendations: Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 - 
Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan 
(2010 November) Comprehensive report on the NATO-EAPC policy on the implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions 
(2011 Aug) Gender Integration, An Afghan Priority 
(2011 November) NATO Secretary General’s report on implementing UNSCR 1325 on 
women, peace and security, and related resolutions 
(2013) NATO Secretary General’s second annual public report on implementing UNSCR 
1325 
(2013 May) Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of NATO-
led Operations and Missions 
(2013 May) Report of the 2013 NCGP Open Conference 
(2014 Jan) NATO Secretary General’s third annual public report on implementing UNSCR 
1325 on women, peace and security, and related resolutions 
(2014 September) Progress report on the implementation of the NATO~EAPC Policy and 
Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security - Report to the Heads of State and Government 
(2014 November) Report Expert Meeting on Training Military to Combat Conflict-related 
Sexual Violence 
(2016) 2015 Secretary General Annual Report 
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(2016 July) Factsheet on NATO policy on protection of civilians 
(2016) Workshop on military guidelines food for thought 
(2016) Workshop on military guidelines outcomes 
(2016-2018) The NATO EAPC WPS Agenda Policy, Action Plan and Strategic Report 
(2017) 2016 Secretary General Annual Report 
(2017) Fact Sheet - Protection of Civilians 
(2017 December) #BeBoldforChange 
(2018) NATO Annual Report 2017 
(2018) Fact Sheet – Inclusive Security Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
 
3. Doctrine and standards 
High level NATO doctrine 
Most relevant doctrine 
Year of issue, document number, document title 
(2001) AJP 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations  
(2009) AJP-3.2.3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police  
(2011) AJP 3.4.4 COIN  
(2013 Feb) AJP 3.4.9 EdA v1 CIMIC 
Year of issue, document number, document title 
(2002) AJP-3 Allied Joint Operations 
(2007 March) AJP-01 Edition C Allied Joint Operations  
(2010) AJP-01 Edition D Allied Joint Doctrine  
(2011 March) AJP-3 Edition B Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 
(2013 June) AJP-5 Operational Level-Planning (with UK elements) 
(2016 March) AJP 3.2 Land Operations 
(2017 Feb) AJP-01 Edition E V1 E Allied Joint Doctrine 
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(2014 December) AJP 3.4.1 Military contribution to peace support 
(2015 April) AMedP-8.9 EDA V1 E Minimum requirements medical care women 
(2015 May) AJP 4.10 Medical Support (with UK elements) 
(2015 Oct) AJP 3.4.3 Military contribution to humanitarian assistance 
(2015 December) AJP 3.4.5 Military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction 
(2016 May) AJP 3.16 Security Force Assistance 
(2016 July) AJP 3.4.4 Ed 2 COIN 
(2016 August) AJP 3.22 Stability Policing 
(2018 November) AJP 3-19 Civil Military Cooperation 
 
4. Military directives, guidelines, procedures 
Year of issue, document title 
(2003) MC 362 Rules of Engagement 
(2005) CWINF Handbook 
(2005) CWINF Meeting record 
(2007) CWINF Guidance for NATO gender mainstreaming 
(2008) CWINF gender balance best practices 
(2009) NCGP Terms of Reference 
(2009) Bi-SC 40-1  
(2009) NCGP Recommendations on implementation of UNSCR 1325 
(2010) NATO Legal Deskbook 
(2011 May) Presentation on ISAF Operations Plan Annex X on Gender 
(2011) How can gender make a difference to security 
(2011) Indicators 
(2012) Bi-SC 40-1 REV 1  
(2013 May) NCGP conference syndicate 1 presentation 
(2013 May) NCGP conference syndicate 2 presentation 
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(2013 May) NCGP conference syndicate 3 presentation 
(2013 May) NCGP conference syndicate findings 
(2014) NCGP Terms of Reference 
(2015) Excerpt from Annex WW to the SACEUR OPLAN 10312 for Resolute Support in 
Afghanistan 
(2015 June) Military Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to Conflict-Related 
SGBV 
(2015 July) NATO ACO Gender Functional Planning Guide 
(2016) Joint Force Command Brunssum GENAD Action Plan 2016-17 
(2016) Joint Headquarters SOP106 Gender Advisor’s Functions in JFC & JTF Headquarters 
(2017 October) Bi-SC 40-01 REV 2 
 
5. Education and training standards and materials  
Year of issue, document title 
(2010) NCGP template for pre-deployment gender training 
(2013 March) STANAG 2449 Training in LOAC 2nd ed 
(2013 March) ATrainP-2, Edition A – Training in the Law of Armed Conflict 
(2015 February) Guidance note Integrating Gender in Military Exercises 
(2015) Sample soldiers’ card 
(2015) Whose security? booklet 
(2015 May) STANAG 2597 ED 1 Training in Rules of Engagement 
(2015 May) ATrainP-4 EDA V1 E Training in Rules of Engagement 
(2015) NATO ACT Gender Education & Training Package for Nations (9 lesson plans, 9 
lectures, scenarios on CRSV) 
(2016 November) ATrainP-1 EDC V1 E Training and education for peace support operations 
(2017) ATP-99 EDA V1 E Urban tactics 
(undated) NCGM Case studies on conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence  




 Function Date of interview 
1 GENAD 24 June 2016 
2 GENAD 4 October 2017 
3 GENAD 26 April 2018 
4 Independent advisor 25 May 2018 
5 GENAD 29 May 2018 
6 Advisor 30 May 2018 
7 Legal Advisor 30 May 2018 
 
7. Observation of training, workshops and public events 
 Date Place Participants/Event 
1 25-28 January 
2016 
Worthy Down Barracks, 
Hampshire 
[Participant] Observation of 
NATO trainers, as part of British 
Defence Gender Training of 
Trainers course 
2 28 April 2016 NATO Allied Rapid Reaction 
Corps, Imjin Barracks, 
Gloucestershire 
Day-long seminar on sexual and 
gender-based violence 
3 31 May 2016 NATO Headquarters Open session of the Annual 
Conference of the NATO 
Committee on Gender 
Perspectives 
4 6 December 2017 Norwegian Defence University 
College, Oslo 
NATO session during seminar on 
“Conflict related sexual violence 
and military leadership in UN and 
NATO operations” 
5 29 May 2018 NATO Headquarters Open session of the Annual 
Conference of the NATO 




6 4 June 2019 NATO Headquarters Open session of the Annual 
Conference of the NATO 






Annex 3 British materials reviewed and fieldwork conducted 
1. Political guidance, policy  
Cross-Government policy 
Year of issue, document title 
(2006) 1325 Low Level NAP 
(2006 March) 1325 High Level NAP 
(2008) National Security Strategy 
(2009) National Security Strategy Update 
(2010 March) UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
(2010 October) Second 1325 NAP 
(2010) National Security Strategy 
(2012 February) Revised Second 1325 NAP 
(2012 May) Foreign Secretary launches new Government initiative to prevent sexual 
violence in conflict (statement) 
(April 2013) G8 Declaration on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
(September 2013) Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence 
(June 2014) Third 1325 NAP 
(2014 June) Chair's Summary - Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict 
(2014 June) Global Summit to End Sexual Violence Statement of Action 
(2014 June) International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Conflict 
(December 2014) 1325 NAP Country Level Implementation Plan 
(2015) National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(2016 September) UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial London Communiqué 
(2017) UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy 





Year of issue, document title 
(2004) JSP 383 Joint service manual of the law of armed conflict 
(2010) Amendment 3 to JSP 383 
(2010) JSP381 Aide memoire on the law of armed conflict 
(2013 May) Amendment 7 to JSP 383 
(2013) International Defence Engagement Strategy 
(2015) MoD International Defence Engagement Strategy 
(2019 January) JSP 1325 Human Security in Military Operations Part 1 
(2019 January) JSP 1325 Human Security in Military Operations Part 2 
 
2. Reports 
Parliamentary and Government reports on key policies 
Year of issue, document title 
(2007) Report on implementation of the 1325 NAP 
(2011) National Security Strategy First Annual Report 
(2011) Protection of Civilians Strategy Annual Report 
(2011) 1325 NAP Annual Review 
(2012 December) Protection of Civilians Strategy Annual Report 
(October 2013) 1325 NAP Annual Review 
(2015 August) NAP Baseline Evaluation Report 
(2015 December) WPS NAP report to Parliament 
(2016 April) NAP Midline Evaluation Report 
(2016 April) House of Lords Select Committee Report on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
(2016 June) Government Response to the House of Lords Select Committee Report on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict 
(2016 September) Report on Defence Ministerial Meeting on UN Peacekeeping 
(2016 December) WPS NAP Report to Parliament 
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(2016 December) National Security Strategy Annual Report 
(2017) 1325 NAP Endline Report 
(2017) WPS NAP Report to Parliament 
(2018) WPS NAP Report to Parliament 
(2020) The UK's Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative: Joint Review 
(2020) HMG Response to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact recommendations 
on the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative 
 
Annual reports to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives 
Year of issue, document title 
(2008) CWINF UK National Report 
(2009) CWINF UK National Report 
(2010) NCGP UK National Report 
(2011) NCGP UK National Report 
(2012) NCGP UK National Report 
(2013) NCGP UK National Report 
(2014) NCGP UK National Report 
(2015) NCGP UK National Report from Summary 
(2016) NCGP UK National Report from Summary 
(2017) NCGP UK National Report from Summary 
3. Doctrine 
NATO doctrine with notable British additions 
Doctrine publications common to NATO and identified as highly relevant for 
Britain are listed in Section 3 of Annex 2. Those listed again below have 
notable British additions. 
Year of issue, document number, document title 
(2013 June) AJP-5 Operational Level-Planning (with UK elements) 




UK-specific high-level doctrine 
Year of issue, document number, document title 
(2008) JDP 01 2nd ed Campaigning  
(2010 November) ADP Operations  
(2011 November) Fourth British Defence Doctrine  
(2014 November) JDP 0-01 5th British Defence Doctrine 
(2014 November) JDP 01 UK Joint Operations Doctrine 
(2017 March) ADP Land Operations 
(2017 June) JDP 0-20 UK Land Power 
 
UK-specific most relevant doctrine 
Year of issue, document number, document title 
(2004) JWP 3-50 The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (2nd Edition) 
(2006) CIMIC  
(2009 November) JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution  
(2010 November) JDN 6-10 Security transitions  
(2010) JDP 3-46 Legal Support to Joint Operations (2nd Edition)  
(2011 July) JDN 5-11 Peacekeeping  
(2011) DN 11-08 Female engagement in Afghanistan 
(2011 October) JDP 1-10 2nd Captured persons  
(2013) Developing Joint Doctrine Handbook (Fourth edition) 
(2014 June) JDN 3.14 Military Medical Contribution to Security and Stabilisation 
(2015 January) JDP 1-10 3rd Captured persons 
(2016 March) JDP 05 Shaping a Stable World: The Military Contribution 






4. Military directives, guidelines, procedures 
Year of issue, document number, document title 
(2008) Values and Standards of the British Army 
(2016 July) MoD WPS Training Needs Analysis 
(2017) Army Field Manual Tactics for Stability Operations 
 
5. Interviews  
 Function Date of interview 
1 Military trainer 1 November 2016 
2 Military trainer 2 November 2016 
3 Military trainer 2 November 2016 
4 Military trainer 2 November 2016 
5 9 pre-deployment trainees, junior ranks 
(private to colour sergeant) (focus group) 
2 November 2016 
6 Civilian advisor 5 June 2017, 26 October 2017 & 30 
April 2018 
7 Doctrine writer 26 June 2017 
8 Military trainer 27 June 2017 
9 Royal Military Police Officer 28 June 2017 
10 Royal Military Police Officer 11 June 2018 
11 Staff member of military college 12 June 2018 
12 Doctrine writer (legal) 12 June 2018 
13 Doctrine writer  12 June 2018 
14 GENAD 26 June 2018 
(2018 June) JDP 3-46 Legal Support to Joint Operations (3rd Edition) 
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15 Staff member of military college 2 August 2018 
16 Army Legal Advisor 7 August 2018 
17 GENAD 3 September 2018 
18 GENAD 28 November 2018 
 
6. Observation of training and workshops 




Worthy Down Barracks, 
Hampshire 
[Participant] Observation of Defence 
Gender Training of Trainers course, 36 





Napier Barracks, Folkestone, 
Kent 
Observation of 45 minute pre-
deployment training briefing on 
“Gender and sexual violence and 
exploitation,” approximately 95 
participants 
3 22 May 
2017 
Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters, London 
[Participant] Observation of Women, 
Peace and Security Agenda in the British 
Armed Forces, Knowledge Exchange 






Officers' Study Centre, 
Edinburgh Garrison 
 
[Participant] Observation of Officer 






Annex 4 Sample schedule for interviews (June 2018) 
INTRODUCTION 
• introduce research 
• get informed consent: 
o To be interviewed 
o For me to use the interview in my research, including potentially as basis for 
publications 
• confirm anonymity unless explicit consent to be identified 
• explain data storage, retention etc. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSES TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
• What task were you given as regards developing responses to sexual violence? When 
and by whom? 
• Why? (E.g. have understandings of IHL/IHRL obligations shifted, or more politically led 
agenda?) 
• To what extent were sexual violence in conflict issues (ie not by or against UK personnel) 
already included in your work – what were the gaps? 
• What was the process by which you developed your responses – e. g. Who (else) was 
involved, and what materials and/or training did you draw from? 
o Legal advisors? 
o Cultural advisors? 
o Gender advisors? 
o Civilian officials e.g. FCO, SU 
o others outside the military (e.g. academics, NGOs)? 
 
WHAT? 
What is anticipated approach - e.g. when would you and what would you do - re: 
- proactive monitoring and reporting  
- referring allegations to host nation security services 
- investigating allegations. taking or security evidence. Arrests. protection of victims / 
witnesses? 
- Tactical deterrence 
- Intervention to halt  
 
• Can you provide any examples from recent or current operations? 
 
• How do you deal with IHL and IHRL obligations? 
o Are there any points of dispute or ambiguity, in your opinion? 
o Does uncertainty as to applicable legal frameworks matter for the effectiveness 




• How are armed forces to make operational judgments between other operational 
objectives and protection of civilians from sexual violence? 
• In your opinion, is sexual violence response primarily directed by law or politics, and 
why? 
 
• In your own opinion, what are the main challenges in the field to effective military 
response to sexual violence? E.g. 
o Mandate 
o Resources, skills, systems 




• In your opinion, how have views on what UK military needs to do / not do re sexual 
violence in conflict changed over the last 10 years (since around 2008, when UN’s strong 
focus on it began), e.g. in  
o changing attitudes within armed forces as to their role, purpose? 
o a change in the nature of UK operations? in armed forces? 
o thinking about a relationship between responses to sexual violence by 
others, and sexual harassment, abuse etc. by UK personnel? 
• Do armed forces’ new responses to sexual violence reinforce their existing internal 
gender regime; or evidence “re-gendering”? 
 
GENDER CULTURE 
• How would you describe the institutional culture within UK military re gender? e.g. 
Equality of participation and opportunity between men and women, how men and 
women contributions are seen? 
 
BACKGROUND & ROLE 
• background working with UK military or in related roles– e.g. length of service, where, 
types of roles and responsibilities 
• own professional background re sexual violence, IHL 
 
CONCLUSION 
• Further people I should be in contact with? 
• Could you share any of your guidelines or training material? 
check: 
• Ask if I can get back to them with follow up questions 




Military responses to sexual violence in armed conflict 
The research 
Sexual violence in armed conflict is high on the international political agenda, the subject of 
a series of UN Security Council resolutions and a British-led global campaign. Attention has 
been focused on what more armed forces can do -- to prevent sexual violence, to protect 
civilians from sexual violence and to assist survivors. 
This research seeks to understand how militaries are developing responses to sexual 
violence in conflict, looking at doctrinal, training and operational developments. The 
research will focus on developments within NATO missions and the British Armed Forces. It 
is my doctoral project, based in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh.  
The research aims both to contribute to academic knowledge, and to strengthen 
policymaking by governments and others tasked with developing responses to sexual 
violence in conflict, including through defence, foreign affairs and peacekeeping strategy. 
Your participation 
The research includes interviews with military and other personnel responsible for 
developing doctrine, education and training to respond to sexual violence in armed conflict, 
and observation of military training relevant to the topic. 
Participation is voluntary: you can opt out of participating or withdraw at any time simply 
by telling me. If you do so, nothing you do or say will be recorded as part of the research. 
Your participation is anonymous: you will not be identified by name or position in the 
research unless you explicitly agree to be. For example, the research might say “a trainer in 
the British military said …” Moreover, it is not anticipated to publish the results of the 
research until approximately 2019 (when the PhD is finished!) Records of interviews and 
observations will be kept confidential and held securely. 
Please feel free to ask me any questions about the research, and indeed to offer 
suggestions and advice. 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
Megan Bastick 
School of Law 
University of Edinburgh 
Contact information 
m.bastick@ed.ac.uk  
Ph: 07906 638 538 
